Battle of Hanging Rock 13

Part 13: Reinforcement and Retreat

Previous: Stalemate

The final British bayonet charge and the withdrawal to the center of the open area effectively brought the battle of Hanging Rock to an end. Nevertheless, the British remained apprehensive about another American attack. According to Charles Stedman, the outcome remained "doubtful," until:

"the appearance of a reinforcement changed entirely the fortune of the day. This reinforcement consisted of forty mounted infantry of the Legion who were returning from Rocky Mount: But the captains [Patrick] Stewart and [Charles] MacDonald, who commanded it, by ordering the men to extend their files, gave it the appearance of a formidable detachment. The bugle horns were directed to sound a charge: And the Americans, already kept at bay, were now fearful of being overpowered" [1].

Reinforcement. While the American militia plunder the center camp, the Provincials holding the open area receive an unexpected reinforcement.

Mounted Infantry Arrive (click to enlarge). Two companies of mounted Legion infantry advance up the Camden Road towards the Americans. The Provincials are in square formation.

William Davie and was dragoons "were returning towards the centre," after driving off a number of Provincials and Loyalist militia, when they saw that Stewart's and MacDonald's companies had "advanced up in the Camden road." Davie turned his men around and charged. The British "took the woods in flight, and one only was outdone" [2].

Davie's Final Charge (click to enlarge). The American dragoons send the mounted Legion infantry into the woods.

This repulse would seem to be the end of the affair, except that these green-jacketed mounted infantry were mistaken for the vanguard of Tarleton's dreaded British Legion dragoons [3]. According to Joseph McJunkin, Sumter remarked, "Boys, it is not good to pursue a victory too far," and began pulling his troops back [4]. A number of American participants and British commentators referred to this reinforcement as the cause of the American retreat [5].

Before the retreat was effected, "about an hour" was spent "plundering the [center] camp, taking the parole of the British officers, and preparing litters for the wounded" [6]. According to William Davie, "All this was done in full view of the British army, who consoled themselves with some military music [7] and an interlude of three cheers for King George" [8]. Hearing this, Sumter called out, "'Boys, can't you raise a whoop of victory?' Then the air was rent with the cry of victory" [9].

Plundering the British Camp (click to enlarge). The Americans raid the British Commissary's stores before abandoning the Hanging Rock battlefield.

Davie concluded, "The militia at length got into the line of march, Davie and his dragoons covering the retreat, but as the troops were loaded with plunder, and encumbered with their wounded friends, and many of them intoxicated, this retreat was not performed in the best military style. However, under all these disadvantages, they filed off unmolested, along the front of the enemy" [10]. Sumter claimed that he "brought off one hundred horses, two hundred and fifty stand of arms, with other articles of considerable value" [11].

The Americans had marched about a mile when a mounted British caught up to the rear of the column with a flag of truce, ostensibly to gain permission to bury their dead [12], but probably also to verify that the Americans were in fact retreating. Joseph McJunkin was near the rear of the column at this time, escorting the prisoners. Turning to Sumter he said, "You have through the Divine hand of Providence, achieved a great victory today." Sumter agreed, but ruefully noted that "it will scarcely ever be heard of, because we are nothing but a handful of raw militia, but if we had been commanded by a Continental officer it would have sounded loud to our honor" [13].

Sumter was correct: Hanging Rock was a remarkable battle, but destined to be mostly forgotten.

Notes:

1. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

2. For William Davie's account, see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1.

3. Cf. Davie, ibid., and Joseph McJunkin's account, in Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

4. McJunkin, ibid.

5. For example, among the Americans, Mark Jackson stated that "it being rumored that Tarleton’s Corps were coming we retreated." James Kincaid noted, "we failed of success by a reinforcement of the British Army from Rocky Mount but we marched off in order." Zachary Kitchens observed that "after a hard and long fight we retreated, upon being informed that a reinforcement was coming to the aid of the British." As for British commentators, the connection between the arrival of this reinforcement and the American retreat is made by Charles Stedman, Banastre Tarleton, and Anthony Allaire.

• The pension application of Mark Jackson, transcribed by Will Graves.
• The pension application of James Kincaid, transcribed by Will Graves.
• The pension application of Zachary Kitchens, transcribed by C. Leon Harris.
• Stedman, ibid.
• Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.
• Lyman Copeland Draper. (1881). King's Mountain and Its heroes: History of the Battle of King's Mountain. (Includes a transcription of Allaire's journal).

Other causes for the American retreat were mentioned previously.

6. Davie, ibid.

7. The British Legion had a regimental band. See the letter from Otho Williams to Dr. James McHenry, dated January 23, 1781, and summarized here.

8. Davie, ibid.

9. McJunkin, ibid. This cheer was recalled somewhat differently by others. According to Davie, ibid., "three cheers [were given] for the hero of America." Richard Winn claimed that Sumter "gathered his men and for victory three cheers was given by the true friends of America." For Richard Winn's account, see General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves.

10. Davie, ibid.

11. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

12. McJunkin, ibid.

13. McJunkin, ibid.

Battle of Hanging Rock 8

Part 8: An Ill-Timed Reinforcement

Previous: Bryan's Defeat

Next: Battle for the Center Camp

The Provincial regiments were not idle while Samuel Bryan’s North Carolina Volunteers were being assailed. In the camp of the Prince of Wales' American Regiment, a detachment of men was sent north towards the Loyalist militia and other Provincials [1]. In the center camp, the British Legion infantry and Royal North Carolina regiment were formed into a line of battle [2]. Also, Captain Kenneth McCulloch's company of British Legion infantry left the center camp to go to Bryan’s aid.

The Prince of Wales' American Regiment Responds (click to enlarge). A detachment is sent north towards the sound of battle.

