British Tanks in 1943

 "Report on use of foreign MK-2 [Matilda] and MK-3 [Valentine] tanks in combat

1. General characteristics

Since the brigade was created on March 25th, 1942, it was armed with MK-2 and MK-3 tanks. The latter showed themselves well in battle as infantry support tanks in all sorts of battles. There were also cases of using them to combat enemy tanks (Pz.Kpfw.III, Pz.Kpfw.IV) at close ranges (200-600 meters), especially from ambush in defensive fighting.

The off-road mobility and maneuverability of the MK-2 and MK-3 tanks is insufficient compared to the T-34 in all types and periods of battle. The MK-2 tank in particular is not very mobile even on even terrain. In cases where it needs to turn 360 degrees, its turning radius is 15 meters. The tracks often fall off on sharp turns. The limit of the slopes it can climb or descend in winter, rainy, or damp weather is 15-18 degrees. 

The dimensions of the MK-3 tank allow it to get up close to the enemy using terrain features as cover and take them by surprise. In winter, the depth of the snow conceals it from enemy fire. MK-2 and MK-3 tanks have a clearance of 420 mm with a ground pressure of 0.60 [kg/cm²] when the tracks are submerged by 100 mm. In the winter, they can drive through 50-60 cm deep snow, which allows them to drive on country roads and off-road. If anti-tank obstacles need to be crossed, they can cross a 0.75 m tall wall, ford a one meter deep stream, cross an anti-tank trench [figure missing] wide. In the winter they can handle 18 degree slopes, in the summer and in dry weather they can handle 30 degree slopes.

Firefighters of the Fiery Salient

Supplies of M4A2 tanks to the USSR began in late 1942. Unfortunately due to technical defects (chiefly to do with injectors) they did not see service right away. Only a few units received these tanks in the spring of 1943, but one of them ended up fighting in the most famous tank battle of the Great Patriotic War.

Firefighters of the fiery salient

The 229th Independent Tank Regiment was one of the first Soviet tank units to receive the new American medium tanks. 31 tanks of this type were issued to the unit on April 10th, 1943, and by the start of July the regiment had 38 functional Medium Tanks M4A2. The regiment was assigned to the 48th Army at the time. As of July 1st it was located in reserve in the village of Perehozheye. The regiment was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Merkulov with Major Bogatyrev serving as the Chief of Staff.

A very early M4A2 tank in Soviet service. This vehicle still has the return roller in the middle of the bogey, M34 gun mount with a narrow external mantlet, and direct vision ports

The regiment was moved to the vicinity of Kazakovka by July 5th, 1943. At the start of the Battle of Kursk the regiment had 1.2 loads of fuel per tank, three refills of ammunition, and 4 days worth of rations on hand. The Shermans got lucky, as the German spearhead struck west of them.

Heavy Trophies from Leningrad

There are plenty of armoured vehicles that had an impact on tank building worldwide. This list includes German vehicles, especially the Tiger tank. At the moment of its appearance, it was the best protected and most heavily armed tank in its weight class. Even though the effectiveness of Tiger crews is often exaggerated, this was indeed a very dangerous enemy, especially from 1943 to the spring of 1944. Tanks all over the world evolved to deal with Tigers.

Tiger 121 before winter camouflage was applied.

At about 9:30 am on January 18th, 1943, the Volkhov and Leningrad Fronts met at the eastern outskirts of Worker's Village #1. This was the first penetration of the Leningrad blockade. Another important event took place on the same day: Tiger tanks were captured in the vicinity of Worker's Village #5. Two samples were delivered to the NIBT Proving Grounds in Kubinka. Their study showed that the Soviet tank program requires some urgent changes. Today, we will discuss how the German tanks were captured and what were the first impressions regarding these tanks.

Goliath Demolition Vehicle

 "Artillery HQ, 49th Army
August 12th, 1943
#128/op

To Chiefs of Staff and Commanders of Artillery Regiments

In order to combat our tanks, dugouts, and pillboxes on the Central and Volkhov Fronts, the enemy is using torpedo tankettes and suffocating yellow-green smoke that is created by means of burning a special powder.

I attach characteristics of these types of German weapons.

Brief characteristics of the torpedo tankette and means of combat against it:

Thicker Roof

"May 8th, 1943
Conclusions of the 16th Department of the GAU Artillery Committee

1. General part:

On April 27th, 1943, the Artillery Committee received a proposal from the Uralmash factory to transition from producing the roof of the 122 mm SU-122 SPG out of 20 mm thick high hardness armour to 30 mm thick medium hardness armour.

The Uralmash factory motivates this proposal with the fact that due to many cutouts and welds of various components the roof is overloaded and cracks appear, which have to be covered with 20 mm thick applique armour.

