Δευτέρα, Μαΐου 30, 2011

monday reading

Is Iceland's Rejection of Financial Bullying a Model for Greece and Ireland?

Breakup of the Eurozone?

By MICHAEL HUDSON

Last month Iceland voted against submitting to British and Dutch demands that it compensate their national bank insurance agencies for bailing out their own domestic Icesave depositors. This was the second vote against settlement (by a ratio of 3:2), and Icelandic support for membership in the Eurozone has fallen to just 30 per cent. The feeling is that European politics are being run for the benefit of bankers, not the social democracy that Iceland imagined was the guiding philosophy – as indeed it was when the European Economic Community (Common Market) was formed in 1957.

By permitting Britain and the Netherlands to blackball Iceland to pay for the mistakes of Gordon Brown and his Dutch counterparts, Europe has made Icelandic membership conditional upon imposing financial austerity and poverty on the population – all to pay money that legally it does not owe. The problem is to find an honest court willing to enforce Europe’s own banking laws placing responsibility where it legally lies.

The reason why the EU has fought so hard to make Iceland’s government take responsibility for Icesave debts is what creditors call “contagion.” Ireland and Greece are faced with much larger debts. Europe’s creditor “troika” – the European Central Bank (ECB), European Commission and the IMF – view debt write-downs and progressive taxation to protect their domestic economies as a communicable disease.

Like Greece, Ireland asked for debt relief so that its government would not be forced to slash spending in the face of deepening recession. “The Irish press reported that EU officials ‘hit the roof’ when Irish negotiators talked of broader burden-sharing. The European Central Bank is afraid that any such move would cause instant contagion through the debt markets of southern Europe,” wrote one journalist, warning that the cost of taking reckless public debt onto the national balance sheet threatened to bankrupt the economy.

Europe – in effect, German and Dutch banks – refused to let the government scale back the debts it had taken on (except to smaller and less politically influential depositors). “The comments came just as the EU authorities were ruling out investor ‘haircuts’ in Ireland, making this a condition for the country’s €85bn (£72bn) loan package. Dublin has imposed 80 percent haircuts on the junior debt of Anglo Irish Bank but has not extended this to senior debt, viewed as sacrosanct.” (Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Daily Telegraph.)

At issue from Europe’s vantage point – at least that of its bankers – is a broad principle: Governments should run their economies on behalf of banks and bondholders. They should bail out at least the senior creditors of banks that fail (that is, the big institutional investors and gamblers) and pay these debts and public debts by selling off enterprises, shifting the tax burden onto labor. To balance their budgets they are to cut back spending programs, lower public employment and wages, and charge more for public services, from medical care to education.

This austerity program (“financial rescue”) has come to a head just one year after Greece was advanced $155 billion bailout package in May 2010. Displeased at how slowly the nation has moved to carve up its economy, the ECB has told Greece to start privatizing up to $70 billion by 2015. The sell-offs are to be headed by prime tourist real estate and the remaining government stakes in the national gambling monopoly OPAP, the Postbank, the Athens and Thessaloniki ports, the Thessaloniki Water and Sewer Company and the telephone monopoly. Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg’s Prime Minister and chairman of the Eurozone’s group of finance ministers, warned that only if Greece agreed to start selling off assets (“consolidating its budget”) would the EU agree to stretch out loan maturities for Greek debt and “save” it from default.

The problem is that privatization and regressive tax shifts raise the cost of living and doing business. This makes economies less competitive, and hence even less able to pay debts that are accruing interest, leading toward a larger ultimate default.

The textbook financial response of turning the economy into a set of tollbooths to sell off is predatory. Third World countries demonstrated its destructive consequences from the 1970s onward under IMF austerity planning. Europe is now repeating the same shrinkage.

Financial power is to achieve what military conquest had done in times past. Pretending to make subject economies more “competitive,” the aim is more short-run: to squeeze out enough payments so that bondholders (and indeed, voters) will not be obliged to confront the reality that many debts are unpayable except at the price of making the economy too debt-ridden, too regressively tax-ridden and too burdened with rising privatized infrastructure charges to be competitive. Spending cutbacks and a regressive tax shift dry up capital investment and productivity the long run. Such economies are run like companies taken over by debt-leveraged raiders on credit, who downsize and outsource their labor force so as to squeeze out enough revenue to pay their own creditors – who take what they can and run. The tactic attack of this financial attack is no longer overt military force as in days of yore, but something less costly because its victims submit more voluntarily.