McCulloch’s company was dispatched “on the first alarm,” and “they arrived on the eminence [where Bryan was encamped] just after the tories had left it” [3]. Here, the Provincials found the Americans in a state of complete disarray. Half of the men, including all of Davie’s dragoons, had scattered in pursuit of the Loyalists [4], while the remainder were taking guns and ammunition from the abandoned Loyalist camp [5].

McCulloch’s men struck the American center and left divisions [6], and “advanced firing in platoons” [7]. However, the attack was ineffective. The Americans “took to trees and rocks,” [8] and the British “overshot their opponents” [9]. The Americans formed “a half circle around the eminence,” and “by taking steady aim” “in a short time caused one third of them to fall” [10]. The Provincials “fell so fast by their unseen enemy that their officers were obliged to push them forward by their sabers” [11].

McCulloch Under Fire. Having gained Bryan's encampment, McCulloch's company confronts an arc of gunfire.

At last, McCulloch’s company broke. More of his men fell when the American left division “began to cut off their flank” [12]. The survivors “retreated to the main body,” all the while “briskly pursued by Sumpter’s men” [13]. Among the fallen, Joseph McJunkin recalled finding Captain McCulloch “near the Tory camp… begging for water” [14]. He would soon be dead [15]. Casualties in McCulloch’s company were so extensive that the company was subsequently removed from the rolls of the British Legion [16].

McCulloch's Defeat. While Bryan's Volunteers flee, McCulloch's lone company is destroyed by Sumter's militia. Some of the unit actions shown on this map will be described in subsequent posts. Bryan's men fled south and west; their flight, and the American pursuit, was less organized and more scattered than the arrows indicate. PoWAR = Prince of Wales' American Regiment.

Notes:

1. William Davie's account of the battle refers to "a part of Colonel Brown's Regiment." Likewise, Banastre Tarleton referred to the actions of "a detachment of Colonel Brown's regiment" [This is the Prince of Wales' American Regiment; emphasis mine]. The activities ascribed to the "part" or "detachment" are so distinct in the two accounts as to suggest that the regiment was divided into two parts early in the battle and that the two parts fought in different parts of the battlefield. One part, as will be seen, became engaged near Bryan's camp and was destroyed. The other part ended up fighting alongside the Legion infantry near the center camp and suffered only light casualties. Why would a division in the regiment have occurred? The most likely reason is that one part of the regiment was sent in the direction of the fighting when the battle began, while the remainder defended the regiment's encampment. More about the activities of this regiment will appear in upcoming posts.

For Davie's account of the battle, see The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. For Tarleton's account of the battle, see Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.

2. Inference based on comments made by Davie. Davie found these regiments in a defensive posture shortly after the events described in this post.

3. William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

4. William Hill claimed half of the men had pursued Bryan’s men “a considerable distance,” and could not “be brought off from the pursuit of the Tories,” before McCulloch arrived. See Alexander S. Salley. (1921). Col. William Hill's Memoirs of the Revolution. Graham, ibid., claimed that the dragoons were so scattered that they could not be collected again until late in the battle.

5. Joseph Johnson (1851). Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South.

6. The main commentators identified with these commands (Joseph Graham, Joseph McJunkin, and William Hill), described this attack in some detail. The main commentators with the right division (William Davie, Richard Winn) did not mention it.

7. Hill, ibid. Graham, ibid. also mentioned the firing by platoons.

8. Hill, ibid.

9. Graham, ibid.

10. Graham, ibid.

11. Hill, ibid.

12. Joseph McJunkin's account, in Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

13. Graham, ibid.

14. McJunkin, ibid. McJunkin also claimed that he “got a canteen out of the Tory camp… and gave him a drink.”

15. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.

16. Don Gara. Service summary of officers of the British Legion Infantry, sorted by troop. The only other officer of the Legion infantry to be killed during the battle was Lieutenant Ralph Cunningham of McCulloch’s company. See Don Gara. Biographical sketches of the infantry officers of the British Legion. (Retrieved February 19, 2010).

Battle of Hanging Rock 6

Part 6: Sumter's Night March to Hanging Rock

Previous: American Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Next: Bryan's Defeat

Thomas Sumter did not command enough men to simply overpower the British in the South Carolina Backcountry, and what men he had were deficient in arms and ammunition. Therefore, he chose to rely on surprise to give him an advantage over his opponents. The battle plan he developed for the attack on Hanging Rock was a repeat of that used at Rocky Mount. On both occasions, he sought to achieve surprise by making a night march to suddenly close with his target. Then, he planned to launch his attack at daybreak from multiple directions. Sumter's subordinates had also adopted this stratagem several weeks earlier at Williamson's Plantation.

The American plans at Williamson's Plantation and Rocky Mount were spoiled by an unexpected obstacle on the eve of the attack [1]. Hanging Rock would be no different. In this case, Sumter's men found the Catawba River to be unexpectedly difficult to cross. Sumter noted:

“I… began to pass the river on Saturday evening [i.e., August 5, 1780]. The rapidity of the current was so great I was not only much delayed, but met with considerable loss; however, [I] proceeded on.” [2].

Once across, Sumter proceeded with some caution. Scouts were dispatched in advance of Sumter’s column [3], and “two spies” had been placed in the British camp before Sumter made his march. During the night, these men stole their way north and reported their findings. They “claimed that “the British camp… did not exceed 300 and that their reinforcement sent to Rocky Mount had not returned” [4].

Armed with this good news, Sumter’s men made their final approach march. According to William Davie, the column “turned to the left of the road to avoid the enemy's piquet and patrol, with an intention to return to it under cover of a defile near the camp” [5].

