Showing posts with label Leningrad. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Leningrad. Show all posts

Tuesday, 17 March 2020

Many Faces of the T-26

"Condition of SPGs and artillery systems on the T-26 chassis

T-26-8: 37 mm AA gun on the T-26 chassis.

According to instructions from the NKSM and tactical-technical requirements developed by the 20th department of the GAU, an experimental prototype of a 37 mm AA gun on the T-26 tank chassis was developed in July and tested.
Trials gave a positive result. Presently blueprints are being developed that include improvements requested by the ANIOP. Production of two prototypes to send to the front is being finished.
Final work on blueprints for mass production will conclude on August 25th, 1941.

Wednesday, 16 October 2019

SU-26 Production

"Decree of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front #001336
November 13th, 1942
Active Army

RE: production of SPGs on the chassis of the T-26 tank

In order to supply the Front's tank units with SPGs, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front decrees that:
  1. The director of factory #174 comrade Muromtsev to produce 10 SPGs on the T-26 chassis for the Front Tank and Automotive Directorate before January 1st, 1943.
  2. The director of Kirov factory comrade Dlugach must supply factory #174 with the following before December 1st, 1942:
    1. 10 76 mm guns, fully assembled.
    2. 10 upper and lower gun mounts without mechanical finishing
      Dispatch two artillery assembly specialists to factory #174 for the term until January 1st, 1943.
  3. The Chief of the Front Tank and Automotive Directorate, Major-General Baranov, must select and deliver 20 T-26 tanks for conversion into SPGs by November 20th, 1942.
Commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant-General [text is cut off]
Member of the Military Council, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik All-Union Communist Party, A. Zhdanov"

Friday, 29 September 2017

SU-26: Blockade Long-Liver

The start of the Great Patriotic War in the summer of 1941 forced many changes onto the prospective designs of Soviet SPGs. Many branches were cancelled, and work on the ZIS-30 SPG on the Komsomolets tractor platform was urgently started. Until then, it was not considered as an SPG platform at all. However, one SPG that was designed according to pre-war plans was not only built, but mass produced. This is a vehicle best known under the name SU-26. Its real name, T-26-6, was buried deep in the archives.

Tuesday, 8 August 2017

Leningrad Guntruck

"Decree of the Military Council of the Northern Front #53/ss
July 8th, 1941
Leningrad

Contents: tactical-technical requirements for the installation of a 45 mm gun in a half-armoured ZIS-5 truck and production of 20 such trucks at the Izhor factory.

The Military Council of the Northern Front has decreed that:

The Izhor factory must produce 20 ZIS-5 half-armoured trucks prepared for the installation of a 45 mm gun by July 13th, 1941, with the following improvements and additions:
  1. Add additional shields in front of the gun wheels to protect the crew from the front, but without limiting the gun's horizontal traverse.
  2. Add seats for the crew and ammunition racks in the truck bed.
  3. The 45 mm gun mount must allow for firing from the truck. At the same time, it must be possible to easily and quickly remove and install the gun, with removable metal stoppers underneath the mounts and a collapsible ramp for wheeling the gun into the truck bed.
  4. Install an armoured container to hold a fuel tank. The placement is up to the designer.
  5. ABTU Chief, Colonel Dementyev, must issue 20 ZIS-5 trucks for the Izhor factory within three days.
  6. The Chief of the Artillery Directorate, Major-General Sviridov, must provide 45 mm guns for the half-armoured trucks produced at the Izhor factory.
Commander of the Norther Front, Lieutenant-General Popov
Member of the Military Council of the Northern Front, Corps Commissar Klementyev
Member of the Military Council of the Northern Front, Kuznetsov"

Monday, 27 March 2017

Cheating at Statistics 17: Leaving Leningrad

In early 1944, the German forces around Leningrad weren't doing so well. The blockade around Leningrad had ruptured, Sinyavino heights were lost, and Army Group North was beginning to slink back westward. Introduction of the hyped up Tiger tank failed to make a difference here. Now these Tigers, namely s.Pz.Abt 502, were holding back the Red Army while the rest of the Germans escaped. Forczyk describes the situation: "The remaining Tigers of the s.Pz.Abt.502 assisted the AOK 18 in its withdrawal by turning to ambush the Soviet spearheads; on 25 January they claimed 41 Soviet tanks destroyed at Voyskovitskiy, 5 km southwest of Gatchina."

Anyone who's been keeping up with this long running series will have recognized the perfect storm: the Tiger crews know for a fact that the battlefield will remain in Soviet hands and that their claims will not be checked. There was also incentive to make up for the Tiger tank's rather dismal performance on the Leningrad front. Let's take a look at just what happened at Voyskovitsy on January 25th.

Friday, 27 January 2017

World of Tanks History Section: How Nikolai Simonyak became General Breakthrough

The name Nikolai Pavlovich Simonyak is closely connected with the Red Army's successes in the Battle of Leningrad. In the winter of 1943, when the blockade was punctured, his 136th Rifle Division was fighting in the main assault, and its actions brought greatest success to the Red Army on January 12th. Here is where N.P. Simonyak earned the nickname "General Breakthrough".

Before the Breakthrough


Way back during the defense of the Hanko peninsula in 1941, Simonyak thoroughly built up a functional staff, a rare occurrence among Red Army commanders in the early war. This was noticeable in how the journals of the 8th Independent Rifle Brigade and then division which Nikolai Pavlovich commanded. Even in the battles of August-September of 1942 that ended poorly for the Red Army, his division, fighting in the 55th Army, probably performed better than any Soviet unit at Leningrad.


In November of 1942, Simonyak's 136th division was taken out of the 55th Army to the front reserve. The troops were busy with training. Everyone understood that a new breakthrough attempt was coming, and there was a lot to do before it could be successful.

Saturday, 23 April 2016

Captain Bekker's SPG

The Battle of Leningrad became a proving grounds for new weapons. From the middle of 1941 to the summer of 1944, the battlefield here saw the newest and most extraordinary creations from both side of the front line. Finding armoured vehicles here was most surprising, as the conditions did not make it easy to use tanks and SPGs. One of the most unusual vehicles that could be found here was a German 105 mm SPG on the chassis of a British light tank.

British tank, German howitzer

The creation of these interesting SPGs is covered in a number of works in both the German and English languages. As a brief reminder, many trophies were captured by the Germans after the fall of France in the summer of 1940. Among them were many armoured vehicles. One of the, the British Light Tank MkVI, served as the chassis for a German 105 mm mod. 1916 howitzer. The author of this project was Captain Bekker, commander of 12th battery, 227th Artillery Regiment, 227th Infantry Division.


The result was a lightly armoured vehicle with a casemate, open from the top and partially from the rear. The crew consisted of 4 men. The thickness of the front armour was 22 mm, 15 mm in the sides. The vehicle turned out very compact, especially when you consider the caliber of the gun. The length of the vehicle was under 4 meters, while the height was only 2 meters. The mass was less than 6.5 tons. The 88 hp engine allowed it to develop a very impressive speed: 40-50 kph on roads.

The maxium range of this improvised SPG was 9200 m. As a bonus, the gun could use ammunition from the most common weapon of German artillery regiments: the 105 mm leFH 18.

