October 31, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 31st: The British assaults on White Plains and Fort Washington were postponed by rain; Washington was alarmed by the state of his army; Washington ordered the troops to a stronger post.

Previous entry: October 30th; next: November 1st.

A downpour struck White Plains in the early morning hours. The rain increased Lieutenant-General William Howe’s unease, but he did not alter his plans to attack the American army at dawn.

George Washington was expecting an attack, and he had the Americans lie on their arms in the fortifications at White Plains. Brigadier-General George Clinton (Heath’s division) wrote:

“Our lines were manned all night… and a most horrid night it was to lie in cold trenches. Uncovered as we are, drawn on fatigue, making redoubts, fleches, abatis and lines… I fear [these things] will ultimately destroy our army without fighting. This I am sure of, that I am likely to lose more in my brigade by sickness occasioned by extra fatigue and want of covering, than in the course of an active campaign is ordinarily lost in the most severe actions”.

At 5 AM, the British army was in motion. A powerful blow was to be made on the left, where Mirbach’s and Lossberg’s Hessian brigades, the 4th British brigade, the Brigade of Guards, the 2nd and 3rd light infantry battalions, and the 5th and 49th regiments of foot assembled for battle. These forces were entrusted to Lieutenant-General Leopold Philip von Heister who apparently had replaced Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton as Howe’s favored subordinate.

Clinton commanded the center, and Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis the right. The forces in this sector included the 1st Light Infantry Battalion, the 1st British brigade, the Hessian grenadiers, the British Reserve, and the 28th, 35th, 44th, 64th, and 71st regiments of foot.

As the troops formed up and moved into place, they looked upon the forbidding American lines. The British redcoats and Hessian bluecoats were cold, wet, and no doubt fearful of what was to follow.

Then, around 7 AM, the men were told that the attack was cancelled, and they marched back to camp.

Hessian Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister later wrote: “a heavy rain, fortunately perhaps for the army, frustrated all our plans. The enemy, well advised of everything[,] were prepared and ready to repulse us, sleeping on their arms that night.” Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton noted that the rain “much swelled the river,” and Charles Stedman claimed that the rain “made the ground so slippery that it was thought it could not be possible to mount the face of the hill”.

The cancellation was only temporary. Headquarters ordered that “the army [is] to be in readiness to move upon the shortest notice.” Commissary Charles Stedman claimed that “the weather proved fine about noon, but the commander in chief did not think proper to put his former intentions in execution.” Instead, Howe seemingly preferred to wait until early the next morning when poor visibility would partially mask the attack.

Baurmeister wondered why Howe did not take other steps to hide his intentions:

“Much might have been done on our left wing to mislead them [i.e., the Americans]. For example, we might have built some bridges [over the Bronx] and constructed roads to them—but nothing was done.”

Although the British did not make a major feint, Washington was anxious for their flanks. Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Harrison (Washington’s secretary) wrote:

“The enemy are throwing up some lines and redoubts in our front, with a view of cannonading as soon as they are ready, and at the same time [they] are extending their wings further by our right and left. It is supposed that one of their objects is to advance a part of their troops, and seize… the bridge over Croton River, that the communication may be cut off with the upper country” [i.e., upstate New York].

Washington dispatched Brigadier-General Rezin Beall to secure this crossing with several regiments of Maryland militia.

Washington was unable to detach many men because his army was rapidly losing strength. Harrison noted:

“Our army is decreasing fast: several gentlemen who have come to camp within a few days have observed large numbers of militia returning home on the different roads”.

General orders from American headquarters on this date admonished the troops for being away from the fortifications:

“The General, in a ride he took yesterday, to reconnoitre the grounds about this [place], was surprised and shocked to find both officers and soldiers straggling all over the country, under one idle pretence or other, when they cannot tell the hour or minute the camp may be attacked, and their services indispensably necessary. He once more positively orders that neither officer [n]or soldier shall stir out of camp without leave… The provost marshal is to take up all stragglers; and it is enjoined upon all officers to seize every man who fires his gun without leave, and to have him tied up immediately and receive twenty lashes.”

Once again, there were small clashes between the armies.

Lieutenant Colonel William Henshaw (Moses Little’s 12th Continental Regiment, Nixon’s brigade) was stationed on the American right where the armies lay especially close together. He wrote:

“The enemy are now encamped within gunshot of us, so that there is a continual firing of small arms…. We daily expect an engagement with the enemy.”

Brigadier-General George Clinton noted that on this date one Captain Van Wyck was killed while commanding a company of rangers.

“He went out in the morning, with about thirty men, fell in with about one hundred of the enemy, and at once, not far distant from their lines, charged them with spirit, gave them a brisk fire, but unfortunately when loading his piece the second time, was shot in the head and fell dead. His lieutenant shot down the man who killed his captain. The enemy fled. Our party brought off their captain [i.e., Van Wyck]… He was a good man and valiant officer.”

During the day, a British deserter provided Washington with a detailed description of the planned British attack. Washington decided that the new position his men had begun to occupy on the night of October 28-29 was a better place to meet this attack. He ordered the troops to withdraw to the new position during the night.