Soon, the Americans could hear “the sound of horse bells” and see “the smoke settled along the valley of Hanging Rock Creek” [6]. “A whispering order came along the line that any might sit down with arms in hand to be ready” [7]. Sumter had wanted to attack at daybreak, but he claimed that “[I] was obliged to alter my mode of attack” because of the time it had taken during the night to get across the Catawba. Therefore, he “concealed” his men near the British camp, waiting for the British “to scatter” [8].

Both sides understood that early morning was an ideal time to launch a surprise attack. At Rocky Mount, George Turnbull kept his infantry under arms at daybreak, lest an attack should come. Sumter implies that by delaying the attack, the British relaxed and went about their daily routine.

While the Americans waited, they “took two Tories,” who claimed “that the reinforcement sent to Rocky Mount had returned” since the spies’ departure. This was very alarming news, and a council of war was held with Sumter and his principal commanders. Initial opinion was divided: “some for fighting others for retreating.” A consensus, however, was quickly achieved in favor of going forward because “no officer was willing to be out done by the other in bravery” [9].

What the Americans had learned, according to William Davie, was that the British were “pretty strongly posted in three divisions.” This force included “Regulars” [actually Provincials] “on the [American] right; a part of the British legion and Hamilton's Regiment were at some houses in the centre; and Bryan's Regiment, and other Loyalists some distance on the [American] left.”

Sumter downscaled the scope of the attack in view of this unwelcome news. Because the “three large encampments” were “so extensive,” “it was impossible to attack the whole at once.” Therefore, he wrote, “I proceeded against the most considerable of the Tory encampments and that of the British, which lay in the center” [10].

Sumter’s men would attack in three divisions. His left and center divisions would attack Samuel Bryan’s North Carolina Volunteers. The center division would attack in front, while the left division curled around to the rear [11]. These two divisions had “orders not to fire a gun” until the left division had “passed between the British and Tory lines to the extremities [i.e., the flank and rear] [12]. The Americans might not be able to seize the entire post, but the North Carolina Loyalists, at least, were going to get thrashed. Sumter’s right division was sent against the center camp [13]. If this force was unable to capture the center camp on its own, they would at least occupy the Provincials while Bryan’s men were slaughtered.

In order to maximize surprise, Sumter wanted his men to ride up to the camps and dismount in sight of the enemy. Davie claimed that “This plan was approved by all the officers” excepting himself. Davie “insisted on leaving the horses at this place and marching to the attack on foot, urging the confusion always consequent on dismounting under a fire, and the certainty of losing the effect of a sudden and vigorous attack. This objection was, however, overruled” [14].

Notes:

1. At Williamson's Plantation, the Americans were led to believe that the British were encamped at a neighboring plantation, which threw off somewhat the planned timing of the attack, and possibly cost them the services of some of their best men (See Richard Winn's account, in General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves). At Rocky Mount, the Americans unexpectedly ran into a detachment of the British Legion before they were in position to attack.

2. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780. The difficulty in crossing the river might be connected to the rain showers on July 30.

3. The pension application of Edward Rogers, transcribed by Will Graves. He recalled that “The night before the battle he got wounded while spying out the enemy's camp.”

4. Winn, ibid.

5. The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. There are some basic disagreements between the accounts of Thomas Sumter, Richard Winn, and William Davie on events during this time. Sumter’s and Winn’s accounts are fairly compatible, and as Sumter’s account is especially trustworthy, I side with them over Davie where there are disagreements.

6. William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

7. Joseph McJunkin's account of the battle, in Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

8. Sumter, ibid. McJunkin, ibid., recalled how he spent the time: “I and a fellow soldier sat down by a pine and both slept a little.”

9. Winn, ibid.

10. Sumter, ibid.

11. Inference based on statements by Winn and McJunkin

12. McJunkin, ibid.

13. Winn and Davie have the right division attacking the Provincials.

14. Davie, ibid. His apprehension may stem, in part, from the particularly dangerous undertaking assigned to his men (the right division).

Battle of Hanging Rock 5

Part 5: American Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Previous: British Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Next: Sumter's Night March to Hanging Rock

Thomas Sumter claimed that he had “Six hundred brave men,” [1] and other participant statements point to a similar total [2]. Not everyone in his command was armed or fought during the battle (among these was Andrew Jackson, future 7th president of the United States) [3]. The number of men who were engaged may have been closer to 540 [4]. Those who were armed were badly supplied with ammunition. It was thought that Sumter's men had no more than 5 [5] or 10 [6] bullets apiece.

Sumter divided his force into three parts, and each contained around 200 men. These divisions are henceforth referred to as the left, center, and right divisions, after their relative positions at the beginning of the battle. Possibly the left division was commanded by William Hill, the center by Robert Irwin, and the right by Richard Winn [7].

Left Division: Several small South Carolina militia regiments, including William Bratton’s regiment, Andrew Neal’s regiment (commanded by either Samuel Watson or William Hill [8]), Edward Lacey’s regiment (possibly commanded by John McClure [9]), and Joseph Brandon’s regiment (commanded by James Steen) [10]. Most of the men in these regiments had seen action before, including at Williamson’s Plantation and Rocky Mount. Of the men that fought in this division, Joseph McJunkin of Brandon’s regiment left a detailed description of the battle.

Center Division: A battalion of 200 North Carolina militiamen under the command of Robert Irwin [11]. These men hailed from Mecklenburg County. Of the men that fought in this division, Joseph Graham left a detailed description of the battle.

Right Division: Major William Davie’s troop of dragoons (70-80 men) [12], supported by a mixture of North and South Carolina militia units [13]. Of the men that fought in this division, William Davie and Richard Winn left detailed descriptions of the battle.