Six tanks were converted into these SPGs and were put through trials. All that was left was to test them in battle. The vehicles were formed into an extra 15th battery in the artillery regiment of the 227th division, with three platoons of two SPGs each. The battery was also equipped with munitions carriers. In documents, it was occasionally referred to as an assault battery. Even though using these SPGs as assault guns was not strictly correct, their combat history is long and varied.

Use in combat, 1941

For a while, the 227th division remained in France, but Army Group North urgently needed reserves by fall. The division was transferred to the Soviet north, where it was included in the 1st Army Corps. The 227th Division replaced elements of the 39th Motorized Corps in the forests south of Ladoga.


Almost instantly, the division ended up in the center of battle. The Soviet 54th Army desperately tried to penetrate the blockade. At the same time, German command was planning an offensive against Volkhovstroy. For the time being, the 227th division was defending.

On October 15th, 1941, the 15th battery took up positions in three places where tanks could appear, one platoon each. Several days were spent shooting at the enemy. The Germans were preparing for an offensive, and two platoons were transferred to the neighbouring 254th Infantry Division. They returned only after the 54th Army's offensive began on October 20th.

On October 23rd and 24th, the SPGs fought actively, firing over 200 rounds. They were also used as infantry support weapons. As a result, the battery suffered its first casualties: 4 men, including Bekker, were wounded.

On November 15th, another attempt to use the SPGs as assault guns was made in support of the unsuccessful assault by the 223rd Infantry Division. The battery lost three men killed, and one SPG was left in no man's land. It was only recovered after three days. Second and third platoons had a similar experience. The vehicles showed themselves to be well designed and reliable.

Out of the battery's three platoons, the first was the most active. Starting in late October, it supported the 11th Infantry Division as it attacked towards Pogostye and Volkhov. SPGs from the platoon fought alongside infantry, to the point of having to use hand grenades and the crew's personal weapons. On November 11th, the platoon fought Soviet tanks near Khotovskaya Gorka village. In this battle, one vehicle was hit 16 times, but its armour was never penetrated. This episode is confirmed by Soviet sources.


The village was defended by elements of the 3rd Guards Infantry Division, supported by several T-40 tanks from the 122nd Tank Brigade. Armed with machineguns, they proved powerless against the even relatively lightly armoured vehicles from Bekker's battery. The 122nd Tank Brigade lost 2 tanks that day. It's worth mentioning that the battles were very fierce and the German march to Volkhov was anything but a walk in the park. The platoon went through several commanders during that time and one SPG was heavily damaged by a mine.

In the end, the 54th Army managed to stop the Germans at the outskirts of Volkhov and push them back to their initial positions in December. Over more than a month, 15th battery managed to fire off up to 1300 shells, or over 200 per gun. The evaluation of the vehicle in combat was very positive. t was very stable when firing and its off-road performance was good.

Use in combat, 1941

The combat history of the battery doesn't end there. In the winter and spring of 1942, elements of the 227th Infantry Division fought at Pogostye. Among them were SPGs from 15th battery. The SPGs also supported infantry from the 269th Infantry Division.

On February 16th, the battery deflected an offensive by the 54th Army. This was the first time the battery saw KV tanks from the 124th Tank Brigade. The Germans lost three vehicles in the ensuing battle. Turns out that armour piercing shells of the 105 mm guns were powerless against the thick armour of Soviet tanks.

The remaining SPGs fought for another month in the swamps and forests near Pogostye. They were quite handy in March. The armour improved the chances of survival of both the crew and the gun, and the 54th Army was poorly equipped when it came to AT guns. As a result, the SPGs frequently played a role reserved for "real" assault guns.

For example, they escorted German infantry that moved through forest roads. Their firepower was enough to destroy a machinegun nest of fight off an unexpected attack. According to German sources, 15th battery managed to shoot up a Soviet infantry column. This fact cannot be confirmed by Soviet sources, but in the chaos of forest battle, something like this could very well have happened.

The SPGs were also useful when it was time to break out from an encirclement. After the fierce battles of March, the battery had only two functional vehicles left.


Despite all attempts to repair the SPGs, 15th battery still had only two vehicles by the time the Volkhov Front began their Sinyavino Offensive. These SPGs fought in the First Battle of Ladoga.

One of the remaining SPGs was used to punch a corridor through to the semi-encircled 366th regiment commanded by M. Wengler. It was shot up by Soviet AT riflemen on a forest road. The second SPG was sent to cover one of the main supply routes when it was threatened by the 4th Guards Infantry Corps. Here, the vehicle was lost to tankers of the 98th Tank Brigade.

After battles in the swamps of Sinyavino, 15th battery had no vehicle left. Nevertheless, the battery remained in records of the 227th Infantry Division during Operation Spark. However, no more combat action by its SPGs can be found in documents.

The battlefields around Leningrad proved to be a tough trial for this unusual vehicle. Its design was well thought out and earned few complaints. Experience earned during its use came in handy when the Germans designed other SPGs.

Original article by Vyachevlav Mosunov.

Wednesday, 9 March 2016

Radio Network of the 31st Independent Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment

Radio communication is an important part of combined arms warfare. Despite popular belief, the Red Army paid extensive attention to this issue, as shown by radio networks such as this one.


At the very top, you have the aircraft communications center, with the appropriate callsign Sky. On the left, the officers' radio net (Method from 30th Guards Tank Brigade, Turret from 13th Air Army, Lamp, the chief of the Motorized and Armoured forces, Concrete from 220nd Tank Brigade, and Bomb from 46th Guards Tank Regiment). On the right, "tank unit #10" radio net, listing all the tank units so far plus 30th Guards Infantry Corps, 46th Breakthrough Tank Regiment, 205th Tank Regiment, and 98th Tank Regiment.

Then, on the bottom, the vehicles of the regiment's contacts. At the top is Granite, the Chief of Staff of the Regiment, followed by Form from the 30th Tank Brigade, Page, the commander of the armoured forces in the 67th Army, Chord from the 30th Guards Infantry Corps, Form (again), the Chief of the Special Department of the 30th Brigade, and then Token, the commander of the armoured forces of the Leningrad Front. The circles in the next row are Bang, the commander of the 133rd Air Regiment, Laquer, the commander of the 63rd Guards Infantry Division, Quill, also from the same division, and Bug, the commander of the 190th Infantry Regiment.

Finally, we get to the regiment proper. At the top is the commander, Cheek, followed by commanders of the companies: Phrase, Dagger, Nettle, and Caviar. Then we get platoon commanders, Jubilee, Swamp, Soda, and Lafette, followed by regular tanks of their platoons, Cherry, Pop, Ducat, and Cliff. Then, another set of platoons, commanders Wing, Canvas, Medal, and Yacht with their subordinates Catfish, Rose, Level, and Drum. As you can see, all tanks in the regiment are equipped with radios.

The text on the right side explains how to read the diagram. Token and Page are allowed to communicate on any network. If contacted by them, one must answer immediately. The callsigns of the company commanders are repeated, just in case.

Thursday, 18 February 2016

Improvised Guns

In 1941, the Red Army found itself desperately struggling to fill a shortage of small caliber anti-tank artillery. While anti-tank rifles were still on the drawing board, improvisations like these had to be made.