This image uses a White Plains map of 1891 to illustrate the positions held by Washington and Howe at White Plains. The road network is substantially more developed at this time than it was in 1776; nevertheless, the area was still predominately rural (unlike today). The American positions were chiefly within the blue lines, and the British positions were chiefly within the red lines.

Washington’s initial position was on high ground north just north of the village of White Plains, with his flanks bounded by the Bronx River and St. Mary’s Lake. Part of the British army crossed the Bronx River on October 28, and remained on the high ground west of the river in the days that followed. These forces were opposite the American right, but to attack this flank they had to re-cross the Bronx River.

Washington’s initial position was a good one, but his army was more secure in the position they occupied on the night of October 31-November 1 (the area at the top of the map).

October 21, 1776 (Part 1)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 21st (Part 1): George Washington’s Continentals occupied White Plains; William Howe moved cautiously by the coast.

Previous entry: October 20th; next: October 21st (Part 2).

George Washington learned on the night of the 20th that he faced the potential for a catastrophic defeat if the British army reached the village of White Plains before he did. Indeed, the Americans wondered why the British had not already made such a move. Major-General William Heath wrote, “it is not a little unaccountable that they did not attempt to stretch themselves across to the Hudson, which [they] might have been done with great ease.” Colonel Rufus Putnam commented on “the stupidity of the British general in that he did not… send a detachment and take possession of… White Plains[,] for had he done this we must then have fought him on his own terms”.

Throughout the day, and into the night, the American army began streaming towards White Plains. The first troops on the road belonged to Brigadier-General William Alexander’s brigade (Spencer’s division). They reached White Plains sometime between midmorning (Rufus Putnam’s memoir) and early afternoon (journal of Sergeant James McMichael). Rufus Putnam accompanied these men and he breathed a sigh of relief when they reached the village: “thus was the American army saved… from a probable total destruction.”

William Heath’s division followed Alexander’s brigade on the road to White Plains. Heath recalled:

“At about four o' clock, p. m., General Heath's division moved from above King’s Bridge… About eight o' clock in the evening, they passed General Lincoln's quarters, on Valentine's Hill, where the Commander-in-Chief was to spend the night…. The division reached Chatterton's Hill, to the south of White-Plains, at four o' clock in the morning… having marched all night.”

Following Heath’s division was the rest of Spencer’s division (the brigades of James Wadsworth and John Fellows). Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion, Wadsworth’s brigade) recorded in his journal:

“Marched about 10 o’clock at night for the White Plains, [we] carried our tents on our backs[,] packs[,] pots[,] kettles[,] and provisions[,] etc. The army marched all night excepting some small halts, [and the men] almost fainted under their burdens and were greatly fatigued.”

Joseph Plumb Martin served in the same battalion as Trumbull, and had a similar experience:

“We marched from Valentine’s Hill for the White Plains in the night… We had our cooking utensils (at that time the most useless things in the army) to carry in our hands. They were made of cast iron and consequently heavy. I was so beat out before morning with hunger and fatigue that I could hardly move one foot before the other. I told my messmates that I could not carry our kettle any further… my arms were almost dislocated; I sat down in the road, and one of the others gave it a shove with his foot, and it rolled down against the fence, and that was the last I ever saw of it. When we got through the night’s march we found our mess was not the only one that was rid of their iron bondage.”

The British commander, Lieutenant-General William Howe, was perhaps unaware of the opportunity at White Plains (just as Washington had been before the 20th). But that does not sufficiently account for his inactivity along the Westchester coastline. Howe, it seems, was extraordinarily cautious about sending men into the countryside. Perhaps this was, as Stephen Kemble (Howe’s assistant adjutant general) put it, because American deserters claimed that their generals “propose to surround us and cut off our communication with our shipping.” On this date, Howe did shift his army 2 miles further from the landing place, but, Kemble noted, “we keep the [Long Island] Sound in short views on our right”.

Howe’s army may have been slow to act, but it was quickly becoming more powerful. Recent reinforcements included Lossberg’s brigade of Hessians from Staten Island, a large detachment of light dragoons from Long Island, and the 2nd and 6th British brigades from Throg’s Neck (minus the 28th Foot, which was left to hold that post awhile longer).

Situation of the armies on October 21st (click to enlarge). Howe’s army remained near Pell’s Point (8) and New Rochelle, although a detachment was sent east to Mamaroneck (10). Most of Washington’s army was in the process of moving from the area of Kingsbridge (6) to White Plains (11). Washington himself made his headquarters on Valentine’s Hill near Mile Square (9). Major-General Nathanael Greene’s men remained in upper Manhattan and at Fort Lee in New Jersey.

Charles Blaskowitz made this representation of British army units on the heights of New Rochelle. Much of the army is visible, including the light infantry and jaegers (red and green triangles, respectively), the British Reserve (the British grenadiers, and the 33rd and 42nd regiments), the Brigade of Guards, the 71st Foot (Fraser’s Highlanders), and two brigades of Hessians. Other troops were encamped to the south and east.