American Losses:

Thomas Sumter claimed that he lost 20 killed, 40 wounded, and 10 missing [14]. Other American participants gave lower figures, but their claims are less reliable. The 10 missing men were likely killed or wounded, but as the fighting took place over a wide area, they were not found by their comrades before the end of the battle. Among these was Matthew McClurkin, who "was severely wounded on the head... taken prisoner by the British troops... confined in jail and... sent to Charleston to be put aboard a prison ship." Fortunately, before arriving in Charleston, "he and the other prisoners overpowered the guard and made their escape" [15]

The British estimated American losses at about 100 [16].

Notes:

1. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

2. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot; Alexander S. Salley. (1921). Col. William Hill's Memoirs of the Revolution.

3. Augustus C. Buell. (1907). History of Andrew Jackson: Pioneer, Patriot, Soldier, Politician, President.

4. According to Joseph McJunkin. Richard Winn claimed that Sumter had 500 men with arms and another 200 without. The men without arms were left to take care of the horses, but later these men took up the arms of the killed and wounded and joined their comrades in the action.

Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11. General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves.

5. Hill, ibid.

6. William Gordon. (1801). The History of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment of the United States of America, Vol 3.

7. This description is based primarily on the account of William Davie. See The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. Davie identified Hill and Irwin with the left and center, respectively. Davie claimed he had command of the right division, but Richard Winn also claimed that role. Winn's claim seems more credible as he outranked Davie and had served with Sumter longer.

8. Andrew Neal was killed 7 days earlier at Rocky Mount. One Samuel Gordon of this regiment claimed that Samuel Watson took over after Neal was killed, whereas Thomas Lofton remembered Hill becoming his commander. See the pension application of Samuel Gordon, and the pension application of Thomas Lofton, both transcribed by Will Graves.

9. Joseph Gaston claimed that before Sumter's men crossed the Catawba River to attack Hanging Rock, "General Sumter ordered an election for general officers in the Chester Regiment." He claimed that John McClure was elected colonel, "Colonel E. Lacy having, at that time, become unpopular among the Chester Whigs." However, several accounts placed Lacey at the battle, suggesting either that Gaston was in error or that he was serving in some other capacity. See Joseph Gaston. (1836/1873). Joseph Gaston's Narrative. The Historical Magazine and Notes and Querries Concerning the Antiquities, History and Biography of America, Vol. 1.

10. Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11. Brandon's absence on this occasion is not explained in the available sources. Steen was his second in command.

11. William Davie, ibid. Letter from Allen J. Davie to Archibald D. Murphey, August 9, 1826.

12. Graham said 70; Hill, ibid., said 80. William Davie, ibid., placed his troop on the American right. For Graham, see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

13. William Davie, ibid. Winn, ibid., identified his regiment as one of the specific units.

14. Sumter, ibid.

15. The pension application of Matthew McClurkin, transcribed by Will Graves.

16. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

The Hanging Rock Battlefield - Part 1

What Did Participants Say about the Hanging Rock Battlefield?

The largest battle of Sumter's first campaign against British-occupied South Carolina was the bloody battle of Hanging Rock (August 6, 1780). As will be seen, Hanging Rock was a remarkable battle in a number of respects, but unfortunately, it has not received the kind of detailed treatment from historians that it deserves. One hindrance to a detailed account of the battle is that the exact site of the fighting is unknown. The topographical map below (click to enlarge) shows four locales linked to the battlefield during the 19th Century. All are on or near Hanging Rock Creek, south of the present-day town of Heath Springs, South Carolina.

Briefly, Heath Springs is at the top of the map. Flat Rock Road (or State Road S-29-15) runs north to south. Hanging Rock Creek flows from the top left of the map down to the bottom right.

Locations on the map:

1. "Hanging Rock" -- a peculiar rock formation which lent its name to both the creek and the general area. It has long been believed that the battle took place not far from this rock formation. However, to the best of my knowledge, no account has claimed that the fighting actually occurred on this spot.

2. Site of the Hanging Rock battlefield, as indicated by Mills' 1825 Atlas of the State of South Carolina.

3. Site of the Hanging Rock battlefield, as indicated by Mills' 1825 map of Kershaw District, South Carolina.

4. The approximate site of Cole's Old Field. Benjamin Lossing, in his Field Book of the Revolution, Volume 2 (1850) visited the Hanging Rock battlefield, and noted that "Along a by-road, across the high rolling plain upon which (at Coles’s Old Field) tradition avers the hottest of the battle was fought." The farm of one "Colly" is shown in James Cook's 1773 A Map of the Province of South Carolina...

Lossing's sketch of Hanging Rock.

A complicating factor is that when Sumter attacked the British post at Hanging Rock, the British were encamped in three distinct position (e.g., William Davie wrote that the British "were pretty strongly posted in three different encampments the British Regulars... were encamped on the right, a part of the British Legion and Hamiltons regiment at some Houses in the centre, and Bryan's regiment with the other Loyalists... some distance on the left.") A complete treatment of the battle should identify the location of each of these camps.

In the next few posts I will consider the location of each encampment. Later, I will use this information to describe, in considerable detail, how I believe the battle of Hanging Rock was fought. In identifying the location of the Hanging Rock battlefield, I relied mainly on statements made by participants in the battle; an exception is that I was also influenced by Benjamin Lossing's mid-19th Century description of the battlefield. Below are ten clues about the location of the British camps appearing in these sources.

1) The three camps were on elevations. Thomas Sumter claimed that "The enemy had three large encampments... all upon exceeding advantageous hights."

2) Colonel Samuel Bryan and his North Carolina volunteers were encamped on the right of the British position. William Davie wrote that before the battle, "the army turned to the left of the road... the guides... led them so far to the left, that... [Sumter's whole force ran up against] the Tory encampment." This statement indicates that Bryan's men were on the right of the British position. Davie also wrote that when Bryan was attacked, the British attempted to support him by making "a movement to their right."

