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Add EIP: ePBS Mandatory Burn of Execution Rewards - #12130

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@benaadams benaadams commented Aug 7, 2026 •

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Summary

Adds EIP-8375, a unified MEV-burn mechanism for EIP-7732 ePBS.

  • Burns a configured fraction of aggregate transaction priority fees on every executed payload, including self-builds.
  • Treats the same fraction of an external builder's gross_value as an auction burn target. The signed whole-Gwei priority-fee credit offsets the builder top-up, avoiding an additive double burn while preserving atomic payment and full bid-time collateral.
  • Extends the PTC to report verifiable public bids. A robust order statistic and configurable haircut produce the local external-bid threshold.
  • Filters a below-threshold external subtree through the following slot so honest fork choice can create and support a competing branch, then returns both branches to ordinary fork choice. Self-build remains unconditional.
  • Adds coordinated EL, CL, Engine API, P2P, settlement, and honest-validator changes. Floor timing, threshold, and haircut remain TBD pending propagation and adversarial analysis.

Aim

Reduce protocol-visible proposer windfalls and make trivial bilateral under-declaration costly on the normal external-builder path when public price discovery propagates. The mechanism does not claim coalition-proof burn: private or late value and proposer-authorized outsourced self-build remain explicit residual paths.

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benaadams requested a review from eth-bot as a code owner August 7, 2026 13:17
Copilot AI lite review requested due to automatic review settings August 7, 2026 13:17
@github-actions github-actions Bot added c-new Creates a brand new proposal s-draft This EIP is a Draft t-core labels Aug 7, 2026
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File EIPS/eip-8375.md

Requires 1 more review from Editors: @g11tech, @jochem-brouwer, @lightclient, @samwilsn

@eth-bot eth-bot added e-consensus Waiting on editor consensus e-review Waiting on editor to review labels Aug 7, 2026
@eth-bot eth-bot changed the title Add EIP: eMBER Add EIP: ePBS Mandatory Burn of Execution Rewards Aug 7, 2026

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Pull request overview

Adds a new draft EIP document proposing a consensus-layer change to ePBS (per EIP-7732) that deterministically burns a fixed fraction of an external builder bid’s declared gross_value, while preserving a trustless proposer-payment component and an optional trusted execution-layer payment.

Changes:

  • Introduces a new EIP draft describing an “ePBS mandatory burn” mechanism and its accounting identities.
  • Specifies new/modified data fields and state objects (e.g., gross_value, BuilderPendingSettlement) and deterministic burn/payment derivation.
  • Adds rationale, test vectors, and security considerations for the proposed burn design.

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@github-actions github-actions Bot added the w-ci Waiting on CI to pass label Aug 7, 2026
Explain the partial burn fraction as a deliberate response to
side-channel and cartel evasion. The protocol cannot burn value that
does not appear in a signed bid, so the moderate rate is calibrated to
sit below the point where evasion pays for the common case, while the
high-value tail lands on a fixed, unchosen proposer that a colluder
cannot target without a broad cartel or vertical integration.
Drop tax/income wording that could imply the burn is a levy on proposer
income. State that the protocol removes the burn from the builder's
gross bid before the proposer payment, so the burned portion is never
proposer revenue.

Rework the backwards-compatibility fallback to reuse the existing
value field in place instead of adding a gross_value field, which
avoids changing the ExecutionPayloadBid container layout.
Collapse Reference Implementation to a pointer: its helper duplicated
the Specification helper and its 14-item list restated the spec.

Remove the Security burn-observability subsection, which repeated the
Specification burn-observability and supply-accounting rules.

Reduce the attester subsection to its one normative line, and replace
the duplicated self-build risk text with a cross-reference.
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github-actions Bot commented Aug 7, 2026

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The commit 2ef6af2 (as a parent of b36b811) contains errors.
Please inspect the Run Summary for details.

Comment thread EIPS/eip-8375.md
@github-actions github-actions Bot removed the w-ci Waiting on CI to pass label Aug 10, 2026

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Some initial items to address 😄 👍

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Burn the configured fraction of priority fees for every executed payload and count that burn toward an external builder's auction target. Defer the builder top-up until payload accounting is known while preserving the full bid-time reserve and atomic payment liability decision.

Extend the PTC with signed public-bid observations, derive a robust local external-bid floor, enforce it through honest fork choice, and document self-build avoidance, propagation risks, configuration, and test cases.
Specify Gwei priority-fee accounting and Engine API results, encode deferred payable settlements, and bound PTC floor enforcement to a frozen same-slot view. Add incentive and adversarial analysis while consolidating rationale, tests, and security text to keep the unified EIP smaller.
Reject bids that would overwrite an unresolved settlement and require older vector entries to finalize before epoch rotation. Clarify that the one-slot PTC floor is probabilistic enforcement and can permit later canonicalization after expiry.
Mark the bid-floor domain as pending consensus-spec allocation, define priority-fee Engine API fields only for VALID responses, label floor vectors in ETH, and clarify testnet burn configuration. Align remaining security terminology with settlement rotation.
Aggregate priority fees in Wei and commit the resulting Gwei auction credit in signed bids so deferred settlement remains independent of uncommitted Engine API results.

Add objective floor evidence checks and bid-by-root recovery, define the zero-rate kill switch and PAYABLE/INVALID transitions, and update the rationale, security analysis, and test vectors.
Identify outsourced self-build as the primary bilateral residual, quantify its avoided top-up, and explain the associated disclosure, trust, and vertical-integration pressures.

Separate bid-floor filtering from payload-timeliness attestations, describe the liability behind floor-setting bids, and add eventual-canonicality, high-floor self-build, and public-floor coverage metrics.
Resolve payable settlements immediately when their stored priority-fee credit is zero, including the zero-numerator configuration, and limit payload-outcome dependencies to nonzero-credit entries.

Add lifecycle coverage, qualify floor-setting builder liability under EIP-7732, define the F/G metric for positive G, and retain the marginal credit explanation.
Keep below-floor subtrees filtered through the following slot so an honest proposer can create a competing branch, and document the resulting probabilistic deterrence condition.

Add a configurable haircut to the robust PTC floor, coordinate pre-proposal timing and evidence retention, clarify activation and information leakage, and update evaluation metrics and test cases.
Define next-slot proposer behavior as ordinary head selection after excluding the filtered subtree, and prevent bids or reports from crossing parent contexts.

Document short-reorg risk and self-build fallback, refine the deterrence loss term, and add post-reorg availability metrics and coverage.
nixorokish added a commit to nixorokish/EIPs that referenced this pull request Sep 21, 2026
Reflects decisions from [ACDC187](https://forkcast.org/calls/acdc/187/)

PFI: 8411
CFI: 8015
DFI: 8237, 8341, 8321, 8243, 8146 

8367 (ethereum#12099) & 8375 (ethereum#12130) also DFI'd but can't be added because dependencies haven't been merged

cc @ralexstokes

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