The Hutchinson River bisects the map. To the left of the river can be seen the town of East Chester (which was plundered by both armies), and a position formerly held by John Glover’s brigade.

October 12, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 12th: The British army crossed to Throg’s Neck; the Americans prevented the British from advancing far inland.

Previous entry: October 11th; next: October 13th.

During the night, the British army began to cross to Throg’s Neck (also known as Frog’s Point). Captain Henry Duncan of HMS Eagle, oversaw part of the crossing. He wrote:

“About three o'clock [on] Saturday morning, the 12th, the troops were embarked in the flat boats and bateaux, to the number of between four and five thousand men; the Guards and 42nd regiment, between fourteen and fifteen hundred men, were embarked on board sloops under my direction. At daybreak in the morning the boats set off, and no sooner had they put off, with an amazing strong tide, but it came on a fog equal to pitch darkness, with now and then an interval of light for a few seconds. The boats were put off; to attempt to stop them would have been very dangerous, for the headmost boats must have anchored, and the boats that followed would in all probability run [a]foul of them, to the imminent danger of sinking each other; the admiral [i.e., Vice Admiral Richard Howe], therefore, rather chose to run the risk of passing Hell Gate with all the boats in that rapid tide and dark fog. I went astern and ordered all the boats to move forward. Soon after their putting off, a galley towing one of the artillery boats, in endeavouring to cross a vessel lying in the passage, towed her athwart hawse; the boat ran directly up her cable, and overset instantly. Many of the people were picked up; there were three field-pieces lost, and I suppose five or six people. There were very few people in the flat boats [that] had ever been through or knew anything of the passage of Hell Gate. This made the danger much the greater.”

Captain George Harris (grenadier company, 5th Regiment of Foot) also had a close call:

“the point of an island… divides the river into two rapid streams, and causes a very dangerous whirlpool…. through the ignorance of our pilot, we were on the edge of the pool… too late to avoid the suction, and found ourselves, circle after circle, attracted to the centre, in spite of all our efforts, till at last the boatmen were on the point of quitting their oars, despairing of escape, when, animated I suppose by the love of life, I began to storm at them for their cowardice, and made them stick to their oars. We at length perceived that we made progress, and emerged from the whirlpool, escaping without other accident than the dislocation of a man's wrist”.

Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton had much praise for Vice Admiral Richard Howe and his fellow Royal Navy officers for getting the army through Hell Gate “almost miraculously” despite the heavy fog and treacherous waters. He added:

“About eight o’clock we arrived off Frog’s Point, where we found a frigate stationed to cover our embarkations. A few rebels made their appearance as we approached the shore; but some scattering shots soon dispersed them, and the landing was effected without loss.”

Two watercourses lay between Throg’s Neck and the American army: Westchester Creek and the Bronx River. Securing the passage over Westchester Creek was especially important as a single bridge over this creek provided the only good route inland. Therefore, according to Clinton, “As soon as the troops could be formed, we pushed for Westchester Bridge in hopes of securing it.”

The area nearest Throg’s Neck was defended by Colonel Edward Hand’s brigade of Pennsylvanians (this included Hand’s own 1st Continental Regiment, Colonel Henry Haller’s Berks County Regiment, and Colonel James Cunningham’s 1st Lancaster County Regiment; see footnote).

Major-General William Heath had previously stationed “25 picked men” from Hand’s brigade to watch over the Westchester Creek bridge at all times, “and, in case the enemy made a landing… to take up the planks of the bridge”.

The men quickly performed their duty, and when the head of the British column appeared, they “commenced a firing with their rifles.”

Clinton lamented: “the enemy had been too quick for us”.

The British then attempted to bypass the wrecked bridge and cross at the head of Westchester Creek. However, according to Heath, they “found here also the Americans in possession of the pass.”

Both sides called up reinforcements.

Situation of the British and American armies on October 12, 1776 (click to enlarge).

Throg's Neck area circa 1781. The map shows the solitary road leading inland from Throg's Neck, which crossed Westchester Creek. Colonel Edward Hand’s brigade had its headquarters at DeLancey's Mills on the Bronx River, but a detachment carefully guarded the Westchester Creek bridge. The town of West Chester was a short distance west of the bridge.

The site of the British landing on October 12th; from a map by Charles Blaskowitz.

Heath stated that “he immediately ordered Colonel Prescott, the hero of Bunker Hill, with his regiment, and Captain-Lieutenant Bryant of the artillery, with a 3 pounder, to reinforce the riflemen at West Chester causeway [i.e., the bridge]; and Colonel Graham of the New-York line, with his [militia] regiment, and Lieutenant Jackson of the artillery, with a 6 pounder, to reinforce at the head of the creek; all of which was promptly done, to the check and disappointment of the enemy.”

Captain-Lieutenant Archibald Robertson (Royal Engineers) wrote that “the [British] guns were taken forward to the bridge, 16 pieces” but no attempt was made to take either pass by force. Instead, he wrote, “we were ordered to encamp.” He noted that the remainder of the day was punctuated by “popping shots across the water.”