In a seeming contradiction of this description, Davie also wrote that "the British Regulars... were encamped on the right, a part of the British Legion and Hamiltons regiment at some Houses in the centre, and Bryan's regiment with the other Loyalists... some distance on the left." However, he doesn't indicate in this passage whether he is referring to his left and right or that of the British. If he meant his left and right, then there is no discrepancy.

3) Bryan's men were encamped on a steeply-sloped hill bordering a creek (presumably, Hanging Rock Creek). William Hill wrote that the Americans "had to march across a water course & climb a steep cliff" to attack Bryan. William Davie wrote that "a Creek with a deep ravine covered the whole front of the Tory camp." Richard Winn recorded that Bryan's men were "On the top of a big hill."

4) Bryan's men were encamped south and west of Hanging Rock Creek, near the "Hanging Rock." Joseph McJunkin stated that Bryan's regiment was "to the South of Hanging Rock creek." Benjamin Lossing recorded that "Bryan’s corps [was] on the verge of the western bank of the creek, near the Great Rock."

5) The hill on which Bryan was encamped curved in one place at nearly a 90-degree angle. Joseph McJunkin stated that the hill formed "something like a half moon or a workman's square." Joseph Gaston recalled, "The enemy's lines [i.e., Bryan's men on the hill] were extended from a point at right angles."

6) To the left of Bryan's position there was a swampy patch of ground. Thomas Sumter wrote that while the Americans were attacking Bryan, the British sent "a Colum to support Bryant, who, through a swamp, found means to turn my Right flank." Samuel Saxon stated that "a body of British had taken up a position near that of the Tories separated from them by a marsh."

7) Bryan's camp was about 1/4 to 1/2 mile from the center camp. Edward Doyle claimed, "the British Troops were stationed about four hundred yards from the Tories." William Hill claimed that "the British camp [was] about one quarter of a mile from this Tory camp." Joseph Graham noted that "the British [were] near a quarter of a mile distant" from Bryan's men. Joseph Gaston recalled that "From that [Bryan's] post, the British lay about a quarter of a mile." Matthew McClurkin claimed that "the British soldiers [were] encamped about half a mile from the place where the Tories were attacked." Richard Winn claimed that the British were "about half [a] Mile from where Brian was posted." Benjamin Lossing wrote that Bryan’s corps... [was] half a mile from the British camp."

8) The Provincials were encamped, in part, on or near "Cole's Old Field." Richard Winn wrote that the British were "in an Open Old field." Private Thomas Gill said that he "marched to the hanging rock Coles old fields where he was in another battle with the British & Tories." Lossing claimed that "the main body [of troops were] stationed upon the plain at Coles’s Old Field." [cf. #4 in the above map]

9) The Provincials were encamped on or near the Camden Road [i.e., today's Flat Rock Road]. Joseph McJunkin stated that "the British were... encamped in Camden road." William Davie claimed that the Provincials in the center camp were "at some Houses."

10) More than 1/4 mile separated the center camp from the left camp. During the battle, the British were forced to give up their center camp; they fell back on their third camp, which they successfully defended. Joseph Graham, describing this retreat, noted that the British first retreated "about 300 yards where they rallied," and then "they were compelled gradually to give ground 200 yards further." Presumably, the third camp was not far behind this final position.

The "high rolling plain" at Hanging Rock. This image previously appeared in the post Touring the Revolution with Google Earth.

Sources:

William R. Davie. The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie. [excerpt]

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Edward Doyle. (.pdf file).

Joseph Gaston. (1873). A reminiscence of the war of the revolution, in South Carolina. The Historical Magazine..., Vol 2.

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of Thomas Gill. (.pdf file).

The website, The Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, hosted by the University of North Carolina, includes a transcription of a letter from Joseph Graham to Archibald D. Murphey, March 9, 1821.

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Benson John Lossing. (1860). Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution (Vol. 2).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Matthew McClurkin. (.pdf file).

Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

The website, The Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, hosted by the University of North Carolina, includes a transcription of a Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Sumter's Brigade Forms

[Minor edits May 2, 2010]

As the British overran the South Carolina Backcountry in June, 1780, scattered bands of American militia coalesced just across the border in North Carolina. A number of militia commanders convened and elected one of their number, Thomas Sumter, as their "brigade" commander [see Note 1].

Sumter had been the colonel of the 6th South Carolina regiment, but he resigned his commission and returned to private life in 1778. The virtual elimination [see Note 2] of the commanders of the South Carolina Continental line at the siege of Charleston, elevated Sumter from has-been to one of the most important men in the state. Knowing that he was a wanted man, Sumter fled to North Carolina in May, 1780.

Sumter has attracted some rather remarkable character sketches.

Here is Henry Lee describing Sumter in his postwar history:

"He was not over scrupulous as a soldier in his use of means, and apt to make considerable allowances for a state of war. Believing it warranted by the necessity of the case, he did not occupy his mind with critical examinations oi' the equity of his measures, or of their bearings on individuals; but indiscriminately pressed forward to his end—the destruction of his enemy and liberation of his country. In his military character he resembled Ajax; relying more upon the fierceness of his courage than upon the results of unrelaxing vigilance and nicely adjusted combination. Determined to deserve success, he risked his own life and the lives of his associates without reserve. Enchanted with the splendor of victory, he would wade in torrents of blood to attain it. This general drew about him the hardy sons of the upper and middle grounds; brave and determined like himself, familiar with difficulty, and fearless of danger."

Here is John Buchanan in the modern history, The Road to Guilford Courthouse:

"Thomas Sumter (1734-1832) is not a sympathetic character. Wearing his ego on his shoulder, he had few peers as a prima donna and could spot a slight, intended or not, around a corner. He was careless with security and lives. His penchant for bloody and repeated frontal assaults was unnecessarily costly and finally led one officer to swear to Sumter's face and before others that never again would he serve under the Gamecock. But of all his partisan foes, Lord Cornwallis considered Sumter the most troublesome and obstinate. Thomas Sumter was a fighter who kept alive the flame of resistance and acted as a beacon for like-minded men at a time when others believed all was lost..."

