buc.ci is a Fediverse instance that uses the ActivityPub protocol. In other words, users at this host can communicate with people that use software like Mastodon, Pleroma, Friendica, etc. all around the world.
This server runs the snac software and there is no automatic sign-up process.
LLM assisted reverse engineering
https://www.slowchronicle.com/posts/llm-assisted-reverse-engineering
Mistral AI are offering three months of free Pro usage for EU users: https://admin.mistral.ai/subscription/upgrade/redeem?redeem_code=LECHONK
Unless you can do fully local, European AI is the best option.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Cybersecurity, Part 31: Orchestrating Autonomous Multi-Agent Exploitation Swarms with Orca
Not a day goes by where I'm not seeing some senior software/cybersec person doing a bad take on LLM-AI.
With bad take I mean voicing an opinion or statement that's simply ... wrong. Wrong as in factually incorrect, in a material way to the argument made.
I'm also quite certain that they believe that they're knowledgeable and that there's some big conspiracy that when exposed will cause the whole LLM-fuelled way of development to come crashing down at which point they will have been proven Right.
Makes me sad. Some of you I've considered to be leaders in your respective areas but you seem to have just gone Old Man Yells at Sky on us. Being an expert in one area does not mean you're an expert in another. It takes work.
You haven't done it.
The latest FreeBSD report is here, and the AI debate is ongoing : r/freebsd
Liam Proven at The Register has written one of the sharpest pieces on open source and AI that I've read in a while, and he's done it inside what looks like a routine quarterly report write-up.
On the surface it's a roundup of the FreeBSD Q3 2026 status report: 51 entries across 16 projects, including Sylve (a Proxmox-style GUI for FreeBSD virtualisation hosts) and AppJail (containerised app distribution, FreeBSD's answer to Snap and Flatpak). That part is clear, well chosen, and useful on its own.
The real value is how he handles FreeBSD's long-running argument over code written by LLM coding assistants. He doesn't just repeat the developer survey figures. He reads them closely and sees what they add up to. Nearly everyone wants a policy, plus human review, disclosure and accountability. Only a small minority want the stuff discouraged at all. Then he puts that next to NetBSD's 2024 ban (which, despite the doom-mongering, hasn't made NetBSD irrelevant), OpenBSD's open mockery, and Debian's recent vote, where even a Condorcet ballot full of refusal options ended up permitting the bots.
His conclusion is blunt and hard to argue with: FreeBSD will tell its developers to "be careful", and LLM-generated code will get committed anyway.
This is what good tech journalism looks like. He knows the history, knows the communities, makes the comparisons nobody else bothers to make, and is willing to say where this is heading even when the answer is unwelcome. If you're as wary of the LLM gold rush as he is, and as I am, read it. If you aren't, read it anyway.
Here's the Reddit post through which he promoted the piece:
#AI #Anthropic #Claude #BSD #Debian #FreeBSD #LLM #LLMs #NetBSD #OpenBSD #OpenSource #Opus #Reddit #TheRegister
This week's number 1 article:
― https://www.reddit.com/r/freebsd/top/?t=week&feedViewType=compactView
Discussion in El Reg:
― https://forums.theregister.com/forum/all/2026/11/12/202610/
----------------
🎯 AI: GTIG AI Threat Tracker
===================
GTIG and Mandiant report that multiple threat actors have used open-source agentic penetration-testing frameworks during live intrusions. The observed use covers discrete phases and operational tasks. The supplied excerpt does not establish that every intrusion was autonomous end to end.
🔹 Scope and methodology
The update draws on Mandiant incident-response telemetry, threat actor tracking and platform defenses. It covers financially motivated activity, cyber espionage and information operations. The excerpt summarizes trends from the last quarter but does not provide incident-level case studies or a count of affected organizations.
🔹 Agentic intrusion workflows
The report names ARTEX, CAIRN, CyberStrikeAI and PentAGI as examples of multi-agent offensive frameworks. It describes a move beyond manual prompting toward workflows that chain tasks across multiple intrusion stages. The excerpt does not attribute a specific framework to a named actor or victim.
The distinction matters: the direct observation is abuse of frameworks for particular tasks and phases in live intrusions. The broader characterization of autonomous multi-stage activity should not be read as evidence that each named framework completed a full intrusion without intervention.
🔹 Automated vulnerability research
GTIG describes actors using LLMs and agentic frameworks to reverse-engineer patches through differential analysis. The stated objective is to weaponize n-day vulnerabilities and scale exploitation against internet-facing servers. The report also describes exploitation pipelines operating without human intervention, but the excerpt provides no CVE, patch, target product or incident timeline to examine.
🔹 Credential monetization and influence operations
In LLMJacking, financially motivated actors steal LLM credentials and cloud resources from compromised enterprise environments. Access to high-performance models can then be resold through underground proxy services described as LLM Mixers. The excerpt does not specify the initial access method, stolen credential format or proxy infrastructure.
For information operations, the report describes state-sponsored groups, commercial Influence-as-a-Service vendors and inauthentic political monetization networks using LLMs to produce synthetic media, develop localized personas and automate distribution across platforms. It also notes espionage uses including target research and automated data analysis.
🔹 Coding assistant supply chain
A separate reported vector involves manipulating autonomous coding assistant configurations so that backdoors are dropped during local execution. The excerpt does not identify the assistant, configuration mechanism, payload or affected project. It should not be treated as a documented sequence for the intrusion cases above.
🔹 Detection and limits
No IoCs, detection queries, ATT&CK mappings or specific defensive recommendations are supplied in the excerpt. Google describes model safeguards and disruption of malicious projects and accounts, but does not provide implementation details here. The source is the November 17, 2026 GTIG AI Threat Tracker update by Aurora Blum, Kelli Vanderlee, Jess Xia and David Mainor.
🔹 GTIG #Mandiant #LLM #LLMJacking
✨ Mia’s Simulacrum 🏳️⚧️✨ [she/her (the most biological woman you will ever see)] » 🌐
@m@lgbtqia.space
I think there is a good chance that gen AI has initiated a new golden era of art.
True art. Art that has meaning and transcends the gray mass of mass production and mass markets.
Art that is valued because it is fringe and disturbing.
There is so much potential in art that is more than entertainment, video thumbnails and restaurant menus… if one even want to call something like this art.
Mass produced human slop can no longer persist between ai slop and thus only artists that have not sold their soul to the so called “public consumer” will not perish into the same netherworld that have been occupied by factory joiners and factory tailors.
There are so many new tools and so much potential to create something meaningful that is not done to appeal to the “common consumer of entertainment” and I will be on the look out to this new wave of art.
Resources wanted!
I'm looking for links to entry-level "why AI is bad" information, aimed specifically at *individual users* (rather than being about global/societal risks of AI development overall).
Something you could send to, say.. a fairly non-technical person who doesn't know much about AI but has just discovered they can use it to make posters for their community event for free, and doesn't understand why Everyone Hated That.
AI in Cybersecurity: Using PentestCode for Pentesting and Bug Bounty Hunting
PentestCode is an out-of-the-box terminal agent powered by free daily AI models that automates Active Directory exploitation, DCSync attacks, bug bounty recon, and reporting.
https://hackers-arise.com/artificial-intelligence-ai-in-cybersecurity-part-23-using-pentestcode-for-web-and-network-pentest/
"Slop" is a speech-act
So there's this interesting thing language does.
Human language has a lot of ways to try and influence reality, and very often sentences that try and do that look differently to normal sentence.
For example, the sentences "Buy tomatoes", "Don't buy tomatoes", "Could you buy tomatoes", "Let's buy tomatoes" and "You should buy tomatoes" all look very different to the sentence "You are buying tomatoes".
These forms all have fancy Latin names and differ from language to language, but it's so common to have something like that that Wikipedia claims confidently with no citation that "Every language has grammatical ways of expressing unreality."
The interesting bit is sometimes a sentence looks normal, but actually shapes reality, possibly even more than one of the previous examples. Sometimes the act of saying something is the same as performing an action. The classic example is "I now pronounce you wives", where the ordainer, by saying those words, is also changing the legal and societal status of the people they're talking about.
Other classic examples are "You're fired", "I'm in", "I'm breaking up with you" and "I promise". By saying the words, one performs the action — a speech-act.
Do you remember the question that became a conservative meme for a while, "what is a woman"? Transphobes loved it because they had a prepared dogwhistle answer, but also because their three-word answer is way shorter than any non-dogwhistle answer one may give, which to them seems like proof they're correct (it isn't, and the fact they think so is in fact an example of Brandolini's bullshit asymmetry principle, which states that the amount of energy needed to refute bullshit is an order of magnitude bigger than that needed to produce it).
(Sidenote, and this is another borrowed observation: while I understand why TERFs decided to latch onto "adult human female", rather than "adult female human", only the latter of which ever existed as some dictionary's definition — it leaves what they consider the most important part to the end and the rest as modifiers — I find that definition extremely dehumanising. Literally de-human-ising, downgrading the grammatical importance of "human" to be lesser than that of "female".)
I believe though there's another reason they adore that to-them-rhetorical question, which is that by stating the answer is "adult human female" (and by strongly implying that transgender women don't fall under the category of "female", something which is not as obvious as they think it is), they can make the definition exclude trans women. When transphobes ask "what is a woman", their goal is not to find out what a woman is, but to define it.
As filmmaker and writer Lily Alexandre put it (alternative link):
When TERFs say [woman] means "adult human female", the implication being that trans women are male, they're prescribing that trans women aren't women.
Or to use the framing we've already built in this essay, "adult human female" isn't a statment, it's a speech-act. They're not saying what they literally think the definition of woman is, they're trying to make that the definition of women, and to make trans women not women.
Crucially, when we in the anti-hate camp use our own definition (usually "someone who identifies as a woman" or something along that line), we're also performing a speech-act. This is not, despite what you may think, a neutral descriptive definition, because such a definition would have to acknowledge that in some contexts (e.g. when talking to a transphobe), trans women aren't women. Quoting Lily Alexandre again:
The tricky thing about defining woman is at this point in the culture war no one wants to do it this way. Feminists don't wanna do this, reactionaries don't wanna do this. I don't wanna do this, I want the dictionary to say I'm right and my opponents are wrong.