But the intended victims of predatory finance are fighting back. And instead of the attacker losing their armies and manpower, it is their balance sheets that are threatened – and hence their own webs of solvency. When Greek labor unions (especially in the public enterprises being privatized), the ruling Socialist Party and leading minority parties rejected such sacrifices, Eurozone officials demanded that financial planning be placed above party politics, and demanded “cross-party agreement on any overhaul of the bail-out.” In other words, Greece should respond to its wave of labor strikes and popular protest by suspending party politics and economic democracy. “The government and the opposition should declare jointly that they commit to the reform agreements with the EU,” Mr. Juncker explained to Der Spiegel.

Criticizing Prime Minister George Papandreou’s delay at even starting to sell state assets, European financial leaders proposed a national privatization agency to act as an intermediary to transfer revenue from these assets to foreign creditors and retire public debt – and to pledge its public assets as collateral to be forfeited in case of default in payments to government bondholders. Suggesting that the government “set up an agency to privatize state assets” along the lines of the German Treuhandanstalt that sold off East German enterprises in the 1990s,” Mr. Juncker thought that “Greece could gain more from privatizations than the €50 billion ($71 billion) it has estimated” (Evans-Pritchard).

European bankers had their eye on the sale as much as $400 billion of Greek assets – enough to pay off all the government debt. Failing payment, the ECB threatened not to accept Greek government bonds as collateral. This would prevent Greek banks from doing business, wrecking its financial system and paralyzing the economy. This threat was supposed to make privatization “democratically” approved – followed by breaking union power and lowering wages (“internal devaluation”). “Jan Kees de Jager, Dutch finance minister, has proposed that any more loans to Greece should come with collateral arrangements, in which European state lenders would take over Greek assets in the event of a sovereign default.” (Peter Spiegel, Financial Times.)
The problem is that ultimate default is inevitable, given the debt corner into which governments have recklessly deregulated the banks and cut property taxes and progressive income taxes. Default will become pressing whenever the ECB may choose to pull the plug.

The ECB makes governments unable to finance their spending

Introduction of the euro in 1999 explicitly prevented the ECB or any national central bank from financing government deficits. This means that no nation has a central bank able to do what those of Britain and the United States were created to do: monetize credit to domestic banks. The public sector has been made dependent on commercial banks and bondholders. This is a bonanza for them, rolling back three centuries of attempts to create a mixed economy financially and industrially, by privatizing the credit creation monopoly as well as capital investment in public infrastructure monopolies now being pushed onto the sales block for bidders – on credit, with the winner being the one who promises to pay out the most interest to bankers to absorb the access fees (“economic rent”) that can be extracted.

Politics is being financialized while economies are being privatized. The financial strategy was to remove economic planning from democratically elected representatives, centralizing it in the hands of financial managers. What Benito Mussolini called “corporatism” in the 1920s (to give it its polite name) is now being achieved by Europe’s large banks and financial institutions – ironically (but I suppose inevitably) under the euphemism of “free market economics.”

Language is adapting itself to reflect the economic and political transformation (surrender?) now underway. Central bank “independence” was euphemized as the “hallmark of democracy,” not the victory of financial oligarchy. The task of rhetoric is to divert attention from the fact that the financial sector aims not to “free” markets, but to place control in the hands of financial managers – whose logic is to subject economies to austerity and even depression, sell off public land and enterprises, suffer emigration and reduce living standards in the face of a sharply increasing concentration of wealth at the top of the economic pyramid. The idea is to slash government employment, lowering public-sector salaries to lead private sector wages downward, while cutting back social services.

The internal contradiction (as Marxists would say) is that the existing mass of interest-bearing debt must grow, as it receives interest – which is re-invested to earn yet more interest. This is the “magic” or “miracle” of compound interest. The problem is that paying interest diverts revenue away from the circular flow between production and consumption. Say’s Law says that payments by producers (to employees and to producers of capital goods) must be spent, in the agregate, on buying the products that labor and tangible capital produces. Otherwise there is a market glut and business shrinks – with the financial sector’s network of debt claims bearing the brunt.