"Decree by the Military Council of the Northern Front #187ss
Leningrad
August 22nd, 1941

Contents: on the end of DOT-4 production and production of simplified ant-tank guns on a wheeled mount at factory #7
  1. Cease production of pillbox DOT-4 45 mm systems.
  2. Factory #7 director comrade Kalistratov must mount leftover 45 mm guns on a simplified wheeled mount (7-33) according to factory #7 blueprints.
    1. August 22nd: 20 systems
    2. August 23rd: 20 systems
    3. August 24th: 25 systems
    4. August 25th: 30 systems
    5. August 26th: 35 systems
    6. August 27th: 40 systems
  3. Other factories must send factory #7 45 mm tank guns with parts, tools, and TOP sights:
    1. Voroshilov factory #174: 200 units
    2. Izhor factory: 150 units
  4. The secretary of the city committee, comrade Dlugach, must transfer staff from other establishments to factory #7 by August 21st:
    1. Electric welders: 30
    2. Assembly technicians: 80
  5. Set up production of the following components at factory #7:
    1. Worm gear of the elevation mechanism, 35 units daily starting on August 23rd."
The result wasn't exactly pretty, but it was functional.


Saturday, 6 February 2016

World of Tanks History Section: Taking Workers' Village #6

On the morning of January 18th, 1943, the first stage of Operation Spark finally resulted in the long-awaited penetration of the Leningrad blockade. For the first time in two and a half years of fighting in the north-east direction, Army Group North suffered a defeat and was pushed back from the shores of Lake Ladoga towards a new line of defense.

With almost no time to rest, Soviet forces turned south from the lake, towards a small village and the Mga railroad station. Sinyavino heights lay between the Red Army and their goal, like a bastion built by nature itself. Their slopes rose up from peat bogs, all important regional roads lay across them or near them, and the heights themselves were reinforced by Germans long ago.This meant that the Soviet soldiers who just penetrated the blockade were in a dead end. To break out, they had to assault the enemy strongholds, one by one.

Concentration of Force

The taking of Workers' Village #6 was of utmost importance during the battle for Sinyavino. One of the few good quality roads passed through here. Having taken the village, Soviet forces could break out of the bogs, take over other key roads, and get a good chance at cutting off the Germans at the heights.

The enemy did not have time to prepare the village for battle. Additionally, the Germans expected the Red Army to come from the east, but they unexpectedly came from the north.

The first battles at Sinyavino began on January 15-16th, 1943, but elements of Lieutenant-General Vladimir Zakharovich Romanskiy's 2nd Shock Army did not reach it until the blockade was penetrated. Here, the general first had a chance to use tanks not individually, but as a whole brigade. This task was given to the 16th Tank Brigade commanded by Colonel Korney Ivanovich Ivanov. At this time, the brigade had 20 T-34 tanks, 10 T-70s and 8 T-60s. By January of 1943, the brigade was a veteran of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts and would be fighting close to where they saw their first battle in the distant past of September 1941.

By standards of the north-east direction, the region designated for the brigade was considered tank-capable. In reality, the tankers only had one narrow gauge railroad at their disposal, designed to move between peat quarries. Everything else was swamp, forest, and other difficult terrain.

Another problem for the 16th Tank Brigade was the lack of organic infantry support. They were to fight alongside the 147th Infantry Division, the only unit of the 2nd Shock Army that had yet to fight in the Leningrad direction. In addition, the division recently received reinforcements and did not have time to do exercises to increase cohesion.

The workers' village was protected by SS police units and was located at a joint between two German divisions. This meant that it was one of the weakest links in the German defenses. Here is where the Volkhov Front had to strike.

Difficulty of Cooperation

The attack began on January 20th, 1943. There was little time allotted for preparation, just one night. Infantry commanders could do nothing to prepare their soldiers for fighting alongside tanks.

Nevertheless, the first attack of our forces was pretty lucky. Soviet artillery hit the SS regiment's HQ, disabling its commanders. When tanks of the 16th brigade showed up, enemy infantry routed and began to retreat. Those who did not manage in time were encircled and destroyed north of Workers' Village #6. A handful of those surrounded managed to slip away at night. The village itself was defensed by a joint group of SS and soldiers from the 374th grenadier regiment, also recently escaped from an encirclement. They were in the way of the tank attack.

The tanks of the 16th brigade burst into the village. The first among them was driven by K.G. Tkachenko. His tracks crushed a few SS-men and an AT gun. Other tanks caught up and fighting began. As a result of the battle, almost the entire village was in Soviet hands. The entire left flank of the SS division hung in the air. For the Germans, the loss of the village seriously threatened their positions at Sinyavino, as their defenses could buckle at any time from a flanking attack. The Soviet forces could also attack southwards and completely cut off the roads that supplied the Germans at Sinyavino.

The enemy quickly understood this. Gathering up the remnants of battered units, the Germans counterattacked. Tankers met the German infantry with fire, and the battle could have gone our way, but it just so happened that the 147th Infantry Division lost nearly all commanders in its regiments. The only thing that they could do with untrained infantry was to lead them personally, but the moment that there was no one left in charge, the soldiers ran. The tankers defending the village had no assistance, and having lost seven tanks burned and four knocked out, managed to hold out on the northern outskirts.

Licking Wounds

The next day, tankers continued to fight for Workers' Village #6. Infantry helped little. Two more tanks were lost to German assault guns. However, the tankers held out.

The battle continued. Senior Sergeant Tkachenko's tank was ignited by a bottle with incendiary fluid, but he managed to drive the tank to a safe place. Lieutenant Gorbunov's tank was also damaged, but he managed to repair it, tying the steering cords directly to his shoulders. This let him drive away with two of his dead comrades. However, no amount of skill and courage could make up for the fact that infantry was pinned down and would not follow the tanks.

On January 22nd, the battle grew more fierce. Few remaining tanks from the 16th brigade burst into the village. They were followed by infantry from another, more experienced division. The Germans were thrown back, but they counterattacked several times during that day. Immobilized Soviet tanks fired from their positions to assist the infantry. By the end of the day, the village was firmly in Soviet hands. This success was provided by the tankers.

Worker's Village #6 was the first of many settlements liberated after the penetration of the blockade. This victory was earned at a great cost. The 16th Tank Brigade alone lost 14 T-34s, 2 T-60s, and 2 T-70s. 28 tankers died, 33 were wounded, and loss of infantry numbered in the thousands. German casualties were less, but the exact number is still unknown.

The 2nd Shock Army began attacking the Sinyavino Heights in January and fought here for many months. Remaining tanks from the 16th Tank Brigade held Workers' Villafe #6 until February 1943. A year later, this unit would participate in the final collapse of the blockade and earn the title of the best tankers of the Volkhov Front.

Original article available here.

Sunday, 31 January 2016

World of Tanks History Section: Best Tankers of the Leningrad Direction

The operation to break the Leningrad blockade wasn't only the first major Soviet offensive of 1944, but also the first major use of armour by Leningrad and Volkov Fronts since 1941.

One of the more notable episodes of the Leningrad-Novgorod Strategic Operation was the action of the tankers from the 59th Army during the liberation of Novgorod. In three years of difficult and bloody fighting in the Leningrad direction, few such examples of independent and effective action by a tank unit can be found. The heroes of this story are the tankers of Colonel Kirill Osipovich Urvanov's 16th Tank Brigade.

