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0.11.0

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Add outline scaling to the tool editor (#258)

The tool editor could only change an outline's size one vertex at a
time. A Size group in the toolbar now shows the outline's width and
height and scales the whole outline when a width or height is typed, or
by a percentage that applies once and returns to 100.

Scaling is about the vertex-mean centre, the centre rotation uses, so a
placed tool keeps its position when a bin re-syncs it. Interior rings
scale with the outline. Cutouts move with it but keep their own size.
The photo underlay matrix and the Detail slider's base are scaled about
the same centre in one history entry, as rotate and flip do.

The fields scale on Enter only and discard typed text on blur. A drag
snapshots the outline on mousedown, before the blur that mousedown
causes, so a scale committed on blur would be overwritten by the drag
while the photo matrix and Detail base stayed scaled.

NumericInput blurred itself on Escape and the blur committed the typed
text, so Escape applied the value it was meant to discard, and Enter
committed twice. Enter now commits once and Escape discards.

The photo guide gains a section on tall or thick objects: the oversize
by edge height and camera distance, and how to correct it with the Size
fields.

Closes #105

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

0.10.1

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fix(docker): install current Pillow and torch dependencies in the ima…

…ge (#239)

The image installs torch and torchvision from the PyTorch CPU index
first. That step also took their dependencies from the CPU index, which
carries Pillow 12.3.0 at most, and the later requirements install left
the satisfied Pillow in place. Images therefore shipped Pillow 12.3.0
even after Pillow 13.0.0 fixed a large set of decoder vulnerabilities,
and filelock and setuptools lagged in the same way.

Install only torch and torchvision from the CPU index and let the
requirements install resolve their dependencies from PyPI. Require
Pillow 13.0.0 so existing environments upgrade too. Upgrade pip before
installing, since the base image's pip 25.0.1 has known install-time
vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

0.10.0

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test: preserve pocket depth in split ZIP exports (#235)

An older split job could leave 17.45 mm ZIP pockets beside a full STL
that already contained the new 12 mm pockets. The export lock in #234
prevents that mismatch.

Measure both downloads after overlapping bin and session exports, saved
depth changes, per-tool overrides and cached generation.

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

0.9.4

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fix: keep overhanging tools, detect paper on dark backgrounds, mask e…

…very object (#226)

* fix: keep overhanging tools, detect paper on dark backgrounds, mask every object

Saliency tracers ran on a crop clipped to the paper rect, so a tool
overhanging the sheet came back cut flat at the paper edge, and a tool
crossing the sheet split the bright region so the crop kept only the
larger half and the tracer masked the printed ruling. The crop now merges
sheet fragments of the same tone that line up across a tool-sized gap,
and grows on any side the mask touches before running again. Gemini does
not crop and is unchanged.

Paper corner detection blacked out the U2-Net mask before looking for the
sheet, but on a dark background the sheet itself is the salient object,
so the upload came back with no corners. A mask over 40% of the frame is
now ignored and a masked miss retries unmasked.

The mask prompt for dimension-accurate Gemini models asked for one tool
while the contour tracer emits a polygon per object; it now asks for
every object, and prompt choice no longer piggybacks on the alignment
set. TRACERS auto-detect behaviour is documented.

Finger holes were rebuilt with hand-written argument lists at six sites,
so a field survived only where someone remembered it. Rebuilds now go
through model_copy or ScaledFingerHole.from_finger_hole, a test walks
FingerHole.model_fields, and the never-called drawer_service module is
removed.

Closes #212
Closes #213
Closes #223
Closes #214

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

* fix: damp saliency crop growth and pin the fragment gap

A grown crop shows more background, which can flip saliency onto the
sheet; that mask touches every edge and would have won unconditionally.
A grown attempt whose foreground exceeds four times the previous one now
loses to the previous crop. The fragment merge gap is fixed to the largest
fragment's long side so chained merges cannot walk across the frame.
Contour points are cast to int32 before drawContours. A library hole not
yet on a placement keeps the library depth_override on sync. README says
the grown crop reaches remote providers as extra requests.

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

0.9.3

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Fix stacking lip cutout depth limits (#217)

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

0.9.2

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fix(auth): refuse a namespace claim onto an occupied directory (#209)

* fix(auth): refuse a namespace claim onto an occupied directory

claim() returned early for any namespace without a deletion marker, so the
refusal that protects a namespace still holding files only covered namespaces
something had explicitly marked. an unmarked directory holding files was
claimed silently.

POST /api/admin/users takes a caller-supplied id, makes it the account's
storage namespace, and ensure_user_dirs adopts an existing tree without
touching it, so an account created on a colliding id opened onto another
account's files. a marker is the wrong condition: an account creation
interrupted before its record landed, or a volume restored without its
users.json, leaves occupied directories and no marker at all.

refuse on the state of the directory instead. an empty or absent namespace
stays claimable, which is the ordinary case. adoption survives only where it
is the caller's purpose: first-run setup taking a single-user library into
authenticated use, create-admin, and an import that passes
adopt_existing_storage. a marked namespace is refused even then, because those
files' owner was already destroyed here.

the claim still runs before the account is written, so a refusal leaves no
account and no directories behind.