The financial system intrudes into this circular flow. Income spent to pay creditors is not spent on goods and services; it is re-invested in new loans, or on stocks and bonds (assets in the form of financial and property claims on the economy), or increasingly on “gambling” (the “casino capitalism” of derivatives, the international carry trade (that is, exchange-rate and interest-rate arbitrage) and other financial claims that are independent of the production-and-consumption economy. So as financial assets accrue interest – bolstered by new credit creation on computer keyboards by commercial banks and central banks – the financial rake-off from the “real” economy increases.

The idea of paying debts regardless of social cost is backed by mathematical models as complex as those used by physicists designing atomic reactors. But they have a basic flaw simple enough for a grade-school math student to understand: They assume that economies can pay debts growing exponentially at a higher rate than production or exports are growing. Only by ignoring the ability to pay – by creating an economic surplus over break-even levels – can one believe that debt leveraging can produce enough financial “balance sheet” gains to pay banks, pension funds and other financial institutions that recycle their interest into new loans. Financial engineering is expected to usher in a postindustrial society that make money from money (or rather, from credit) via rising asset prices for real estate, stocks and bonds.

It all seems much easier than earning profit from tangible investment to produce and market goods and services, because banks can fuel asset-price inflation simply by creating credit electronically on their computer keyboards. Until 2008 many families throughout the world saw the price of their home rise by more than they earned in an entire year. This cuts out the troublesome M-C-M’ cycle (using capital to produce commodities to sell at a profit), by M-M’ (buying real estate or assets already in place, or stocks and bonds already issued, and waiting for the central bank to inflate their prices by lowering interest rates and untaxing wealth so that high income investors can increase their demand for property and financial securities).

The problem is that credit is debt, and debt must be paid – with interest. And when an economy pays interest, less revenue is left over to spend on goods and services. So markets shrink, sales decline, profits fall, and there is less cash flow to pay interest and dividends. Unemployment spreads, rents fall, mortgage-holders default, and real estate is thrown onto the market at falling prices.

When asset prices crash, these debts remain in place. As the Bubble Economy turns into a nightmare, politicians are taking private (and often fraudulent) bank losses onto the public balance sheet. This is dividing European politics and even threatening to break up the Eurozone.

Breakup of the Eurozone?

Third World countries from the 1960s through 1990s were told to devalue in order to reduce labor’s purchasing power and hence imports of food, fuel and other consumer goods. But Eurozone members are locked into the euro. This leaves only the option of “internal devaluation” – lowering wage rates as an alternative to scaling back payments to creditors atop Europe’s economic pyramid.

Latvia is cited as the model success story. Its government slashed employment and public sector wages fell by 30 per cent in 2009-10. Private-sector wages followed the decline. This was applauded as a “success story” and “accepting reality.” So now, the government has put forth a “balanced budget amendment,” to go with its flat tax on labor (some 59 percent, with only a 1 percent tax on real estate). Former U.S. neoliberal presidential candidate Steve Forbes would find it an economic paradise.

“Saving the euro” is a euphemism for governments saving the financial class – and with it a debt dynamic that is nearing its end regardless of what they do. The aim is for euro-debts to Germany, the Netherlands, France and financial institutions (now joined by vulture funds) are to preserve their value. (No haircuts for them). The price is to be paid by labor and industry.

Government authority is to lose most of all. Just as the public domain is to be carved up and sold to pay creditors, economic policy is being taken out of the hands of democratically elected representatives and placed in the hands of the ECB, European Commission and IMF.

Spain’s unemployment rate of 20 per cent, just a bit more than in the Baltics, with nearly twice as high an unemployment rate among recent school graduates. But as William Nassau Senior is reported to have said when told that a million Irishmen had died in the potato famine: “It is not enough!”

Can anything be enough – anything that works for more than the short run? What “helping Greece remain solvent” means in practice is to help it avoid taxing wealth (the rich aren’t paying) and help it roll back wages while obliging labor to pay more in taxes while the government (i.e. “taxpayers,” a.k.a. workers) sells off public land and enterprises to bail out foreign banks and bondholders while slashing its social spending, industrial subsidies and public infrastructure investment.

One Greek friend in my age bracket has said that his private pension (from a computing company) was slashed by the government. When his son went to collect his unemployment check, it was cut in half, on the ground that his parents allegedly had the money to support them. The price of the house they bought a few years ago has plunged. They tell me that they are no more eager to remain part of the Eurozone than the Icelandic voters showed themselves last month.