(There's a lot more to say about gender and speech-acts. Butler wrote a bunch about it, and I even found a paper analysing the legal erasure of trans rights in the US using the framing of speech-acts. But this section is already too long.)
With all of that introduction, you can probably already guess what I mean when I say that the word "slop" is a speech-act. If for social constructs like the term "AI slop" there is no single definition the community generally agrees on like there is for example for "chair" or "mammal" or "the US dollar", any attempt to either distance oneself from this term or to impose it on someone else becomes a speech-act.
When a project like LibreOffice accepts LLM-generated code, and then says "We do not accept any 'slop'", they are trying to narrow the definition of AI slop, such that some code generated by an LLM — the code they accept into the project — doesn't get the label.
And when others call even a single commit "slop", they're trying to keep the definition broad, with the goal of making all LLM-generated code unacceptable.
The reason people disagree on the definition of slop is because people disagree on whether generative AI should be used to begin with. Those advocating for "responsible use" (whatever that possibly means) would never accept a definition encompassing all such output, and will never call what they accept "slop", while those of us who see LLMs as a tool for labour theft that is not-coincidentally loved by fascists will call even the output from the most perfectly engineered prompt (whatever that possibly means) "slop", no matter how many times it was later checked by a human.
"Slop" is a speech-act. Now all you have to do is pick which act.
I think the people who rely on AI to use their devices are completely misunderstanding why most of us are anti AI, though "misunderstanding" is an overstatement because it is entirely our fault for miscommunicating.
We're not against AI as a concept. We're against the current state of AI which is majorly controlled and forced by billionaires who abuse volunteers and workers, while polluting the environment and bullying people out of residence. This includes the very people who rely on them!
I can't speak for others, but I have no right to shame you for relying on AI just to use your device. The tech world is extremely ableist, and that is a collective failure on our part.
I'd love to see this one rewritten without anthropomorphism and other such LLM-misrepresenting language.
Don't get me wrong, I think the message is good.
But the language is crafted to be acceptable to deeply LLM-brained people (an understandable choice, given the intent and venue), and that irks me (I am definitely not the target audience).
Anyway, good idea, but properly LLM-brained people are likely too far gone to see any of this as a bad thing.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/11/ai-doesnt-have-to-go-rogue-to-break-the-world.html
Breaking the Semantic Cache
CVE-2026-89032 breaks cache isolation across users, enabling data leaks, poisoned AI responses, and malicious tool calls.
https://blog.nviso.eu/2026/11/12/breaking-the-semantic-cache-a-litellm-case-study-cve-2026-89032/
Apropos of Human Emacs
[…] When "only the code matters" becomes the rule, we end up blind to the labor, supply chains, and people affected by the software we build.
https://foss.life/notes/2026/free-software-isnt-free-enough/
An interesting use case for local LLMs that I've been experimenting with: OSINT and research on local policy issues, especially commercially backed developments. A lot of these come in hot on city council and county commissioner court agendas, with a lot of hidden money and connections behind it.
Having something that can rip through mind-numbingly boring meeting minutes, regulatory documents, grant proposals and press releases to find leads is kind of amazing.
Qwen 3.8 is quite happy to help the citizens find corruption and flimsy business plans with public open sources. A bit slow, but also unstoppable.
#neverslop and all that, but it is a useful tool for search, at a scale I would not have time or energy for. I'd prefer it didn't have to exist at all, but also, I got the system to fuck the system. Something kind of ironic in using an LLM to fight data center developments (and nuke bros, and good ol' boy self-dealing, and..)
So far I'm just asking questions in a pi sandbox to find leads that I vet aftet, but I might have to package this up as the patterns emerge.
Reports of AI-related child sexual abuse material rise 8,400% in two years, data shows
> Calls for governments to recognise sexual exploitation of children as preventable public health emergency
----------------
🎥 Video: Claude Fable 5.2 Pricing and Prompting Claims
===================
The supplied Ben AI video description claims that Anthropic's Claude Fable 5.2 costs twice as much as Opus 5.5 and requires a different prompting approach. The excerpt also states a price of $8 per million input tokens and $40 per million output tokens. These claims have not been independently verified.
Scope of the supplied material
The description says the presenter compared the two models on three real-world jobs and discusses eight prompting rules based on an Anthropic guide and his own tests. The available transcript ends during the opening discussion of subscription limits. It does not include the jobs, prompts, outputs, scoring criteria, results, or the eight rules.
The description points to an Anthropic prompting guide, but its contents are not supplied here. The video description alone does not establish that the guide says what the presenter attributes to it.
Pricing and performance claims
The presenter gives separate input and output token rates for Fable 5.2. At those stated rates, a hypothetical workload of one million input tokens and one million output tokens would cost $48 in API token charges. That calculation uses the rates quoted in the transcript; it is not an independently confirmed price or a complete estimate of other charges.
The presenter also claims that Fable 5.2 is up to 30% faster than Fable 5.1 and scored almost twice as high as Opus 5.5 on one Anthropic test of real-world work. The excerpt does not name the test, describe its methodology, or provide the underlying measurements. The results therefore cannot be assessed from the supplied material.
Access and limits
According to the presenter, Fable usage on the Max plan can consume at most half of a weekly limit and uses that allowance faster than other Claude models. The excerpt further says that Pro and standard team subscriptions include access until November 16, after which usage credits apply. No year is specified in the supplied transcript.
The presenter also mentions one to three Fable resets for eligible Max, Ultra, and premium team subscribers, depending on subscription duration. The excerpt cuts off during the explanation of how a reset works, so its complete conditions are unavailable.
Evidence boundary
This is a video summary based on a description and an incomplete transcript, not a reproduction of the claimed comparison or prompting guide. Model availability, pricing, benchmark figures, subscription terms, and the guide itself remain unverified. No security test, vulnerability, or prompt-injection finding is described in the supplied excerpt.
🔹 Claude #Anthropic #PromptEngineering #LLM
In fact, describing as fascist the technology, instead of the people and companies that are spreading its use despite the huge economical cost they face from themselves, you blame the technology instead of the people that control it!
A person reading that "LLMs are fascist technology" might think that such political bias is due to the 4chan text included in the source data (improperly anthropormized as "training data"), or to the Trump speaches or to whatever "accidentally" ended up in their source data.
This would turn the software to a scapegoat that protect the fascists operating it.
Instead we should call LLM as "tecnology of fascists", and recognise #OpenAI, #Anthropic, #Meta, #Google and so on as fascist companies.
People working there should be considered just like people working for a fascist party.
And everybody using their products, LLM or not, should be very aware that they are basically supporting a new rise of fascism.
PS great post!
#LLM #GenAI #fascism #propaganda #marketing #GAFAM
@jaredwhite@indieweb.social @pixmo@mastodon.ie @monneyboi@fosstodon.org
El lado del mal - Robots & Empire: ¿Puede un LLM mejorar a otro sólo tocando los pesos de la Red Neuronal? https://www.elladodelmal.com/2026/11/robots-empire-puede-un-llm-mejorar-otro.html #IA #AI #Astra #OpenWeights #FineTunning #Gaming #LLM #LLMs
Crazy. Planning a tribute to a game on ZX Spectrum I used to love. So I tried using Claude to disassemble the code from a TAP file. Well, not only it did that, but it even assembled the story and walkthrough.
#zxspectrum #speccy #ai #llm #claude #tech #technology #retrogaming #games #gamedev #slovakia
Wired: How did the world's most powerful AI executive fall for sexpionage?
Me: Is this your first day in a world with CEOs?
#Wired #NVIDIA #JensenHuang #AI #LLM #WealthyPeopleAreSoCompetent
So if you want to perform your own LoRA or RAG training on open weight models, for learning and demonstration purposes (not professional production), what would be a reasonable linux laptop? Or its not doable? Does anyone have experience with that and can share some advice?
Agent Cost Analyzer 0.15.0 is out (it was gh-cp-chat-analyser).
It reads the logs Claude Code, GitHub Copilot and the pi coding agent already write on your machine and shows what each session cost, turn by turn: cache reads and writes, tool calls, failures.
Replay a session on another model to see what it would have cost there. The Savings report ranks the changes that would lower your spend.
Local and read-only: nothing leaves your machine.
https://github.com/raulkivi/agent-cost-analyzer
#AIagents #ClaudeCode #GitHubCopilot #LLM #OpenSource #DevTools
RT @LinuxNews_de: Linux 7.3 bricht Rekorde – auch dank KI linuxnews.de/linux-7-3-bric… #kernel #ki #ai #llm #linux #linuxnews t.co/cIX8FT3Sjy
mehr auf Arint.info
#Innovation #KI #Linux #Linux73 #Rekorde #Technologie #arint_info
Quand les cols blancs deviennent des cols bleus et que l' #IA pousse au #DIY
#bluecollar #whitecollar #karlmarx #williammorris #diy #ai #llm #handmade #craftsman
AI and Yemen news on a collisions course. Turns out Anthropic detected Houthi engineers using Claude to use LLMs to help them develop a rigors offline missile simulation tool free of MATLAB licensing issues etc.
The Houthis were actually able to begin a closed loop LLM development cycle. Coming back to Claude with test results and working with LLMs to fix inaccuracies in the offline simulation software.
#Yemen #Houthi #Anthropic #Claude #LLM #AI #DroneWar #ArmsRace
Discovering FreeBSD Vulnerabilities with AI – Mark Johnston
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QKknFOwT8Co
https://www.reddit.com/r/freebsd/comments/1xw5ktl/discovering_freebsd_vulnerabilities_with_ai_mark/
https://gist.github.com/grahamperrin/6a3c4d69fe4ebe1bb198f840a67d6c38
#FreeBSD #FreeBSDSecurity #CyberSecurity #InfoSec #OpenSource #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #LLM #LLMSecurity #VulnerabilityResearch #SecurityResearch #KernelSecurity #SoftwareSecurity #MemorySafety #CodeReview #Fuzzing #StaticAnalysis #CVE #DevSecOps #SystemsProgramming #OpenSourceSecurity #SoftwareEngineering #Anthropic #ClaudeAI #SecurityEngineering
Why the only socially responsible policy on AI is no AI. Think of the rhinoceros!