T-34 Commander's Cupolas

 "Order of the People's Commissar of Tank Production of the USSR #338
Moscow
June 9th, 1943

On installation of commander's cupolas in T-34 tanks

In carrying out State Committee of Defense decree #3531ss, I order to:

1. Approve a commander's cupola with the following specifications for installation on T-34 tanks:
1. The commander's cupola is installed in the existing two-hatch turret instead of the commander's hatch.
2. The commander's cupola has five vision slits covered in triplex bulletproof glass and a MK-4 periscope (English type) in the rotating lid of the cupola that allow for 360 degree observation.
3. The lid of the cupola consists of two separate halves and must allow the crew to enter and exit the tank turret.

Training Time

 "Order of the People's Commissar of Defense #0436
October 23rd, 1943
Moscow

Contents: on moving training tank units to a 6 month study period.

In order to raise the quality of crews trained in training tank and SPG regiments, I order to:

Establish a 6 month training period for personnel of all Red Army training tank units as of November 1st, 1943.

People's Commissar of Defense,
Marshal of the Soviet Union, I. Stalin"

Via Valeriy Lisyutin

KV-1S Planetary Turning Mechanism

 "January 7th, 1943

In October and November of 1942 factory #100 developed and built a planetary turning mechanism designed by Engineer Lieutenant-Colonel A.I. Blagonravov. The report on the trials performed in the KV-1S tank is attached, we ask you to review it.

Armoured Confusion: Mid-war

The history of Soviet wartime armoured vehicles bore several misconceptions. There are many reasons for this. A number of myths came from a lack of information. Sometimes historians' own guesses that had little to do with reality were interpreted as fact. Unfortunately, the authors of some myths are still considered experts to this day and these exercises in fiction are still cited as fact. Initially the author planned on two articles dedicated to misconceptions about the Great Patriotic War, but there were too many misconceptions for 1942-1943, and so the second article won't be the last.

SU-152 Regiments

 "State Committee of Defense Decree #2889ss
February 14th, 1943
Moscow, Kremlin

Topic: on the formation of heavy SPG regiments within the Reserve of the Supreme Command

The State Committee of Defense decrees that:

1. 16 heavy SPG regiments are to be formed according to TO&E #08/175 including 310 personnel and 12 152 mm self propelled ML-20 gun-howitzers each.
   The formation of regiments is assigned to the Commander of Artillery of the Red Army, Marshal of Artillery comrade Voronov, and the Military Council of Armoured and Mechanized Forces of the Red Army (Colonel General of the Tank Forces comrade Fedorenko and Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces comrade Biryukov). The following deadlines are set:
1. By February 28th, 1943: 1 regiment
2. By March 25th, 1943: 5 regiments
3. By April 25th, 1943: 5 regiments
4. By May 25th, 1943: 5 regiments

Teletank Revival

 "To the Chief of the Tank Directorate, Engineer-Colonel Afonin

RE: development and production of teletanks (your letter #1148978)

October 2nd, 1943

Modern telemechanical devices for tanks consist of a whole complex of separate devices and components. Their production is effort intensive, requiring qualified personnel and highly precise equipment.

Production and tuning of telemechanical components can largely be done only by hand.

It is senseless to revive equipment for teletanks based on existing NII-200 designs and development of new simpler types of equipment would take a long time (5-6 months). Transition into mass production would take an equal amount of time.

SU-85 Production

"Order of the People's Commissar of Tank Production of the USSR #477ss

Moscow

August 9th, 1943

On the organization of 85 mm SPGs on the T-34 chassis at the Uralmash factory

To carry out State Committee of Defense order #3892ss issued on August 8th, 1943, I order that:

1. Uralmash factory director comrade Muzrukov must prepare for production of SU-85 SPGs designed at the Uralmash factory on the T-34 tank chassis and armed with the factory #9 D-5 gun.
2. The following quota for SU-85 SPGs at the Uralmash factory is established:
1. August: 100 units. Production begins on August 25th according to the daily table approved by me on August 8th.
2. September: 150 units.

Bombs vs Tanks

The eternal question of aircraft vs tanks came up during the recent stream with Valeriy Zamulin about the Battle of Kursk.