The strikes continue. Anger is rising. When incoming IMF head Christine Lagarde was French trade minister, she suggested that: “France had to revamp its labor code. Labor unions and fellow ministers balked, and Ms. Lagarde backtracked, saying she had expressed a personal opinion.” This opinion is about to become official policy – from the IMF that was acting as “good cop” to the ECB’s “bad cop.”

I suppose that all that really is needed is for people to understand just what dynamics are at work that make these attempts to pay in vain. The creditors know that the game is up. All they can do is take as much as they can, as long as they can, pay themselves bonuses that are “free” from recapture by public prosecutors, and run to their offshore banking centers.

εικόνες από την πλατεία












Δευτέρα, Μαΐου 23, 2011

είμαστε κλειστά




...

καλύτερα ένα φρικτό τέλος παρά μία φρίκη δίχως τέλος

Abandoning the Euro

Can the Greek People Teach the Central Bankers Economics?

By DEAN BAKER

There is an old maxim that in any bureaucracy people will always rise to the level of their incompetence. This certainly seems to be the case with the European Central Bank (ECB). After totally ignoring the build-up of dangerous housing bubbles in most euro zone countries, as well as the imbalances that supported these bubbles, the ECB now seems intent on punishing the people in many of these countries for its mistakes.

This is the likely result of the policies that it is now pursuing, whether or not this is the intention. The insistence that the heavily indebted countries in the euro zone – Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain – pay off their debt in full will inevitably lead to years of high unemployment in these countries and trillions of dollars of lost output throughout the euro zone as a whole. The budget cuts demanded of these countries will force large reductions in pensions and other social supports at a time when macroeconomic policies ensure that few jobs are available.

It is difficult to see any plausible gain from this pain. If the purpose of the pain is increased respect for fiscal discipline then the guns are pointed in the wrong direction. Ireland, Portugal, and Spain had surpluses or relatively small deficits in the years preceding the crisis. The problems that sank these economies were bad loans in the private sector and the bubbles they fueled.

It is difficult to see what lessons are taught by strangling the public sector. The austerity policies being imposed on these countries are unlikely to put serious dents in the fortunes of those who profited from these speculative bubbles.

Even in the case of Greece, which clearly did have serious fiscal problems, the austerity agenda only deals with half of the problem. Every reckless borrower needs a reckless lender. In this case, the reckless lenders in Germany and France are being bailed out by new loans from the euro zone rescue fund and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It's not clear what lessons the lenders are learning.

Remarkably, for its larger macroeconomic policy the ECB continues to maintain its fixation on its 2.0 percent inflation target, as though the economic collapse never occurred. This has caused it to already start raising interest rates at a time when more than 15 million people are unemployed throughout the euro zone. (It's worth noting that even at the peak of the crisis the ECB never lowered its overnight rate below 1.0 percent, compared to the near zero rate maintained by the Federal Reserve Board for the last two and a half years.)

The higher interest rate unnecessarily clamps down on badly needed growth throughout the euro zone but its impact on the heavily indebted countries will be especially pernicious. In addition to worsening the employment situation, it is also likely to increase their interest burden as the interest rates paid by these countries will likely rise in step with the ECB rate.

There is a real risk that the ECB's policy may soon make the situation of the governments in the heavily indebted countries untenable. The populations of these countries are clearly willing to endure economic hardship for a period of time, under the belief that this suffering will lead to a better future. However, this prospect is getting more questionable by the day, as the better future gets pushed out ever further in the distance.

The latest projections from the IMF show that Spain's GDP will not recover its pre-crisis peaks until 2013. It will take Ireland until 2015, and Portugal and Greece until 2016. Furthermore, given the consistent patterns of downgrading growth projections over the last few years, it is likely that it will take these countries even longer to regain their lost output on their current policy path.

This raises the possibility that governments of the heavily indebted countries will soon find it impossible to agree to the never-ending demands for austerity coming from the ECB and the IMF. The refusal to come to terms will inevitably lead to a financial crisis, as anyone with assets will seek to withdraw them from the banks of a country facing such a standoff.

In such circumstances, leaving the euro and re-introducing a domestic currency becomes a realistic prospect. No government would ever go this route unless it had no choice, because it is almost inconceivable that it could re-introduce a domestic currency without bringing on a financial crisis. However, if the crisis is already there, then the domestic currency route would suddenly look much more appealing.

