Draft: HARICA's clientAuth Incident Shows What Chrome Actually Wants From CP/CPS Compliance#40
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HARICA continued issuing TLS certificates with the clientAuth EKU for about a month past its own CP/CPS cutoff after failing to track Chrome's policy extension. Post covers the Bugzilla incident timeline, Chrome's rejection of training/manual-review remediations, an openssl check for affected certs, and what it means for auditing CA compliance posture.
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Draft blog post: HARICA continued issuing TLS certificates with the
id-kp-clientAuthEKU for about a month past its own CP/CPS cutoff, after failing to track Chrome's extension of the leaf-certificate deadline from June 15, 2026 to March 15, 2027. Chrome's response in the incident bug explicitly rejects training and manual-review remediations, demanding automated per-profile CP/CPS conformance controls instead.Sources used:
Most recent existing posts checked for uniqueness:
public-ca-eku-separation-june-2026.md(2026-05-27) — covers the DigiCert/Sectigo intermediate cutover and Chrome policy deadlines for the same EKU separation, but not this HARICA incidentsc098v2-caa-rfc8657-mandatory.md(2026-05-20) — different topic (CAA parameters)lets-encrypt-generation-y-transition.md(2026-05-13) — different topic (Let's Encrypt root transition)Why this topic, this week: The HARICA incident is actively unfolding (reported ~July 17, revocations began July 20, root cause report due July 24) and gives a distinct governance angle, a CA's own CP/CPS drifting out of sync with a moving root program deadline, that our prior EKU post didn't cover.