Buchanan's claims that Sumter "was careless with security and lives," and that he had a "penchant for bloody and repeated frontal assaults" that were "unnecessarily costly," rest on events occurring during the battles of Rocky Mount, Hanging Rock, and Fishing Creek. To anticipate my coverage of these battles in the months ahead, my description will suggest that Sumter behaved imprudently on each of these occasions, but otherwise it will be much less critical [see Note 3].

The date of Sumter's election is usually given as June 15 (cf. Buchanan's history and Robert Bass' biography of Sumter). However, some of the participants in this event remembered the election being held on June 19, or the day before the battle of Ramsour's Mill. I haven't examined this discrepancy well enough to form an opinion on its cause. Several descriptions of the election are quoted below. Note that on June 20, Sumter's newly-organized brigade sought to join in the attack against Loyalist forces at Ramsour's Mill, but because of poor communication between the various American militia forces, they only arrived on the battlefield some hours after the fighting had ended.

Colonel Richard Winn [see Note 4] wrote after the war that: [T]he next day Arrive at Genl Rutherford's Camp near Charlotte in No. Carolina where I found 44 of the So. Carolinians in the Same Situation of myself[.] [W]e got together and held a Consultation, notwithstanding the Smallness of Our No. [I]t was unanimously Agreed on to oppose the British & Tories under Expectation when the panick [sic, panic] of the people was over many would Join us, [T]he next Question was who Should Command[.] Capt. R Winn was Chosen without a Desenting Voice, Capt. Winn obsd. that Colo Sumter was on the ground An Old Experienced Officer[.] [H]e shorely [sic, surely] was the most proper person to take the Command, for the memd [?] this was Objected too, however it was Agreed on that Colo Patton & Capt. Winn should without delay Consult the Colo on the Subject[.] [A]fter some Converstation and Explination Colo Sumter Accepted the nomination and the Next day Set Out with his party on Horse back and made a forced March to Reinforce Colo. Lock in Order to Attack a body of about 1000 Tories who had Collected at Ramsowers Mill in No. Carolina on the So. fork of Catawba under their leader Colo Moore, however Colo Sumter did not Arrive untill the Action was over..."

Captain Samuel Otterson recalled that "On the day after the election, we marched toward the house of a celebrated Tory by the name of Ramsour for the purpose of defeating some Tories who had encamped at Ramsour's mill, but before we arrived, the Militia from Rowan, N. Carolina had defeated the Tories."

Captain Joseph McJunkin [see Note 5] recalled that "...we unanimously chose Col. Thos. Sumter to be our leader or General, to lead us to face the Enemy, &... Sumter joined Rutherford that day, & [we]... could hardly be constrained from proceeding that evening to attack the above Tories; but Rutherford would not consent for him to start until next morning, him & men, all anxious to meet the Enemy, started by time, & posted on with all possible speed, but the distance being too great, our hero & his party did not get to the place of action until it was over.

It has been supposed, by some authors, that all of Sumter's regimental commanders were present at his election. Winn, however, claimed that there were only 44 men with Sumter at the time, exclusive of those in his own command. Sumter's brigade is known to have grown steadily after Ramsour's Mill until it numbered in the hundreds by late July. Perhaps some of the regiments that fought with Sumter in July and August attached themselves to his brigade after its initial formation. William Hill is one of the American commanders credited with helping to elect Sumter, but in my reading of his postwar memoir, quoted below, he and Andrew Neal retained an independent command at the time, and did not join Sumter's brigade until after Ramsour's Mill.

"About this time [i.e., shortly after the battle of Hill's Ironworks of June 17 or 18, 1780], I was informed that Col. Sumter was then in Salisbury with a few men waiting for a reinforcement — I then wrote to him, informing him of our situation & that there was a probability of our making a handsome stand — and that we were about to form a junction with Genl. Rutherfd. in N. Cara. that we were going to attack a large body of Tories that had collected at a place called Ramsour's Mill — But so it was that a detached party of about 300 horse from Genl Ruthd. attacked the Tory camp said to be upwards of a 1000 men, killed & dispersd. the whole — and then it was that Col. Sumter met with us from So. Ca. He then got authority from the civil & military authority of that State to impress or take waggons horses, provisions of all kinds, from the enemy that was in that action — & to give a receipt to that state for the same —"

The victory at Ramsour's Mill and the arrival in North Carolina of a large force of Maryland and Delaware Continentals commanded by Major-General Johann de Kalb gave the Americans the initiative.

Sumter's brigade would play a major role in the campaign that followe. In late June, Sumter moved his forces into the lands of the Catawba Nation, giving the Americans a toehold in South Carolina. The value of this position was more psychological than military. The Americans were badly lacking in provisions, arms, and ammunition. In early July, most of the brigade was temporarily disbanded. As the big American push into South Carolina would not occur before August, Sumter's men were given an opportunity to see to their farms and families and obtain supplies from home before the campaign began. Sumter himself returned to North Carolina in search of supplies.

Notes:

1. South Carolina Governor John Rutledge commissioned Sumter as brigadier general in October, 1780; because the election had no official standing, he is referred to in various sources as both a colonel and a general during the preceding summer.

2. A notable exception was Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Marion of the 2nd South Carolina regiment, who had been injured prior to the siege.