Argentina provides the model for this situation. Its government had supposedly created an unbreakable peg between its currency and the dollar in the early '90s. When interest rates in the United States rose in the late '90s, and the value of the dollar rose as well, Argentina's situation became untenable.

After negotiating a series of austerity packages with the IMF, the resulting recession and cutbacks in public services created enough civil unrest that the country could go no further. With the situation spiraling out of control, the government had no choice but to break its unbreakable peg. The resulting financial crisis sent the economy spiraling downward. However, it stabilized after three months, and began leaping forward six months after the break. It continued to have strong growth for the next six years until the world economic crisis brought Argentina's economy to a standstill in 2009.

If the ECB and IMF do not ease up on their conditions, they may push the heavily indebted countries down a similar path. Greece is the most likely candidate, having experienced the sharpest fall in output to date and facing the highest burden of debt to GDP. While there is much about Greece's economy that is badly in need of reform, the current austerity policies are not helping them to accomplish this reform.

If Greece were to leave the euro, there would undoubtedly be considerable short-term pain, but with its own currency it would at least have a route to resume growth in a reasonable period of time. Greece's departure would also pave a path for other countries to follow. This may be the lesson that the ECB needs in order to develop more realistic policies for dealing with the enormous imbalances that it allowed to develop in the last decade. Maybe the ECB bureaucrats can still learn some basic economics before they take Europe's economy even deeper into a hole.

η καλύτερη θεραπεία είναι ο θάνατος του ασθενούς

When Austerity Fails

I often complain, with reason, about the state of economic discussion in the United States. And the irresponsibility of certain politicians — like those Republicans claiming that defaulting on U.S. debt would be no big deal — is scary.

But at least in America members of the pain caucus, those who claim that raising interest rates and slashing government spending in the face of mass unemployment will somehow make things better instead of worse, get some pushback from the Federal Reserve and the Obama administration.

In Europe, by contrast, the pain caucus has been in control for more than a year, insisting that sound money and balanced budgets are the answer to all problems. Underlying this insistence have been economic fantasies, in particular belief in the confidence fairy — that is, belief that slashing spending will actually create jobs, because fiscal austerity will improve private-sector confidence.

Unfortunately, the confidence fairy keeps refusing to make an appearance. And a dispute over how to handle inconvenient reality threatens to make Europe the flashpoint of a new financial crisis.

After the creation of the euro in 1999, European nations that had previously been considered risky, and that therefore faced limits on the amount they could borrow, began experiencing huge inflows of capital. After all, investors apparently thought, Greece/Portugal/Ireland/Spain were members of a European monetary union, so what could go wrong?

The answer to that question is now, of course, painfully apparent. Greece’s government, finding itself able to borrow at rates only slightly higher than those facing Germany, took on far too much debt. The governments of Ireland and Spain didn’t (Portugal is somewhere in between) — but their banks did, and when the bubble burst, taxpayers found themselves on the hook for bank debts. The problem was made worse by the fact that the 1999-2007 boom left prices and costs in the debtor nations far out of line with those of their neighbors.

What to do? European leaders offered emergency loans to nations in crisis, but only in exchange for promises to impose savage austerity programs, mainly consisting of huge spending cuts. Objections that these programs would be self-defeating — not only would they impose large direct pain, but they also would, by worsening the economic slump, reduce revenues — were waved away. Austerity would actually be expansionary, it was claimed, because it would improve confidence.

Nobody bought into the doctrine of expansionary austerity more thoroughly than Jean-Claude Trichet, the president of the European Central Bank, or E.C.B. Under his leadership the bank began preaching austerity as a universal economic elixir that should be imposed immediately everywhere, including in countries like Britain and the United States that still have high unemployment and aren’t facing any pressure from the financial markets.

But as I said, the confidence fairy hasn’t shown up. Europe’s troubled debtor nations are, as we should have expected, suffering further economic decline thanks to those austerity programs, and confidence is plunging instead of rising. It’s now clear that Greece, Ireland and Portugal can’t and won’t repay their debts in full, although Spain might manage to tough it out.

Realistically, then, Europe needs to prepare for some kind of debt reduction, involving a combination of aid from stronger economies and “haircuts” imposed on private creditors, who will have to accept less than full repayment. Realism, however, appears to be in short supply.

