Copper Horns

The need for communications equipment in armoured vehicles became clear soon after their creation. Semaphores and signal flags were just a half measure. It was necessary to equip tanks with radios, but the road to equipping even a part of them was a long one. The modern system with a radio in the turret and a whip antenna was also far from the initial norm. There were many alternative visions of how a tank radio antenna should look.

The rail antenna was a characteristic feature of Soviet tanks in the 1930s.

 

Rail antennas became one of the characteristic features of Soviet tanks in the interwar years. "Horns" around the turret became a calling card of this generation of tanks. Few people stop to consider where such a strange antenna came from and how it works, especially since their age was brief. They were no longer used by Soviet industry after 1939, as opposed to the nation that came up with them originally.

Fine Vintage

 "May 23rd, 1945
#0859140

The Armoured and Mechanized Units of the Far East and Transbaikal Front possess 1600 functional old tanks: T-27, T-37/38, T-30/40/60, MK-2, MK-4, M3 light, M3 medium. There are also 1167 of these tanks at repair plants that require refurbishment.

Production of these tanks and spare parts for them is long finished. Spare parts for old imported tanks are not being delivered. 

Obsolete Tanks

 "#0858795
April 10th, 1945

I report that production for the T-27, T-30, T-37, T-38, T-40, and T-60 tanks has ceased. As of April 1st, 1945, there are 566 tanks of these types that require refurbishment but cannot be supplied with parts.

Imported Mk.II [Matilda], Mk.IV [Churchill], M3s [Medium Tank M3], and M3l [Light Tank M3] tanks are in the same state. As of April 1st, 1945, there are 315 tanks of this type that require refurbishment.

All of these vehicles are obsolete, as they have weak armament and insufficient armour. They cannot be used in battle and are only used in training units.

It would take a considerable expense to restore these tanks. Repair units are loaded with repairs of modern tanks, and it is not reasonable to distract them with repairs of obsolete vehicles.

I ask for you permission to use the aforementioned tanks until they require refurbishment, after which they will be written off and disassembled for parts. These parts will be used for light and medium repairs of tanks that are still being used.

Deputy Commander of the Armoured and Mechanized Forced, Colonel General of the Tank Forces, Korobkov."

TsAMO RF F.38 Op.11355 D.290 L.4
Printed in Glavnoye Bronetankovoye Upravleniye Lyudi, Sobytiya, Fakty v dokumentakh, 1944-1945 p.457

Chief Designer of the 1930s

When one lists Soviet tank designers, M.I. Koshkin is usually remembered first as one of the main authors of the T-34. He is usually followed by A.A. Morozov, who succeeded Koshkin as the Chief Designer of factory #183 in Kharkov and in Nizhniy Tagil after the evacuation. Zh.Ya. Kotin, the author of many tanks from the KV-1 to the IS-2, also ranks highly. N.A. Astrov, the creator of the T-40, T-60, T-70, and other light vehicles is slightly less famous. However, if one explores an earlier period of Soviet tank building, one will see many other much less known names. Their obscurity is largely due to their complicated history.

One such history belongs to the main character of today's article, Semyon Aleksandrovich Ginzburg. He oversaw the creation of the most numerous and most successful Soviet tanks of the interbellum era: the T-26, BT, T-28, and T-35. As the Chief Engineer at factory #185 he directed the creation of a number of tanks and SPGs. His designs include the T-50 light tank and SU-12 (SU-76) SPG, which played a fatal role in his career. Let us recall this man, whose contribution to Soviet tank building was truly immense. The war for his tanks began back in 1936 and finished in August of 1945 in the Far East.

From Sky to Earth

The concept of an airborne tank appeared in the early 1930s. The creator of this concept was John Walter Christie, who presented a tank that was supposed to get to the battlefield over the air using a discarding airplane attachment. Thanks to a powerful engine and a linkage to the propeller, the tank would not need an aircraft to tow it. This tank, known as the Convertible Airborne Tank M1932, never took flight, but the idea made its way into several countries. Christie himself quickly understood that a carrier airplane is necessary after all. There were two further developments: a plane that could carry a tank either underneath or inside it, or a specialized glider. Both developments were explored in the USSR and abroad. The Germans and British got the furthest with gliders, and the USSR, Germany, and USA got to practical stages with the aircraft approach. This article will discuss the fate of Soviet airborne tanks.