George Washington arrived in person to examine the situation of the British army. He later wrote that Throg’s Neck “is a kind of island” although “the water that surrounds it is fordable at low tide.” However, he was pleased to find that “The grounds from Frog's Point are strong and defensible, being full of stone fences, both along the road and across the adjacent fields, which will render it difficult for artillery, or indeed a large body of foot, to advance in any regular order, except through the main road.” He then ordered fortifications erected to guard the road and the pass at the head of the creek. He noted that “Our men, who are posted on the passes, seemed to be in good spirits”.

These fortifications, according to Hessian Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister, soon made “everything still more unapproachable.” At the same time, the Americans “cannonaded the camp of the 71st Regiment, which lost six killed and three wounded.” He claimed that “If the rebels had accurately aimed their guns, the balls of which flew over English headquarters, they could have annihilated the Guards and the 33rd Regiment in the reserve.”

October 10, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 10th: Gunning Bedford described life in the American army; the Americans feared the British would seize key points on the Hudson; William Howe prepared for the move to Throg’s Point.

Previous entry: October 9th; next: October 11th.

The passage of the British ships up the Hudson on the 9th alarmed the American army. Once it became clear that no major movement was afoot, the officers and men returned to their usual routine. Lieutenant-Colonel Gunning Bedford (the Delaware Regiment) described the situation of the army on this date:

“We are strengthening our [defensive] lines,--the enemy are also busy with theirs. Our duty continues hard, having the lines to man every morning before day, and they are a mile and a half from here, and [we have] a great deal of other duty… many of our men have deserted to the enemy, though none from our regiment... [British] deserters say the enemy are apprehensive of an attack from us. They all, likewise, say they are healthy, and their army strong,--above thirty thousand… Our army is very sickly yet. We have one hundred and forty of our regiment unfit for duty. We have neither hospitals nor medicines for them, which makes them suffer much… Our army seems in good spirits, and we think our lines are secure, if they should be attempted.”

Although the British vessels on the Hudson posed no immediate threat to the American army, their presence was suggestive of Britain’s longer-term plans. Writing from the town of Fishkill, the New York Committee of Safety described to George Washington their fears that British vessels, acting in conjunction with local Loyalists, would take control of key points on the river:

“Nothing can be more alarming than the present situation of our state; we are daily getting the most authentic intelligence of bodies of men [i.e., Loyalists] enlisted and armed in order to assist the enemy[.] We much fear that they[,] cooperating with the enemy may seize such passes as will cut off all communication, between the army and us and prevent your supplies.”

This map (click to enlarge) shows the lower Hudson River, which was a primary route for the flow of men and materials to and from Washington’s army. On October 9th, a handful of British vessels successfully passed Fort Washington (4) and Fort Constitution (5) and took post in a wide stretch of the Hudson’s River near Dobb’s Ferry (7) and Tarrytown (8). The Americans had previously begun construction on Fort Montgomery (10) to defend one vital chokepoint on the river, but other points seemed vulnerable, such as Stony Point (9) and West Point (11).

The painting is Dominic Serres’ depiction of the frigates Phoenix, Roebuck, and Tartar passing, on October 9th, between the American batteries in and around Fort Constitution (left) and Fort Washington (right).

The Americans were well aware that their supply lines extending north and east of Manhattan were also vulnerable. Although they had no forts to control the shoreline (like they did on the Hudson), the Americans were at least aided by geography: British vessels moving troops into Long Island Sound would have to pass through a treacherous passageway known as Hell Gate.

Colonel George Weedon (3rd Virginia Regiment) wrote with amazement that the British kept a vessel anchored in this passage: “at this time a 28 gun frigate lays in Hellgate, a place not much wider than the streets of Williamsburg, [Virginia]”

Lieutenant-General William Howe had in fact decided to move his entire army through this passage and land on Throg’s Point (cf. October 8, 1776). At this time he was attending to the details of this operation. In brief, the British occupied several posts in the New York City area: the lower half of Manhattan, western Long Island, Staten Island, Paulus Hook on the New Jersey shore, and a couple of islands in New York’s East River. Howe decided to largely strip these posts of troops, although on Manhattan Lieutenant-General Hugh Percy would be left with three brigades of British troops and one of Hessians.

Howe’s force would consist, at first, of the 1st, 2nd, and 6th brigades of British regulars, the British Reserve (three battalions of British grenadiers, and the 33rd and 42nd regiments), the brigade of Guards, one brigade of Hessian grenadiers, one brigade of Hessian musketeers and fusiliers, three battalions of light infantry, two battalions of the 71st Foot, some light dragoons, the Hessian jaegers, and a couple of recently formed Loyalist corps.

Howe expected to receive substantial reinforcements while the campaign was underway, including an entire division of Hessian troops that was then crossing the Atlantic. In addition, Percy would be able to release some of his men to Howe if and when Washington pulled back from Manhattan.

The exact timing of these decisions was unrecorded, but by this time the British were nearly ready for the offensive to begin. On this date the army was issued 6 days’ worth of provisions (a sure sign that a move was imminent) and they were ordered to “dress” these provisions on the 11th.

