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Releases: paulirotta/ahma

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v0.19.2

v0.19.2 Latest
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@github-actions github-actions released this 08 Aug 14:54
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.19.2
56346e4
This commit was created on GitHub.com and signed with GitHub’s verified signature.
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Learn about vigilant mode.

Ahma v0.19.2

Built from main via the CI pipeline.

Install

Linux / macOS:

curl -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"

Windows (PowerShell 5.1+):

irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex

Update an existing install:

ahma update

Supply chain protection — SLSA Level 3 via Sigstore

Every release archive and raw binary has a GitHub Build Provenance Attestation (Sigstore).
Attestations are keyless — signed by an ephemeral Fulcio certificate bound to this workflow's
OIDC identity. No private key exists; no rotation is needed.

ahma update and ahma verify --self verify the attestation automatically.

Manual out-of-band verification:

gh attestation verify ahma-release-linux-x86_64.tar.gz \
  --repo paulirotta/ahma

AGPL + SLSA: two-layer supply chain defence

The ahma binary and security-relevant crates are AGPL-3.0-or-later.
AGPL requires source disclosure for any distributed or network-accessible modification,
closing the route of shipping a backdoored binary without publishing the changes.
The Sigstore attestation verifies that what you install was built from the published,
auditable source by the official CI pipeline.

Building from auditable source is always an option:

cargo install --git https://github.com/paulirotta/ahma ahma_bin --bin ahma --root ~/.local --locked

See docs/release-signing.md
for the trust model and verification details.

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v0.19.1

v0.19.1

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@github-actions github-actions released this 07 Aug 11:55
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.19.1
8b1802b
This commit was created on GitHub.com and signed with GitHub’s verified signature.
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
Verified
Learn about vigilant mode.

Ahma v0.19.1

Built from main via the CI pipeline.

Install

Linux / macOS:

curl -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"

Windows (PowerShell 5.1+):

irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex

Update an existing install:

ahma update

Supply chain protection — SLSA Level 3 via Sigstore

Every release archive and raw binary has a GitHub Build Provenance Attestation (Sigstore).
Attestations are keyless — signed by an ephemeral Fulcio certificate bound to this workflow's
OIDC identity. No private key exists; no rotation is needed.

ahma update and ahma verify --self verify the attestation automatically.

Manual out-of-band verification:

gh attestation verify ahma-release-linux-x86_64.tar.gz \
  --repo paulirotta/ahma

AGPL + SLSA: two-layer supply chain defence

The ahma binary and security-relevant crates are AGPL-3.0-or-later.
AGPL requires source disclosure for any distributed or network-accessible modification,
closing the route of shipping a backdoored binary without publishing the changes.
The Sigstore attestation verifies that what you install was built from the published,
auditable source by the official CI pipeline.

Building from auditable source is always an option:

cargo install --git https://github.com/paulirotta/ahma ahma_bin --bin ahma --root ~/.local --locked

See docs/release-signing.md
for the trust model and verification details.

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v0.19.0

v0.19.0

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@github-actions github-actions released this 03 Aug 19:31
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.19.0
f148a55
This commit was created on GitHub.com and signed with GitHub’s verified signature.
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
Verified
Learn about vigilant mode.

Ahma v0.19.0

Built from main via the CI pipeline.

Install

Linux / macOS:

curl -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"

Windows (PowerShell 5.1+):

irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex

Update an existing install:

ahma update

Supply chain protection — SLSA Level 3 via Sigstore

Every release archive and raw binary has a GitHub Build Provenance Attestation (Sigstore).
Attestations are keyless — signed by an ephemeral Fulcio certificate bound to this workflow's
OIDC identity. No private key exists; no rotation is needed.

ahma update and ahma verify --self verify the attestation automatically.

Manual out-of-band verification:

gh attestation verify ahma-release-linux-x86_64.tar.gz \
  --repo paulirotta/ahma

AGPL + SLSA: two-layer supply chain defence

The ahma binary and security-relevant crates are AGPL-3.0-or-later.
AGPL requires source disclosure for any distributed or network-accessible modification,
closing the route of shipping a backdoored binary without publishing the changes.
The Sigstore attestation verifies that what you install was built from the published,
auditable source by the official CI pipeline.

Building from auditable source is always an option:

cargo install --git https://github.com/paulirotta/ahma ahma_bin --bin ahma --root ~/.local --locked

See docs/release-signing.md
for the trust model and verification details.

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v0.18.0

v0.18.0

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@github-actions github-actions released this 02 Aug 12:42
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.18.0
b387dbc
This commit was created on GitHub.com and signed with GitHub’s verified signature.
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
Verified
Learn about vigilant mode.

Ahma v0.18.0

Built from main via the CI pipeline.

