Showing posts with label T-10. Show all posts
Showing posts with label T-10. Show all posts

Tuesday, 9 February 2016

Penetration Part 10: Cold War Subcaliber

I already posted penetration intel on Soviet post-war guns, but there were a lot of holes in that table. Let's skip a few years to another upgrade to the Soviet arsenal, the 125 mm smoothbore gun, and check our numbers again.

P.P. Isakov, Theory and Design of a Tank, 1982

Parameter
Type of shell (Gun)
3BM11 (M-62)
3BM9 (D-81)
3BM15 (D-81)
Caliber, mm
122
125
Type of shell
Rotating
Fin stabilized
Shell mass, kg
7.4
5.67
5.9
Core mass, kg
2.8
-
0.26
Muzzle velocity, m/s
1575
1800
1785
Muzzle energy (kJ)
9200
9200
9400
Penetration at 2000 meters at an angle from normal of:
0 degrees
320
245
400
45 degrees
190
185
200
60 degrees
110
140
150


The M-62 blows its AP performance out of the water. However, you can see that this is an era of HEAT, as the American intelligence talked about a 460 mm penetration HEAT shell. The subcaliber ammunition of the 125 mm gun is no slouch, however. The mediocre performance of 3BM9 is due to the shell being made from high hardness steel. Once tungsten carbide ammunition is used, the penetration soars to 400 mm, more than enough to combat any tank of the era.

Via andrei-bt.

Saturday, 28 November 2015

The Last Soviet Heavyweight

The last fighting machine named after Stalin would be the last Soviet heavy tank. It appeared at a time when the trend of constant increase in the weight of tanks came to a stop. Without the ability to grow protection and armament of tanks at the expense of weight, the designers of the IS-8 (T-10) used a number of creative solutions.

The end of an era of giants

Starting from late 1943, Soviet tank designers steadily increased the mass of their heavy tanks. Eventually, the initial stages of tank projects stepped over the psychological limit of 50 tons. The IS-3 was an exception, but it was essentially a deep modernization of the IS-2. Interestingly enough, there were doubts at the very top of the Main Armour Directorate (GBTU) about the suitability of the IS-3 for service. The Object 701, which hit a mass of 55 tons during the prototype phase, seemed much more desirable. Development of the future IS-4 was moving slowly: the first prototypes were ready for the summer of 1944, but the tank was constantly changed, and, despite being designed as an answer to the Ferdinand, only reached mass production in 1947. By that time, production of the IS-3 not only started, but also ended, netting a total of 1555 tanks.

The IS-4 was already yesterday's news in 1945. In the winter of 1945, the design of a new tank began, the IS-7. This designation, as well as the index "Object 260", covered three tanks that were significantly different in their design and characteristics. Designed as a counter to the German Maus, the IS-7 was the most perfect fighting machine of its class. The characteristics of the tank that was finalized in 1948 boggle the mind even today: with a mass of 68 tons, it could reach a speed of 60 kph, all with the armament and protection no less than that of the 189 ton German monster, even superior in some regards.

However, the increasing mass was a trap for heavy tanks. ChKZ managed to produce the IS-4 with great difficulty: only 55 tanks in 1947 and 155 more in 1948. The IS-7 was even more problematic: it needed a new engine, the production of which was yet to be mastered. The 68 ton weight meant that new recovery vehicles were needed, and the tactical mobility of the tank was questionable. Few bridges, even railroad ones, could carry such a monster. There was also an issue with railroad platforms that could carry sufficient weight. The problems that were bypassed in one way or another in 1941 caught up. The same issues would have to be resolved if the KV-3, KV-4, or KV-5 reached mass production.

Weighing all pros and cons, Soviet leadership made the only correct choice. On February 18th, 1949, the Council of Ministers of the USSR had a meeting which included the commanders of the Armoured and Mechanized Forces, as well as representatives from GBTU. The result of the meeting was decree #701-270ss, which stopped the development and production of tanks heavier than 50 tons. The IS-7 was doomed, as was the IS-4 (the last 19 tanks were amde in 1949).

The same decree ordered SKB-2 of ChKZ and the experimental department of factory #100 (Chelyabinsk) to begin development of a new heavy tank, no more than 50 tons in weight. The design had to incorporate components from the IS-4 to speed up development. At the same time, the armour layout and hull design were to be taken from the IS-3, as the most appropriate for this weight. The design team had very limitd time: the first three tanks were to be ready in August of 1949, and another ten in September, for military trials. In total, only half a year was allotted to the production of a new tank, which was yet to be designed.

