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confidential-processing engine — attested RA-TLS gateway, inference and transcription sidecars

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conf-proc

conf-proc is sol pbc's operated confidential-processing engine. it serves the same model used by the local-default path over a two-phase RA-TLS channel bound to fresh AMD SEV-SNP and NVIDIA confidential-GPU evidence.

the sealed production recipe runs these components:

  • ratls_gateway.py: fail-closed TLS 1.3 admission and loopback routing
  • ratls_collector.py: live CPU/GPU evidence collection
  • ratls_contract.py + ratls-contract.json: the versioned wire-contract source and generated consumer artifact
  • verifier.py + roots/amd/: the AMD CPU-leg appraisal reference from which the journal's owner-side verifier is derived
  • asr_shim.py + strict_wav.py: the bounded hosted-transcription sidecar
  • spp_health_push.py + health-push-contract.json: independent, fixed-schema health reports to sol pbc's monitoring on Cloudflare
  • usage_tally.py + fleet_usage.py: in-memory usage accounting and bounded service-wide operational figures
  • allowance.py: allowance enforcement, disabled unless portal authorization supplies an allowance

SGLang, the model weights and NVIDIA's local GPU verifier are deployment dependencies rather than vendored source. the collector takes the AMD report from the vTPM's HCL report and checks it against the AMD roots pinned in roots/amd/ before returning it, fetching only the VCEK from AMD's KDS.

trust boundary

the gateway admits no credential or inference bytes until both attestation phases verify. before the first post-attestation request reaches a serving upstream, the gateway validates its portal-issued bearer against the live SPP binding and entitlement state. invalid/inactive credentials fail 401; authorizer failure fails 503; neither path opens an upstream connection. the raw bearer is stripped before forwarding, and the gateway replaces any client-asserted x-sol-device value with a process-randomized label derived from the portal-authorized journal binding (not stable across restart of the gateway process). inference and audio upstreams bind only to loopback. the engine does not log request or response content, write owner content to durable storage, or send content to a third-party telemetry service. the audio path accepts only canonical PCM16 WAV, 16 kHz, mono input and rejects rather than transcodes every other format.

the serving stack uses that journal label to partition its prefix cache. a caller cannot choose the label or a shared cache namespace. the partition is enforced by software, not by separate hardware for each journal.

a separate unprivileged reporter pushes health over HTTPS without adding a listener or waiting for admission. its schema permits fixed system, model, GPU and collector states and bounded operational figures. it carries no request or response content, journal or sign-in identifiers, credentials or owner challenges. prompt and cached-prompt totals freeze at UTC midnight; load bands cover only a closed month and suppress populations below the in-container floor. the reporter reads only the bounded HTTP status line, not response headers or bodies, and follows no redirects. the receiver admits only explicitly allowed source IPs before storing a report.

the engine produces the composite attestation evidence. the checked-in verifier.py preserves the independently testable CPU-leg reference, but the production owner-side appraisal and verify-before-egress decision execute in the journal client, not on the engine.

development

Python 3.10 or newer is required for the gateway and hardware-free tests.

python3 -m venv .venv
.venv/bin/pip install -r requirements.txt
make PYTHON=.venv/bin/python ci

make ci compiles every shipped Python module, compiles and runs the native SPP diagnostic-trace C codec tests (ordinary and address/undefined-behavior sanitizers), checks that ratls-contract.json matches the code source, and runs the CPU verifier, gateway, health, and ASR self-tests. it does not require confidential-compute hardware or model weights.

the ASR serving environment is intentionally separate and pinned in requirements-asr.txt. any NeMo bump, change to strict_wav.py or parse_multipart, or change to gateway relay framing requires security re-qualification before production rollout.

production rebuilds install requirements-lock.txt and requirements-asr-lock.txt, the complete environments resolved on the qualified Ubuntu 22.04 / CPython 3.10 / CUDA 13 pool. the shorter requirement files remain the human-maintained direct-dependency intent. refresh a lock only from a qualified candidate and commit it with the source revision that advances the deployment recipe.

sealed appliance recipe

appliance/ holds the public recipe for the sealed confidential-processing appliance (python3 appliance/spp_appliance.py --help). --stage prod is the image that serves; stages 1a, 1b and 2h are the earlier qualification images, kept for reference and not reproducible (inputs they baked are no longer published).

  1. acquire. follow the input acquisition and build instructions. the scripts fetch the serving stack, models, kernel, driver and build inputs by pinned identities.
  2. verify. the build refuses unless every input matches --manifest exactly: each file by SHA-256 and size, each directory by its full file list, symlink targets included.
  3. build. appliance/toolchain.py assembles the pinned Debian-package toolchain root and runs the recipe inside it without network access. the recipe refuses a dirty checkout. it emits the build manifest, the verified input manifest and a generated SBOM of the assembled root.
  4. egress. appliance/check_egress_ruleset.sh NFT_PACKAGE_ROOT loads the prod egress ruleset with the image's own nft in a throwaway network namespace and checks that the content services cannot initiate traffic beyond loopback or reach the gateway's loopback listeners. the gateway and health reporter can initiate HTTPS traffic on TCP 443; their code fixes the permitted endpoints.

deployment

the sealed recipe generates its own systemd units inside the measured root. it exposes the attested gateway on TCP 9443 and has no operator shell or guest agent. qualification checks attestation, serving, reboot-stable measurements and the pushed health report. a listening port alone does not establish readiness.

deploy/systemd/, deploy/spp-health and the on-box spp_health.py checker remain tools for the earlier unsealed deployment layout. they are not an operator path into the sealed image. run-collector.sh bridges the gateway to the NVIDIA verifier environment included by the recipe.

the current production environment is one persistent Azure Standard_NCC40ads_H100_v5 confidential VM. this repository does not provision or destroy that standing infrastructure.

history

confidential processing: image #6 and earlier

the engine graduated from solpbc/devops-lab on 2026-07-21. this repository preserves that Git ancestry, so historical security-review pins remain independently inspectable. devops-lab remains the home for the exploratory Azure CVM, ACI, and AKS work; its verifier copy remains part of those historical lab flows, while this repo carries the production trust-chain reference forward.

security

please report vulnerabilities through the process in SECURITY.md.

license

copyright 2026 sol pbc. licensed under the GNU Affero General Public License, version 3 only. see LICENSE.

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