On one side, Germany is taking a hard line against anything resembling aid to its troubled neighbors, even though one important motivation for the current rescue program was an attempt to shield German banks from losses.

On the other side, the E.C.B. is acting as if it is determined to provoke a financial crisis. It has started to raise interest rates despite the terrible state of many European economies. And E.C.B. officials have been warning against any form of debt relief — in fact, last week one member of the governing council suggested that even a mild restructuring of Greek bonds would cause the E.C.B. to stop accepting those bonds as collateral for loans to Greek banks. This amounted to a declaration that if Greece seeks debt relief, the E.C.B. will pull the plug on the Greek banking system, which is crucially dependent on those loans.

If Greek banks collapse, that might well force Greece out of the euro area — and it’s all too easy to see how it could start financial dominoes falling across much of Europe. So what is the E.C.B. thinking?

My guess is that it’s just not willing to face up to the failure of its fantasies. And if this sounds incredibly foolish, well, who ever said that wisdom rules the world?

Κυριακή, Μαΐου 22, 2011

Πέμπτη, Μαΐου 19, 2011

Ο Νιόνιος είναι καραγκιόζης

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και ζητώ συγγνώμη από τον καραγκιόζη για την προσβολή



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Πέμπτη, Μαΐου 12, 2011

Τρίτη, Μαΐου 10, 2011

καταλάβατε τώρα γιατί δεν θα γλιτώσουμε ποτέ

Την επισήμανση πως δεν γίνεται λόγος για τέτοιες λύσεις, σε ό,τι αφορά τη
συζήτηση περί «κουρέματος» του ελληνικού χρέους και άλλων, «ακόμη πιο ακραίων
επιλογών», έκανε σήμερα στη Βιέννη μετά το εβδομαδιαίο υπουργικό συμβούλιο, ο
καγκελάριος της Αυστρίας και αρχηγός του Σοσιαλδημοκρατικού Κόμματος, Βέρνερ
Φάιμαν, ο οποίος παράλληλα τόνισε πως δεν επιθυμεί τη διάλυση της Ευρωζώνης και
τάχθηκε υπέρ μιας «διαδικασίας βήμα προς βήμα» ως προς το ελληνικό πρόβλημα.

Τόσο ο κ. Φάιμαν όσο και ο Αυστριακός αντικαγκελάριος, υπουργός Εξωτερικών και
αρχηγός του συγκυβερνώντος με τους Σοσιαλδημοκράτες, συντηρητικού Λαϊκού
Κόμματος, απαντώντας σε ερωτήσεις για τις οικονομικές εξελίξεις στην Ελλάδα,
παρέπεμψαν στο Συμβούλιο των υπουργών Οικονομικών της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενωσης την
ερχόμενη εβδομάδα, επισημαίνοντας ότι «εκεί θα εξεταστεί εάν η Ελλάδα τηρεί τις
δεσμεύσεις που η ίδια έχει καθορίσει».

Κατηγορηματικά απέκλεισε το ενδεχόμενο αναδιάρθρωσης στην Ελλάδα και η νέα
αυστριακή υπουργός Οικονομικών, Μαρία Φέκτερ, προβάλλοντας ως επιχείρημα πως
«αυτό δεν θα έχει κανένα αποτέλεσμα, διότι δεν θα υπάρχει για την Ελλάδα η
πίεση των μεταρρυθμίσεων» και μάλιστα για συγκεκριμένες ιδιωτικοποιήσεις, ενώ ο
τραπεζικός τομέας πρέπει να βοηθηθεί, προκειμένου να εξασφαλιστεί ρευστότητα
για την τόνωση της οικονομίας.