Working together

In order to solve such a difficult problem, two competing design bureaus were involved. On March 19th, 1949, the factory #100 design group was included in the newly created VNII-100 (Leningrad). The first task given to the institute was the design of the new heavy tank. J. Ya. Kotin headed this new team. Leningrad was tasked with development, and workers in Chelyabinsk put their designs into metal. 41 members of VNII-100 were sent to Chelyabinsk. The vehicle also got a Chelyabinsk index. Vehicles developed in Leningrad were designated Object 2##, whereas Chelyabinsk tanks were Object 7##. For example, the IS-4 was Object 701, and IS-7 was Object 260. This vehicle received the code 730, or Object 730.

Some sources claim that the Object 730 was based on the IS-4, but that, to put it lightly, is contestable. The IS-5 was effectively a new tank, only inheriting the V-12 engine from the IS-4, and, initially, the cooling system with two large fans. Otherwise, the vehicle that was designed in April of 1949 was the product of a completely different school. The IS-4, especially its hull and turret, was the product of 1943 technology. Since then, Chelyabinsk produced the IS-3, which had almost identical armour, and Leningrad produced the IS-7, which left the IS-4 far behind. Other components were greatly improved over the previous 5 years. A large amount of work was done on the suspension, transmission, and other components during the design of the IS-7. Additionally, as mentioned above, the development was mostly based in Leningrad, and the experience of local tank designers was fully applied to Object 730.

Looking closely, the IS-5 is a creative reformatting of the IS-7 mod. 1948. The front pike with driver's periscopes on the side, the rear with its characteristic slope, the V-shaped bottom of the hull and curved sides, all this indicates the heritage of the Object 730. The turret, a combination of IS-3 and IS-7 solutions, also has nothing in common with the IS-4. Since the mass of the IS-5 was limited to 50 tons, the armour had to be reduced for the first time since the KV-1S. Thanks to scientific work to increase the effectiveness of armour without thickening it, a series of solutions were implemented, making the tank more protected than the IS-3. Compared to the IS-4, and especially the IS-7, the protection of the tank decreased. Such was the cost for lowering its weight to 50 tons.

Another regression was seen in the armament. The D-25T, which was installed in the IS-2, IS-3, and IS-4, was already not enough for the military in 1944. The IS-7 received a new 130 mm S-70 gun, but it was not possible to install it in an IS-5. As a result, the IS-5 received the same D-25T. The armour and armament of the tank was closer to the end of WWII, rather than the end of the 1940s.

A tank of compromise

The Americans faced the same problem around the same time. Starting with the 64 ton T-29 Heavy Tank, American tank designers managed to develop a final tank weighing in at 65 tons. While Soviet tank designers were working on the 50 ton IS-5, their American colleagues were working on the T43 heavy tank with a 55 ton limit. As a result, the M103 Heavy Tank turned out to be slightly heavier at 56.7 tons, but this was still significantly lower than the 65 ton heavy tanks of the late 1940s.

The cost of weight reduction was weak armour. The turret suffered the most. A significant advantage of the American tank was its 120 mm gun, but this made the vehicle very large. The characteristics of the FV214 Conqueror were similar, but it turned out to be even heavier than the M103, 65 tons. One can say that all leading armies of the world made the same step back, but the Americans and British managed to improve the tank's armament. The cost was increased size, and therefore weight.

Even though the armament and armour were steps back, it would be wrong to consider the IS-5 a failure. For the late 1940s, armour that was completely immune to the German 88 mm gun was standard. The D-25T was equally modern, as its enemies weren't German tanks, but those of the former allies.

Even the M46 and M47 Patton tanks that appeared in the late 40s and early 50s were not proper adversaries for the IS-3, let alone the new tank. Until the 105 mm L7 gun began appearing in foreign tanks, the front armour of Soviet heavies was reliably impenetrable. By the way, trials of the IS-5 hull performed in May-June of 1950 showed that the front armour withstands hits from 122 mm shells at 100 meters. The Soviet Army received a modern heavy tank.