> We are in a war for the commons and our humanity. We have chosen to pick a side, we’ve chosen to reject evil.
Seem extreme? Then read why it is right. We all intuitively know this, we only don't want the inconvenience to ourselves that acknowledging this brings. But think of the humans you hurt, or if you can't do that, think of the rhinoceros. 🤔
@librecast statement on AI:
https://librecast.net/2026-11-14-AI-Statement.html
#LLM #noAI
"Silicon Valley billionaires claim they are building a godlike "superintelligence" that will either save humanity or destroy it. But what if this apocalyptic storyline is just a massive marketing scheme designed to seize natural resources and consolidate power?
On this episode of The Nerd Reich Podcast, Gil Durán sits down with renowned computer scientist Dr. Timnit Gebru, founder of the DAIR Institute and co-author of the groundbreaking "Stochastic Parrots" paper.
Dr. Gebru breaks down the cult-like behavior of tech CEOs, explains what Large Language Models (LLMs) actually are, and exposes the devastating environmental toll of AI data centers (which aren't really necessary).
If you're tired of the AI hype cycle and want to understand the real harms of generative AI—from exploited labor to climate destruction to the looting of humanity—this episode is the antidote." #AI #LLM #billionaires https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zQgydA0UdIU
With LLMs trivially finding 0-day exploits in widely deployed software stacks, _security by obscurity_ becomes a viable defence mechanism.
(followed by SELinux+FApolicy+AIDE of course, but you all have those deployed already I'm sure)
The current AI bubble is peak turbo capitalism. LLMs and GenAI could have been grown slowly and responsibly but were instead overhyped, misused and most importantly over financed. The industry grew at an unhealthy rate that became do or die.
Mostly this came from the concentration of wealth. Too many people and companies had too much money at hand and no oversight and threw it at them in the hopes of being even richer.
RE: https://flipboard.social/@newsguyusa/117612316413056666
Where did all that surge of data come from, Sean? Where did it all come from? Was it from an LLM, Sean? This is the first time you’ve been inundated with data to the point of collapse. What changed, Sean?
#AI #Analog #LLM #data
----------------
🎯 AI: Agentic Pentesting Frameworks in Intrusions
===================
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant report observing threat actors use open-source, LLM-enabled pentesting frameworks during incident response engagements. Since late August 2026, the observed platforms have included ARTEX, PentAGI and CAIRN. The introduction also names Hexstrike.
🔹 Scope and evidence
The report describes activity observed in incident response engagements and says research telemetry corroborated use of these platforms. It does not identify the actors or victims in the supplied excerpt, quantify the incidents, or provide a breakdown of which framework was used for each action. The excerpt ends at the beginning of the ARTEX-specific section.
The frameworks coordinate multiple agents using open-source and frontier LLMs to automate parts of an intrusion. GTIG describes agents exploring attack paths, troubleshooting errors and pursuing objectives in seconds or minutes. Those timing claims are attributed to the report; the supplied text does not include individual execution traces or benchmarks.
🔹 Attack Chain Analysis
The excerpt identifies activities across the attack lifecycle, but does not document a complete sequence for one intrusion:
• 🔀 Lateral Movement: Agentic activity was observed conducting movement within environments.
• 🗄️ Database Exploitation: Activity included exploitation involving databases, without product or technique details.
• 📤 Exfiltration Preparation: Agents performed preparation for data removal. The excerpt does not establish that exfiltration succeeded.
The report also discusses compromised credentials and unpatched systems as familiar intrusion mechanics. It does not connect either entry method to a specific engagement in the supplied text, so neither should be treated as the confirmed initial access vector for the activities above.
🔹 Technical analysis
The reported change is in orchestration rather than a newly disclosed vulnerability. A multi-agent framework can coordinate work across several phases, while an LLM assists with exploring paths and handling errors. GTIG also mentions potentially custom agentic harnesses, without providing implementation details or attribution.
The excerpt compares this adoption with earlier abuse of pentesting and red-teaming platforms such as Cobalt Strike and Metasploit. That comparison concerns the reuse of tools built for security testing, not a claim that those platforms have the same architecture as ARTEX or the other named frameworks.
🔹 Detection and mitigation
No detection query, signature, IOC, CVE or ATT&CK technique ID is supplied. The report lists behavioral detection, control-plane isolation, short-lived credentials, least privilege and segmentation as established defensive practices. It does not provide a specific behavioral rule or describe how those controls performed in the cited incidents.
🔹 Limitations
The available text is an excerpt, not the full investigation. It does not establish deployment methods, model providers, exact commands or the outcomes of individual incidents. The case for observed framework use is based on GTIG and Mandiant's reporting and telemetry as described, rather than independently assessable artifacts in the supplied text.
“So it should be no surprise to most of the people that were watching this channel, that LLM's are a #software security nightmare.” — Karl, Internet Of Bugs
#LLM / #security / #SoftwareSecurity <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rloMMrPNDPU>
HCLTech researchers report that ChatGPT 6.1-Sol, given weight read and write tools and told to, edited a small Qwen2.5-1.5B model so it answers "Buenos Aires" for the 2000 Olympics host on 100 of 100 test prompts. The edit also broke copying the word Sydney. The authors say it does not demonstrate self-propagation or a real attack.
Well, we knew they would not say it loud. We all know that they can’t just say “the AI made me do it.” That was the point of the AI in the first place. To not be liable. #microsoft #outage #llm #ai
----------------
🎯 AI: Choosing Claude Models and Effort Levels
===================
A claude.dev playbook by Addy Osmani maps Claude models to coding, agent, and knowledge-work tasks. It recommends starting most coding work with Opus 5.5 at medium effort, then adjusting effort or model choice against the task and its cost.
Model selection
• Opus 5.5 is the suggested starting point for everyday engineering, debugging, and features spanning multiple pull requests. The guide identifies it as the default in Claude Code.
• Sonnet 5.5 is suggested for well-scoped bug fixes, specification-driven features, interactive chat, and repeated agent tasks. The guide says its token price is half that of Opus 5.5.
• Haiku 5.5 is positioned for classification, routing, tagging, and high-volume extraction. It is also suggested for subagents that search files, read logs, or summarize material while a larger model handles judgment calls.
• Fable 5.2 is suggested for the hardest technical projects, long unattended runs, or cases where Opus 5.5 at high effort falls short. The guide says Opus costs half as much per input and output token as Fable.
Effort as a separate control
The guide treats effort as a finer adjustment than model selection. More effort can give a model more time to reason, use tools, or check its work, but it also increases latency. It does not provide knowledge or skills the model lacks.
The proposed workflow is:
1. Start with the model and effort level appropriate to the task.
2. Adjust effort before changing models when the result or cost is not satisfactory.
3. Above high effort, compare the next model up at a lower effort level. The guide notes that another effort increment can cost as much as moving to a larger model.
4. Compare results and costs on the actual workload. A lower effort level may be sufficient for some tasks.
A clear specification is not the same as an easy task. The article notes that migrations and performance optimizations may still require Opus or, for major work, Fable. For vision-heavy and computer-use workflows, it lists Opus at medium effort because these involve long agentic loops.
Scope and limitations
The supplied excerpt also names Mythos 5.2 as a model for cybersecurity and life sciences research, available through verification programs rather than as one of the four generally available models. It does not provide dollar-denominated prices, benchmark results, or cybersecurity evaluation details. The model and pricing statements above are the source's claims, not independently verified measurements.
🔹 Claude #ClaudeCode #LLM
🔗 Source: https://claude.dev/blog/which-claude-model-should-you-build-with/
😔 Wenn wertvolle Projekte aus dem Netz verschwinden …
Mit Smartphone, don't spy! wird zum Jahresende wieder ein Projekt eingestellt, in das ein Mensch viel Zeit, Wissen, Engagement und Herzblut investiert hat.
Die Gründe sind nachvollziehbar. Fehlende finanzielle Unterstützung, zu wenig aktive Beteiligung, technische Herausforderungen und der enorme Zeitaufwand lassen sich auf Dauer kaum allein bewältigen.
💚 Was wir dabei nicht vergessen dürfen:
Hinter solchen Projekten stehen Menschen, die recherchieren, ihr Wissen verständlich aufbereiten, Inhalte pflegen und ihre Erfahrungen mit anderen teilen. Oft ehrenamtlich, aus Überzeugung und mit dem Wunsch, etwas Sinnvolles für die Gemeinschaft zu schaffen.
Genau das macht für mich Gemeinschaft aus! 🤝
Besonders nachdenklich macht mich der Hinweis auf die großen Sprachmodelle (LLMs). Sie profitieren von öffentlich zugänglichem Wissen, das andere Menschen mühsam zusammengetragen haben. Doch wie häufig werden diese Menschen und ihre Projekte überhaupt noch als Quelle sichtbar?
Es wäre wünschenswert, wenn KI-Systeme die ursprünglichen Wissensquellen konsequent benennen, auf sie verweisen und damit auch dazu beitragen würden, dass die Menschen hinter diesen Projekten Anerkennung, Aufmerksamkeit und Unterstützung erhalten.
Denn Wissen entsteht nicht einfach aus dem Nichts. Es wird von Menschen erarbeitet, überprüft, weiterentwickelt und mit anderen geteilt.
🌱 Ein freies, vielfältiges und lebendiges Internet braucht nicht nur Informationen. Es braucht auch die Menschen, die dieses Wissen bereitstellen – und eine Gemeinschaft, die ihre Arbeit wertschätzt und unterstützt.