Η ίδια, μάλιστα, πρόσθεσε ότι η διεθνής βοήθεια είναι σαφής όσον αφορά τις
μεταρρυθμίσεις που πρέπει να γίνουν, παρατηρώντας πως «εάν υπάρξουν δυσκολίες
με το χρονοδιάγραμμα, μπορεί να δοθεί κάποια παράταση, ή να εξετάσουμε τι
μπορεί να γίνει με τα υψηλά επιτόκια».
Σε ό,τι αφορά τις φήμες περί εξόδου της Ελλάδας από την Ευρωζώνη, η υπουργός
Οικονομικών τις χαρακτήρισε «πραγματική ανοησία», συμπληρώνοντας ότι κάτι
τέτοιο θα ήταν πολύ δύσκολο και νομικά, καθώς η Ελλάδα θα έπρεπε πρώτα να
εξέλθει από την ΕΕ, «πράγμα που ουδείς επιθυμεί».
Το ενδεχόμενο εξόδου της Ελλάδας από την Ευρωζώνη απέκλεισε και ο Αυστριακός
υπουργός Οικονομίας, Ράινχολντ Μίτερλενερ, τονίζοντας ότι η ΕΕ πρέπει να
αντιμετωπίζει τα προβλήματα που προκύπτουν.

Why Greece Should Reject the Euro


Washington

SOMETIMES there is turmoil in the markets because a government threatens to do what is best for its citizens. This seemed to be the case in Europe last week, when the German magazine Der Spiegel reported that the Greek government was threatening to stop using the euro. The euro suffered its worst two-day plunge since December 2008.

Greek and European Union officials denied the report, but a threat by Greece to jettison the euro is long overdue, and it should be prepared to carry it out. As much as the move might cost Greece in the short term, it is very unlikely that such costs would be greater than the many years of recession, stagnation and high unemployment that the European authorities are offering.

The experience of Argentina at the end of 2001 is instructive. For more than three and a half years Argentina had suffered through one of the deepest recessions of the 20th century. Its peso was pegged to the dollar, which is similar to Greece having the euro as its national currency. The Argentines took loans from the International Monetary Fund, and cut spending as poverty and unemployment soared. It was all in vain as the recession deepened.

Then Argentina defaulted on its foreign debt and cut loose from the dollar. Most economists and the business press predicted that years of disaster would ensue. But the economy shrank for just one more quarter after the devaluation and default; it then grew 63 percent over the next six years. More than 11 million people, in a nation of 39 million, were pulled out of poverty.

Within three years Argentina was back to its pre-recession level of output, despite losing more than twice as much of its gross domestic product as Greece has lost in its current recession. By contrast, in Greece, even if things go well, the I.M.F. projects that the economy will take eight years to reach its pre-crisis G.D.P. But this is likely optimistic — the I.M.F. has repeatedly lowered its near-term growth projections for Greece since the crisis began.

The main reason for Argentina’s rapid recovery was that it was finally freed from adhering to fiscal and monetary policies that stifled growth. The same would be true for Greece if it were to drop the euro. Greece would also get a boost from the devaluation’s effect on the trade balance (as Argentina did for the first six months of recovery), since its exports would be more competitive, and imports would be more expensive.

Press reports have also warned of a sharp increase in Greek debt from devaluation if it were to leave the euro zone. But the fact is that Greece would not pay this debt, as Argentina did not pay two-thirds of its foreign debt after its devaluation and default.

Portugal just concluded an agreement with the I.M.F. that projects two more years of recession. No government should accept this kind of punishment. A responsible leader would point out to the European authorities that they have the money to support Greece with countercyclical policies (like fiscal stimulus), though they are choosing not to.

From a creditors’ point of view, which the European Union authorities have apparently adopted, a country that has accumulated too much debt must be punished, so as not to encourage “bad behavior.” But punishing an entire country for the past mistakes of some of its leaders, while morally satisfying to some, is hardly the basis for sound policy.

There is also the idea that Greece — as well as Ireland, Spain and Portugal — can recover by means of an “internal devaluation.” This means increasing unemployment so much that wages fall enough to make the country more internationally competitive. The social costs of such a move, however, are extremely high and it rarely if ever works. Unemployment has doubled in Greece (to 14.7 percent), more than doubled in Spain (to 20.7 percent) and more than tripled in Ireland (to 14.7 percent). But recovery is still elusive.

You can be sure that the European authorities would offer Greece a better deal under a credible threat of leaving the euro zone. In fact, there are indications that they may have already moved in response to last week’s threat.

But the bottom line is that Greece cannot afford to settle for any deal that does not allow it to grow and make its way out of the recession. Loans that require what economists call “pro-cyclical” policies — cutting spending and raising taxes in the face of recession — should be off the table. The attempt to shrink Greece’s way out has failed. If that’s all that the European authorities have to offer, then it is time for Greece, and perhaps others, to say goodbye to the euro.