Install

Linux / macOS:

curl -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"

Windows (PowerShell 5.1+):

irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex

Update an existing install:

ahma update

Supply chain protection — SLSA Level 3 via Sigstore

Every release archive and raw binary has a GitHub Build Provenance Attestation (Sigstore).
Attestations are keyless — signed by an ephemeral Fulcio certificate bound to this workflow's
OIDC identity. No private key exists; no rotation is needed.

ahma update and ahma verify --self verify the attestation automatically.

Manual out-of-band verification:

gh attestation verify ahma-release-linux-x86_64.tar.gz \
  --repo paulirotta/ahma

AGPL + SLSA: two-layer supply chain defence

The ahma binary and security-relevant crates are AGPL-3.0-or-later.
AGPL requires source disclosure for any distributed or network-accessible modification,
closing the route of shipping a backdoored binary without publishing the changes.
The Sigstore attestation verifies that what you install was built from the published,
auditable source by the official CI pipeline.

Building from auditable source is always an option:

cargo install --git https://github.com/paulirotta/ahma ahma_bin --bin ahma --root ~/.local --locked

See docs/release-signing.md
for the trust model and verification details.

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v0.17.1

v0.17.1

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@github-actions github-actions released this 01 Aug 06:55
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.17.1
56bcd63
This commit was created on GitHub.com and signed with GitHub’s verified signature.
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
Verified
Learn about vigilant mode.

Ahma v0.17.1

Built from main via the CI pipeline.

Install

Linux / macOS:

curl -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"

Windows (PowerShell 5.1+):

irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex

Update an existing install:

ahma update

Supply chain protection — SLSA Level 3 via Sigstore

Every release archive and raw binary has a GitHub Build Provenance Attestation (Sigstore).
Attestations are keyless — signed by an ephemeral Fulcio certificate bound to this workflow's
OIDC identity. No private key exists; no rotation is needed.

ahma update and ahma verify --self verify the attestation automatically.

Manual out-of-band verification:

gh attestation verify ahma-release-linux-x86_64.tar.gz \
  --repo paulirotta/ahma

AGPL + SLSA: two-layer supply chain defence

The ahma binary and security-relevant crates are AGPL-3.0-or-later.
AGPL requires source disclosure for any distributed or network-accessible modification,
closing the route of shipping a backdoored binary without publishing the changes.
The Sigstore attestation verifies that what you install was built from the published,
auditable source by the official CI pipeline.

Building from auditable source is always an option:

cargo install --git https://github.com/paulirotta/ahma ahma_bin --bin ahma --root ~/.local --locked

See docs/release-signing.md
for the trust model and verification details.

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v0.17.0

v0.17.0

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@github-actions github-actions released this 31 Jul 07:09
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.17.0
7c1932d
This commit was created on GitHub.com and signed with GitHub’s verified signature.
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
Verified
Learn about vigilant mode.

Ahma v0.17.0

Built from main via the CI pipeline.

Install

Linux / macOS:

curl -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"

Windows (PowerShell 5.1+):

irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex

Update an existing install:

ahma update

Supply chain protection — SLSA Level 3 via Sigstore

Every release archive and raw binary has a GitHub Build Provenance Attestation (Sigstore).
Attestations are keyless — signed by an ephemeral Fulcio certificate bound to this workflow's
OIDC identity. No private key exists; no rotation is needed.

ahma update and ahma verify --self verify the attestation automatically.

Manual out-of-band verification:

gh attestation verify ahma-release-linux-x86_64.tar.gz \
  --repo paulirotta/ahma

AGPL + SLSA: two-layer supply chain defence

The ahma binary and security-relevant crates are AGPL-3.0-or-later.
AGPL requires source disclosure for any distributed or network-accessible modification,
closing the route of shipping a backdoored binary without publishing the changes.
The Sigstore attestation verifies that what you install was built from the published,
auditable source by the official CI pipeline.

Building from auditable source is always an option:

cargo install --git https://github.com/paulirotta/ahma ahma_bin --bin ahma --root ~/.local --locked

See docs/release-signing.md
for the trust model and verification details.

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v0.16.9

v0.16.9

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@github-actions github-actions released this 29 Jul 04:48
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.16.9
7c46519
This commit was created on GitHub.com and signed with GitHub’s verified signature.
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
Verified
Learn about vigilant mode.

Ahma v0.16.9

Built from main via the CI pipeline.

Install

Linux / macOS:

curl -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"

Windows (PowerShell 5.1+):

irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex

Update an existing install:

ahma update

Supply chain protection — SLSA Level 3 via Sigstore

Every release archive and raw binary has a GitHub Build Provenance Attestation (Sigstore).
Attestations are keyless — signed by an ephemeral Fulcio certificate bound to this workflow's
OIDC identity. No private key exists; no rotation is needed.

ahma update and ahma verify --self verify the attestation automatically.