3. I'm also inclined to be less praiseworthy of Sumter. Buchanan implied that American resistance in the Backcountry somehow would have collapsed without Sumter. However, the accounts of Winn, Hill, and others make clear that a serious resistance to the British was organized in a number of places and before Sumter attained a prominent position. It seems likely that these various commands would have coalesced without Sumter -- just under a different leader. If participant accounts are to believed, there was no shortage of talented and determined officers in Sumter's brigade.

4. Richard Winn is credited as being colonel of the Fairfield militia regiment at this time (see J. D. Lewis' South Carolina military organization (or lack thereof): June 1, 1780, for a reconstruction). He calls himself captain in this account, but notes that "Capt. Winn begun to Rank as a Colonel" in early July.

5. Major Joseph McJunkin was frequently cited in my Cowpens project; McJunkin held the rank of captain during the summer of 1780.

Sources:

Robert Duncan Bass. (1961). Gamecock: The Life and Campaigns of General Thomas Sumter.

John Buchanan. (1997). The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas.

Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11.

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Otterson. (.pdf file).

Henry Lee. (1812). Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

Cowpens in Miniature 25

Part 25: The Battle Ends

Previous: The Last Gambit

At the time that Tarleton and the remnants of the British cavalry fled the battlefield, it was still morning. For many of the Americans, the remainder of the day would be spent in pursuit of the British. The Continentals would not return to the battlefield until the evening.

The main body of British Legion dragoons were in the foremost of the retreat. When they reached the British baggage train, according to Lieutenant Mackenzie, the British guards soon mounted the wagon horses and retreated after them. After their departure, some Americans began arriving on the scene and began raiding the baggage train. Tarleton noted that his group, the last of the British to flee the battlefield, came up behind and attacked "a party of the Americans, who had seized upon the baggage of the British troops on the road." In the official British report, Tarleton "retook the Baggage of the Corps, & cut to pieces the detachment of the Enemy who had taken possession of it."

Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie disputed Tarleton’s characterization of it describe this event. Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard believed that "Baron Glaubeck… with some five or six militia men… had taken the baggage," but when Tarleton’s band arrived, "he was obliged to leave." Howard did not refer to British losses; however, one of the raiders, militiaman Thomas Young, described running into Tarleton’s group while returning to camp and being severely injured by them [see Note 1].

Meanwhile, on the battlefield, according to Major Joseph McJunkin, "You might have seen some five or six hundred tall, brawny, well clad soldiers, the flower of the British Army, guarded by a set of militia clad in hunting shirts ‘blacked, smoked and greasy.’"

McJunkin also recalled that "The plain was strewn with the dead and dying." But at least "The number of the slain on the side of the Americans was inconsiderable compared with that of the Enemy." Private James Collins remembered that "After the fight was over, the sight was truly melancholy." Remembrance of the scene was also persevered in local lore. Obadiah Haggis, a mid-19th Century visitor to the battlefield, learned of "A woman who lived 2 miles away… [that] When the firin’ stopped and she knowed which side had whipt, she ventured to the place, with the rest of the neighborhood, and found the place all covered with dead people."

Those men that had pursued the British slept on the battlefield that night, and in Lieutenant Thomas Anderson’s words, "lay amongst the Dead & Wounded Very Well pleased With Our days Work."

Losses:

One of the more difficult questions to address in connection with the battle of Cowpens concerns how many British and American soldiers were killed, wounded, or captured. Quite a few participants commented on losses, but their claims are not particularly trustworthy for the reason that they are typically reporting on what they heard others claim rather than on what they personally witnessed.

The numbers of Americans killed or wounded are stated in most histories to be quite few, about 72 in number, and they refer to a seemingly unimpeachable source: Morgan’s official report of the battle. Lawrence Babits, writing in A Devil of a Whipping, claimed to have a list of 128 Americans known to have been killed or wounded based on a number of different sources, including pension applications [see Note 2].

I’m inclined to believe that the number was higher, but for a different reason. Consider carefully Morgan’s language (see Morgan's Report). He said first, "Our loss is inconsiderable, which the enclosed return will evince. I have not been able to ascertain Col. Pickens loss, but know it to be very small" [see Note 3].

Then in a postscript he added, "Our loss was very inconsiderable, not having more than twelve killed and about sixty wounded." Notice, however, that he previously defined "our loss" as something different than Pickens’ loss. Therefore, the 72 casualties is arguably limited to the force he took with him from North Carolina: Howard’s battalion of Continentals, Washington’s regiment of dragoons, and Triplett’s battalion of Virginia militia.

If 72 is an "inconsiderable" number, then Pickens’ "very small" loss would likely be something a bit less, say around 50. This produces a total loss in the neighborhood of 120, or near Babits’ number.

Sergeant Major William Seymour recorded in his journal that "Our loss in the action were one Lieutenant wounded, and one Sergeant, and thirty-five killed and wounded, of which fourteen were of Captain Kirkwood's Company of the Delaware Regiment." In this case, "our loss" would seem to mean something different than it did in Morgan’s report. It’s possible that he is describing only the losses sustained by Howard’s Continentals (which included Kirkwood’s company). When Morgan’s and Seymour’s statements are combined, American losses would have included 37 men in Howard’s Continentals (about 13% of the battalion), of which 14 men were lost in Kirkwood’s company (23% of the company; see Note 4). This leaves about 35 men lost between Washington’s dragoons and Triplett’s Virginians (about 14% of those commands). These numbers are not unreasonable, and they are reflected in the four miniature casualties on the battlefield (again, the representation is 1:20).

I also placed on the battlefield three miniature casualties representing around 50 killed and wounded between the various detachments of Georgia and Carolina militia attached to Morgan’s army (about 12% of those forces, not including the baggage guard and other detachments). One casualty was placed on the militia line, another with the militia charged by Ogilvie, and the last with the militia charged by Nettles.

For the American army, exclusive of detachments, losses are estimated to have been in the neighborhood of 13% (~120 out of ~950 participants).