"I saw an analysis I think in August-September of 1943 of using HE bombs on enemy concentrations of armoured vehicles. They specified in brackets: tanks, APCs, accompanying wheeled vehicles. It clearly said that the effectiveness of HE bombs against enemy armoured groups was rather low. Causes:

1. The armoured groups are highly mobile. Consider this: you order the strike against tanks, point it out, the order goes through several HQs (army, front, airstrip) and by the time the airplanes  gather and arrive there is no one there. 
2. The Germans used concealment well, like smokescreens. It was also rare for significant armoured forces to be concentrated on a narrow section of the front. If the Germans came up with an armoured group it would immediately scatter and when bombed (according to our statistics) about 5% were hit. "

American Steel

The USSR received a lot of American armour, both as a part of finished tanks and armour plates. Soviet representatives had some access to the American steel industry as a result, and specialists toured the American Car & Foundry Company in April of 1943 where they picked up some information on American steel manufacturing.

"This factory is the largest supplier of cemented armour in the USA. It began to supply cemented armour about 3 years ago and in these 3 years it improved and developed its process.

Armour up to 2 inches in thickness is cemented.

Today the factory makes about 5000 tons of armour per month, about 60% of it is cemented (out of accepted plates). About 18-20% of the production is discarded as byproducts, about 2-3% due to production defects.

There used to be a lot of cracks, but a lot of work was spent on this issue and now cracks are rare. Work was done to make welding more precise, maintaining gap tolerances, training welders (they have schools for this), protection of the places from carbonization by schoop-plating them with copper, changing the design (sharp angles were removed), etc.

This factory (unlike many others) has very strict military QA with well educated workers and managers.

Armour now comes from the Republic Steel Co., Jones and Laughlin, thin armour is now purchased from Armco. Earlier the armour came from Carnegie-Illinois but it is no longer ordered due to low quality (impure and heterogeneous steel)"

CAMD RF F.38 Op.11355 D.1791 L.22

Stars and Stripes

"Identification markings for ground forces, tanks, armoured cars, and armoured vehicles of the Central Front

Radios for All

"Order of the People's Commissar of Tank Production of the USSR #447

Moscow

July 28th, 1943

Presently, only 50% of T-34 tanks are equipped with radio receivers and transmitters. This reduces their combat qualities and makes controlling tanks in battle difficult.

To increase the combat qualities of T-34 tanks,  I order that:

1. Directors of factories #112 (comrade Rubinchik), #174 (comrade Zadorozhniy), and UZTM (comrade Muzrukov) must install 9-R radio receivers and transmitters on all T-34 tanks as of August 20th, 1943.

T-34 Cupolas

"Order of the People's Commissar of Tank Production of the USSR #338ss

Moscow

June 9th, 1943

On the installation of commander's cupolas on T-34 tanks

In carrying out decree #3531ss issued by the State Committee of Defense on June 7th, 1943, I order that:

1. A commander's cupola for the T-34 must be accepted into service with the following technical requirements:
1. The cupola must be installed in an existing two-hatch turret instead of the commander's hatch.
2. The cupola must have five observation slits with triplex glass and a MK-4 observation device (English type) in a rotating roof that provide for comfortable all-round observation from the tank.
3. The roof of the cupola must consist of two flaps that allow the crew to enter and exit the turret.

Mine Roller Trials

"Report on the use of PT-3 mine rollers in combat from July 12th to 16th, 1943

29th Guards Independent Tank Brigade

The use of two mine rollers was planned during the penetration of enemy defenses near the eastern forest clearing 1.5 km east of Dudino to the southeast outskirts of Seraya. As of July 11th the brigade only had one roller.

A roller was towed via tractor to initial positions before the operation.

T-43 Level Up

"Approximate calculations

Increase in mass of the T-43 tank as a result of new tactical-technical requirements

The main changes in the tactical-technical requirements that will result in an increase in mass are:

• Increase in the front armour from 75 to 90 mm
• Increase of the turret ring from 1600 to 1700 mm
• Increase of the front turret armour from 90 to 110 mm
• Decrease of the ground pressure from 0.93 to 0.8 kg/cm²

Main changes in tactical-technical requirements that will result in a decrease in mass are:

• Decrease of the rear armour from 75 to 60 mm
• Decrease of the roof armour from 30 to 20 mm
• Decrease of the rear floor from 30 to 20 mm 

Kursk Experience

"70th Army HQ

August 25th, 1943

#4025569

Active army

To the Chief of Staff of the Central Front

I attach summary #1 of the experience of the combat units and formations of the 70th Army in the offensive and defensive battles in July-August of 1943.

Attachment: the aforementioned on one sheet.

Deputy Chief of Staff of the 70th Army, Colonel Abayev

Summary #1

Experience of the combat units and formations of the 70th Army in the offensive and defensive battles in July-August of 1943.

1. Signals detachments of army units laid telegraph and telephone cable to rifle regiment HQ level. This allowed timely installation of telegraph and telephone cables to connect units, formations, and their neighbours. In the practice preceding combat this was never done.
   The losses in personnel while performing this task were insignificant. The laying of cables proved itself.