Fuel Capacity

"Table of one full load of fuel per fighting vehicle."

Vehicle	Capacity in kg	Type of fuel	Notes
T-35	637	BK-70, B-70	Aux. tank 360 L
KV-1 and KV-2	834	RB-70 diesel
T-28	462	BK-70, B-70
BT-7M	619	RB-70 diesel
BT-7	547	BK-70, B-70, RB-70
BT-5	263	ditto
T-34	710/628	BK-70 diesel/B-70
T-26	204	RB-70
T-40	154	RB-70
T-50	255	RB-70
T-60	227	RB-70
T-70	321	RB-70
T-38	90	Automotive gasoline
T-37	90	Automotive gasoline
T-27	35	Automotive gasoline
BA-20 light	75	Automotive gasoline
BA-10 medium	88	Automotive gasoline
BA-11 heavy	115	Automotive gasoline
BA-64	68	Automotive gasoline
MK-3 Valentine	145	Gasoil “3”
MK-2	192	Gasoil “3”
American M3 medium	613	3 cubic cm of RD per 1 kg of B-70
American M3 light	146	2 cubic cm of RD per 1 kg of B-70 or B-74
Universal Carrier	45	B-74 2nd grade
Bren Carrier	68	B-74 2nd grade

Via Valeriy Lisyutin

1942 Lineup

"Wundsdorf Tank School

March 1st, 1942

Which Russian tanks will you encounter in 1942?

A significant amount of obsolete tanks:

1. Ford armoured reconnaissance car
2. T-37 amphibious tank
3. T-26 light tank
4. BT (Christie) light tank
5. T-28 heavy tank
6. T-35A heavy tank

Modern tanks:

1. T-60 light tank
2. T-40 amphibious tank
3. T-34 heavy tank
4. KV-1 heavy tank
5. KV-2 heavy tank

Future of Soviet Tanks

"February 21st, 1938

To People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union, comrade Voroshilov

...

Using existing tanks in the Red Army

1. Existing 862 T-18 tanks should be used as mobile anti-tank guns in fortified regions in the event that modernization results in satisfactory results. Modernization work is currently being performed. If the modernization is unsuccessful, the T-18s should be removed from service and melted down. There are no spare parts for the T-18, and they are not being produced.

Far East Modernizations

"To the Chief of the GBTU TU

RE: #1142232

January 24th, 1944

1. Repair factory #105 developed blueprints and processes to rearm the T-37 and T-38 tanks to use the ShVAK gun. The mass of the tank increases by 100 kg as a result of rearmament. After being rearmed, the prototype was tested by firing on the move and by swimming. Trials show satisfactory results. Repair factory #105 is performing the rearmament. As of January 1st, 97 T-37/38 tanks have been rearmed with the ShVAK gun.

Far East Conversions

"To the Chief of the Tank Directorate of the GBTU, Major-General of the Tank Engineering Service, comrade Afonin

RE: your letter #822338 written on May 23rd, 1944

I report that:

1. As of June 1st, 1944, the Armoured and Motorized Forces of the Far East Front have applied applique armour to 128 BT-7 tanks, 113 of which were converted in 1942-43 and 13 in 1944.
   Since no proper quality armour was available, applique armour is only installed at factories during refurbishing. Armour of written-off tanks was used. Contoured armour for turrets is not available.
2. As of June 1st, 1944, 130 T-37/T-38 tanks have been converted to ShVAK guns. Further work to re-arm T-37 and T-38 tanks ceased due to an absence of ShVAK guns.
3. Repair factories #405 and #77 are converting two-turreted T-26 tanks into single turreted. As of June 1st, 1944, 35 tanks have been converted.
4. The following is necessary to continue work on rearming and adding applique armour:
1. Contoured armour for BT-7 turrets.
2. ShVAK guns.
3. TMFP-1 sights.
4. Equipment to convert two-turreted T-26es to single turreted (turrets, turret platforms, turret rings, etc).
5. Rearmament and installation of applique armour is not being planned due to a lack of aforementioned armament and parts.
   All BT-7s refurbished by the repair factories are being equipped with applique armour.