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (13)

This is Part 13 in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10, Part 11, Part 12.

At the battle of Guilford Courthouse, British units reached the Americans’ third and final defensive line at different times and attacked in a piecemeal fashion. First Lieutenant-Colonel James Webster led an attack against the American right that was bloodily repulsed (Part 9). Then, the 2nd Battalion of Guards attacked the American left and defeated the troops opposed to them (Part 10). The Guards’ success, however, was short-lived; they were soon mauled made by counterattacking American infantry and cavalry (the 1st Maryland Regiment and Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington’s dragoons; Part 12).

Although these attacks were unsuccessful, the threat they posed was sufficiently great that the American commander, Major-General Nathanael Greene, ordered his army to retreat (Part 11).

The setbacks also did not deter the British from continuing their attacks. The 71st Regiment reached the Guilford Courthouse building more or less opposed, where they threatened the flank and rear of the 1st Maryland Regiment. Webster’s group advanced again and attacked the 2nd Virginia Regiment. Finally, the 23rd Regiment of Foot and the remnants of the Guards began to advance once more.

The American forces still on the field could not hope to repel all of these threats.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard was with the 1st Maryland Regiment, and recalled:

I found myself in the cleared ground, and saw the seventy-first regiment near the courthouse, and other columns of the enemy appearing in different directions. Washington's horse having gone off, I found it necessary to retire, which I did leisurely; but many of the guards who were lying on the ground, and who we supposed were wounded, got up and fired at us as we retired. [1]

Then, Webster’s men advanced again and attacked the 2nd Virginia Regiment.

Lewis Griffin of the 2nd Virginia saw his brigade commander get wounded in this clash:

General [Isaac] Huger was wounded in the right hand in my view. I saw him with his Sword in his hand raised above his head encouraging his men when a shot penetrated his hand and his Sword fell in his lap, which he caught up with his left, drew from his pocket a handkerchief, tied up his hand, and moved on, not long after this occurrence we were ordered to retreat. [2]

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At top, the 33rd Regiment of Foot advances against the 2nd Virginia Regiment (click to enlarge). At lower left, the 1st Maryland Regiment holds the open ground; at lower right, the 71st Foot has reached the courthouse building (not shown).

Another view of the above. At bottom and lower left: The 23rd Foot and remnants of the Guards assemble on the edge of the open ground near three-pounders of the Royal Artillery. The 2nd Virginia Regiment is represented by the troops around the red and white flag; the 1st Maryland by the troops around the blue flag.

Another view of the above. In the foreground, the last of the North Carolina militia retreat along the Reedy Fork Road. In the background, the 23rd Foot prepares to advance.

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Finally, the 23rd Regiment of Foot and the remnants of the Guards advanced once more.

According to Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, “the two 6-pounders [of Singleton’s battery] once more fell into our hands; two ammunition-wagons and two other 6-pounders [Finley’s battery], being all the artillery they had in the field, were likewise taken… The 23rd and 71st regiments, with part of the cavalry, were ordered to pursue”. [3]

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At right, the 1st Maryland Regiment retreats along the Reedy Fork Road, while the British Guards, the 23rd, 33rd, and 71st Regiments seize the American artillery.

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The exhausted 23rd and 71st regiments did not advance very far, but the British cavalry thundered down the road after the retreating Continentals. They soon received a check from some troops of the 1st Virginia Regiment, who were acting as rearguard. According to Henry Ingle:

on our retreat we went about 3 quarters of a mile… got into a thicket we had not been there but a little while until we spied the British Light Horse coming through the lane full speed when they got within about 40 yards we stepped out in an open place and fired upon them and there was a dreadful slaughter again of Light horse men &c. [4]

Greene wrote, in concluding his report:

General Huger was the last that was engaged, and gave the enemy a check. We retreated in good order to the Reedy Fork river; and crossed at the ford, about three miles from the field of action, and then halted, and drew up the troops, until we collected most of the stragglers. We lost our artillery, and two ammunition wagons, the greater part of the horses being killed before the retreat began, and it being impossible to move the pieces but along the great road. After collecting our stragglers, we retired… ten miles distant from Guilford. [3]

But the battle was not quite over yet. South of the American third line, a separate battle continued between American riflemen and light infantry and Hessian infantry and British guardsmen.

Notes:

1. Howard is quoted in James Herring and James Barton Longacre (1835). The national portrait gallery of distinguished Americans, Vol. 2.

2. Pension application of Lewis Griffin, transcribed by Will Graves.

3. Cornwallis' and Greene's accounts of the battle (among others) can be found in this compendium.

4. Pension application of Henry Ingle, transcribed by Will Graves.

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (12)

This is Part 12 in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10, Part 11.