Closes #208

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

* fix(auth): refuse storage adoption from an admin token

review feedback: the adopt_existing_storage field added on this branch was
ungated by principal type. get_admin_principal accepts an admin API token,
and create_user's only token-specific check covered the admin bit, so a
tfadm_ token holder could set one boolean, name any unmarked namespace
holding another party's files, create an account onto it and log in as that
account to read and write them. reproduced end to end before fixing.

extend the invariant the module already holds. a token neither creates an
administrator nor writes to an account that is one; now it also cannot open
an account onto storage that already holds files. 403 with the same shape as
the existing refusal.

adoption stays available to an administrator session rather than moving to
the CLI. the CLI creates the first administrator only, so this endpoint is
the only way to put the second and later accounts back on storage carried
over with them, and removing it would push operators to edit users.json by
hand. the risk was never that adoption exists, it is that an unattended
credential with no password step and no second factor could perform it.

checked on the request field rather than on whether the namespace turns out
to be occupied, so the answer does not leak which namespaces hold data and
there is no window between the check and files arriving.

add is_token to AdminPrincipal as the single discriminator both token rules
test. token_id is set only by the token branch of get_admin_principal, from
a record whose field is a str, so the default None means a session and
nothing else; the named property stops a future guard picking the truthiness
form instead.

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

0.9.1

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Add administrator API tokens (#206)

* feat(auth): administrator API tokens for the admin API (#205)

Administrative endpoints resolved identity only from the login cookie, so
a deployment that provisions accounts programmatically had no way in. An
automated caller cannot drive a browser login, and cannot supply a second
factor at all. `AUTH_SETUP_ENABLED=false` and the `create-admin` command
already acknowledge that some installs provision administrators out of
band, but both address first run only.

An administrator issues an opaque token from a logged-in session and
presents it as `Authorization: Bearer`. That header is understood by
every HTTP client, a browser never attaches it on its own, and it
collides with neither the auth cookie nor `X-Proxy-Secret`. A request
carrying a bearer token is decided by that token: an invalid one is 401
and never falls back to a cookie that happens to be present.

The token reaches the user-provisioning routes only: list, create,
disable, enable and reset password. Clearing a second factor, managing
tokens, and instance storage stats stay session-only. A credential that
authenticates without a second factor must not be able to remove second
factors from accounts, which combined with a password reset would make
every account takeable by whoever holds the token; nor mint a successor,
because containing a leak should not mean chasing a chain. Routes opt in
by declaring `get_admin_principal`, so a route added later reaches
nothing until someone says otherwise.

Tokens live beside login tokens in auth_tokens.json as sha256 hashes,
compared in constant time, each with its own resolver so neither kind is
accepted where the other belongs. They do not slide, default to never
expiring, take an optional lifetime at issue time, and are revoked
individually. A password change no longer takes them with it, since
rotating a password is not evidence that a provisioning credential
leaked. Disabling or demoting the issuing account makes them inert at
once, checked against the live account on every use, and deleting the
account destroys them.

Every administrative mutation now records who acted and, when a token was
used, which token. Only account creation did before.

Native mode only: `open` and `proxy` return 404 for this surface as they
always have, so nothing here extends `PROXY_SECRET`.

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

* fix: stop an admin token reaching administrator authority

An administrator API token could set is_admin on POST /api/admin/users,
then log in interactively as the account it had just created. That account
carries no second factor, so the token holder obtained a full session and
with it successor tokens, clear-2fa and storage-stats: every containment
decision the credential was built around. Resetting an existing
administrator's password reached the same place in one step fewer.

A token now neither creates an administrator nor writes to an account that
is one. is_admin: true on create is refused with 403, as are reset-password,
disable and enable whose target is an administrator, including the account
that issued the token. The refusal is explicit rather than a downgrade to a
member account: a provisioning script that asked for an administrator and
got a 200 would carry on believing it had one. Disable and enable are
included because suspending every other administrator locks out the people
who could revoke the token, and because the rule is easier to rely on stated
once than carved out per route. Ordinary accounts are unaffected, and an
administrator session keeps every ability it had.

The write guard runs inside the account store lock, against the live record,
so it cannot race a change to the target's admin bit.

The admin router now declares get_admin_principal as a default dependency, so
a route added without an explicit one is authenticated rather than anonymous.
FastAPI caches the dependency per request, so the routes that declare it
themselves resolve their token once.

docs/auth.md claimed a token could not mint another with no chain of
successors to chase. That was false as written; it is true now, and the
reasoning for each exclusion is recorded alongside it.

Relates to #205

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

* fix(auth): reject a trailing newline in an id or namespace

Python's `$` matches before a trailing newline, so `_USER_ID_RE` accepted
`"<valid id>\n"`. The id becomes a directory name under the storage root,
so an admin create, `create-admin --id`, or `--storage-namespace` could
land a namespace with a newline in it. That is not cross-user exposure,
the namespace is still distinct, but a newline in a path breaks shell
globbing, log parsing, backup scripts, and anything that reads a list of
namespaces a line at a time.

