One command to fix the PHP critical RCE (CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619). Auto-detects every PHP on the server — BaoTa/aaPanel, source builds, distro packages — and fixes each the right way, with source-level backports for the EOL versions the PHP team never patched.
On 2026-10-21 the PHP project disclosed two critical (CVSS 9.2) vulnerabilities allowing unauthenticated remote code execution, affecting every PHP that serves web requests (PHP-FPM, Apache mod_php, php-cgi, FrankenPHP, LiteSpeed).
- Advisory: https://www.php.net/archive/2026.php#2026-10-21-5
CVE-2026-109618(GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w): on out-of-memory, PHPlongjmps out of a half-initialized request; shutdown then acts on the invalid state.CVE-2026-109619(GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp): request-owned global state survives into the next request and is read before normal init (use-after-free).
Updating to a fixed PHP build is the only complete fix. This repo does that in one command, and provides source-level patches for the old versions that got no official backport.
Run as root on the server:
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lizhipay/php/main/php-security-update.sh -o php-security-update.sh && bash php-security-update.shIt auto-detects every PHP install — not just BaoTa — and handles each by source and version:
| Source | What it does |
|---|---|
BaoTa / aaPanel (/www/server/php/*) |
rebuild + patch automatically |
Source builds (/usr/local, /opt, LiteSpeed lsphp, php-fpm on PATH) |
rebuild + patch automatically |
| Distro packages (apt / yum php-fpm) | advice only — update via the package manager (the distro already ships the fix); never recompiled |
| Version | What it does |
|---|---|
| 8.2 / 8.3 / 8.4 / 8.5 | upgrade to the latest fixed release of the branch |
| 7.4 / 8.0 / 8.1 | last release + the PHP team's official backport, recompiled |
| 7.0 / 7.1 / 7.2 / 7.3 | last release + this repo's port of that fix, recompiled |
| 5.4 / 5.5 / 5.6 | last release + this repo's port of that fix, recompiled |
| 5.2 / 5.3 and older | official mitigation settings only |
Common flags:
bash php-security-update.sh --check # show the plan, change nothing
bash php-security-update.sh --only 74,82 # only these versions (version number or install id)
bash php-security-update.sh -y # no countdown, start nowA separate issue from the two CVEs (the official 2026 patch does not fix it): the
classic session.serialize_handler mismatch object injection, where an attacker gets an
unserialize() of a controlled object (often via session.upload_progress) and runs a
POP chain through __wakeup/__destruct.
bash php-security-update.sh --check --harden # preview
bash php-security-update.sh --harden -y # apply--harden rebuilds each PHP with an opt-in source patch that adds a new
session.harden ini (default off), turns it on, and sets a safe session config
(upload_progress.enabled=0, use_strict_mode=1, use_only_cookies=1). When on,
session decoding refuses to instantiate objects (they become __PHP_Incomplete_Class)
and upload_progress keys are sanitised. Even a PHP already on the latest release is
rebuilt once to carry the patch. Caveat: it disables object deserialization in
sessions, so apps that store objects in sessions are affected — preview with --check
first. On PHP 5.4–5.6 only the upload_progress vector is closed (object-deny is not
possible pre-7.0); see hardening/.
- Each version is compiled and checked before replacing; a full backup is taken first and a failed start rolls back automatically — the site only blips for ~1–2s during the FPM restart.
- Every source download is SHA256-verified; the patches are embedded in the script and self-checked.
- The original configure flags and compiler are reused, so extensions match the old build.
- PHP-FPM restart uses the service manager where present, otherwise a
SIGUSR2graceful reload; if neither is possible it tells you to restart manually (it never guesses). - Distro-packaged PHP is never touched — only a package-update command is printed, matching the official advice.
The PHP team only shipped a backport for 7.4 / 8.0 / 8.1; older versions got nothing. patches/ holds standalone patches you can use directly:
php-7.4.patch,php-8.0.patch,php-8.1.patch— official PHP backports, kept verbatim (upstream commit noted).php-7.0.patch…php-7.3.patch,php-5.4.patch…php-5.6.patch— this repo's port of that fix to the older versions.
The old-version ports are unofficial and not vendor-reviewed, but each one was compiled in Docker and validated by running PHP's own test suite before vs after the patch to confirm no regressions. Per-version change notes and validation numbers are in
port-notes/; the cross-version consistency check is inport-notes/AUDIT-concat-guards.md.
Apply a single patch manually:
cd php-7.3.33
patch -p1 < /path/to/php-7.3.patch
./configure ... && make && make installphp-security-update.sh one-command fixer (all patches embedded; ship as-is)
patches/ standalone per-version patches (3 official + 7 ported)
src/ script template + builder (build.sh embeds patches/)
port-notes/ per-version change notes, validation data, cross-checks
docs/ technical notes on the vulnerability and the fix
Rebuild the script after editing a patch or the template:
bash src/build.sh ./php-security-update.shLinux only. Source recompiles need a working toolchain and internet to fetch the PHP sources (SHA256-verified). The old-version patches (7.0–7.3, 5.4–5.6) are unofficial ports, provided as-is; in production, run --check first and apply during off-peak hours (the script backs up and auto-reverts). The durable fix is still to migrate these sites to a supported PHP version.