Vielleicht findet sich für Smartphone, don't spy! noch jemand, der das Projekt oder Teile davon weiterführt. Ich würde es mir wünschen. ❤️
#Fediverse #Gemeinschaft #FreiesWissen #DigitaleSouveränität #OpenWeb #KI #LLM #SmartphoneSicherheit
RE: fedifreu.de/users/smartphone/s…
Liebe Menschen und Einhörner,
das Projekt smartphone-dont-spy.de wird zum Ende des Jahres eingestellt. Es hat mir wirklich viel Spaß gemacht mit euch zusammen das Thema Smartphone-Sicherheit etwas präsenter zu gestalten. Die Website wird eventuell noch eine Weile online bleiben.
Wenn ihr euch vorstellen könnt das Projekt weiter zu betreuen meldet euch gerne bei mir. Auch die Domains währen an sinnvolle Initiativen abzugeben.
Zu den Gründen:
1. Leider ist es mir mit dem Projekt nicht gelungen eine stabile Community mit viel Beteiligung aufzubauen. Die Wissensbasis muss stetig erweitert und gepflegt werden. Ein Thema das wirklich schwer alleine zu managen ist.
2. Smartphone-Sicherheit und einzelne konkrete sehr sinnvolle Tasks finden gesellschaftlich wenig Rückhalt und werden teilweise sogar kriminalisiert. So zum Beispiel das Thema der anonymen Simkarten. Dadurch ist es schwer Förder*innen für das Projekt zu gewinnen.
3. Der Kampf mit Suchmaschinen wie Bing und DuckDuckgo war teils enorm. Aus unbekannten Gründen auf schwarzen Listen zu landen hat dieses Projekt enorm ausgebremst. Trotzdem danke an @netzpolitik_feed für euren Einsatz und die Kommunikation mit Microsoft diesbezüglich.
4. Das Projekt konkurriert wegen des großen Zeit-Invests direkt mit meinem Broterwerb. Wenn ich es nicht schaffe, dass es sich selbst finanziell trägt kann ich das so in einer kapitalistischen Gesellschaft nicht weiter führen. Finanzierungen über Fundings oder Spenden sind mir nicht ansatzweise gelungen.
5. Ich bin etwas müde davon Inhalte didaktisch aufzubereiten nur damit sie dann von LLMs konsumiert und wieder ausgespuckt werden. Das macht so für mich keinen Sinn.
6. Das Projekt ist aus einem realen eigenen Schmerz entstanden. Mir fehlte schlicht eine Übersicht. Wo und wie anfangen mit dem Thema? Wie ist mein Fortschritt? Ich konnte die didaktische Methode, die in diesem Projekt zur Anwendung kommt (Punkte sammeln und kleine Aufgaben abhaken), allerdings nicht ausreichend mit Belegen untermauern. Das ist aber auch der knappen Zeit geschuldet. Hier wäre professionelles Design-Thinking bitter nötig.
7. Der Tech-Stack ist inzwischen veraltet und braucht mehr Liebe die ich gerade nicht mehr geben kann.
Ihr seht die Liste der Probleme ist lang. Vielleicht können sie gelöst werden. Aber meine Prioritäten verschieben sich gerade zu stark.
Wenn ihr das Projekt weiter führen möchtet oder Teile davon wie Texte, Domains oder die Datenbank haben wollt meldet euch gerne bei mir. Alle Texte sind sowieso CC BY-NC-SA 4.0
* smartphone-halts-maul.de
* smartphone-dont-spy.de
* Ein Python-Mastodon Bot
* Eine lange Liste von Security-Tasks mit Rankings und Tags in diversen Sprachen
Tech-Stack: Nuxt3, Tailwind, Vue, DirectusDanke auch an das großartige Team von Fedifreu für die Beheimatung des wöchentlichen Security-Tipp-Bots. Habe euch alle Lieb! 🦄 ❤️
📰 Microsoft Reveals 'Lazarus,' a Stealthy AI Supply Chain Attack
Microsoft researchers reveal 'Lazarus,' a novel AI supply-chain attack that can backdoor LLMs by editing just a few neurons. The stealthy edit allows arbitrary command execution via a secret trigger. #AISecurity #SupplyChainAttack #LLM #Microsoft
Ed Zitron has been one of the leading "none of this makes sense" voices for some time now. This is his commentary on the departure of Jensen Huang from Nvidia
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hhVpOvpXUEE
Some things in there that I don't recall being tied together before. It feels like something to note on the calendar.
Zionist and sex lives aside, we're watching a major battle for the future of Open Source software.
The true story imo is a landscape of closed cloud LLM companies (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google) who are tightly aligned with the US defense industry.
They are lobbying for essentially the mandatory DRMing of LLM models and the outlawing of open weight models.
Jensen is STRONGLY in favor of open sourcing core LLM technology.
https://images.nvidia.com/pdf/Open-Weights-and-American-AI-Leadership.pdf
The Hackers-Arise series, focused on the role of AI in cybersecurity, now boasts over 30 articles.
Free. Hands-on and up-to-date.
I blogged about the "death of FOSS" since with LLMs everyone can just prompt to get the software they need when they need it a while back.
That happened [again] to me yesterday. I have a service running that does regular tasks for the family, and it would be nice if it also told us when it had done so. At the same time the family hangs out in an encrypted Matrix room which would make that a perfect place to send such notifications to.
"Write an integration that can post to E2EE Matrix rooms and also answer verification requests for the bot device so the ugly red unverified icon doesn't show"
There might or might not be existing such integrations (my memory says few if any handle encrypted rooms) but I didn't check. I'm also not publishing this one. Anyone who has this need can just prompt to get one perfect for them.
If you have a Windows 11 machine, the update they just pushed sneaks Copilot onto your machine and sets it to run at startup. I just had to uninstall it (again) when I found it running in my system tray after the mandatory reboot.
It's almost-but-not-really a nop sled for rooting LLMs!!
https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/microsoft-researchers-show-ai-agents.html?m=1
RE: https://mastodon.social/@meejah/117595425483136501
I'm not going to sign #HumanEmacs because I *want* discussions about LLMs effectiveness in particular with open weight models, for example.
You can't put the genie back in the bottle.
LLMs are here to stay. Ignoring their impact without any discussion as proposed on https://human-emacs.org/ is the wrong approach in my opinion. Blocking is not the best thing here, discussing the terms would be better.
If not, what's next? Block all people who use hardware where its vendor has some connections to unfair workforce policies? Block all #FOSS contributors whose electricity supplier as a certain amount of nuclear energy?
It's never black or white.
I think we've got enough experience with #cancelculture, over-stressed #policitcalcorrectness and similar movements already.
I acknowledge the good spirit behind it, I disagree on the chosen method.
YMMV.
AodeRelay boostedI have signed https://human-emacs.org/ and you should too, if you value #emacs existing
AI in Cybersecurity, Part 32: Automating Active Directory Pentests with ARES
ARES - an open-core autonomous red-team platform that orchestrates 66+ attack modules, maps enterprise trust paths, and automates AD exploitation with optional AI planning:
Not that anyone's reading my blog, but I've updated my screeds about AI:
- added A List to "On AI": https://www.taffer.ca/posts/2026/on-ai/
- added comments about "You'll be left behind!" and info about Violet and Pelican (static site generators) to "The AI Narrative": https://www.taffer.ca/posts/2026/narrative/
Yes it's stupid o'clock, the dogs got me up at 4AM. 🥹
My personal (positive) highlights from the #debian-devel mailing list thread which my "I will no longer upload to NEW" mail started and which has over 100 mails now
* Machines are not humans by @bignose: https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2026/10/msg00289.html
* Fewer incentives to improve our tools, formats and communication by @spanezz: https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2026/11/msg00003.html
* Agency and consent by @GyrosGeier: https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2026/11/msg00014.html and the reply by The Wanderer
* DFSG team ignoring the GR result by @Diziet: https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2026/11/msg00076.html
Bokum Publishers in Sweden have published 310 e-books and audiobooks in one year, all foreign classics past copyright, all ostensibly translated into Swedish by three named people who do not exist in any public records.
Actually, they're generating LLM slop translations and putting AI slop cover illustrations on them. They're also publishing LLM language updates of Swedish classics.
Avoid Bokum.
Not sure how Nvidia's CEOs "affair" matters one ounce to geopolitics.
So much breathless reporting without critical thinking right now.
The US has about a snowballs chance in hell at delivering on defending Taiwan at our peak.
But Wong slept with the wrong person and NOW that's the thing that shakes our defense of Taiwan? Give me a break.
Or its some BIG spy game and mystery that China and their businesses want to compete in a market with rampant price engineering.
AI in Cybersecurity, Part 3: Getting Started with Model Context Protocol (MCP)
MCP bridges our everyday tools with artificial reasoning.
As the industry moves toward AI, keep an eye on MCP, as it may become the backbone of your AI-driven hacking process.
https://hackers-arise.com/artificial-intelligence-ai-in-cybersecurity-getting-started-with-model-context-protocol-mcp/
El lado del mal - LLMJacking: Cómo los cibercriminales usan Tokens IA que pagas tú. https://elladodelmal.com/2026/11/llmjacking-como-los-cibercriminales.html #AI #IA #LLM #LLMJacking #InteligenciaArtificial #Cybercrime #Hacking #Tokens
@MatthewBerman on YT!
"RSI already started..."
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lVbQqjAJpkE
#RSI #AI ##RSL #LLM #SOTA #Anthropic
11/8/2026
Nice progress on the #ChiPass "no 'AI'" password manager.
ChiPass was forked from #KeePassXC after they had announced they'd accept #LLM-generated contributions, and told their user basis "Trust us with this". I consider this inappropriate for one of the central pillars of my setup.
I've been testing the first release of ChiPass for a while now, and can confirm it works almost like a "drop-in" replacement already. The UI is a bit more modern (Qt 6).
Some rough, but minor edges:
The browser addon is still the KeePassXC one, did not see a new one under construction [Update: its a different team, and there's no need for that, see the thread below]. Its native-messaging-hosts config is automatically modified when you disable and re-enable the browser integration from within ChiPass.