The Unwisdom of Elites


The past three years have been a disaster for most Western economies. The United States has mass long-term unemployment for the first time since the 1930s. Meanwhile, Europe’s single currency is coming apart at the seams. How did it all go so wrong?

Well, what I’ve been hearing with growing frequency from members of the policy elite — self-appointed wise men, officials, and pundits in good standing — is the claim that it’s mostly the public’s fault [μαζί τα φάγαμε] . The idea is that we got into this mess because voters wanted something for nothing, and weak-minded politicians catered to the electorate’s foolishness.

So this seems like a good time to point out that this blame-the-public view isn’t just self-serving, it’s dead wrong.

The fact is that what we’re experiencing right now is a top-down disaster. The policies that got us into this mess weren’t responses to public demand. They were, with few exceptions, policies championed by small groups of influential people — in many cases, the same people now lecturing the rest of us on the need to get serious. And by trying to shift the blame to the general populace, elites are ducking some much-needed reflection on their own catastrophic mistakes.

Let me focus mainly on what happened in the United States, then say a few words about Europe.

These days Americans get constant lectures about the need to reduce the budget deficit. That focus in itself represents distorted priorities, since our immediate concern should be job creation. But suppose we restrict ourselves to talking about the deficit, and ask: What happened to the budget surplus the federal government had in 2000?

The answer is, three main things. First, there were the Bush tax cuts, which added roughly $2 trillion to the national debt over the last decade. Second, there were the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which added an additional $1.1 trillion or so. And third was the Great Recession, which led both to a collapse in revenue and to a sharp rise in spending on unemployment insurance and other safety-net programs.

So who was responsible for these budget busters? It wasn’t the man in the street.

President George W. Bush cut taxes in the service of his party’s ideology, not in response to a groundswell of popular demand — and the bulk of the cuts went to a small, affluent minority.

Similarly, Mr. Bush chose to invade Iraq because that was something he and his advisers wanted to do, not because Americans were clamoring for war against a regime that had nothing to do with 9/11. In fact, it took a highly deceptive sales campaign to get Americans to support the invasion, and even so, voters were never as solidly behind the war as America’s political and pundit elite.

Finally, the Great Recession was brought on by a runaway financial sector, empowered by reckless deregulation. And who was responsible for that deregulation? Powerful people in Washington with close ties to the financial industry, that’s who. Let me give a particular shout-out to Alan Greenspan, who played a crucial role both in financial deregulation and in the passage of the Bush tax cuts — and who is now, of course, among those hectoring us about the deficit.

So it was the bad judgment of the elite, not the greediness of the common man, that caused America’s deficit. And much the same is true of the European crisis.

Needless to say, that’s not what you hear from European policy makers. The official story in Europe these days is that governments of troubled nations catered too much to the masses, promising too much to voters while collecting too little in taxes. And that is, to be fair, a reasonably accurate story for Greece. But it’s not at all what happened in Ireland and Spain, both of which had low debt and budget surpluses on the eve of the crisis.

The real story of Europe’s crisis is that leaders created a single currency, the euro, without creating the institutions that were needed to cope with booms and busts within the euro zone. And the drive for a single European currency was the ultimate top-down project, an elite vision imposed on highly reluctant voters.

Does any of this matter? Why should we be concerned about the effort to shift the blame for bad policies onto the general public?

One answer is simple accountability. People who advocated budget-busting policies during the Bush years shouldn’t be allowed to pass themselves off as deficit hawks; people who praised Ireland as a role model shouldn’t be giving lectures on responsible government.

But the larger answer, I’d argue, is that by making up stories about our current predicament that absolve the people who put us here there, we cut off any chance to learn from the crisis. We need to place the blame where it belongs, to chasten our policy elites. Otherwise, they’ll do even more damage in the years ahead.

η επιστροφή της Stevie Nicks




http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/musical/2011/05/16/110516crmu_music_frerejonesh

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Παρασκευή, Μαΐου 06, 2011

η τέχνη του Robert Mapplethorpe


Children, Puerto Rico, 1981.


Tulips, 1987

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η τέχνη του Arthur Elgort

pElgort-6.jpg

Fire Island, 1976

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στο παλιό βιενέζικο στυλ



Vienna, May 2011

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Τετάρτη, Μαΐου 04, 2011

oh Vienna 2.0



oh vienna


Vienna, May 2011

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