From the Foothold

The last time the brigade was actively used in battle was January of 1943, in an attempt to build on the success of the first penetration of the Leningrad blockade. Now, a year later, it composed the mobile group of the 6th Infantry Corps. The brigade had 48 tanks, 32 of them T-34s and the rest light T-60s and T-70s.

Opposing them was the German 28th Jaeger division. The German command reinforced them with assault guns from a tank destroyer unit and a large amount of AT guns.

The offensive of the 59th Army started in the Novgorod direction on January 14th, 1944. The first successes were on the auxiliary direction, where the Soviet operational group crossed lake Ilmen. On the main direction, the 239t Infantry Division attacked from the Volkhov foothold and also penetrated enemy defenses after some time. On January 15th the 16th Tank Brigade reinforced with an SPG regiment followed them into the breach.

The tanks fought in difficult conditions. First, the Soviet forces did not penetrate the defenses completely. Second, forests, swamps, deep snow, and the reinforced banks of Pitba river created many problems for the attackers. The first attack revealed all these issues, but there was no choice: it was still necessary to cross the swampy shores and minefields. Thanks to timely actions of the commander and personnel, a Soviet motorized infantry battalion managed to capture a foothold on the opposite side of the river by dusk. The rest of the infantry and the tanks followed them. By the end of January 15th, German defenses were penetrated. The 16th Tank Brigade turned south to the Novgorod-Chudovo highway. In addition, the Germans were driven out of Tyutitsa.

Pummelling at Podberezye

On the next day, the 16th Tank Brigade achieved great success due to competent direction from superior officers who managed to coordinate an artillery barrage that was necessary when attacking such a large stronghold. Tankers hit the village and the Podberezye railroad station. Senior Lieutenant Gorokhov's platoon entered the village first, then the others pulled up, fully clearing it of Germans. Having captured Podberezye, the Soviet forces took one of the largest German footholds, as well as cut off several enemy garrisons positioned to the east. This was a serious hit for the Germans. The 18th Army HQ demanded that the station be held at any cost, and this was quite a shock.

The 16th brigade also distinguished itself by defeating a German column that was trying to retreat from Podberezye. On January 16th, Soviet intelligence reported that the Germans were retreating west. Tankers had to cut off the enemy's retreat, and tanks were sent to the Podberezye-Nekohovo highway. Two T-60s were the first to reach the road: tanks commanded by Senior Sergeants Pridatko and Sviridov.

They saw a column of a German tank destroyer squadron, headed by an assault gun. The tankers opened fire. The Germans fired back and hit Sviridov's tank. The tank burned. With the last of his strength, the driver turned the tank perpendicular to the road, blocking the column.

Pridatko's crew managed to knock out several cars when the German assault gun rammed his tank. The light vehicles was crushed by the enemy's mass. By then, other tanks reached the battlefield, and a two hour battle ensued. When the Germans were finally defeated, 200 dead Germans, 45 cars, 10 guns, 8 motorcycles, and 3 radio stations littered the road. In addition, several dozen Germans were taken prisoner. Seems that most of the 28th Jaeger Division's AT guns were destroyed in this battle. German sources write that the 478th Tank Destroyer Battalion was lost here.

The front lines turned into several strongholds that the enemy still held onto. The Germans in Novgorod were in a serious danger of being encircled.

Novgorod is Ours!

The penetration of German defenses and battles over their strongholds came at a cost. In total. the 16th Tank Brigade lost 6 T-34 tanks and 4 light tanks. The fighting was far from over.

The tankers did not rest on their laurels. On January 17th, they moved further south along with the 65th Order of the Red Banner Infantry Division and another veteran of the swamps and forests, the 29th Tank Brigade. Tanks tore southwards across forest roads and swamps, threatening to cut off the main road west from Novgorod. They captured one important location, Vyazhishe village, reaching yet another railroad.

It became clear that significant effort was required to keep moving forward. Brigade commander Colonel Urvanov was selected as the head of the advance guard. While soldiers were clearing the road, he decided to send an SPG regiment and motorized infantry battalion to capture the railroad and hold it until the tanks can get out of the swamps.

By the end of January 17th, the armoured advance guard of the Soviet offensive was several kilometers away from the Novgorod-Luga highway. The motorized infantry battalion of the 16th Tank Brigade was ahead of the rest. If was the first to reach the railroad near the Nashi passing loop. Here, our tankers met their old friends from Sinyavino in the winter of 1943: elements of the 3rd Grenadier Regiment of the 21st Infantry Division and SS cavalry. Until the arrival of the main forces, the advance guard repelled up to eight attacks without retreating one step. Several days later, sad scraps of a single battalion from the 21st Division managed to make it through the encirclement.

The Germans knew that Novgorod could not be held. The breakthrough began on the morning of January 20th. The Germans took heavy losses in the fighting around the city.

When tanks joined up with their motorized infantry, another push south followed. Soon those who spent days marching through swamps and crushing German garrisons were shaking the hands of their comrades who liberated Novgorod the Great.

This part of the operation concluded fortunately for the 16th Brigade. Total losses were 11 tanks, 54 dead, 148 injured and three MIA. Considering the conditions of the operation, these losses were acceptable.

Original article available here.

Saturday, 30 January 2016

World of Tanks History Section: Liberation of Novgorod

Early 1944 was a difficult time for forces of Army Group North. They were in well prepared defensive positions and they avoided difficult crises that befell the central and southern German groups. However, other defeats had a negative impact on Georg von Küchler's forces. He lost several of his units, including mode tank and mechanized ones. German high command also had no reserves in case the situation at Novgorod and Leningrad turned sour.

Meanwhile, the Red Army was preparing future offensives, the famous Stalin's Ten Blows, the series of attacks that defeated 140 divisions (half of which were destroyed completely) and chased the Germans out of the USSR. The first of them was the Leningrad-Novgorod operation, carried out in the middle of January, 1944.

Target: Novgorod

Stavka of the High Command tasked Army General K.A. Meretskov's Volkov Front with the task of defeating the German Novgorod group. To do this, he had about 260,000 men, over 3600 guns, and about 400 tanks and SPGs. Most of these forces were a part of the 59th Army, which was to deliver the main blow. In its sector, the Soviet forces surpassed the Germans 3.3 times in infantry, 3.5 times in artillery, and 11 times in armour.

The offensive towards Novgorod was scheduled for the morning of January 14th. For the first time in history, Soviet command included the actions of partisans in its plans. About 40,000 men were supposed to destroy railroads and bridges, damage wires and telegraph poles, create chaos in German communications.

Meretskov picked a direction north of Novgorod for his 59th Army, a foothold on the western shore of the Volkhov river. After an artillery barrage, specially formed infantry assault groups reinforced with tanks would attack here. A group composed of a reinforced infantry brigade and motorized sled units would deliver an auxiliary attack. This group would stealthily cross the ice of lake Ilmen south of Novgorod, distract a part of German forces, and finally join up with the rest of the Front west of the city.

German intelligence supplied von Küchler with enough information for him to foresee a Soviet attack. However, the Germans did not properly predict the scale of the attack, expecting to be able to contain it. On the other hand, von Küchler was careful enough to have prepared a plan of retreat just in case in December of 1943. He was sceptical about being able to keep the attackers at existing positions and proposed falling back to defensive line "Panther", but Hitler demanded that he hold on. The Germans at Leningrad were forced to wait and see what would happen.