Acting Assistant to the Chief of the Armoured and Motorized Forces of the Far East Front, Engineer-Major Ryabov

Acting Chief of the UK ORT of the Armoured and Motorized Forces of the Far East Front, Engineer-Major Sviridov"

CAMD RF 38-11355-2548 p. 175

Metamorphoses of an Amphibian Scout

An unusual modification of the T-38 can be seen in the outdoor display of the Central Museum of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. This vehicle is distinct from its brothers: instead of one DT machinegun, its turret houses a 20 mm TNSh autocannon and a coaxial DT machinegun. Some Russian historians spread the myth that this tank was experimental. In reality, not only was this not an experimental tank, but these tanks had the chance to fight. This article will cover modifications of T-37 and T-38 amphibious tanks.

T-37 and T-38 with ShVAK

"To OKB-15 director, comrade Shpitalniy

Kaganovich factory (Khabarovsk) plans to arm 400 T-37 and T-38 tanks with a ShVAK gun and a coaxial DT machinegun.

I ask you to take this project under your supervision and urgently send your representatives to the Kaganovich factory.

Consider that, due to the small amount of space in these vehicles, it might be necessary to replace the autocannon's belt feed with a magazine one.

GBTU TU Chief, Engineer-Colonel, Afonin

GBTU TU 4th Department Chief, Engineer-Lieutenant-Colonel, Nenarokov"

Failed "Laser" Tank

In the first half of the 20th century, the aircraft industry gathered up all technical and scientific achievements. Airplanes were the first to try out new materials, new engines, equipment, and armament. From time to time, tank designers had the chance to use something that was designed for aviators. The attempt to install the ShKAS aircraft machinegun on Soviet tanks in the mid-1930s was one such occurrence.

T-37 Modernization

"Report on the modernization of the T-37 tank

1. After the modernization, the T-37 becomes purely a land tank.
2. The following components are removed:
1. Hull buoys
2. Propeller with transmission
3. Rudder, carrier, and drive
4. One DT machinegun magazine rack (15 slots remain)
5. Gunner's turning seat

T-37 and T-38 Applique Armour

"To the Deputy People's Commissar of Tank Production, comrade Goreglyad
CC: factory #37 director

The question of adding applique armour to T-38 and T-37 tanks during their repair and turning them into land tanks has arisen.

I ask you to instruct factory #37 to develop blueprints for applique armour for the T-38 and T-37 with calculations of change in mass and other parameters.

GABTU BTU Chief, Military Engineer 1st Class, Korobkov
GABTU BTU Military Commissar, Regimental Commissar [illegible]"

Teletank Development

"To Lieutenant-General of the Tank Forces, comrade Fedorenko

Report

I report to you on the current status of armoured telemechanics:

Various organizations (NII-10, NII-20, Red Army NIST) performed work regarding telemechanization of tanks since 1929 under the orders of Red Army US and ABTU. Experimental prototypes of Renault, T-18, T-24, T-37, T-26, T-28, T-20, T-38, and BT-7 teletanks were produced.

By 1935, the issues of automation of the suspension and chemical armament of the tank were resolved, and a commission selected the TOZ-26 T-26 teletank developed by NII-20 as the most suitable teletank out of three experimental T-26 teletanks. This prototype was accepted for mass production. In 1936-37, factory #192 produced 35 groups and another 30 groups in 1938-39, slightly modernized vehicles with the index TOZ-8. In total, 130 special tanks were built, 65 control tanks and 65 teletanks (65 groups).

Militia Armour

Soviet militia units had a pretty colourful arsenal, and this spread to armour as well as small arms. As a result, there wasn't really a way to reach any kind of standardization; the unit would have to beg for scraps at some warehouse or repair base and then retroactively have those vehicles assigned to themselves.

"To the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, comrade Stalin

By the initiative of the divisions and regional committees of the VKP(b) in Moscow, tankette units were formed in infantry divisions of the 32nd Army.

