DeKYX is a reusable identity and participation-qualification layer for systems that must verify eligibility without exposing more identity information than the application needs.
X may be a person, legal entity, device, service, or autonomous agent. An
issuer creates a credential, the holder proves only the qualifications required
for one action, and the application receives a scoped eligibility result rather
than the holder's full identity record.
This repository contains standalone Rust crates. It is a research implementation and has not been audited or certified as a KYC/KYB system.
- Governance-controlled issuer registration and issuer-key epochs.
- Credentials for multiple subject kinds and application scopes.
- Holder-generated secrets and proof-of-possession at issuance.
- Selective disclosure of required qualification attributes.
- Anonymous presentations bound to one audience, action, request, nonce, and validity window.
- Scope-specific nullifiers for controlled linkability within one policy.
- Re-randomized commitments across presentations and scopes.
- Signed, monotonic revocation status lists.
- Issuer-key rotation with grace periods and an immediate compromise path.
- Replay prevention using the presentation nullifier and exact context.
- Validated persistence formats for issuer directories and replay ledgers.
- A verified-result API for application-owned eligibility adapters.
sequenceDiagram
participant G as Governance
participant I as Credential issuer
participant H as Holder
participant D as DeKYX verifier
participant A as Application
G->>D: Register issuer, key epoch, namespace and policy
H->>H: Generate subject secret and commitment
H->>I: Credential request + proof of possession
I->>H: Signed scoped credential
I->>D: Signed revocation status list
A->>H: Exact presentation context and requirements
H->>D: Anonymous presentation + selected qualification proofs
D->>D: Verify issuer, signature, status, scope, context and replay
D-->>A: VerifiedEligibility / scoped subject line
The application never receives the holder's secret. It receives only the verified output needed to authorize the requested action.
| Object | Purpose |
|---|---|
IssuerDefinition |
Defines an issuer, key epoch, namespace, subject kinds, and validity window |
IssuerDirectory |
Holds validated issuer epochs and current revocation lists |
CredentialRequest |
Binds a holder-created commitment to an issuance proof |
Credential |
Contains the issuer-signed scope, policy, commitment, and qualification root |
RevocationStatusList |
Publishes an issuer-signed, epoch-ordered set of revoked credential digests |
PresentationContext |
Binds a proof to one audience, action, request, nonce, and expiry |
AnonymousPresentation |
Proves credential possession and selected qualifications for that context |
VerifiedEligibility |
Non-serializable result produced only after verification |
PresentationLedger |
Consumes a nullifier-context pair and rejects replay |
The holder generates the subject secret and proves knowledge of the commitment opening during issuance. The issuer does not receive that secret through the normal API.
Qualification leaves are committed in a Merkle root. A presentation reveals only the leaves required by the application's policy and proves that they belong to the signed root. Its challenge includes the audience, action, request, nonce, and expiration, so a transcript for one operation cannot be moved to another.
A subject line is derived from the issuer, scope, policy, and scope nullifier. It stays stable when the same holder receives a replacement credential under a rotated issuer key, allowing an application to enforce one line or one limit without learning a legal identity. Different scopes use different nullifier bases and re-randomized commitments.
This version is scope-pseudonymous, not fully issuer-unlinkable. An Ed25519-signed commitment is stable inside one credential and may be correlated with the issuer's issuance record. Deployments requiring stronger issuance unlinkability need a rerandomizable credential scheme such as a reviewed BBS+ or CL-signature adapter.
Every accepted issuer-key epoch must have a signed status list. A missing or stale list fails closed, and an older list cannot replace a newer one.
Key rotation registers a strictly higher epoch and bounds earlier epochs by a grace instant. A grace instant before the old key's start time provides an immediate compromise response. Previously verified application records remain application state; the retired key cannot authorize a new presentation after its allowed window.
PresentationLedger consumes the pair of scope nullifier and presentation
context. Re-randomizing the proof does not make the same action reusable. The
host must persist this ledger in authenticated storage because rolling it back
would re-enable a replay.
IssuerRegistrycannot be deserialized around its validation.IssuerDirectoryrestores only through a validated record conversion.- Credentials, status lists, presentations, and contexts are wire data and are verified before use.
VerifiedEligibilityis deliberately not serializable; it is an output of verification, never a trusted input.
DeKYX is application-independent. Integrations consume its verified result instead of reimplementing credentials.
flowchart TB
CORE["dekyx-core\ncredential and presentation verification"]
AA["aethel-dekyx\nowned by Aethel"]
A["Aethel\ncredit and guarantee eligibility"]
C["DeCCP\nclearing-member admission"]
O["Other applications\npolicy-specific eligibility"]
A --> AA --> CORE
C -->|EligibilityPort adapter| CORE
O --> CORE
Z["zkPI / DeFMI"] -. "no direct credential dependency" .-> CORE
| Module | Relationship |
|---|---|
dekyx-core |
Standalone credential, presentation, issuer, revocation, and replay implementation; no application dependency |
| Aethel | Owns aethel-dekyx in its repository and consumes dekyx-core; DeKYX never imports Aethel |
| DeCCP | Consumes a verified result through its EligibilityPort when admitting a clearing member |
| zkPI / DeFMI | Do not define credentials; a host may require DeKYX eligibility before creating or settling an instruction |
crates/
└── dekyx-core/ Issuers, credentials, qualification proofs, revocation, replay
Enterprise PoC guide (Japanese) covers role separation, qualification policy, revocation, key rotation, replay rejection, evidence retention and acceptance criteria.
Run the checks on Linux with the locked dependency graph:
cargo test --workspace --locked
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets --locked -- -D warnings
cargo fmt --all -- --check
cargo build --workspace --release --lockedThe published revision passed these four gates. A real deployment must also define issuer governance, evidence standards, corporate-group resolution, revocation operations, data-retention policy, and jurisdiction-specific KYC/KYB obligations.