Soviet disinformation led German attention away from Novgorod. Even when Küchler was told that Soviet forces are concentrating at the Volkhov foothold, he expected it to be an easily contained local offensive.

On the morning of January 14th, he realized his mistake.

Main Secondary Direction

The morning of the offensive was met with a heavy snowfall. This almost completely prevented Soviet bombers from taking any action, and complicated matters for Soviet artillery. Guns and mortars were forced to fire at general areas, and even though about 133,000 shells landed on the German lines, it was not possible to fully suppress their firing positions.

Infantry and tanks, attacking from the activated foothold, started off poorly. Many units reached the front lines late, giving the Germans a chance to organize a resistance. Reconnaissance and engineering support were also lacking. As a result, tanks got stuck in craters and in swamps. For example, out of 29 tanks that were sent to reinforce the 310th Infantry Division, only 11 reached the front lines. Individual battalions acted passively when met with German resistance and took unreasonably heavy losses. Battles in the main direction became long and arduous.

The secondary attack was much more successful. Even though the ice on lake Ilmen wasn't robust, the southern group managed to secretly cross the lake and surprise the enemy, destroying several of his strongholds and capturing a foothold 6 km wide and up to 4 km deep by the end of the first day. The Germans counterattacked several times, trying to drive the Soviets back into the lake, but they were not successful. Finally, they started to bomb and fire at the ice to at least prevent reinforcements.

Knowing about this and trying to maintain success, Meretskov gave engineers the order to build a crossing with portable bridges. In difficult conditions, working in ice cold water, engineering units managed to complete the task and allowed the southern group to be reinforced with an impressive amount of infantry and 20 armoured cars. Forces north of Novgorod also received reinforcements. Meanwhile, von Küchler started pulling out everything he could and moving it to the endangered section of the front. The Germans counterattacked, trying to prevent the south and north groups' meeting.

Through Mud and Snow

The slowly progressing offensive annoyed the Volkov Front commander. On January 17th, Meretskov chewed out the commander of the 59th Army in writing and demanded that his forces be more active.

Meanwhile, the Red Army penetrated German defenses north of Novgorod across a 20 km front. However, daily progress amounted to no more than 6 km. The fierce German resistance wasn't the only problem. Melting snow, a lack of roads, and swamps made things very difficult. Forces could often only move through one road. Tank tracks would beat it up so badly that even infantry, let alone artillery or trucks, could not use it. It was hard to deliver fuel, ammunition, supplies. Soldiers marched knee deep in mud pushing their guns and mortars, carrying crates of supplies on their backs.

Slowly but surely, the German front was collapsing. North of Novgorod, Soviet forces surrounded and fully defeated a Jaeger division, and then swept through positions of German forces protecting the Finev Lug-Novgorod railroad. Increasing the pressure on the enemy, Meretskov send the second echelon of the 59th Army and the 54th Army into battle. The latter only managed to move forward several kilometers, but its attack prevented the German 38th Army Corps from reaching the city.

By January 19th, Novgorod was surrounded by Soviet forces from the north and south. One infantry corps penetrated through west of the city. Threatened by encirclement, von Küchler asked Hitler for permission to retreat. By this time, the only road that could allow this was within the range of Soviet guns. The weather improved, and the retreating enemy could be attacked by aircraft.

Sadly, the slow pace of the offensive did not allow for encirclement of the Germans in Novgorod. Before a tight ring could be formed, the Germans blew up the bridge across the river and left the city before the Red Army reached it on January 20th and took it without a fight. Individual German units were encircled west of Novgorod and were defeated. That day, a salute in Moscow announced the liberation of the ancient city.

Original article available here.

Sunday, 17 January 2016

World of Tanks History Section: Sinyavino Offensive

1. Introduction

On September 8th, 1941, Shlisselburg fell. German forces reached the shore of Lake Ladoga, closing a ring around Leningrad. Zhukov, who replaced Voroshilov as the head of the Leningrad front, counterattacked all September to free the northern capital. Local attacks were successful, but the overall situation became more and more dire. Petergof, Strelna, Uritsk fell to the Germans. On September 18th, the Germans captured Pushkin. The front only stabilized in October of 1941.

In mid-October, Stavka ordered the first operation to liberate Leningrad. However, Germans struck first, and attacked towards Tihvin on October 16th. On November 8th, despite nonstop counterattacks from the RKKA, the city fell. The Germans took the last railroad to Leningrad. The blockaded city was doomed.

However, with the taking of Tihvin, the German offensive stalled. The front stretched out so far, that it was impossible to move further without collapsing the supply lines. Finns, whose aid was valuable to the Germans, stopped their advance, and weren't in a hurry to go on. The cold winter of 1941 began. The RKKA attempted to throw the Germans back all winter, but without much progress. The summer came, and the Leningrad Front fell silent.

2. Two assaults

Both Germany and the USSR planned to attack in the fall of 1942. The Germans rushed to crush the resistance of the besieged city. For Germany, taking Leningrad would be a strategic and a propaganda victory. The fall of such a major city would be a hit to the morale of the Red Army and all Soviet people. The operation titled "Northern Lights" was scheduled to begin in September. Hitler put Erich von Manstein in charge, who successfully took Sevastopol in the summer of 1942. His 11th army was moved up from the southern fronts, and reinforced with elements of the 18th army. The Germans assembled a force of 12 divisions.

The Soviet side planned to execute its own offensive. The most important part of it fell to the forces of the Volhov Front, which were meant to penetrate the German defenses south of Sinyavino, crush the Mginsk-Synyavino region group, and regroup with the forces of the Leningrad Front. Said forces would attack the enemy in the direction of the Tosna river. The Neva operational group would cross the Neva river, advance on Sinyavino, and reinforce the forces from the Volhov Front. The shortest point in the German defense was found near the Otradnoe village. There, only 16 kilometers separated the fronts. That section was heavily defended, but the Soviet high command expected that an attack from two directions at once could overwhelm it.

3. Combat action

A part of any attack is to confuse the enemy and obscure the direction of the main attack. Sadly, this could not be achieved in this case. By August 4th, German scouts reported that the Soviets would attack south of Lake Ladoga sometime in the middle of the month. Scouts also spotted moving Soviet forces. While the exact plan of attack was not revealed, the Germans made preparations to resist the Red Army's advance.

On August 19th, the forces of the Leningrad front moved out, attacking the German forces at Ust-Tosno. This village was fortified by the Germans with a system of bunkers, trenches, and AT gun positions on both sides of the river. The terrain that the Germans were located on was rather unfriendly to tanks, and swamps from the south and south-west prevented movement through them completely. The only path of armoured attack, the road to Ust-Tosno, was heavily mined, defended by trenches, and was within line of sight of AT batteries.

The attack started on August 19th at 10 am. After an artillery barrage, troops landed on the eastern shore of Tosna. After noon, an infantry regiment and a company of KV tanks joined the attack. The Germans saw KV tanks before, and knew what they were capable of. As soon as the tanks were sighted, all AT fire was focused on them. Tanks tried to maneuver, but fruitlessly. One fell into a crater and got stuck. Two went off-road and were trapped in the swamp. Two more were immobilized by mines. One of the immobilized tanks was penetrated by AT fire and burned. More tanks were assigned to the assault, but no more attempts to regroup were made in that region. Infantry had to proceed with no armour support.