1. 2nd Infantry Division has a tankette company of 13 T-27 tanks.
2. 8th Infantry Division has a tankette company of 16 T-27 tanks and 2 T-37 tanks.
3. 13th Infantry Division has a tankette company of 57 T-27 tanks, 2 T-37 tanks, and one BA-6 armoured car.

I ask, as an exception, to officially assign one tankette battalion of 30 small tanks to each infantry division in the 32nd Army according to TO&E 010/85.

Deputy Chief of GABTU, Major-General Lelyushenko

GABTU Military Commissar, Army Commissar Birykov

September 17th, 1941."

TO&E 010/85 describes an independent tank battalion consisting of three tank companies, one medium and two light, which these obsolete vehicles could not pass as, but at least they were better than nothing.

In GKO decree #686s, Stalin approved this formation.

German Intel: Red Army Tanks

Naturally, before you invade a country, you need to be aware of what their army is like. This is a German intelligence bulletin listing the tanks that were known to be in the Red Army. Black rectangles mark especially vulnerable areas.

"BA Ford" armoured car

This is a BA-10 armoured car. The German document correctly identifies it as being armed with one 45 mm gun and two machineguns, although the hull MG is very much overexaggerated in the drawing. The armour is also listed correctly (6-10 mm). The speed is a little low (50 kph instead of 52). The mass is listed as 5-7 tons, which is also a bit high (actual mass was 5.1 tons). The vehicle is shown to be vulnerable to armour piercing bullets at 250 meters and 20 mm shells at 700 meters.

Amphibious Tank T-37

The T-37 is correctly named, but its armour is overestimated (10 mm instead of 8) and so is the speed (45 kph instead of 40), but the rest seems about right. The vulnerability of the vehicle is the same as the BA-10.

Amphibious tank T-38

The data on the T-38 is largely the same as on the T-37, except it's 100 kg lighter (it was actually heavier, at 3.3 tons). The armour is still listed as 10 mm, even though it's still thinner (9 mm). Vulnerability is, naturally, the same.

Vickers-Armstrong's T-26A tank

This is the two-turreted T-26 mod. 1931 or 1932. The document can't decide, ascribing the tank an armament of one 37 mm gun and two machineguns, whereas in reality tanks with two turrets had either two machineguns or one 37 mm gun and one machinegun. The armour is listed as 14 mm, which is in between the mod. 1931's 13 mm and mod. 1932's 15 mm. The mass (8.55 tons) is more than either of the modifications (8 and 8.4 tons respectively). This tank is listed as invulnerable to armour piercing bullets, but still vulnerable to 20 mm shells at a range of 550 meters.

Vickers-Armstrong's T-26B Tank

This is the most common T-26, T-26 mod. 1933. Armour is too thin (14 mm instead of 15 mm) and mass is a bit high (9.55 tons instead of 9.4). Vulnerability is the same as the above tank.

Vickers-Armstrong's T-26B Flamethrower Tank

This is a KhT-130 chemical tank, the Red Army's most common flamethrower tank on the T-26 chassis. Data is the same as on the "T-26B".

Vickers-Armstrong's T-26C Tank

This is the last model of the T-26, T-26 mod. 1939. The mass is too low again (9.7 tons instead of 10.25), armour is still too thin at 14 mm. The armament is identified correctly. The vulnerability of the tank is the same as above.

BT (Christie tank)

Despite the Germans being aware that there are different kinds of BT tank, they are all rolled into the one BT entry. The mass is listed as 10.5 tons to 12 tons, and is a little off again, as the BT-2 weighed in at 11 tons and the BT-7 went up to 13.9 tons. Armour is listed as 6-16 mm; too thin for the BT-7, which went up to 22 mm. Armament is listed for all BT models, including the BT-7 with a 76 mm gun. The vehicle is vulnerable to 20 mm shells at 400 meters. 

T-28 Medium Tank

Here we have the classic T-28 with a KT-28 gun. Unlike with the T-26, there is only one T-28 model listed in the guide. The mass is a bit too high (28 tons vs. 25). Vulnerability is listed as 300 meters with the 20 mm gun, 700 meters with the Czech 37 mm gun, 450 meters with the German 37 mm gun, 1400 meters with the 50 mm tank gun, and 1500 meters with the 50 mm AT gun. The side is vulnerable at 500 meters to the 20 mm gun and at any range to any other gun.