As mentioned above, many technical solutions migrated from the IS-7 to this tank. This includes the novel bundled torsion bars. This system allowed the length of the torsion bars to be drastically reduced. Other elements of the suspension (road wheels, idlers, tracks) were further improvements of IS-3 components. The suspension looked similar, but the design was drastically altered and reliability improved. It was designed in such a way that it could be installed on other IS series tanks without significant changes.

In the mid 1950s, IS-2, IS-3, and ISU vehicles were modernized. This meant that the new tank and the old tanks had identical suspensions. The use of a 750 hp V-12 engine allowed for superior mobility compared to the IS-3. The maximum speed increased to 42 kph. Several types of planetary transmissions were developed for the IS-5. It's worth mentioning that some components were tested on IS-4 and IS-7 vehicles lightened to 50 tons.

Preliminary blueprints were shown to the state commission in April of 1949. By June, working blueprints were complete. For several reasons, there was a delay, and the first hull only reached ChKZ on July 30th, and second on August 9th. The first IS-5 was finished on September 14th. The tank had a 6-step gearbox and planetary transmission from the IS-4. Trials showed that the transmission and cooling system do not last for the required 2000 km warranty period. As a result, an 8-step planetary transmission developed by VNII-100 was installed, a design with roots in the IS-7. Instead of a fan-based cooling system, an ejector system was used, like on the IS-7. Two more tanks were build in December of 1949, which participated in the winter trials.

Renaming

Trials requested by decree #701-270ss started with a half-year delay, in February of 1950. Three tanks were finished by April 5th and sent to Lomonosov, near Leningrad, where they underwent trials for the duration of April. Defects discovered during those trials were corrected by ChKZ, after which the tanks underwent more trials at Kubinka in October-November of 1950. Earlier, in June-July of 1950, the tanks underwent trials in Central Asia. In total, 13 IS-5 tanks were built in 1949-1950, and another 2 in 1951.

Changes were constantly made to the IS-5 to improve reliability. The tank served as a test bed for multiple systems, including an autoloader mechanism. The total sum of improvements was so great that it was decided that the tank should be renamed. In early 1953, the tank was named IS-8. This would be the name the tank would serve under, had Stalin not died on March 5th, 1953. In May, the tank was already referred to as only Object 730 in letters. It's possible that this was just a precaution to weather the power struggle in the Politbureau. On June 26th, L.P. Beria was arrested, and N.S. Khrushchev came into power.

The new heavy tank was accepted for service by a decree of the Council of Ministers on November 28th, 1953. This same decree assigned it the index T-10. The first 30 T-10s were built in 1954, and 190 tanks were built in the first series at ChKZ. Kotin's tank was the last to carry the name of a notable Soviet leader. 15 years prior, Kotin worked on the SMK heavy tank (Sergei Mironovich Kirov), which started the trend of naming heavy tanks instead of giving them numbers.

The T-10 was a temporary measure. In 1952, a program began to create a next generation tank, the result of which was the Object 777. The T-10 was destined to outlive its successor, which never moved past a scale model, as well as the next wave of heavy tanks, which birthed Objects 277, 279, and 770. In 1958, LKZ began production of T-10s, but only once did annual production surpass 200 units. In 1965, ChKZ built the last 60 T-10s, and that was the end for Soviet heavy tanks. A new type of tank appeared on the horizon, including the best parts of heavy and medium vehicles, the Main Battle Tank.

Original article by Yuri Pasholok.

Friday, 17 July 2015

Object 268 Loading Instructions

A while ago, I caught a glimpse of the autoloader operation instructions in the IS-7. Today, I came across a similar label inside the Object 268, a successor to the ISU-152 on the IS-8/T-10 chassis in this video.


"Instructions of operation of the loading mechanism.
  1. Turn on electrical power. The green light should turn on. Open the gun breech.
  2. Place the shell on the tray and mover out the frame, holding the shell in place.
  3. After the shell is secured, place the propellant in the tray and press the "ram" button. If the propellant is not rammed in all the way, open the manual control cover. The red light should turn on. Using the "back" button, return the chain and, having lowered the cover, repeat the ramming process."
The ram button is in the center of the control panel, with the indicator lights on the right. The manual control box is on the left.