Over several days, the battle raged on. Soviets managed to force the enemy out of Ust-Tosno and capture a portion of the right shore of the river next to the village of Ivanovskoye. German reserves, supported by aviation and artillery, managed to retake Ust-Tosno, gaining nearly all previously held territory. The Soviets retained their section of shore and half of Ivanovskoye.

The Volhov Front moved into battle on August 27th. General Starikov's 8th army struck between two German divisions defending the villages of Gontovaya Lipka and Tortolovo. The first two days of the offensive went very well. The Soviets penetrated the line of defense, crossed the Chernaya River, and got close to Sinyavino.

Keep in mind that the section of the front where the Soviets attacked was very difficult to traverse. General Meretskov, commander of the Volhov Front, later wrote in his memoirs that it would have been hard to find a worse place to attack. The region was full of swamps, forests, and peat bogs. The quality and quantity of roads was horrible. Attacking forces had nowhere to maneuver, the swampy land made it difficult to entrench. Instead of trenches and foxholes, wood and soil fortifications were built. Artillery and mortars had to be placed on wooden platforms so they would not sink into the ground. Sinyavino Heights, towering 10-15 meters over the flat plains, was the only reasonably dry place. They housed key German defenses in the path of the Soviet attack.

Despite the inappropriate landscape, infantry was accompanied by about 150 tanks. Several of those were curious tanks like the KV-8 and OT-34. The OT-34 was a T-34 equipped with a flamethrower, while retaining its 76 mm main gun. Flamethrower tanks were used very successfully. In memoirs, Soviet tank crewmen wrote that Germans would scatter as they approached. Sadly, due to the swampy terrain, tanks could not aid the offensive as much as they wanted to. In order to stop the Soviets, Germans forces from other fronts were moved to the region. By August 29th, Manstein's forces from Crimea were opposing the Soviet advance. The attack was stopped.

On August 29th, Germans sent their first Tiger tanks into battle. 4 tanks of this type, belonging to the 1st company of the 502 heavy tank battalion, were unloaded from the trains at 10 am, and went into battle at 11 am, barely giving German crews time to check their guns and instruments. This rush led to a very poor showing from the Tigers: one Tiger lost its transmission, two more tanks had their engines stall. The Germans hurriedly sent engineering vehicles to recover the tanks. Soviet commanders could not see that these were new tanks, and the Germans managed to recover all three.

By September 4th, the front reached equilibrium. The German reinforcements managed to stop the Soviet attack. 6 kilometers remained to the Neva river, but it was not possible to move even one meter forward.

On September 5th, Manstein's forces counterattacked. The forces at the front of the offensive were encircled and destroyed.

After regrouping, forces of the Volhov front again attacked towards Sinyavino. On September 8th, the 2nd Shock Army managed to destroy several German positions, but it was too late to seriously shift the situation. The offensive stalled. Soviet forces were taking heavy losses in the battles for Sinyavino, Workers' Villages #6 and #7, and Kruglaya Forest. The Soviet front was uneven, leading to small German squads moving past the spearheads, and interfering with supply lines and evacuation of the wounded.

On September 21st, the Germans finished regrouping and counterattacked the Sinyavino spearhead from the north and south. Soviet intelligence could not discover this attack in advance, and Meretskov was not expecting this move. German forces met up in the Gaitolovo region, encircling the 2nd and 8th Soviet armies. Attempts to break out were repelled. After closing the ring at the river Chernaya, German forces suppressed resistance inside the encirclement until October 2nd.

The Volhov Front was defeated. The Leningrad Front wasn't doing too great either. By October 10th, all that was gained was the "Neva Patch", a small foothold by Dubrovka. One battalion managed to hold it until April of 1943.

4. Conclusions

The Sinyavino offensive did not achieve its objectives, but it was not a complete failure, either. Because of it, Germans were forced to break up the forces meant to attack Leningrad in "Northern Lights". Considering that Manstein's soldiers had experience with storming cities, his presence could have proved fatal for Leningrad. Recall that the Germans did not plan to merely capture Leningrad, but completely destroy it. The sacrifice of Soviet soldiers was not in vain. Through a heavy price, they saved the city and its inhabitants.

The lack of Manstein's 11th army weakened the German offensive in the south. Many historians believe that the lack of these forces prevented a German victory in the Caucasus.

Original article available here.

Sunday, 6 December 2015

World of Tanks History Section: The Road of Life

An IV drip for a heavily wounded soldier cannot instantly heal him or protect him from bullets and shells, all it can do is keep him from dying. This is the role that the "road of life" played for Leningrad during the siege. During the difficult winter of 1941-1942, this road over the ice of Lake Ladoga saved the city from inevitable demise. There was no alternative for Leningrad.

The Germans had no intention of feeding the starving citizens of the city, and the loss of Leningrad would mean an almost guaranteed defeat for the USSR.

Ladoga: Threat and Hope

Everything began in August of 1941 when the Germans cut off the last railroad that connected Leningrad with the rest of the country. Soviet command decided to evacuate civilians through the lake, known for its powerful storms. In order to travel safely, ships carrying people had to take the Old Ladoga and New Ladoga channels. However, on September 8th, 1941, the Germans captured Shlisselburg. The land blockade was complete, and it was no longer possible to use water channels that entered the Neva near Shlisselburg.

As a result, the ships of the Ladoga navy were forced to travel directly through the lake. The trip between New Ladoga in the east and Osinovets on the west was short, only 60 kilometers, but very dangerous due to storms, rivalling the sea in their ferocity. To make things worse, there was no time to build lighthouses or mark the fairway.

Nevertheless, the first barges arrived at Osinovets on September 12th, 1941. September 17th, 1941, saw one of the biggest catastrophes in the history of lake and river travel. Towed barge #725 and the tugboat Orel was caught in a storm. Various sources estimated it to be carrying 1200-1500 people. Of those, the tugboat could save just over 200.

There was no alternative to the lake. In September 1941, the situation with supplies for Leningrad steadily worsened. The city needed 1100 tons of flour alone every day. The lake managed to supply half of that during the first blockade fall. Aircraft could only deliver 100 tons per day.

Ships and planes that delivered the necessities to the city didn't return with only civilians, but also soldiers to transfer east. About 20,000 men transferred during the German offensive on Tikhvin and Volkhovstroy in October helped prevent the enemy from taking those cities.

However, Tikhvin fell on November 9th, 1941, and supplies that were shipped there for Leningrad by rail stopped. This put the city's supply situation in danger, and it appeared to be on the brink of death.

Laying the Road of Life

By this time, the Soviets were already working on a project of a supply route over the ice of the lake. There was some experience in making such roads, and the most notable experience was only a year ago, during the war with Finland, a Red Army march over the ice of Vyborg bay. By the time Tikhvin fell, the first plans for the road already existed and work was underway.

The shallower north portion of Lake Ladoga froze faster. The Red Army needed to wait for this moment and perform reconnaissance. This happened on November 15-18th. A small column of 7 cars tried to make it across from the east shore, but unsuccessfully. The same thing happened to the second column. On November 18th, a recon group from the 88th Bridgebuilding Battalion, after spending 24 hours on the ice, managed to discover a route from Osinovets on the Leningrad side of the lake to Kobon village on the west side. The ice road went from an idea to a fact. Over the first few days, it could only support horse drawn sleds, later, cars.