T-35A Heavy Tank

The drawing might not look like it, but yes, this is the T-35. Armament is identified correctly, even though the drawing seems to be missing three turrets. Vulnerability is the same as in for the T-28.

T-35C Heavy Tank

The SMK (the only new Soviet tank the Germans seemed to be aware of) has been rolled into the T-35 family, which is not too absurd if you don't have very good intel. The drawing is of the early SMK with the T-35 suspension, but the tank already lost its third turret. This information is likely based on the SMK that was bogged down in Finland, as there was not much opportunity to examine the other two prototype heavy tanks.

The vulnerability of the tank is not too shabby either: impervious to bullets or 20 mm shells, vulnerable to 37 mm guns at 100 meters, and to 50 mm guns at 450 meters. The Germans bust out the heavy artillery here, noting that the tank is vulnerable at 500 meters to the 105 mm mod. 1918 cannon firing mod. 1939 shells.

And that's it, no T-34, no KV-1 or KV-2. Those tanks were indeed surprises for the German intelligence.

Winter War Tank Discussion, Part 2

Part 1.

"Lelyushenko (Brigade Commander, 39th Tank Brigade): I will concentrate on issues that turned up in our experience, using the 39th Tank Brigade as an example. I think that it was a mistake to enter the battle against the White Finns with only two tank battalions. When we were leaving West Belarus, I had 5 battalions, so I ended up with 110 tanks instead of 350. Three battalions were designated as independent and assigned to infantry divisions. These battalions did not have means of repairing their vehicles or replenishing their ranks. The HQ and political department could only service half of the brigade. These tank battalions ended up with 7-8 tanks by December 15th, 1939, and very few men. They had no way to evacuate their tanks or repair them. Tank brigades have excellent mobile workshops for this, a small factory. If a tank is knocked out in the morning, it will be back in action by evening. I had only two battalions, plus later the 204th Flamethrower Battalion and 65th Ski Battalion, and ended the war with almost as many tanks as I had at the start. I repaired my own tanks, and those from other brigades. As a result, the brigade remained combat capable, ready to complete any mission.
What's new with tanks in this war? Before the war, commanders thought that tanks will be of little use in a real war, as the terrain will be 50% forests, 25% water, some percentage of swamps, and only about 10% of terrain will be suitable for tanks. Practice shows that tanks could be used in the Finnish theater, and not only could, but should, with the caveat that organization of cooperation with infantry needs to be theater specific. Infantry must follow tanks closely. When tanks moved slowly (I am talking about tanks with applique armour that were invulnerable to 37 mm guns), infantry walked confidently, holding onto them.
...
Another issue was new to me. Commanders thought that tanks should not be used at night, and they were used rarely in this way. Experience showed that tanks should be used at night, but how? They should not be used for long range attacks, but for short pushes with infantry to capture important defensive objects. This is how you achieve success. For example, we defeated the enemy with our infantry at the Ilvesk fortified region. Infantry feels our force and support. Tanks, with their guns and flamethrowers, repelled any attempt to counterattack our infantry.
Can tanks be used at night? They can and should be used, but should be combined with carefully organized infantry units and good reconnaissance.
The issue of assault and blocking groups. An assault group is composed of a company of infantry, a platoon of tanks, two anti-tank guns, and one sapper unit. Assault groups should be trained in attacking pillboxes on real terrain. The infantry, not just the sappers, needs to know how to calculate the necessary amount of explosives, attach them, and use them. I had three cases where all sappers were wounded and there was no one among the infantry that could destroy the fortifications. Everyone needs to learn the absolute minimum about explosives in peace time.
Returning to the issues of tank force organization. I think that a tank battalion attached to an infantry division is not enough. They must be removed to create tank regiments and brigades. Experience at the Finnish front shows that the tank battalions are not viable. These battalions don't have the means to evacuate and repair tanks. Replacement of manpower is complicated, as the battalion has no resources to draw the replacements from. Here is what I did in my tank brigade: form an unofficial training battalion. I gathered up 150 men from the supplies, communications, HQ reserve, and other companies. I trained them once in a while, preparing mechanics, drivers, motorists, tank commanders, gunners. This worked out well. I did not receive enough drivers, so I trained my own. They were taught the traditions of combat spirit, and I've never seen one that faltered in battle and turned back, they all raced forward to complete their mission. The 39th Tank Brigade completed all objectives that were given to it."

