Repository navigation
Conversation
Collaborator
File
|
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Pull request overview
Adds a new draft EIP document proposing a consensus-layer change to ePBS (per EIP-7732) that deterministically burns a fixed fraction of an external builder bid’s declared gross_value, while preserving a trustless proposer-payment component and an optional trusted execution-layer payment.
Changes:
- Introduces a new EIP draft describing an “ePBS mandatory burn” mechanism and its accounting identities.
- Specifies new/modified data fields and state objects (e.g.,
gross_value,BuilderPendingSettlement) and deterministic burn/payment derivation. - Adds rationale, test vectors, and security considerations for the proposed burn design.
Explain the partial burn fraction as a deliberate response to side-channel and cartel evasion. The protocol cannot burn value that does not appear in a signed bid, so the moderate rate is calibrated to sit below the point where evasion pays for the common case, while the high-value tail lands on a fixed, unchosen proposer that a colluder cannot target without a broad cartel or vertical integration.
Drop tax/income wording that could imply the burn is a levy on proposer income. State that the protocol removes the burn from the builder's gross bid before the proposer payment, so the burned portion is never proposer revenue. Rework the backwards-compatibility fallback to reuse the existing value field in place instead of adding a gross_value field, which avoids changing the ExecutionPayloadBid container layout.
Collapse Reference Implementation to a pointer: its helper duplicated the Specification helper and its 14-item list restated the spec. Remove the Security burn-observability subsection, which repeated the Specification burn-observability and supply-accounting rules. Reduce the attester subsection to its one normative line, and replace the duplicated self-build risk text with a cross-reference.
|
The commit 2ef6af2 (as a parent of b36b811) contains errors. |
3 of 4 tasks
abcoathup
reviewed
Aug 8, 2026
jochem-brouwer
requested changes
Aug 11, 2026
jochem-brouwer
left a comment
Member
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Some initial items to address 😄 👍
4 tasks done
Burn the configured fraction of priority fees for every executed payload and count that burn toward an external builder's auction target. Defer the builder top-up until payload accounting is known while preserving the full bid-time reserve and atomic payment liability decision. Extend the PTC with signed public-bid observations, derive a robust local external-bid floor, enforce it through honest fork choice, and document self-build avoidance, propagation risks, configuration, and test cases.
Specify Gwei priority-fee accounting and Engine API results, encode deferred payable settlements, and bound PTC floor enforcement to a frozen same-slot view. Add incentive and adversarial analysis while consolidating rationale, tests, and security text to keep the unified EIP smaller.
Reject bids that would overwrite an unresolved settlement and require older vector entries to finalize before epoch rotation. Clarify that the one-slot PTC floor is probabilistic enforcement and can permit later canonicalization after expiry.
Mark the bid-floor domain as pending consensus-spec allocation, define priority-fee Engine API fields only for VALID responses, label floor vectors in ETH, and clarify testnet burn configuration. Align remaining security terminology with settlement rotation.
Aggregate priority fees in Wei and commit the resulting Gwei auction credit in signed bids so deferred settlement remains independent of uncommitted Engine API results. Add objective floor evidence checks and bid-by-root recovery, define the zero-rate kill switch and PAYABLE/INVALID transitions, and update the rationale, security analysis, and test vectors.
Identify outsourced self-build as the primary bilateral residual, quantify its avoided top-up, and explain the associated disclosure, trust, and vertical-integration pressures. Separate bid-floor filtering from payload-timeliness attestations, describe the liability behind floor-setting bids, and add eventual-canonicality, high-floor self-build, and public-floor coverage metrics.
Resolve payable settlements immediately when their stored priority-fee credit is zero, including the zero-numerator configuration, and limit payload-outcome dependencies to nonzero-credit entries. Add lifecycle coverage, qualify floor-setting builder liability under EIP-7732, define the F/G metric for positive G, and retain the marginal credit explanation.
Keep below-floor subtrees filtered through the following slot so an honest proposer can create a competing branch, and document the resulting probabilistic deterrence condition. Add a configurable haircut to the robust PTC floor, coordinate pre-proposal timing and evidence retention, clarify activation and information leakage, and update evaluation metrics and test cases.
Define next-slot proposer behavior as ordinary head selection after excluding the filtered subtree, and prevent bids or reports from crossing parent contexts. Document short-reorg risk and self-build fallback, refine the deterrence loss term, and add post-reorg availability metrics and coverage.
4 tasks done
nixorokish
added a commit
to nixorokish/EIPs
that referenced
this pull request
Sep 21, 2026
Reflects decisions from [ACDC187](https://forkcast.org/calls/acdc/187/) PFI: 8411 CFI: 8015 DFI: 8237, 8341, 8321, 8243, 8146 8367 (ethereum#12099) & 8375 (ethereum#12130) also DFI'd but can't be added because dependencies haven't been merged cc @ralexstokes
This branch has not been deployed
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Summary
Adds EIP-8375, a unified MEV-burn mechanism for EIP-7732 ePBS.
gross_valueas an auction burn target. The signed whole-Gwei priority-fee credit offsets the builder top-up, avoiding an additive double burn while preserving atomic payment and full bid-time collateral.Aim
Reduce protocol-visible proposer windfalls and make trivial bilateral under-declaration costly on the normal external-builder path when public price discovery propagates. The mechanism does not claim coalition-proof burn: private or late value and proposer-authorized outsourced self-build remain explicit residual paths.