On November 21st, 350 horsedrawn sleds arrives in Osinovets with the first 63 tons of flour for Leningrad. A thin strand stretched from Leningrad to the outside world, without which it would not survive the blockade. Officially, it was called "Military Automotive Road #102" (VAD-102), under the jurisdiction of Major-General of the Intendant Service, Afanasiy Mitrofanovich Shilov.

VAD-102 in Work and in Battle

Each kilogram of goods delivered over the road came at a cost of effort and life. Cars broke through the ice and sank, they were destroyed by German aircraft, the road itself had to be moved because the ice buckled under the pressure. A special schedule had to be established in order for the ice to not be overloaded. All possible efforts ensured that by January 1942, the Road of Life could deliver the minimum daily requirement of flour.

The return trips continued evacuating civilians and moving soldiers, and not just infantry. In February of 1942, the 124th Tank Brigade crossed the ice of the lake, dozens of heavy KV tanks. In order to ensure their safety, their turrets were taken off and towed separately on sleds.

The Germans were dissatisfied with the presence of this road right under their noses. The Luftwaffe started bombing it the moment it was built, and fighters hunted Soviet transport planes. When trucks started moving over the ice, they were fired on by artillery. The Germans were even preparing the 8th Tank Division to drive over the ice in order to break the supply line, but this plan was foiled due to a general offensive by the Leningrad and Volkov Fronts in January of 1942.

Soviet forces protected the Road of Life from the air and the ground. Here, a pilot from the 4th Guards Fighter Regiment, Leonid Georgievich Belousov repeated Aleksey Maresyev's heroic act. Both of his legs were frosbitten, gangrene set in, and they had to be amputated. Nevertheless, the pilot returned to battle in 1944. He received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union 13 years later.

In the summer and fall of 1942, the enemy transferred Italian torpedo boats and armed Siebel ferries. In October, the Germans attempted an offensive operation on the Suho island. The Soviet garrison fought off the attack with the help of the Lagoda navy.

Leningrad was ready for a second blockade winter. Supply lines over the lake worked flawlessly, and this work allowed for several major offensives by the Leningrad Front. Several other projects for moving supplies over ice materialized by the winter of 1942-43. There was even one as risky as building a trolleybus line over the lake, but it was declined. Instead, a railroad would be built, but the idea was not implemented in time.

On January 18th, 1943, Soviet forces penetrated the blockade. Even though the Road of Life continued its work until March, there was a new main supply artery, the Road of Victory, a railroad built in a record setting 17 days.

Original article available here.

Tuesday, 13 October 2015

Salary

There are those who claim that the USSR was a wondrous paradise where money was no object, and resources were unlimited. I already published a number of documents detailing exactly how important money was when dealing between commissariats and factories, but it was also considered very important when dealing with individuals as well.

"Decree of the State Committee of Defense #575ss
August 24th, 1941

On the salary of soldiers of destroyer battalions

The State Committee of Defense decrees that:
  1. Include members of the Podolsk, Serpukhov, Noginsk, Elektrostal, Krasnopakhorsk, Maliy-Yaroslavl, Mozhaisk, Volokolamsk, Istra, Klin, Dmitrov, Shelkovo, Kolomenskoye, Kashirskoye, Stupino, Lotoshino, Uvarov, and Shakhtersk regional destroyer battalions of the Moscow oblast in coverage of decree #76ss issued on July 9th, 1941, paying each soldier 8 rubles per day for food.
  2. The salary of the 6000 members of destroyer battalions of the Leningrad oblast front line will be paid from the NKVD budget, issuing each soldier 8 rubles per day for food.
    Members of destroyer battalions who used to work at establishments that were evacuated retain their previous monthly salary. Members who earned less than 300 rubles per month will be paid 300 rubles, as well as students and farmers.
  3. The People's Commissar of Finance will assign the additional budget to the NKVD to maintain the destroyer battalions.
Chair of the Committee of Defense, I. Stalin."


RGASPI 644-2-15

Wednesday, 12 August 2015

Leningrad SPGs

Remember the SPG on the T-26 chassis that showed up on the Leningrad Front? For the sake of convenience, it was referred to as SU-26, but it turns out that's not the real name at all, nor was it a wartime improvisation.

"USSR NKSM
Order of the Red Banner Voroshilov factory #174
Department #1
June 3rd, 1941
#2440

To the factory director

I ask you to order the Planning Department to begin preliminary development of the following:
  1. SU-51: ZiS-4 gun on the T-50 chassis.
  2. SU-52: AA SPG on the T-50 chassis.
  3. T-26-6: SPG with a KT-28 gun on the T-26 chassis.
    This work is to be done on the orders of Marshall of the Soviet Union, comrade Kulik
  4. T-26-8: AA SPG on the T-26 chassis.
    The project is open, but no work has been done."
Here are the SPGs being assembled.

"Tank assembly in a plant inside the S. M. Kirov Factory"


Monday, 10 August 2015

More on Tank Bunkers

I posted some photos of dug-in tanks used as bunkers before, but not many details about them. Here are some more details about the various tank components that were dug in around Leningrad. As you remember, the tank park on the Leningrad front was very colourful, and this is reflected in this document.

"In BT-2 turrets with dual machineguns that still had a mantlet, no changes were made. Where there were no mantlets, a successful combination was used (fig. 38) designed by Red Armyman Sidorov, nicknamed Sidorov's Mantlet. In this case, the DT mount from a 45 mm gun mantlet was used. As no more than 100 pillboxes could be made if we only used DT machineguns, a simple mantlet for the Maxim machinegun was made and has proven itself worthy (fig. 39).

Pillboxes made from old tank turrets at UNI make powerful fortifications. There is the "YuL" type for 45 mm guns and "VS" type for 76 mm guns and larger (fig 40-41).

Machinegun turrets are attached to a turret ring and installed on top of a blockhouse (fig. 42), but artillery turrets are installed on a special welded metal frame (fig. 43). Starting with a simple blockhouse on top of a ditch, we gradually perfected the design until we arrived at the method shown in fig. 44: turrets (machinegun and cannon) are placed on a blockhouse that is installed on top of a dugout where the crew lives. A more detailed description would be excessive. Let us focus on some characteristic cases:
  • A turret with a 152 mm gun needed to be installed (fig 45). This took 1950 man-days. 
  • Same with a turret with a 85 mm gun.
Both of these projects consumed 36 cubic meters of concrete with an internal volume of 9 cubic meters, which was too small for the crew to operate and supply shells. Additionally, the ammunition magazine was protected by only wood and stone. These problems were considered when installing 76 mm KV turrets, and the design was changed (fig. 46). Here, the above defects were corrected, each turret took 43 cubic meters of concrete with an internal volume of 25 cubic meters. Construction of each bunker with a dugout for the crew took 2000 man-days.

Lastly, a design made of stone and wood due to a lack of concrete in Leningrad (fig. 47).

When using the turrets in the winter, there is one downside that is also observed in other structures, but to a lesser extent. Condensation gathers on the inside.