The 2nd Battalion of Guards was one of the first British units to reach the American third line. They attacked and quickly defeated the 2nd Maryland Regiment. In their pursuit of this regiment, the Guards then captured a battery of guns and gained the American flank and rear (Part 10). This success on their part was short-lived. Moments later they were suddenly counterattacked by the 1st Maryland Regiment and charged by Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington’s light dragoons.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard of the 1st Maryland Regiment recalled:

Our men gave them some well directed fires, and we then advanced and continued firing. At this time [Colonel John] Gunby's horse was shot… his horse fell upon him, and it was with difficulty he extricated himself. Major [Archibald] Anderson was killed about this time. As we advanced I observed Washington's horse, and as their movements were quicker than ours, they first charged and broke the enemy. My men followed very quickly, and we passed through the guards, many of whom had been knocked down by the horse without being much hurt. We took some prisoners, and the whole were in our power. [1]

Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee, in his history of the southern campaign, wrote that “Gunby… wheeled to his left upon [the Guards]… Here the action was well fought; each corps manfully struggling for victory; when lieutenant colonel Washington… pressed forward with his cavalry… This combined operation was irresistible… the two field pieces were recovered” and the Guards were “driven back with slaughter”.

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From the third line, looking west (here and below, click to enlarge). In the foreground, the 2nd Battalion of Guards melees with the 1st Maryland and William Washington's light dragoons. In the middle ground, British infantry, artillery, and cavalry approach the third line. In the extreme distance lie casualties from the fighting on the first and second lines.

A view of the third line fighting looking south. The 2nd Guards are being mauled at upper left, while other British units approach from the right. At center, the 2nd Virginia Regiment occupies a hillside opposite the 33rd Regiment of Foot.

The 1st Maryland Regiment drives the 2nd Battalion of Guards into the open field.

Washington's light dragoons pursue the remnants of the 2nd Guards.

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Most of the Guards were left prostrate on the field of battle, but a number reached the western edge of the field. Lee believed these men were “saved by the British artillery". He wrote that these guns:

“to stop the ardent pursuit of Washington and Howard, opened upon friends as well as foes; for [Lieutenant-General Charles] Cornwallis, seeing the vigorous advance of these two officers, determined to arrest their progress, though every ball, leveled at them, must pass through the flying guards.” [2]

Neither Howard nor Cornwallis mentioned the British firing on their own men. However, Cornwallis did report that “The enemy's cavalry was soon repulsed by a well-directed fire from two 3-pounders”. [2]

Hundreds of American militia were in the vicinity of this bloody clash, and it seems some were willing to continue the contest. John Wadkins stated that “some of the militia who had stopped at the Court House followed in the rear of the Horse” when they charged the Guards [3]. James Martin claimed that he helped rally “about 500 [men] & was marching them to the Battle Ground” [3].

However, Greene had previously issued orders for the army to retreat (see Part 11), and soon these militia began to move off. Martin noted that when he was approaching the fighting “I met General Stephens [i.e., Brigadier-General Edward Stevens] of [the] Virginia [militia] Corps retreating[.] I asked if the Retreat was by General Greene's Orders[;] he told me it was[.] I then retreated with him” [4].

At the same time that Howard and Washington lost their potential support, the Guards were aided by British troops coming through the woods.

Cornwallis wrote:

the 71st regiment, which, having been impeded by some deep ravine, were now coming out of the wood on the right of the Guards, opposite to the Court-house. By the spirited exertions of Brigadier-General [Charles] O'Hara, though wounded, the second battalion of Guards was soon rallied, and, supported by the grenadiers [of the Guards], returned to the charge with the greatest alacrity. The 23rd regiment arriving at that instant from our left, and Lieut.-Colonel [Banastre] Tarleton having advanced with a part of the cavalry, the enemy were soon put to flight. [2]

Notes:

A challenging aspect of depicting the battle in miniature has involved issues of timing. The sequence of events involving each unit is generally clear, but it’s rather difficult to determine how the events involving one unit corresponded in time with the events involving other units on the battlefield. A source of particular consternation for me has been the retreat of Stevens’ brigade to the third line. In recent posts, Stevens’ men were depicted as reaching the third line only after major combat had begun on the third line (in the second picture, above, they are the block of retreating militia at the top of the image). There are a couple of reasons for this. One is that the 71st Foot is known to have been delayed by rough terrain on its march to the third line (see Cornwallis' quote, above); Stevens’ brigade had to traverse the same ground, and it’s reasonable to think they would have been delayed as well. The other is Martin's pension application (also quoted above), which implies that Stevens’ brigade was still moving towards the courthouse when the Guards were defeated. However, the depiction has ended up looking a bit peculiar – this huge brigade of Virginia militia is shown essentially behind the Guards during the third line fighting. Of course, the alternative would also look a bit odd – having Stevens' brigade reach the third line quickly only to stand idly about while the Guards attacked and routed the 2nd Maryland. (As is, there are already quite a few militia figures shown hovering near the third line, based on Martin’s comment above, and comments by St. George Tucker concerning Lawson’s Virginia brigade [5]). There is, to say the least, room for varying interpretations.

1. Howard is quoted in James Herring and James Barton Longacre (1835). The national portrait gallery of distinguished Americans, Vol. 2.