Seems that this idea of explosives training was not unique.

"Bychevskiy (Major, chief of engineers of the 13th Army): ... I agree that tankers and infantry need to be taught to deal with explosives. There is nothing difficult during explosives training in regular military academies. In practice, we saw that soldiers and commanders could master explosives quickly, and in the end could dismantle minefields on their own. A short training course right on the front lines (3-4 days) showed good results. We definitely need to introduce explosives training for infantry and tankers so they can deal with minefields on their own."

Lelyushenko was not alone in using tanks at night either.

"Mladentsev: (Colonel, commander of the 387th Infantry Regiment): ... On using tanks: tankers, your field manual says that tanks should not be used at night. I used them, and it worked well. Tanks move forward, infantry moves forward, they work together, and work together wonderfully. Infantry is morally supported, tankers are not afraid of the night, even if visibility is poor. Infantry and tanks penetrated enemy fortifications together, and destroyed his counterattacks. Tanks can and must fight at night. We need to practice cooperation of tanks and infantry in peace time."

"Frolov (Corps Commander, 14th Army): ... On tanks: the T-26 tank fully proved itself. The BT was not useful, I should have pulled them back to Petsalmo. Artillery must be replaced. We need a light mountain gun. New model 1936 guns [76 mm F-22] are good, but not useful here. The 122 mm howitzer showed itself well, but it needs a ChTZ tractor, no other tractor can pull it here."

Pavlov (Army Commander 2nd Class, Red Army ABTU Chief): ... Tanks assigned to divisions met a terrible fate, and would have in any war. Pardon my honesty, but everyone that claimed that these tanks will be used to teach cooperation was bluffing, there was no cooperation. More than 7000 tanks were scattered across infantry divisions, and they had no effect. They were helpless. A tank battalion in an infantry division, T-37 and T-26 tanks, is a limited organization. Weak T-37 tanks are incapable of traversing any mud. These battalions were ineffective. Correct me if I'm wrong, but they were mostly used to guard the divisional or regimental HQ.
Voice from the audience: Correct.
Pavlov: And this is more than 7000 tanks. These same battalions inside the brigades, they fought well and achieved more, since they were controlled by the brigade HQ. I have to say that not only HQ staff, but political workers looked after the control. Comrade Lelyushenko said: we're going to attack, political workers, go to the infantry units, make sure they will follow the tanks. This is how we achieved cooperation. It is not always possible to check the cooperation with independent battalions.
Where am I going with this? We need to restore tank brigades using tanks from infantry divisions. In the Kiev Military District, I have 4 brigades with 14 tanks. The tanks were transferred, the brigades fell apart. I will say it outright: if there is mobilization tomorrow, our brigades will not be ready. The tanks will have to be sent back from as far as the Leningrad district. We need to end this practice. As long as I am the commander of this type of armed forces, I will make sure that no more units are dismantled. If they need tanks, take the whole unit.
...
Regarding the T-37, it is a special type of vehicle, it must be moved to special battalions at the corps level so the commander can use T-37 tanks properly. As far as new types of tanks are concerned, I will make a note: commanders, don't flood the Commissariat and comrade Stalin with telegrams, let us solve the issues of organization in Moscow properly. I know how it is in practice, as soon as a new vehicle is available everyone starts saying that the old vehicles are no good. They say: give us T-34s and KVs, only they are compatible with our theater, no other tanks are compatible. I will tell you now that I will take measures to ensure that not a single telegram like this even receives an answer. We will determine what district gets how many tanks at the General Staff, wait your turn."

Winter War Tank Discussion, Part 1

After the conclusion of the Winter War, it was clear that application of tank forces in the Red Army needs to be reviewed. Here are some excerpts from a meeting of VKP(b) bigwigs discussing the effectiveness of the tanks and suggesting changes to how they are used, from rkka.ru archives. I will also include some interesting parts that characterize the army as a whole.