Wednesday, 11 February 2015

Swedish Intel

Today's article is brought to you by Something Awful forums poster TheFluff who works with Swedish archive documents. He dug up a rather interesting instruction to the Swedish army attache in Moscow, which reveals that the Swedes had a rather high opinion of Soviet armour:


"Armored fighting vehicle development in the Soviet Union

Briefing for the army attache in Moscow, 1962-09-03, 13:00-13:50.

(Handwritten: head of the vehicle department, head of the intelligence section [both of the army ordnance administration] and Sundin [engineer at the intelligence section at the time])
  1. The Russians started committing a great deal of resources to the AFV sector as early as in the 1920's. It is a very telling fact that during the 1931-1939 period, when other great powers held trials with maybe 5-10 different tank types and took 3-4 types to series production, the Russians trialed 32 different tank designs, both foreign and domestic, and took 10 different types to significant series production runs. The Russian tanks have heavily influenced the tank and anti-tank technology of other countries ever since the late summer of 1941, when the Russians surprised the Germans with the T-34 tank. For a long time - since 1944 - our best reference manuals on armored fighting vehicle technology have been Russian works. 
  2. Our current knowledge regarding Russian AFV's is documented on a number of datasheets, which are kept at the army attache office. The general characteristics of these vehicles will be shown on the following slides:
    1. T-34-85, IS-3 (both 1945)
    2. T-54, T-10, PT-76, ASU-57 (four different chassis types)
    3. APC (8 wheels) 
    4. SU-100 - T-54 chassis
    5. ZSU-57-2 - T-54 chassis
    6. ISU-152 - T-10 (IS-3) chassis 
    7. "SU400"- T-10 (IS-3) chassis 
    8. BTR-50 - PT-76 chassis
    9. "SU-85/62" - PT-76 chassis
    10. Rocket launcher vehicle - PT-76 chassis
    11. Artillery tractor - ASU-57 chassis
  3. Regarding new AFV's, the following intelligence is of primary interest:
    1. Photos or drawings
    2. Designation 
    3. Type of armament and armament characteristics (gun bore, guided missiles, any electronics, turret or fixed casemate) (Handwritten note next to point 3) Card with this text provided to the army attache. The attache said he would request that a tank expert be sent over to be present at parades and other such events in the future.")
    4. Weight (chassis class, number of road wheels)
    5. Amphibious capability or lack of such capability
    6. Presence of external armor screens or such things (on heavier tanks and other well armored vehicles)
    7. Night fighting equipment"

Saturday, 20 December 2014

Modern Soviet Tank Ergonomics

The Armoured Journal yields another article of interest, this time on human factors of tanks by M.N. Tikhonov and I.D. Kudrin: Human Factors and Scientific Progress in Tank Building, submitted on May 18th, 1991. The article mostly contains very general thoughts on things that are rather obvious to us now (ability to fight in irradiated environments, tanks that are able to drive for longer without stopping being more tiring for their crews, etc), but there is a table of something we've seen before, a table of ergonomic factors of some tanks!

Table 2. Volume occupied by one crewman in a tank, meters cubed.

Only the volumes are given this time for various tanks (commander, gunner, driver, loader, who is of course absent in the T-64 and T-72). It's not as detailed as what we've seen before, but at least we can compare these four tanks.

Comparing the heavy and medium contemporaries, the heavy T-10 and medium T-55, one might expect the heavy tank to be roomier, but no such luck here. The volumes for each crewman are comparable. The commander in the T-10 has a slightly more luxurious workspace, but its gunner is slightly more cramped. The driver of the T-10 also has a slight edge over his medium comrade, but the loader in the T-55 lives a life of royalty, as he has nearly twice as much space to work with as the T-10 loader. 

Moving on to the next generation, the changing of priorities is noticeable. The article talks about how increasing penetration of modern ammunition tipped the scales away from armour. The most effective defense, now more than ever, was "don't get hit", and Soviet tanks became shorter and stouter to avoid this fate. However, the loss of one crewman meant that the change didn't impact the crew too negatively. For instance, the commander's workspace decreased to the levels of a driver of the old generation tanks, but the gunner's workspace actually grew in side by a significant amount. There was also much more room for the driver.

As for the two modern tanks, they aren't too different. The "budget" T-72 is a little smaller across the board than the T-64. The commander barely loses any space at all, but the gunner and driver both suffer significantly more. Still, they are doing much better than their T-55 counterparts.