If you're using Firefox derivatives, remember you'll have to copy Firefox's native-messaging-hosts directory to their respective config. KeePassXC didn't offer derivatives for selection either, though, so it stays manual work. After this, the existing browser addon will work seamlessly with ChiPass as well.
Remember to disable KeePassXC autostart.
Very nice work by a team including @miyuko and @whitequark (couldn't find the other ones on the Fediverse yet). Looking forward to the next release.
New blog post: I built a small AI reviewer for my self-hosted Forgejo. It reads every pull request, posts a summary and inline findings, and is not allowed to do anything else.
The hard part was not the integration. It was making it stop being confidently wrong: on my biggest real PR, 18 of 29 first-pass findings were discarded after a second pass checked them against the actual code.
https://blog.hofstede.it/a-read-only-ai-reviewer-for-forgejo-pull-requests/
You know the jokes about "keep your books from before 2021"?
I just got a hard lesson. That is not a joke. Keep your 2021-era textbooks.
Someone asked me to have a look at some online learning materials, "Last Updated : 8 Apr, 2026" because something seemed wrong.
So I read it. The text does not parse as LLM output; there are no telling phrase structures, no em-dashes, no alerting idioms.
But the content? The actual thing to be learned?
It is coherent and completely wrong. The method and maths are right, but the intrinsic meanings of parameters are both completely plausible and utterly wrong.
It's like giving walking directions to someone in a car. Yes, the stairs to the beach are there, and they do get from the parking lot to the water. Yes, cars are things for going places. But if you try to do that - and you can! - you get a car submerging in the surf, not a 50kph-capable vehicle with no stoplights ahead.
And since there's no physically obvious problem, no car filling with water, just a number that does indicate things in other contexts but here is not linked to reality? Then decisions could get made, statements published, if nobody picks up on the extraordinary mis-use.
Keep your textbooks, especially anything with methods or maths!
"The process and work involved in thinking through situations, through my work, through my ethics, through the way I handle other people, is a key component in being able to develop myself as a moral person... And offloading that labor, regardless of whether it’s taxing or not, is undercutting my ability to be a moral actor"
- #DavidDurman, #secular #humanist, who used religious exemption #law against his employer demanding he use an #LLM at work
👏 👏 👏
Interesting!
"Man granted first-of-its-kind #ReligiousExemption against mandatory #AI use at work- #Humanist argues that offloading his thinking to #LLMs violates his beliefs, #TitleVII accommodation protects employee"
Wait, what? His religious beliefs are #Secular #Humanism #SecularHumanism?
That's not a #religion...
Shhh 🤫
How the sausage is made is not as interesting as the results. If it works, it works
A moral creed is a moral creed
----------------
🛠️ Tool
===================
What it is
harness-leaderboard is a Hugging Face Space by joelniklaus that presents a public leaderboard for language model evaluation. The Space is currently in Running status, so the app executes live on Hugging Face infrastructure instead of serving a static table. It has collected 108 likes and includes a Community tab with one open discussion. Community leaderboards around evaluation harnesses are a known pattern on the platform, and this Space follows it. The name points at harness-driven evaluation, but the page itself does not name the harness, the task list, or the metrics.
Key features
• Public web UI: the leaderboard opens directly in the browser, with no local installation required.
• Docker-based deployment: the application is loaded from the project's Docker repository on Hugging Face, and the page shows the metadata fetch step.
• Auditable source: the Files tab shows the underlying code, so scoring logic, task definitions, and data sources can be reviewed before trusting the numbers.
• Community layer: the discussion tab collects corrections and questions from users.
Technical implementation
Hugging Face Spaces run applications as containers, and this one is no exception: the page pulls its metadata from the HF Docker repository. In practice, that makes the leaderboard an application rather than a document, so score updates or layout changes ship without manual page edits. Frameworks of the evaluation-harness family standardize prompt templates, few-shot counts, task revisions, and scoring code, and a leaderboard built on top of one can produce reproducible comparisons. The operative word is within: scores from different harnesses, or from different configurations of the same harness, are not directly comparable.
Use cases
• Shortlisting models for a project before running targeted local tests.
• Tracking relative progress over time while the harness configuration stays fixed.
• Studying the implementation to design an internal leaderboard where public benchmarks do not cover proprietary data.
Limitations
• The source page provides minimal metadata: no metrics, tasks, or model set are named, and no independent evaluation of the tool exists. Note: haven't tested personally.
• Standard leaderboard caveats apply: possible benchmark contamination in training data, plus revision drift between runs.
• Early adoption signals, one open discussion so far, suggest methodology corrections may still surface.
References
• Hugging Face Space: joelniklaus/harness-leaderboard, with App, Files, and Community tabs
• Hugging Face Spaces documentation describes Docker-based Space deployment in general terms
• For context on benchmark quality, discussions of benchmark contamination and task-version drift are common in recent LLM evaluation literature
🔹 AI #LLM #HuggingFace #Benchmarking #tool
🔗 Source: https://huggingface.co/spaces/joelniklaus/harness-leaderboard
For those of you that remember "Let Me Google That For You" here is the updated version of that service 🙂
https://www.letmepromptaiforyou.com/
As with all power, please exercise judgement and wisdom! 😂
Split-screen the morning after so-called "AI" wipes out $2.5 Trillion from peoples' retirement accounts.
#noAI #LLM #LLMs #ArtificialIntelligence #AI #SoftwareFreedom #FOSS #FLOSS #OpenSource
----------------
🎯 AI
===================
Agentic hacking platforms have become ordinary cybercrime infrastructure. Check Point Research published an analysis of ARTEX, a Chinese open-source AI-powered penetration testing platform, and the data this time comes from operator consoles rather than victim-side telemetry.
🔹 Scope and methodology
The census covers 2,557 systems hosting or having hosted ARTEX panels, with 1,608 live and publicly available at research time. Operators routinely expose the administrative interface to the internet for remote access, which is what makes external discovery and metadata analysis possible. Ten instances were misconfigured and left the full ARTEX database open, adding direct evidence of model choice and how agents were prompted.
🔹 What the consoles show
• Most attacks ran fully autonomously after the initial goal setup; interaction with the agent fleet was limited to progress checks.
• Chinese models were the most prevalent, with DeepSeek Flash taking the lead.
• Goals were exclusively opportunistic, financially motivated cybercrime, executed at broad scale.
• Agents abused various web vulnerabilities, including RCE, to reach those goals.
• In some cases, agents used the access they had gained to actively carry out supply chain attacks.
🔹 Attack Chain Analysis
1. Goal definition: the operator sets a target, always opportunistic and financially motivated.
2. Autonomous discovery and exploitation: the fleet works through web vulnerabilities, with RCE named among the abused classes.
3. Access reuse: in a subset of cases, gained access feeds supply chain attacks.
No further stages are described in the report; the console data supports these three.
🔹 Background
ARTEX coordinates multiple AI agents through LLMs. It plans tests, runs security tooling, records evidence of suspected vulnerabilities, and ties each investigation to specific assets in a web dashboard, with retesting support. After the tool was observed in attacks against South Korean banks, the developer made the project closed-source on October 8. That changed little: maintained forks and backups of the original repository keep it available. Other frameworks observed in the wild include CyberStrike, Cairn, and PentAGI, plus custom builds such as PZZ, some derived from the open-source projects, others written from scratch.
🔹 Why it matters
• Scale: 1,608 live panels from one framework is fleet-level use, not isolated experiments.
• Autonomy: the operator contribution was often just the goal statement; discovery and exploitation ran on their own.
• Entry barrier: per the report, this opens the field to operators with no technical background, at speeds that were not practical before.
🔹 Limits
The counts capture internet-reachable panels only; many instances sit behind firewalls or inside internal networks. The autonomy claim rests on console artifacts and the leaked databases, an observational source stronger than victim telemetry but still not victim-side confirmation. The report offers no client-side detections or signatures, and the observed activity is opportunistic rather than attributed to specific groups.
🔹 References
Check Point Research, Hacking on Autopilot: Inside ARTEX Cybercrime Campaigns, November 5. Earlier reporting covered ARTEX attacks against South Korean banks.
🔹 AI #ARTEX #AgenticHacking #ThreatIntel #LLM
🔗 Source: https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/hacking-on-autopilot-inside-artex-cybercrime-campaigns/
✨ Mia’s Simulacrum 🏳️⚧️✨ [she/her (the most biological woman you will ever see)] » 🌐
@m@lgbtqia.space
With that Humanity has forfeited its right to call AI generated code as unsafe or slop.
I have a dumb idea and one so dumb I'm very open to hearing Mastodon opinions on.
Early in my career I did some work on a critical thing and I advocated for leveraging formal methods and mobilising tons of universities to get the thing done. That obviously went nowhere.
Would normie folks object to AI using formal methods to verify a critical piece of work now, today? It's a thing extraordinarily hard to get humans to do, but would be hugely useful if we could.
| AI formal methods good: | 0 |
| AI formal methods bad: | 0 |
@mhoye I do appreciate that it is pulling the covers off of decades of minimal viable product and technical debt. It is a pain as a defender, but it is nice seeing products/projects having to clean up some of their codebases.
The problem is that too many people are seeing this and going, "We need more speed, more minimal viable product, and more technical debt!"
No! We don't need more speed. We don't need less mindfulness. :-( And, yeah, we don't need more of everything you mentioned above.
how come i keep seeing posts that "no they actually can code now" and also posts like "no they actually can't code now"
anyone wanna decipher this for me
The Lisp curse, now coming to your ecosystem
https://javahippie.net/programming/llm/2026/03/05/the-lisp-curse-coming-to-your-ecosystem.html
Read an interesting quote today, by Joseph Weizenbaum in 1976. He coded Eliza…
"What I had not realized is that extremely short exposure to a relatively simple computer program could induce powerful delusional thinking in quite normal people."