The turret is cooled externally. Inside, it contains warm moist air that rises from the basement or from the breath of the crew. The turrets are covered with frost or moisture on the inside, which seeps into the turret traverse mechanism and freezes, locking the turret in place. This effect is accelerated by snow on the outside that melts.

Measures were taken to protect our turrets from the above problems.
  1. The turret and its platform are always kept clear of snow and water.
  2. The turret ring is covered with a warm cover made from sacks reinforced with felt.
According to our calculations, a turret needs a 5 cm thick cover. When the covers were applied, the condensation stopped. Special desiccant packets also helped (see fig. 53).

Fig. 46. "VS" type artillery pillbox with a reinforced concrete base and ammunition magazine.

Fig. 47. 

Report of an artillery pillbox with an armoured KV-4 type turret, built by 125th OSB from September 29th to October 8th, 1942

Photo #8. KV artillery pillbox with a 76 mm L-11 gun.
Photo #9. KV artillery pillbox with a 76 mm ZiS-5 gun.

Friday, 6 February 2015

Blockade Repairs

This listing of repair work works well to illustrate two things that I have mentioned in the past and one I have not. The first that I have mentioned is that the Leningrad Front was an odd mishmash of strange and obsolete vehicles, which you can see from mentions of BT-2s and machinegun-only BT-5s. The other is that it's a massive pain to keep track of how many vehicles were actually produced, as you can clearly see that it's not only the repair factories that are taking in damaged vehicles to restore them.

The thing I haven't mentioned yet is that Soviet factory nomenclature is incredibly annoying. This document lists all factories by their proper names, so you have both "Kirov factory" and "factory named after Kirov" (factory #185) mentioned on the same page. In order to prevent confusion, I refer to the latter by its number.

"Decree of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front #001311
Active Army
October 30th, 1942

Content: On the repairs of tanks, tank engines, and tractors at Leningrad factories

The Military Council of the Leningrad Front decrees that:
  1. The director of the Kirov factory, comrade Dlugach, must perform major repairs of 10 tank engines for factory #371 and 6 engines for Leningrad Front ABTU before December 1st, 1942.
  2. The director of factory #371, comrade Kozharinov must, before December 1st, 1942:
    1. Perform major and medium repairs on 10 KV-1 tanks.
    2. Assemble upper and lower turret rings for BT and T-26 tanks in the following amounts:
      1. For the Leningrad Front ABTU repair factory: 20 units.
      2. For factory #185: 10 units.
    3. Perform thermal conditioning and polishing of KV gearboxes for the Leningrad Front ABTU in the following amounts:
      1. Item #12-355: 50 units.
      2. Item #12-322: 50 units.
      3. Item #12-266: 30 units.
      4. Item #12-167: 30 units.
  3. The director of factory #185, comrade Muromets must, before December 1st, 1942:
    1. Convert machinegun BT-2 tanks into machinegun BT-5 tanks (10 units).
    2. Perform major and medium repairs on BT-5 tanks (5 units).
  4. The director of Yegorov factory, comrade Kolesnikov, must provide major repairs for 10 T-37 and T-38 tanks by December 1st, 1942.
  5. Repair factory #4 chief, Engineer-Colonel comrade Smirnov, must, before December 1st, 1942:
    1. Produce 10 new tanks.
    2. Provide major repairs for T-26 and T-60 tanks (5 items).
    3. Provide major repairs for T-26 engines (5 items) and gearboxes (10 items).
    4. Provide major repairs for 30 STZ tractors.
  6. Repair factory #27 chief, Engineer-Lieutenant-Colonel comrade Hoprov must, before December 1st, 1942:
    1. Convert machinegun BT-2 tanks into machinegun BT-5 tanks (10 units).
    2. Perform major repairs on 3 medium tanks (3 units).
    3. Perform major repairs on tank engines (5 units).
Coal, lubricant, fuel, electricity, and repair inventory is being distributed among factories.

Leningrad Front Commander, Lieutenant Govorov
Military Council Member, Secretary of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), A. Zhdanov
Military Council Member, N. Solovyev
Military Council Member, T. Shtykov"

Wednesday, 29 October 2014

Leningrad Front, Fall 1941

I already posted about the variety of vehicles that fought on the Eastern Front way past their obsolescence, and here are some more that show up in a table listing available vehicles on the Leningrad Front for September 27th, 1941.

The first column of each unit lists vehicles that are fully repaired, the second lists vehicles that are subject to minor repairs. The last two columns tally up the vehicles for both categories among all units, and the bottom row totals up the total amount of vehicles for the unit (armoured cars in the numerator, tanks in the denominator). The units listed are as follows: 123rd Tank Brigade, 124th, Tank Brigade, 42nd Army, 55th Army, 23rd Army, 115th Infantry Division, 8th Army, 21st NKVD Division, and Front Reserves. The vehicles listed are KV, T-34, T-28, BT-7, BT-5, BT-2, T-50, T-26, flamethrower tanks (likely T-26 modifications), BA-10 and BA-20 armoured cars.


Given the proximity of Kirov factory, the amount of KV tanks available for combat is not surprising, and neither is the amount of T-34s being overshadowed by older vehicles, like the BT series and T-26es. Six entire T-50s defend the northern capital, but I don't know if the Kirov prototype is one of them, or is not listed due to being owned by the factory instead of a military unit.

The previous article also mentions the 124th Tank Brigade, but about 13 months later, allowing us to track some of the more interesting vehicles. For instance, right now it has zero BT-2s, but two of the Front's 19 BT-2s can be found among its ranks in a year. Only two of the 51 KV tanks remain, replaced with other obsolete vehicles that migrate among the Front's units.

Friday, 3 October 2014

Flak vs KV

The following is a part of a debriefing of a KV-1 radio operator of the 86th Independent Tank Battalion of the 55th Army on the Leningrad Front, whose unit came under fire from the then unidentified high caliber guns.

"On September 18th, 1941, our crew, composed of the tank commander and company commander Lieutenant P.P. Ivanov, gun commander Senior Sergeant E.E. Ivanov, mechanic-driver Senior Sergeant B. Minevich, loader Sergeant A. Zibin...moved out from Kupchino to complete our mission in the direction of Moskovskaya Slavyanka-Pushkin, for cooperation with the 2nd battalion of the 142nd Infantry Regiment.

At 17:00-18:00, a messenger came from the HQ to the commander, with orders to enter the battle, and our four tanks (one from the 84th OTB) drove on the highway to Novaya village. In the middle of the highway, we turned left and drove into a village, I don't know what it was called. From the western part of the village, 200-250 meters away, a high caliber gun opened fire on us, likely larger than 76 mm. We were hit 3-4 times (this was likely a whole battery, judging by how fast they fired). The 4th or 5th shot hit the driver's viewport, and knocked it through, cracked the driver's head open, and the shell ignited, first a red fire, then a bright white. I started opening the hatch, the tank commander was crawling towards me. I barely managed to open the hatch (the turret was turned to the left), and jumped out of the 20-25 cm opening, into a roadsided ditch. Smoke and vapour was coming out of our vehicle."

Iam-Krasnoyarsk, the mastermind behind the largest collection of KV photographs I am aware of, has a photo of these KV tanks.


The writing on the side of the right KV isn't a patriotic slogan, commonly seen on tanks of that era, but German writing, claiming the kill for Heeres Flak Abt. 280.