Aethel turns a signed payment stream into a financeable receivable and lets independent providers supply credit assessment, guarantees, funding, and servicing around it.
The central idea is that the payment stream itself becomes the receivable. Aethel does not hard-code one lender, rating model, guarantor, or marketplace. Providers join through explicit capabilities, sign the artifacts they are responsible for, and can be replaced or combined without changing the stream's underlying payment semantics.
This repository contains the deterministic Rust state machine for that process. It is a research implementation and has not been audited for production use.
- Registration and versioned state transitions for signed payment streams.
- Receivable series that define which streams may be financed and under what policy.
- Signed credit decisions bound to one receivable context.
- Guarantees with explicit loss layers and lifecycle states.
- Competing funding quotes from independent liquidity providers.
- Receivable issuance, default attestation, guarantee claim, and release.
- Provider registration, capability separation, suspension, revocation, and key rotation.
- Anonymous qualification checks through a qualification port, without storing a legal name in the Aethel record.
Aethel records the commercial meaning and lifecycle of a receivable. It does not hold cash, securities, or legal title. Those authoritative assets and their settlement remain at the settlement rail the deployment chooses: zkFMI (zkPI, DeFMI, DeCCP) is one rail; a conventional settlement system that returns operator-signed attestations is another. The business crates depend on neither.
The book reaches everything it does not own through two ports defined in
aethel-core:
| Port | Question it answers | Implementations |
|---|---|---|
SettlementRail |
Is this guarantee or funding backing live? Does this witness settle exactly this issuance, release or claim? | aethel-defmi-host (zkPI + DeFMI + DeCCP), aethel-rail-attested (operator-signed attestations) |
QualificationPort |
Who stands behind this anonymous line? | aethel-dekyx (DeKYX anonymous presentations), aethel-rail-attested (issuer-signed qualification statements) |
Artifacts name what a rail holds through the rail-neutral records in
aethel-types: GuaranteeBacking, FundingBacking, GuaranteeAuthority
and SettlementEvidence. The book stores those identifiers and digests; the
rail port decides whether they are genuine, before the book moves. A
StreamState carries a kind_digest, and a SeriesPolicy may restrict which
kinds of obligation it finances.
Signatures follow the same rule. Provider artifact keys and obligor payment
keys are Ed25519 by default; the hybrid feature of aethel-provider-sdk and
aethel-obligation-wallet adds the zkfmi-crypto Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 form,
which the DeFMI host requires. See
docs/RAIL_INDEPENDENCE_JA.md.
flowchart LR
S["Signed payment stream"] --> R["Register stream"]
R --> RS["Create receivable series"]
K["DeKYX\nqualified subject"] --> C
C["Credit providers\nsubmit signed decisions"] --> G
G["Guarantors\ncommit coverage"] --> F
F["Liquidity providers\nsubmit funding quotes"] --> I
RS --> C
I["Issue receivable"] --> P["zkPI\nsettlement instruction"]
P --> D["DeFMI\nasset and cash settlement"]
I --> M{"Payment stream outcome"}
M -->|paid| X["Close receivable"]
M -->|default| A["Default attestation"]
A --> W["DeCCP\nguarantee claim / loss allocation"]
W --> D
The diagram shows the zkFMI deployment model. The aethel-core crate owns the
stream and receivable state transitions. DeKYX, DeCCP, zkPI, and DeFMI are
separate modules the host connects through the two ports; on the attested
rail the same steps are backed by operator-signed holds, reservations and
settlements instead.
Every provider is registered with one or more narrowly scoped capabilities:
| Capability | Responsibility |
|---|---|
StreamAttestor |
Attest that a payment stream and its updates are valid |
CreditAssessor |
Sign a credit decision for an eligible receivable |
Guarantor |
Commit a guarantee backed by an external facility |
LiquidityProvider |
Submit an executable funding quote |
Servicer |
Perform permitted servicing actions |
CredentialIssuer |
Vouch for the issuer key a qualification port trusts, without becoming a lender or guarantor |
Capabilities do not imply one another. A credit assessment cannot silently act as a guarantee, and a guarantor cannot issue a funding quote unless separately authorized. Providers may be suspended or permanently revoked. Key rotation keeps artifacts signed while an older key was valid verifiable, while rejecting new artifacts under that retired key.
AethelBook is the validated aggregate state. Its main records are:
RegisteredStreamandStreamStateReceivableSeriesandSeriesPolicyCreditDecisionGuaranteeCommitmentandGuaranteeReleaseFundingQuoteReceivableIssuanceDefaultAttestationandGuaranteeClaimProviderDefinition
Operations carry stable identifiers, validity windows, nonces, policy digests, and signatures. State transitions reject duplicate operations, unexpected versions, invalid provider capabilities, expired artifacts, and inconsistent series or stream references.
A series may require a presentation at the qualification port before a credit
decision or guarantee is accepted. The book builds a QualificationRequest
bound to the exact Aethel domain, action, unsigned artifact statement, nonce,
and expiration; a presentation made for one decision cannot be replayed for a
different decision or guarantee, whichever port produced it.