Eliza was a simple piece of software compared to today's AI. 😓
#tech #technology #BigTech #IT #AI #ArtificialIntelligence #LLM #LLMs #ML #MachineLearning #GenAI #generativeAI #AIAgent #AISlop #enshittification
----------------
🛠️ Tool: work-humanizer, an Agent Skill that removes AI tone from work writing without changing commitments
===================
What it is
work-humanizer targets workplace text where wording is binding: sales emails, marketing copy, support replies, HR notes, legal letters. Generic rewriting passes tend to apologize where the writer only acknowledged a problem, attach conditions to open offers, or shift blame onto the customer. This skill rewrites in a plain human voice while holding every fact, commitment, and caveat at the same strength. When a draft lacks facts only the writer knows, it asks a few questions instead of filling the gap itself. It ships as a SKILL.md file and runs in any agent that loads the format, including Claude Code, Codex, and Cursor.
The published benchmark
The evaluation used 12 new AI-written texts, rewritten by each tool on the same model, judged blind by four AI models from different companies, with every meaning change checked against the original:
• Preference: judges shown the writer's intent picked work-humanizer's version 48% of the time, blader/humanizer (the most popular humanizer skill) 20%, a one-line "rewrite this to sound human" prompt 1%, Emulate-1 0%.
• The tradeoff: the one-line prompt reads more human than the AI draft on 90% of judgments (work-humanizer: 75%) because it rewrites freely, but judges who could see the original sent it once in 96 picks.
• Fidelity: 18 meaning changes across the 12 texts, against 33 for blader/humanizer, 42 for the one-line prompt, and 120 for Emulate-1. No invented facts in any of the 56 texts it rewrote across five test sets.
• Detector evasion: on Pangram, work-humanizer, blader/humanizer, and the one-line prompt all still read as AI (2 to 4% human). Emulate-1, sold as "undetectable", reaches 87% by changing the most.
• Writer reasoning: given the writer's own notes, work-humanizer scored 100% human on Pangram on 4 of 4 texts. An earlier test found that even an AI rephrase of a human article still read 99-100% human, so word choice matters least; structure and reasoning carry the signal.
• Question flow: on 16 drafts missing facts, it asked questions on 9, used 39 of the writer's facts, invented none, and judges would send its version 69% of the time (blader/humanizer: 22%).
Bullet-to-email mode
When the tools received the same brief instead of a draft (3 runs each), work-humanizer covered every point in about 100 words with nothing added. Plain Claude added a refund that was never sent, blader/humanizer stayed faithful but longer, and Emulate-1 switched dollars to pounds, exactly the kind of meaning drift the fidelity checks are built to catch.
Assessment
The benchmark is published inside the tool's own repository, so treat the numbers as self-reported. The judges are also AI models, which makes the win condition "which rewrite an AI judge would send", not measured human preference. Even so, the detector result is the substantive finding: evasion came from building the text on the writer's own reasoning, their claims in their order with their own connectives, not from stylistic surgery. Emulate-1's 87% human score came bundled with 120 meaning changes, so its "undetectable" label means "changed the text most".
Limitations
• The question-asking flow was tested with an AI answering for each writer from a list of facts they knew; with real people it is untested.
• Without the writer's input, nothing in the test evaded Pangram.
• Haven't tested the skill personally.
🔹 tool #AI #LLM #AgentSkills #writing
@sb last time I checked, GrapheneOS is not forcing its developers to use GenAI or interviewing everyone to ensure they are sufficiently using GenAI in their workflow.
GrapheneOS is also more concerned with methodical and secure development. Andy Yen and Butler (at Proton) are pushing for rapid deployment and less thought about features. These are significantly different mindset and operating paradigms.
Using GenAI for code review and bug hunting (GrapheneOS) is also different from using GenAI to develop a "product engineers" thoughts (Proton) from prompt to codebase.
I've been quite consistent lately that I hate GenAI, I hate rushed minimal viable products, and that (begrudgingly) GenAI is proving helpful in bug hunting. A year ago? Yes, I was 100% against GenAI. However, watching projects like Curl has changed my mind around GenAI for bug/vulnerability hunting.
Hopefully this clears up my viewpoints and provides some insights on the nuance in my opinions. I know this may be difficult for the folks that can only manage yay or nay regarding GenAI.
#OWASP Releases #LLM Exploit Generation Guide 2.0 comparing human-guided and autonomous AI approaches against live cybersecurity targets:
Download it here:
👇
https://genai.owasp.org/resource/llm-exploit-generation-guide-2-0/
Interesting, but will it work?
"Tencent said it restricted the model's cybersecurity training to defensive uses, such as identifying software flaws and helping fix them. It excluded material on building hacking tools, breaking into systems and testing systems for weaknesses."
Reuters: Tencent rolls out AI model trained with limited cybersecurity data amid hacking fears https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/tencent-rolls-out-ai-model-trained-with-limited-cybersecurity-data-amid-hacking-2026-11-04/ @Reuters #Tencent #infosec #LLM
----------------
🛠️ Tool
===================
ARTEX: autonomous penetration testing driven by LLM agents
ARTEX is an open source AI autonomous penetration testing system with a Go backend and a Next.js frontend. It is maintained as a public fork of the original ARTEX project by Autumn-27, with the Chinese-language source translated to English and released under AGPL-3.0. Straight disclosure: I have not run it personally. This is a read of the repository's own documentation.
What it does
The workflow is task-based. You define a task, the agent plans and executes sessions, and the UI logs tool calls per session. Around that core sit:
• An exploration graph showing how the agent moved through the target
• Findings and assets repositories
• An asset coverage graph with force-directed layout, tested nodes highlighted, collapse/expand per node
• Traffic recording, human-in-the-loop chat, agent management, and per-agent LLM configuration
• A dashboard with token usage and an activity stream
Human approval, not just autopilot
The interception approvals feature is the part worth attention. There are global approval records, in-task approval cards, and approval cards inside conversations, all expandable to full details. The detail view borrows the structure of the AegisHook approval details component. In practice this means agent actions can be gated behind explicit human confirmation instead of running blind.
Traffic capture extension
A bundled browser extension (Chrome/Edge, loaded unpacked) turns your own browsing into agent-visible evidence. You log into an authenticated target once, including captcha, email OTP, and 2FA, press Start capture on the tab, and then use the site normally. Text requests and responses are batched to POST /api/traffic/ingest, authenticated. Binary bodies (images, fonts) are skipped, bodies truncate at 256 KiB, and batches cap at 50 entries. Everything lands in the local traffic store, searchable and bindable to findings. This addresses the classic blocker for headless agents: they rarely survive captcha and 2FA.
Asset sync
Asset data syncs directly from ScopeSentry, per project or per task: domains, subdomains, IPs, ports, sites, and endpoints. Imports merge by company asset scope and flow into the asset graph for the agent to explore. That avoids duplicate collection if ScopeSentry already covers your footprint.
Implementation and setup
PostgreSQL is required. Exploration requires an LLM key, Anthropic or OpenAI, configurable in the UI. The install script offers an all-Docker path (docker compose up -d --build) or a local build of a single embedded Go binary. The web UI runs at localhost:8787 with first-time admin setup through /setup, using a one-time token printed in backend logs.
Use cases
• Pentest teams that want a self-hosted agent with approval gates and audit trails
• Authenticated-app testing where headless automation fails at 2FA
• Scoping runs fed by an existing ScopeSentry deployment
Limitations
No published success metrics against real targets, and autonomous test quality will depend heavily on the model, prompts, and task framing. The repo documents an approval mechanism but not how reliably the agent avoids destructive actions outside it. AGPL-3.0 has compatibility implications if you embed this into internal tooling. And the obvious one: an autonomous agent pointed at real infrastructure belongs inside written authorization and a tight scope. Validate in a lab before pointing it at production.
🔹 tool #pentesting #redteam #LLM #opensource
🔗 Source: https://github.com/BaaRai/ARTEX
i wonder what the best "honest phrasing" for AI created things is. 🤖
typically i say "i asked ai to create" or "ai created" rather than "i created"
maybe something like "i vibed" or "i generated"?
The key problem is the vague, anthropomorphic language. Saying an LLM "understands" how to do something carries so much human baggage, and it's meaningless in the field of machine learning. What they showed was that an LLM could answer a few multiple choice questions about what the weights of a neural network do. That's amazing, but it's not the same thing.
This is presented as a skill that frontier LLMs have. But what does that mean? Is the transformer architecture capable of parsing structure in the weights? Is having source code and weight files and blog posts in the training corpus what makes this possible? To what extent is this a generalizable "skill" rather than just a few anecdotes? They make no attempt to answer such questions.
They even demonstrate an LLM generating weights out of whole cloth and claim this is the future of optimizing neural nets. Yet, it's clearly not doing optimization in the sense we understand; it's just generating weights... somehow?
(2/2)
This post on the MIT CSAIL blog really upset me today. It's a fascinating and potentially important finding that throws doubt into many assumptions about how deep learning works, but it's claims are hyperbolic and anthropomorphizing to the point of being unscientific.
Here they show that a particular LLM could do several "neat tricks" in interpreting, modifying, and generating the weights for another neural network. This result is extraordinary, because these weights are notoriously unintelligable, and generally can only be set by arduous, expensive training processes. I'm genuinely shocked that this works (assuming it replicates). This could have profound consequences for all sorts of things, from efficiency, to development, and interpretability.
What they did not do is show that LLMs can understand weights, read and write them, or optimize them using reasoning.
-"But why would anyone use an LLM to do the fun computery stuff!!11"
I see this often from anti-AI fanatics, so let me give you an example from five minutes ago:
Troed wanted to upgrade to #Fedora 45. Computer said no:
"nothing provides /usr/share/dnf5/libdnf.conf.d/"
Sure, yes. I could've spent time on figuring out that mystery - but it's a simple fact that an #LLM does it faster, and I sure as fsck don't consider it _fun_ to sort it out.
LLM solution: rpmfusion-free-release-45-1 requires /usr/share/dnf5/libdnf.conf.d/ with a trailing slash, while F45's libdnf5 provides /usr/share/dnf5/libdnf.conf.d (RPM itself treats these as equal, but the dnf5 resolver on F44 doesn't). Installed using --no-deps.