"Semenov (Brigade Commissar, Military Commissar of the 50th Infantry Corps): ... We did not study Finland during peacetime enough, we did not study it properly. During wargames, we reached Vyborg in no time at all, with a break for lunch. The White Finn tactics are based on close combat, with an organized system of rifle and mortar fire, with light ski units. Our units turned out to not be ready to fight on skis, they were bound to roads, and their supply lines dragged 10 km behind. We were only saved due to a shortage of Finnish aircraft. For instance, the 123rd and 84th infantry divisions, 1st, 13th, 15th, 35th, and 20th tank brigades, and elements of the 90th Division were all stuck on one narrow road. Many people had to work for several days to untangle this traffic jam."

"Pshennikov (Brigade Commander, 142nd Infantry Division): ... Next issue, the use of tanks. When we were fighting in no man's land, despite my division advancing along a wide front, there was a lack of roads. I had a tank brigade that operated on a front of one regiment with only one road. What happened? The tank brigade clogged up the road and I had nothing to feed that regiment with. All carts had to be stopped and supplies carried to the regiment on foot. In future wars, tank units need their own roads. If there is no other road, don't reinforce the division with tanks, or maybe with just one battalion.
I also think that it is necessary to review tank division compositions, as T-37 and T-38 tanks did not show themselves well. Divisions need to have T-26 tanks. Even those have a drawback, their tracks slip off. That is their greatest weakness, and it must be resolved."

"Sinitsin (Regimental Commissar, Military Commissar of the Front Armoured Forces): Comrades, I consider it my duty to raise some issues on the use of armoured forces in Western Ukraine and against the White Finns. Comrades that spoke before me correctly brought up on the poor cooperation between tanks and infantry. I've been in tank forces for a while, but I have never seen proper cooperation between tanks and infantry in training. If we want to have proper cooperation between tanks and infantry, we need to include a tank brigade in each infantry corps and force the commander to train tanks and infantry together. This will have an effect.
I think that tank battalions with 15 T-26es and several T-38s worked poorly, since there was no repair bases for them, and the vague directions given by combined arms commanders, as a rule, resulted in their disablement. Spreading tanks out without proper orders does not achieve anything. Tank battalions should not be included in infantry divisions.
There is no tank master in the region, front, or army. ABTU is no more or less than an inspectorate. In this condition, we cannot prepare tank forces properly, as nobody is really responsible for training or control. I think that ABTU and tank force directorates should be organized like the VVS. This will increase responsibility for actions, create a centralized training center, and military councils and commanders will have someone to hold responsible for the state of tank forces. Some words on tankers: it is known how important tanks are in any battle, but we have problems with finding qualified crewmen. For instance, there is a regular captain in the Leningrad district who is in charge of assigning tank unit commanders. Where does he know them from? He doesn't, nobody studies these issues, and there is chaos going on with our crews. I think it is necessary to have training and assignments under control of the armoured forces chief. This will make things more reasonable.

The next issue is about the types of tanks. It is sad that a regular 37 mm shell penetrates our tanks, not to mention larger calibers. I think that we need to move to tanks armed with larger calibers and thicker armour due to enemy anti-tank artillery.
Stalin: Is 45 mm enough for T-26es?
Sinitsin: It is enough, but the KV is a new type of tank, and 45 mm is not enough.
Stalin: Is 75 mm enough?
Sinitsin: Yes, that is enough. We need to make more tanks like this and quickly. My next issue is discipline. We talk too much, but the state of affairs is poor. We need to stop talking and prepare our forces properly. I will give you an example. In the 13th Army, I saw a soldier that was lightly wounded in the arm, led to the rear by 3-4 men led by a political chief to take care of him, and then this group sticks around the rear instead of going back and fighting.
It is also necessary to improve training in military academies. We have young lieutenants that just finished the academy, and they don't know how to shoot their pistols. I must make a remark about political workers, there are many comrades with a very low level of military knowledge. We need to end this now and train our commanders and political workers better."

Continued in part 2.