`\A` and `\Z` now anchor the whole alternation rather than each branch, so
the cuid and uuid shapes cannot drift apart the way they would if only one
side were corrected. `_EMAIL_RE` had the same loose anchor and gets the
same treatment; `normalise_email` strips before matching, so no behaviour
changes there, but the expression no longer relies on its caller for the
guarantee.

Nothing legitimate is rejected. Ids come from `uuid4`, the literal
"default", or a validated flag or field, and no code builds one from an
unstripped line: the only `readline` in the backend is the CLI password
prompt, which rstrips, and every store reads whole files as JSON. The one
released version carrying this expression, 0.8.0, applies it solely to the
proxy `x-user-id` header, where a bare newline cannot cross the wire.

Tests cover leading, trailing, and embedded newlines and other trailing
whitespace on all four paths through the validator, and on the validator
itself.

Relates to #205

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

0.9.0

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feat(auth): native single-user-first authentication (#204)

Tracefinity had no accounts. A standalone install was a single anonymous
user, and multi-user deployments relied on a trusted reverse proxy
asserting identity through a header, so nothing inside the application
knew who anyone was.

Add native authentication with three modes. `native` is the default: a
fresh install prompts for an initial administrator, there is no default
password, and identity comes from a cookie. `proxy` preserves the
existing trusted-header behaviour for deployments that use it and is
deprecated. `open` keeps the current single-user behaviour for anyone
running privately who wants no login at all. Absent identity fails
closed in native and proxy; only open retains the anonymous fallback.

Accounts live in users.json at the storage root, hashed with stdlib
scrypt behind a scheme prefix so other schemes can be verified and
transparently upgraded on the next login. Auth tokens are opaque, stored
hashed, and revoked on logout, password change, disable and deletion.
Isolation is enforced server side: the storage guard resolves identity
per mode rather than trusting a path segment, and existing installs keep
their data because the first administrator claims the default namespace
by alias, so no files move and no stored path is rewritten.

Two-factor authentication is included. Enrolment confirms a code before
enabling, login becomes a two step exchange through a single-use pending
token, verification is stdlib RFC 6238 with replay protection, and
secrets are encrypted at rest under a key derived from AUTH_SECRET with
rotation support. Backup codes are single use and regenerable, and an
administrator can clear a locked-out account's second factor.

Accounts can be created with an externally supplied id and credential so
an installation migrating from another system keeps its storage keying
and its users' existing passwords. The same is available without the web
flow: `python -m app.cli create-admin` creates the first administrator
from inside a container, for deployments that provision out of band and
close the web setup route. It reads the password from a prompt or stdin,
never from an argument, and hands anything it creates as root to the
storage owner so the service can still read it.

Startup now validates the mode against what the volume already holds.
Serving an instance that has accounts in a mode with no login would
publish the first administrator's data to anyone and strand the rest, so
open and proxy refuse to start in that state unless explicitly overridden.
A native start with no accounts on populated storage warns that setup is
open on data somebody already owns. AUTH_SETUP_ENABLED closes the web
setup route entirely for deployments that create administrators by other
means.

Instance storage statistics previously relied on the proxy secret alone,
which is unset in native mode, leaving the per-user roster readable by
anyone; that endpoint now requires an administrator and the secret
comparison is constant time. Account writes use compare-and-set so a
concurrent administrative change cannot be reverted by a slower request,
and the store refuses any change that would leave no enabled
administrator. Deleting the last administrator while other accounts
remain is refused, and a namespace whose deletion did not complete is
marked so a later account cannot inherit its files. The generated API
documentation is no longer served, and the remaining unauthenticated
surface is the health check, the version, and the auth entry points.

Closes #197

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

0.8.0

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jasonmadigan Jason Madigan
Decouple tool preview from output smoothing

0.7.0

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Show app version in settings popover (#145)

* Add version endpoint sourced from image build (#144)

Bake APP_VERSION into the Docker image (release tag for releases,
dev-<sha> for dev builds, dev locally) and expose it via GET
/api/version.

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

* Show app version in settings popover (#144)

Fetched from /api/version on first open, hidden if the request
fails.

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

* Smoke test release image version in CI (#144)

Fail the release build if the pushed image does not report the
release tag, catching a dropped build-arg or non-semver tag.

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

* Harden version tests against ambient env (#144)

Check the Settings default with APP_VERSION unset rather than via
the import-time singleton, and use the fixture style of
neighbouring route tests.

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

* Make version display optional via SHOW_APP_VERSION (#144)

Defaults on. When false, /api/version returns 404 (so the settings
popover shows nothing) and the OpenAPI version is a neutral
placeholder, disclosing nothing.

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

* Smoke test image before pushing release (#144)

Build a single-arch image with load, check the baked APP_VERSION
against the release tag with a literal compare that logs both
values, and only then run the multi-arch push. Stops a bad version
reaching the public tags.

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

* Ignore empty env vars in settings (#144)

An empty value (docker run -e SHOW_APP_VERSION=) crashed settings
validation at import; fall back to defaults instead. Tests build
fresh Settings without the dotenv file and restore reloaded modules
even if the reload itself fails.

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Jason Madigan <jason@jasonmadigan.com>