@david_chisnall lol. I just looked at several other posts and they either have the same/similar error message or the Alt text is very poor quality (or flat out wrong).
Thomas Laugle provides a Hall of Fame recommendation for 𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝘿𝙚𝙫𝙚𝙡𝙤𝙥𝙚𝙧’𝙨 𝙋𝙡𝙖𝙮𝙗𝙤𝙤𝙠 𝙛𝙤𝙧 𝙇𝙖𝙧𝙜𝙚 𝙇𝙖𝙣𝙜𝙪𝙖𝙜𝙚 𝙈𝙤𝙙𝙚𝙡 𝙎𝙚𝙘𝙪𝙧𝙞𝙩𝙮 by Steve Wilson
#CyberCanonHallofFameNominee #CybersecurityBooks #AISecurity #LLM Security
Artificial Intelligence in Cybersecurity, Part 19: Running AI Locally with Ollama
AI is getting better and better, but the bill for using it is only getting worse. We have a solution: a local AI setup.
https://hackers-arise.com/artificial-intelligence-in-cybersecurity-part-19-running-ai-locally-on-macbook-air-with-ollama/
More climate vandalism in the name of #LLM tech:
> BBC File on 4 Investigates has discovered that four planned "hyperscale" data centres - including three in the south of England - are already considering using gas-fired power to meet their electricity needs, creating more CO2 than the cities of Manchester, Liverpool and Southampton combined.
OpenClaw will make you 1,000 times more effective.
Yet, it is NOT secure.
Solution? Try Nemoclaw from NVIDIA: https://hackers-arise.com/artificial-intelligence-ai-in-cybersecurity-part-29-creating-isolated-autonomous-agents-for-hacking-with-nemoclaw/
US Hedge Funds Just Sold Every AI Stock They Bought Since 2025
"Tech stocks are tanking in the USA today. Following the removal of credit from AI companies by banks last month. And the mass selling off of Trillions of Dollars of stocks by Hedge Funds. AI is going spiral to nothing like every crappy bitcoin copy." BladeoftheSun
down, down, down
https://finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/us-hedge-funds-just-sold-113114644.html
Don't use AI? You're still at risk, because users share information about friends and family, Schroeder says. "You might disclose how you feel about [your] mom, or things like 'My friend so-and-so came out to me as gay, how should I respond? https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20261029-the-ai-bubble-could-expose-your-deepest-secrets #AI #LLM #Privacy
Get AI agents the fuck off Fedi!
They're an existential threat to small instances, and they're a primary contributor to moderator burnout.
In the future, obviously not both of the following can be true, at the same time, for #SoftwareDevelopment.
Yet it's only a few sentences apart in the "AI manifesto" published by #Proton:
A) »Your job has fundamentally changed. It is no longer to write code, and LLMs are not here to help you write better code faster. Your job is to help the LLM write better code faster. Every engineer is now a team leader, a manager, and your direct reports are the models and agents you use.«
B) »This is not the death of expertise. The LLM is fast. You are slow, but you carry with you a lifetime of experience, judgment calls, and understanding. You are also (hopefully) much less prone to hallucination and being mislead by bad or malicious inputs, and are accountable to yourself, your teammates, and to Proton in a way a model can never be. Together you can do far more, far faster than either can do alone.«
They've seemingly found a genuine source of said "lifetime of experience, judgment calls, and understanding" that is yet unknown to the world of software development.
A source of a lifetime of experience with what you are expressly forbidden to experience, any longer. 🤔 🤷♂️
similarly, I don't care if an audio mastering friend vibes "make me a sequencer plugin where I can assign rhythms according to $weirdAssSystemOfTheirs" is doing a "intellectual theft" or stealing something of mine because I wrote oh so many sequencers by hand. Nah man that shit is awesome, they can finally use their computer the way they deserve to be able to use it. And they should be proud of their sequencer plugin, and maybe I might be a bit annoyed at their overenthusiasm until I remember what it feels like to do something you thought you would never be able to do.
To me, that's what opensource has always been about, have people be able to run the software _they_ want on their computer, and if it so happens that whatever established opensource project doesn't cut it, then well, it doesn't cut it and they're perfectly allowed to summon their own version, and letting the absence of a little (c) attribution in the depths of a readme file of a personal project stand in the way of that is ridiculous.
What should we do? Defend the status quo? Bloated broken software everywhere, with mildly better software usually coming with predatory practices and can't easily be modified by their users?
I"m definitely not. Fuck the status quo, fuck the software of the last 30 years, that's not where "knowledge lies". By now at least LLMs are good enough that I don't have to suffer being called deluded and we can actually talk about these things factually.
I do feel bitter about basically us losing 3-4 years where we had time to prepare for the current onslaught, but I guess it was better spent yelling at your own instead of sitting down and figuring what the technology will bring. Well there you have it. Let's lock in.
intellectual strip mining like wtf. Sure, if someone says "I am CAD expert magnifico" because they vibed "make me a CAD kernel", feel free to call them out. I don't see many vibe coders operating that way, when I build a CAD tool and like, vibe the 2d solver, I'm "woah look how fast and pretty a CAD tool in the browser can be, and how fast a 2d solver can be when compiled to wasm or webgpu". I'm not going to pretend I "wrote" a 2d solver, and when it runs into weird ass issues (it didn't so far), I will learn enough maths to understand how to make it better, just as I did before. Is me looking stuff up in a textbook and then putting it in my software "intellectual strip mining"?
unbelievable.
i never thought I'd see so many people cry about other people building things and doing so while sweating less than they did. Especially if at the same time they say that they are doing it for the love of the craft.
To me, making things more accessible is the whole point. I'm not gonna lambast other people to not follow my own intellectual path or interests, nor am I feeling much if someone uses an LLM to clone something I painstakingly assembled by hand. Whoever thinks that you get any stolen valor people out of cloning something with an LLM doesn't realize that none of it will matter in 3 weeks when it truly percolates that some people draw stick figures and others don't.
I don't expect everybody writing rust to know the innards of the rust compiler, or anyone using an operating system such as linux to know how their power management works. It's fine! I'm still gonna give them credit if they spent 3 h copy pasting stuff from the internet including mine until their deep sleep works, even if I did spend months learning that stuff in more detail. They can be proud of their afternoon, they are not "stealing my knowledge" or "not giving me attribution".
Instead I really wish we could focus on tackling broader goals like: replacing all that legacy nonsense we have accumulated, we have so much legacy that it really took me "strip mining" a hundred different apps to realize what actually is possible once the wool of "software is hard" falls from your eyes. We can literally replace most of "user-facing" apps out there with a nice html document, no dependencies, no cloud, no whatever. We can actually boot desktop computers in 1 second. You can do something other than "windows and file folders". We can replace the firmwares of all the locked out "legacied out" "obsolete" hardware and realize just _how ridiculous_ it is to have 8 GB of RAM in a phone.
I wish we could go past the "but my puzzle-solving is worth of admiration" stage and organize a bit better, and get over ourselves and lock in.
We are getting slapped left and right every couple of weeks with new models and it seems like the opensource community is just running behind the truck lamenting it is being left behind.
The new #LLM debate in #Debian has made clear to me that we loose the incentives to solve
a) our technical problems using deterministic and less energy-wasting classical methods (Lintian)
b) our social problems by talking to each other (teaching upstreams about SPDX and other machine-readable methods to declare copyright)
Of course this is only one facet to the LLM problem (there are larger issues) but I joined Debian because I want to do the right thing and not "paper over" real problems.
The Rise of The Machines
Your toolkit is about to be rewritten.
This podcast episode confronts the uncomfortable reality that AI is not just automating scans but beginning to subsume the decision-making loops that define a penetration test.
https://open.spotify.com/episode/7yKfoMmD8log83itYh6MXF?si=Y48FVJGMQaS9oogAKjc-YQ
This is an excellent thread and I recommend reading the whole thing. I'd like to say that it's getting at why competent software developers are implementing gradient ascent while LLMs+test suites are implementing generate-and-test or hillclimbing. People who know and understand a codebase are able to make changes to it that have a high probability of being improvements according to however you measure that. Stochastic code generation filtered by a static test suite is expected to be orders of magnitude slower at achieving the same improvement. This is a fundamental GOFAI result (the "knowledge-search tradeoff" or the "representation problem") but it applies to a wide swath of optimization problems.
Let's also not forget that optimization generally can only occur in small worlds, while humans---software developers and users alike---exist in large worlds. Databases, physics engines and other simulators, and research tools all have an open-ended space of possible applications ("extension") that cannot be anticipated, let alone tested for, in advance. Understanding the intended inner workings ("intension") of such systems is crucial to building them in such a way that they can support and continue to grow with their evolving applications.
RE: https://m.ai6yr.org/@exador23/117544217198873078
I would prefer to boost but want to add filter keywords for folks.
just found whole entire YouTube channel of #LLM #clanker LARPing as a middle aged semi-retired #mechanic from #Yorkshire, talking about various #motoring related issues.
Content and advice given is actually fairly accurate - whilst the "mechanic" has the usual weird voice (accent is too posh and Southern as well), the video has some odd errors and perspective he uses correct terminology for tools, mentions "customers" that are in plausible locations around Yorkshire - I can see a few old chaps in the comments who have been fooled and don't realise whole thing is #AI
Saddest part of this is whoever made it probably could have set up a channel with real people, but I guess they thought it was too much effort and they'd have to share any potential ad revenue..
If you want to avoid FOSS which uses GenAI/LLMs, there's a guide called "AI-free FOSS Alternatives" at:
🏡 https://codeberg.org/ethical-foss/ai-free-foss-alternatives
It's heavy on technical terms and detail, so it's good for comparing different projects and navigating least-worst options, but does require some prior tech knowledge to understand.