Aethel stores only the SubjectBinding the port returns. With DeKYX the
credential, revocation policy, issuer keys and selective-disclosure proof stay
in DeKYX, whose issuer directory the host persists beside the book; with the
attested port the credential issuer signs a statement for the exact request.
Aethel defines what a guarantee covers and how it relates to a receivable. DeCCP owns the guarantee facility and its remaining capacity. A deployment can reserve a DeCCP hold when the guarantee is accepted, bind the hold when the receivable is issued, and release or consume it when the obligation closes.
The guarantee amount may remain confidential. In that mode, Aethel and DeCCP exchange commitments, state digests, identifiers, and verified transition receipts instead of a plaintext amount.
When issuance or a claim moves assets, the host creates a typed zkPI and asks DeFMI to settle it, then hands the verified instruction to the book as the rail's witness. Aethel changes its final state only after the rail port has verified that witness against the artifact being recorded. On the attested rail the witness is the operator's signed settlement attestation.
Dependencies are deliberately separate from Aethel's product definition.
flowchart TB
APP["aethel-defmi-host (SettlementRail)"] --> AC["aethel-core (ports)"]
ADK["aethel-dekyx (QualificationPort)"] --> AC
ADK --> DK["dekyx-core"]
APP --> ADK
APP --> ACCP["aethel-deccp"] --> CCP["deccp-core"]
APP --> AZ["aethel-zkpi"] --> Z["zkpi"]
APP --> DF["DeFMI generic VM / ledger"]
ATT["aethel-rail-attested (both ports)"] --> AC
| Module | Relationship |
|---|---|
aethel-core |
Defines SettlementRail and QualificationPort; depends on no zkFMI crate |
aethel-dekyx |
DeKYX as the qualification port: issuer directory, status lists, presentations |
aethel-deccp |
Application-owned guarantee adapter over deccp-core; not imported by aethel-core |
aethel-zkpi |
Receivable context, verification extension and wire format over generic zkPI |
aethel-defmi-host |
DeFMI as the settlement rail, plus the application runtime and dedicated binary |
aethel-rail-attested |
Settlement rail and qualification port backed by operator- and issuer-signed attestations; no zkFMI dependency |
The core crate can be embedded in any deterministic host that supplies durable state, authorization, and the external verification ports required by its deployment. Integration with one chain or one credit provider is not built into the Aethel domain model.
This workspace contains eight business crates, one zkFMI-free rail, and four
application-owned zkFMI integration crates. The integration crates pin the
zkFMI repositories by git revision. A deliberately reduced, core-only
downstream package would contain only crates/aethel-core; such a package
would not provide the tokenization, distribution, obligation-wallet,
servicing, or composition paths.
crates/
├── aethel-types/ Shared identifiers, digests, time and signature checks
├── aethel-provider-sdk/ Provider capabilities and signed artifacts
├── aethel-core/ Stream, receivable, guarantee and issuance semantics
├── aethel-tokenization/ Supply caps and external-ledger mint/burn intents
├── aethel-distribution/ Circulation admission, venue fills and settlement binding
├── aethel-obligation-wallet/ Bounded pre-authorization and payment retry queue
├── aethel-servicing/ Payment evidence, delinquency, cure and default evidence
├── aethel/ Business composition boundary and end-to-end tests
├── aethel-rail-attested/ Attested settlement rail and qualification port (no zkFMI)
├── aethel-dekyx/ DeKYX as the qualification port
├── aethel-deccp/ Guarantee adapter owned by Aethel
├── aethel-zkpi/ Receivable proof context and wire format
└── aethel-defmi-host/ Application runtime and dedicated VM binary
Use cargo metadata --locked --no-deps --format-version 1 as the authoritative
package inventory. A layout diagram is not evidence that a crate was shipped.
Enterprise PoC guide (Japanese) covers signed payment streams, external credit providers, guarantees, funding, tokenization, servicing, zkPI/DeFMI settlement, rejection tests and acceptance criteria.
Foundation independence and migration describes ownership, the generic RPC envelope and snapshot compatibility. Rail independence describes the ports, the two rails, and what changed on the wire.
Run the checks on Linux with the locked dependency graph:
cargo test --workspace --locked
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets --locked -- -D warnings
cargo fmt --all -- --check
cargo build --workspace --release --lockedPassing these four gates is not a substitute for an independent cryptographic, financial, Rust state-machine, host-VM, and integration audit.
- The current anonymous credential contract is scope-pseudonymous; it does not claim issuer-unlinkable credentials.
- Cross-issuer anti-Sybil policy requires a shared governance or registry decision outside this crate.
- Guarantee claims and releases currently target full-cover transitions; more granular partial transitions require an extended state model.
- Legal assignment, perfection, tax, accounting, and bankruptcy treatment of a receivable remain deployment-specific.