4. Lee's and Cornwallis' accounts of the battle (among others) can be found in this compendium

3. Pension application of John Wadkins.

4. Pension application of James Martin.

5. Letters of St. George Tucker to his wife (from the Magazine of American History).

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (8)

This is the eighth in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7.

Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee had been placed at the head of a flank corps (or “corps of observation”) that consisted of his own legion of infantry and cavalry, some Virginian Continental light infantry, and a corps of riflemen from western North Carolina and Virginia. As briefly noted in Part 1, this corps skirmished with the British on the British march to Guilford Courthouse. Lee’s men then took position on the extreme left end of the first American line.

It so happened that the right end of the British line (Regiment von Bose) passed through this field, giving Lee what he thought was a magnificent opportunity to stymie the British attack. He later wrote:

[the men] raked by their fire the right of the British wing, entirely uncovered… The appearance in this quarter was so favorable that sanguine hopes were entertained by many of the officers, from the manifest advantage possessed, of breaking down the enemy’s right before he approached the fence; and the troops exhibited the appearance of great zeal and alacrity. [1]

However, he claimed that he could not capitalize on the opportunity, because of the rapid collapse of the North Carolina militia on the first line (see Part 4). The sudden retreat of the North Carolinians “threw the corps of Lee out of combination with the army, and also exposed it to destruction.”

Regiment von Bose, aided by the 1st battalion of Guards (brought up from reserve), began to pursue Lee’s men. However, according to Charles Stedman:

the first battalion of the guards, and the regiment of Bose, [were] greatly impeded in advancing by the excessive thickness of the woods, which rendered their bayonets of little use. The broken corps of the enemy were thereby encouraged to make frequent stands, and to throw in an irregular fire… [2]

The pursuit of Lee caused the 1st Guards and Hessians to become separated from the rest of the British army. Soon, they would find themselves in a desperate fight for survival in the deep woods.

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At the beginning of the battle, Regiment von Bose was placed on the right end of the British line, alongside the 71st Regiment of Foot (Fraser’s Highlanders).

However, after the American first line was defeated, the two regiments headed in slightly different directions, and a gap opened between them.

The further the two regiments advanced, the larger the gap became. In this image, the 71st is approaching Brigadier-General Edward Stevens’ brigade, while Regiment von Bose skirmishes with riflemen in Lee’s corps.

However, Regiment von Bose was not without support; the 1st Battalion of British Guards was soon ordered up to their assistance.

Lee’s Legion (foreground) and Campbell’s Virginia riflemen (background) skirmish with the British and Hessians in the woods.

Parties of riflemen contest the Hessians’ advance.

Virginia light infantry cause trouble for the 1st Guards.

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Notes:

In this post I describe the beginning of what is known as the "separate battle" at Guilford Courthouse. I've commented previously on different ways the source material for this part of the battle can be interpreted (see here).

1. Henry Lee. (1812). Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

2. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (7)

This is the seventh in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6.

The second defensive line at Guilford Courthouse was comprised of two brigades Virginia militia. Brigadier-General Edward Stevens commanded the brigade on the left; Brigadier-General Robert Lawson commanded the brigade on the right.

Among those serving in Stevens’ brigade was a young rifleman named Samuel Houston. He recorded in his journal how that morning the men formed a line in the woods and loaded their rifles.

“Presently our brigade major came, ordering [us] to take trees as we pleased. The men run to choose their trees, but with difficulty, many crowding to one, and some far behind others. But we moved by order of our officers, and stood in suspense.” [1]

The men could plainly hear the opening cannonade (Part 2) followed by the roar of muskets and rifles as the first American line came under attack (Part 4). Gradually the sounds of battle drew closer.

Eventually, the 71st Regiment of Foot (Fraser’s Highlanders) emerged through the trees and attacked Stevens’ men. The blow fell not on Houston’s front (on the left end of the brigade), but rather against Stevens’ center and right.

On the first line, the Highlanders quickly overcame resistance by firing and charging with the bayonet. They found Stevens’ men much more difficult to dislodge.

According to American Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee, “the Virginia militia… were not so advantageously posted as their comrades of North Carolina, yet gave every indication of maintaining their ground with obstinacy. Stevens… had placed a line of sentinels in his rear with orders to shoot every man that flinched.” [2]

Instead of a single swift charge, the fighting was marked by a long thunderous exchange of rifle and musket fire. According to a Scottish author familiar with the battle, “The ground was level, but the wood was so thick and difficult, that, though the fire rolled in torrents, few were killed on either side.” [3]

Eventually, Stevens was shot in the thigh and his horse killed. [4]

Perhaps at the same time, some of the British Guards had begun to threaten Stevens’ right flank and rear. [5]

In any case, “the Virginians stood their ground & fought until their commander the brave General Stevens ordered them to retreat.” [6] Stevens’ men could hold their head high as they fell back; theirs was the one brigade of militia to wholly carry out their assignment in the Americans’ defense in depth.