Manual out-of-band verification:

gh attestation verify ahma-release-linux-x86_64.tar.gz \
  --repo paulirotta/ahma

AGPL + SLSA: two-layer supply chain defence

The ahma binary and security-relevant crates are AGPL-3.0-or-later.
AGPL requires source disclosure for any distributed or network-accessible modification,
closing the route of shipping a backdoored binary without publishing the changes.
The Sigstore attestation verifies that what you install was built from the published,
auditable source by the official CI pipeline.

Building from auditable source is always an option:

cargo install --git https://github.com/paulirotta/ahma ahma_bin --bin ahma --root ~/.local --locked

See docs/release-signing.md
for the trust model and verification details.

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v0.16.8

v0.16.8

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@github-actions github-actions released this 28 Jul 17:16
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.16.8
fa0b8ee
This commit was created on GitHub.com and signed with GitHub’s verified signature.
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
Verified
Learn about vigilant mode.

Ahma v0.16.8

Built from main via the CI pipeline.

Install

Linux / macOS:

curl -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"

Windows (PowerShell 5.1+):

irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex

Update an existing install:

ahma update

Supply chain protection — SLSA Level 3 via Sigstore

Every release archive and raw binary has a GitHub Build Provenance Attestation (Sigstore).
Attestations are keyless — signed by an ephemeral Fulcio certificate bound to this workflow's
OIDC identity. No private key exists; no rotation is needed.

ahma update and ahma verify --self verify the attestation automatically.

Manual out-of-band verification:

gh attestation verify ahma-release-linux-x86_64.tar.gz \
  --repo paulirotta/ahma

AGPL + SLSA: two-layer supply chain defence

The ahma binary and security-relevant crates are AGPL-3.0-or-later.
AGPL requires source disclosure for any distributed or network-accessible modification,
closing the route of shipping a backdoored binary without publishing the changes.
The Sigstore attestation verifies that what you install was built from the published,
auditable source by the official CI pipeline.

Building from auditable source is always an option:

cargo install --git https://github.com/paulirotta/ahma ahma_bin --bin ahma --root ~/.local --locked

See docs/release-signing.md
for the trust model and verification details.

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v0.16.7

v0.16.7

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@github-actions github-actions released this 28 Jul 14:45
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.16.7
513e020
This commit was created on GitHub.com and signed with GitHub’s verified signature.
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
Verified
Learn about vigilant mode.

Ahma v0.16.7

Built from main via the CI pipeline.

Install

Linux / macOS:

curl -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"

Windows (PowerShell 5.1+):

irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex

Update an existing install:

ahma update

Supply chain protection — SLSA Level 3 via Sigstore

Every release archive and raw binary has a GitHub Build Provenance Attestation (Sigstore).
Attestations are keyless — signed by an ephemeral Fulcio certificate bound to this workflow's
OIDC identity. No private key exists; no rotation is needed.

ahma update and ahma verify --self verify the attestation automatically.

Manual out-of-band verification:

gh attestation verify ahma-release-linux-x86_64.tar.gz \
  --repo paulirotta/ahma

AGPL + SLSA: two-layer supply chain defence

The ahma binary and security-relevant crates are AGPL-3.0-or-later.
AGPL requires source disclosure for any distributed or network-accessible modification,
closing the route of shipping a backdoored binary without publishing the changes.
The Sigstore attestation verifies that what you install was built from the published,
auditable source by the official CI pipeline.

Building from auditable source is always an option:

cargo install --git https://github.com/paulirotta/ahma ahma_bin --bin ahma --root ~/.local --locked

See docs/release-signing.md
for the trust model and verification details.

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v0.16.6

v0.16.6

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@github-actions github-actions released this 15 Jul 10:42
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
v0.16.6
b809b0b
This commit was created on GitHub.com and signed with GitHub’s verified signature.
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
Verified
Learn about vigilant mode.

Ahma v0.16.6

Built from main via the CI pipeline.

Install

Linux / macOS:

curl -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.sh | bash
export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"

Windows (PowerShell 5.1+):

irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paulirotta/ahma/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex

Update an existing install:

ahma update

Supply chain protection — SLSA Level 3 via Sigstore

Every release archive and raw binary has a GitHub Build Provenance Attestation (Sigstore).
Attestations are keyless — signed by an ephemeral Fulcio certificate bound to this workflow's
OIDC identity. No private key exists; no rotation is needed.

ahma update and ahma verify --self verify the attestation automatically.

Manual out-of-band verification:

gh attestation verify ahma-release-linux-x86_64.tar.gz \
  --repo paulirotta/ahma

AGPL + SLSA: two-layer supply chain defence

The ahma binary and security-relevant crates are AGPL-3.0-or-later.
AGPL requires source disclosure for any distributed or network-accessible modification,
closing the route of shipping a backdoored binary without publishing the changes.
The Sigstore attestation verifies that what you install was built from the published,
auditable source by the official CI pipeline.

Building from auditable source is always an option:

cargo install --git https://github.com/paulirotta/ahma ahma_bin --bin ahma --root ~/.local --locked

See docs/release-signing.md
for the trust model and verification details.

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