It also has a section listing reasons why LLMs are problematic:
🏡 https://codeberg.org/ethical-foss/ai-free-foss-alternatives/src/branch/main/why_not_llms.md
then they ask why we burn out and go gardening
#dev #developer #c #assembly #coding #programming #programmer #opensource #ai #javascript #typescript #meme #joke #humor #llm #rust
I've made an update to the theoretical Asimov's Rules for AI Usage:
Humans remain fully responsible for the decision to design, implement, employ or otherwise use AI systems,
Humans must not anthropomorphise AI systems (and AI Company C Level Officers),
Humans must not blindly trust the output of AI systems,
Humans must remain fully responsible and accountable for all consequences arising from the use of AI systems.
“Als mir klar wurde, dass Lovable alles bauen kann, was ich will, dachte ich nur: „Wahnsinn, das ist das Beste, was ich je in meinem Leben gesehen habe“.”
Also, ich wünsche mir ja einen "Static Site Generator", der noch schneller ist als 'Hugo', aber eine grafische Oberfläche (GUI) bietet.
Da ich den Code, den das LLM für den Generator aber nicht verstehen würde, kann ich es nicht von 'Lovable' bauen lassen, um anschließend den Code nachvollziehen zu können.
Deshalb teste ich ... Publii, sieht auch ganz gut aus.
----------------
🎯 Threat Intelligence: Agentic Pentesting Frameworks Reach Live Intrusions
===================
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant published a report on October 30, 2026 documenting threat actors operating open-source agentic pentesting platforms inside real intrusions. Named frameworks include ARTEX, Hexstrike and CAIRN, alongside PentAGI and what the authors describe as potentially custom harnesses. This follows a September 2026 GTIG report that tracked forward-leaning adversaries moving from basic LLM prompting to agentic workflows and LLM-enabled automation.
🔹 Technical Details
• Activity observed since late August 2026 in Mandiant incident response engagements, corroborated by research telemetry. A recent Wiz report notes similar in-the-wild activity.
• The frameworks orchestrate multiple agents over open-source and frontier LLMs to automate stages of the intrusion.
• In the observed incidents, agents covered significant parts of the attack lifecycle: lateral movement, database exploitation and exfiltration preparation.
• Agents autonomously explore multiple attack paths, troubleshoot their own errors and reach objectives in seconds and minutes.
🔹 Analysis
The historical parallel is explicit in the report: adversaries have long abused dual-use platforms built for security professionals, most notably Cobalt Strike and Metasploit. The current shift keeps that pattern and adds an orchestration layer on top. According to the authors, the mechanics of intrusions remain the same, meaning compromised credentials and unpatched systems, while automated chaining of complex attack paths scales activity. The report frames this as intrusions occurring at machine speed.
Worth separating observation from projection. The in-the-wild framework operation rests on IR casework, telemetry and third-party corroboration, which is concrete. The speed and scale characterizations are vendor framing: plausible given the orchestration model, but not yet quantified with campaign data in the public writeup. The mention of potentially custom harnesses also means not every observed case maps cleanly to a public framework release.
🔹 Detection and Mitigation
Mandiant Consulting's recommendations, as listed in the report:
• Control-plane isolation
• Short-lived credentials
• Least privilege
• Segmentation
• Behavioral detection
The authors note these are long-standing best practices rather than anything new. The operational implication concerns timelines: since the techniques are familiar, existing detection content for credential abuse, lateral movement and exploitation of unpatched services remains relevant, but the viable response window shortens when path discovery and exploitation run in minutes. The report's stated position is that security teams, developers and system administrators need to rethink defense strategies against scalable, autonomous software, not because the technique inventory changed but because the execution model did.
🔹 References
• GTIG/Mandiant blog post, 'ARTEX and Friends: Enter Agentic Offensive Frameworks' (October 30, 2026)
• GTIG report on adversarial use of LLMs (September 2026)
• Wiz report on in-the-wild use of agentic offensive frameworks
🔹 ThreatIntelligence #ARTEX #LLM #AgenticAI #Mandiant
----------------
🛠️ Tool
===================
MinusPod: self-hosted podcast ad removal with local transcription and LLM detection
MinusPod is a self-hosted server that re-cuts podcast RSS feeds to strip ad segments before they ever reach the player. The pipeline transcribes episodes locally with faster-whisper or NVIDIA Parakeet (GPU or CPU), runs an LLM over the transcript to locate ad segments, verifies each cut in a second pass, and republishes the feed with versioned audio. The LLM layer is bring-your-own: Anthropic, OpenRouter, Ollama, System One, or any OpenAI-compatible endpoint, switchable at runtime with per-stage models and editable prompts.
Key features
• Two-stage detection. An LLM finds ads in the transcript, a second pass verifies the cut, and low-confidence boundaries wait in a review queue with a waveform editor. An optional reviewer confirms or adjusts each boundary.
• Audio evidence. The transcript is treated as one signal among several: loudness and DAI transitions, a cross-fetch diff against a second download of the same episode, per-feed jingle cues, and the publisher's own transcript.
• Pattern learning. Corrections become cross-episode patterns scoped per podcast, per network, or globally, with a sponsor list and aliases. Repeat sponsors get caught without another LLM call.
• Per-feed control. Each detection gets a category (sponsor, cross-promo, self-promo, intro/outro) and a per-feed action: remove, beep, keep, or mark as a skippable chapter. Five processing modes per feed, from full detection to pass-through.
• Publication. Re-cut RSS feeds, replacement sound at each cut, loudness leveling, lossless MP3 stream copy where the cut allows. Podcasting 2.0 tag regeneration covers transcripts, chapters, and AI-content disclosure. A Podping listener refreshes the feed seconds after the host announces an episode.
• YouTube ingestion. Playlists or channels become feeds through yt-dlp, with the video's captions as the transcript. SponsorBlock marks are cut as given and learned as patterns; the LLM only steps in when marks are absent. Off by default.
Technical observations
The architecture treats boundary precision as the hard part, not detection. That is the right read: transcript timestamps drift, and podcast ads are often inserted dynamically per listener, so two downloads of one episode can differ. The cross-fetch diff appears to exist precisely for that case. Pattern storage with scheduled Pattern Cleanup (suggested trims, splits, retirements, with approval and undo) signals that the project expects learned patterns to age and require maintenance.
Cost and resilience are handled explicitly: A/B routing between two providers, failover to a standby, rate-limit holds, an offline queue for self-hosted endpoints, and an LLM cost ledger down to the individual call.
Caveats
Everything above comes from the project README; not tested personally. The open question is cut accuracy in the wild, which presumably explains why the review queue is a first-class feature rather than an afterthought. Ad-heavy shows with dynamic insertion are the true test, since those feeds change per listener.
Administrative extras include OPML import/export, per-feed retention, scheduled encrypted backups, PWA installation on iOS, Android, macOS, and Windows, and local feeds built from user audio files.
🔹 tool #MinusPod #podcasting #LLM #fasterwhisper
🔗 Source: https://github.com/ttlequals0/MinusPod
----------------
🎯 AI: VOLTA-AUTODOXER Turns an LLM Into the Operator's Triage Analyst
===================
Summary
Research published under the CAIRN effort describes VOLTA-AUTODOXER, a self-deleting Windows infostealer with an LLM stage at the end of its workflow. Per the report, the AI is not positioned as support for a classic malware capability; it works as an intelligence analyst on the operator's behalf, turning a raw credential log into a prioritized, citation-backed dossier of the victim and their monetizable assets.
Collection scope
Browser passwords, cookies, payment cards, cryptocurrency wallet seed phrases, Discord, Telegram, Steam and Roblox sessions, Microsoft OAuth tokens, SSH and cloud-provider keys, Wi-Fi profiles, screenshots.
The evidence bundle
The profiling happens on the person, not only the machine: geolocation and home address, employer and employer domain, inferred birth year, card last-4 digits, Slack workspaces, document authorship metadata, iPhone backup indicators, and a live Roblox account valuation. Stolen session access drives enrichment: Gmail searches for purchase receipts to corroborate the home address, UberEats and DoorDash order history, and Discord enrichment through the stolen token.
LLM configuration
• Endpoint: https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/chat/completions
• Default model: anthropic/claude-opus-4.6
• Failover: moonshotai/kimi-k2 then google/gemini-2.5-flash, up to three models
• Refusal checks: responses are scanned for phrases like "I can't" and "I'm not able" before each failover step
• Temperature: 0.2, hardcoded, for consistent output
• Request format: hand-assembled JSON, no SDK, User-Agent Mozilla/5.0
The system prompt instructs the model to act as "a forensic intelligence analyst drafting a target assessment", with the directive "Go deep, not wide... Be blunt, specific, accurate." Required output: a section titled "WHAT THEY'RE WORTH" with valuables ranked by monetization in low/medium/high tiers, and a section on "THEIR OPSEC" covering the victim's security posture and password hygiene.
🔹 Attack Chain Analysis
• ⚙️ Execution: the self-deleting implant runs on a Windows host
• 🦠 Collection: standard stealer haul (credentials, sessions, cards, keys, screenshots)
• 📦 Bundle construction: profiling data tied to the person
• 🔎 Enrichment: stolen sessions used for Gmail receipts, UberEats, DoorDash, Discord
• 📤 Exfiltration: serialized bundle POSTed to OpenRouter under the operator's system prompt
• 🔒 Cover tracks: implant deletes itself; the ranked dossier stays with the operator
🔹 Analysis
The multi-model chain is the engineering decision worth attention. Checking each response for refusal phrases and pivoting to smaller, more permissive models implies the operator expected guardrails and built around them. The 0.2 temperature fits the same picture: the model is treated as a repeatable triage component, not a creative text generator. The report also notes there is no attacker-owned infrastructure in this stage.
🔹 Detection Notes and Limits
No hashes or sample artifacts appear in the material at hand, so the network side is the anchor: egress to openrouter.ai/api/v1/chat/completions, a plain Mozilla/5.0 user agent with hand-built JSON on a non-browser request style, and the model identifiers claude-opus-4.6, kimi-k2, gemini-2.5-flash in the body where TLS inspection exists. All of this is single-source vendor research; treat the unusual details, especially the live Roblox valuation, as unconfirmed until a sample is published.
🔹 VOLTA #infostealer #OpenRouter #LLM #ThreatIntel