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British Guards and Fraser’s Highlanders advance through the woods towards the American second line. Mumford’s regiment of Lawson’s brigade is partially visible at the extreme left. Stevens’ brigade is on the right side of the road. Some of the North Carolinians that had fought on the first line can be seen retreating in the distance. [7]

Guards and Highlanders battle Virginia militia in the woods. At left, the bulk of Lawson’s brigade has taken flight (see Part 6). In the distance is part of the American third line. Some of the North Carolinians that had fought on the first line can be seen retreating towards the third line.

Another view of the above.

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Notes:

1. Houston's account appears in William Henry Foote (1855). Sketches of Virginia....

2. Henry Lee. (1812). Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

3. David Stewart (1825). Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

4. Lee, ibid; Pension application of Cornelius Sanders.

5. According to Lee, part of the Guards first attacked Lawson’s brigade and then turned on Stevens’ brigade. In his words: “brigadier O’Hara, advancing… with fixed bayonets, aided by the seventy-first… compelled first Lawson’s brigade and then Stevens to abandon the contest.”

6. Pension application of Christopher Hand.

7. This depiction refers to the following statement by British Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis:

The 71st regiment and [Guards] Grenadiers, and second battalion of Guards, not knowing what was passing on their right, and hearing the fire advance on their left, continued to move forward, the artillery keeping pace with them on road, followed by the cavalry.

Events “passing on their right” will be covered in the next post in this series. The “advance on their left” refers to Webster’s activity on the British left flank, which I began to describe in Part 5, and which I will take up again in Part 9.

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (4)

This is the fourth in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3.

At Guilford Courthouse, the American army was arrayed in three defensive lines. The attacking British deployed on a wide front and charged the first line, which was composed chiefly of North Carolina militia.

According to a Virginian militiaman listening from the second line, the “close firing began near the centre… and soon spread along the line.” [1] This suggests that the 23rd and 71st regiments were advancing more quickly across the fields in the center of the British line than the 33rd and Bose regiments were advancing across the more difficult terrain on the left and right of the British line.

Descriptions of the details of this attack vary considerably from source to source. For example, militiaman James Martin recalled that on his front the first shot was fired when his company commander successfully picked off a British officer:

I was posted in the front Line with… Captain Forbes a brave and undaunted Fellow we were posted behind a Fence & I told the Men to sit down until the British who were advancing came near enough to shoot when they came in about 100 yards I saw [a] British officer with a drawn sword driving up his mans [sic, men] I asked Captain Forbes if he could take him down he said [he] could for [he] had a good Rifle and asked me if he should shoot then I told him let him [come to with]in 50 yards and then take him down which he did it was a Captain of the British Army [2]

But other accounts make no mention of isolated shots. Instead, they described a mass volley coming from the North Carolinians. The American commander, Major-General Nathanael Greene, stated that the North Carolinians opened fire when the British were 140 yards distant. Conversely, Sergeant Roger Lamb of the 23rd Regiment claimed the Americans held their fire until the British had closed to within murderously close range. He wrote:

…when [we] arrived within forty yards of the enemy's line, it was perceived that their whole force had their arms presented, and resting on a rail fence, the common partitions in America. They were taking aim with the nicest precision. [3]

However it happened, the Americans’ reception was deadly. The 23rd and 71st regiments respectively lost 29% and 26% of their men at Guilford Courthouse, and most of these casualties occurred in front of the rail fence. [4]

The British may have fired repeatedly during their advance through the center fields, and this fire (plus the threat of the bayonet) routed the North Carolinians.

Nathan Slade recalled that:

The enemy approached us and were according to the best of my belief within eighty to an hundred yards of us when they made their first fire—my recollection is that most of us stood firm until after the second [British] fire. On the third fire there were but few if any of us left to receive it—all or nearly all had broke and retreated in great disorder. [5]

This retreat was witnessed by men on the left and right ends of the American lines.

Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee commanded the flank corps on the left of the North Carolinians. There he saw, to his “infinite distress and mortification, the North Carolina militia took to flight”. [3]

James Collins was a North Carolina militiaman posted 200 yards to the right of the center fields. There “he saw the disgraceful retreat of that portion of the militia which was placed behind the fence”. [6]

Possibly this retreat set off a wave of panic among neighboring militia units. John Wadkins recalled that the “part of the line in which he was exchanged three or four fires” with the enemy. However, the men “became alarmed by report that the enemy was surrounding them – and fled”. [7]

The 71st Foot (Fraser's Highlanders) fires a volley at the North Carolina militia (here and below, click to enlarge).

Regiment von Bose is staggered by a volley.

North Carolinians of Brigadier-General John Butler's brigade flee from British bayonets.

The British break through the first defensive line.

Notes:

1. Houston's account appears in William Henry Foote (1855). Sketches of Virginia....

2. Pension application of James Martin.

3. Copies of the accounts by Greene, Lamb, and Lee (among others) can be found in this compendium.

4. Based on the appendixes in Lawrence E. Babits & Joshua B. Howard (2009) Long, obstinate, and bloody: The battle of Guilford Courthouse.

5. Pension application of Nathan Slade.

6. Pension application of James Collins.

7. Pension application of John Wadkins.