Quite a few sources provide an estimate of British casualties. All agree that British losses were considerable. The exact number given, however, differs widely from one source to another. An exact count of the British killed and wounded was not performed, and most sources report their impression of British losses or what had been related to them by others.

The Americans did not linger long on the battlefield. Morgan was concerned that the British army under Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis would soon advance on him in an effort to free the British prisoners. Morgan, did, however, have an officer ride over the battlefield and do a rough count of British losses. Subsequently, Morgan stated in his report of the battle that the British had 10 officers and 100 or so rank and file killed, and 200 or so wounded. A total in the low 300s is also suggested by subtracting from total British strength the number of unwounded prisoners captured by the time Morgan filed his report, a number of infantry and cavalry that were captured after the report was filed, a small contingent of infantry that escaped capture, and the British Legion dragoons and 17th Light Dragoons that escaped wounding or capture. Therefore, I have placed 16 miniature British casualties on the battlefield. A number of American sources pegged British losses higher than Morgan, but those claims are generally less trustworthy.

For the British army, exclusive of the baggage train detachment, losses are estimated to have been around 29% (~320 out of ~1,115 participants).

In addition to the killed and wounded, the British lost large numbers of prisoners to the Americans. Morgan indicated that 531 were captured soon after the battle (some others were captured after Morgan wrote his report). For reasons that I will not wholly recount, it appears that a certain portion of Tarleton’s infantry escaped capture during the battle, but some of these men were captured later. It also appears that while almost all of Tarleton’s cavalry escaped capture during the battle, some of these men were also captured afterwards (notably, the British Legion lost 277 rank and file around the time of the battle; far too many to be accounted for by infantry losses alone). Samuel Otterson recalled how some of the Legion dragoons were captured by the American militia. Others were likely taken by William Washington’s dragoons during the pursuit. Some of the Americans must have been mounted on faster horses than some of the British, especially as the latter had made an all-night march to reach the battlefield.

Notes:

1. Howard’s acknowledgement that the Americans were forced to withdraw is the only acknowledgement on the American side that such an encounter took place. However, American participants were more likely to recall triumphs rather than setbacks, and it’s possible that there were some American casualties (aside from Young). That’s not to suggest, however, that Tarleton’s description is without exaggeration. Young’s vivid description of his wounding and capture is worth reading, but it is not recounted here.

2. Babits also suggested that the actual number may have been even higher, because these records did not cover all participants and because of an ambiguous document in the archives of the state of North Carolina [a transcription of which can be found here].

Conversely, counting the losses mentioned in pension applications may overstate the number of American killed or wounded as the information in the pension applications may in some cases be inaccurate. It’s possible, even likely that some of the claims about having been present at the battle and even wounded there were in error.

3. I have not seen a transcription of this return, but I suspect it is extant. Babits alluded to it in recounting American losses.

4. There are quite a few reasons for why Kirkwood’s losses exceeded those of the other companies. I show in the maps (although not in the miniature representation) one of the two three-pounders lined up with Kirkwood’s company during the British advance against the American main line. One or more salvos of grapeshot could have led to significantly higher casualties. William Seymour’s journal gives Kirkwood’s company a leading role in the American counterattack. It’s possible they sustained greater losses in the subsequent melee than did other companies. Henry Wells’ account suggests that Kirkwood’s company was also attacked during the final British cavalry charge; perhaps other companies were not.

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Mackenzie's and Tarleton's accounts of the battle.

A transcription of the British after action report, written by Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, can be found here.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Howard, McJunkin, Collins, Anderson among others.

Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South has Young's account of the battle.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes a review by Will Graves of McJunkin's statements.

Edwin Bearss' 1974 Historic Grounds and Resource Study (.pdf file) has a transcription of Obadiah Haggis' description of an 1857 visit to the Cowpens battlefield, in which Haggis related some local lore about the battle.

Lawrence Babits' 1998 A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can be found on this Battle of Camden website.

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782 has a comparison of British rank and file returns before and after the battle of Cowpens.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Otterson (.pdf).

Will Graves trancribed the pension application of Henry Wells (.pdf file).

Related: How Many Fought at Cowpens?, Morgan and Seymour, The British Legion

Cowpens in Miniature 23

Part 23: Surrender

Previous: Flight

Next: The Last Gambit

The flight of the British Legion dragoon reserve meant that the American counterattack would not be checked. François-Jean de Chastellux noted that the British Legion "fled full gallop, without ever thinking of the infantry, or taking the least precaution to cover their retreat."

The infantry struggled to fend for themselves as all order broke down. Daniel Morgan reported that "The enemy's whole force were now bent solely in providing for their safety in flight." Sergeant-Major William Seymour happily observed that the British "retreated off, leaving us entire masters of the field." From writing from a British perspective, David Stewart gloomily concurred, "the rout Was general; few of the infantry escaped; and of the cavalry, who put their horses to full speed, not a man was taken."

Not all of the British troops attempted to flee, however. The remnant of the 17th Light Dragoons stayed on the field, although they had been, in Cornet James Simons words, "deserted by Colo. Tarleton's Legeonary Cavalry." Tarleton also remained behind. When the Legion dragoons could not be rallied, he remained with the 17th Light Dragoons and a handful of others on horseback, near the Green River Road. George Hanger claimed that "He stood almost alone, between his flying troops and the enemy, with hopes either of rallying his own men, or not surviving their disgrace." This small force offered at least some protection for his retreating infantry, which had, in American Thomas Young’s words, thrown "down their guns and cartouch boxes, made for the wagon road, and did the prettiest sort of running!"

The presence of the American cavalry in the rear of the British infantry severely limited their options to escape.

Cornet James Simons stated in a letter to William Washington long after the battle that "In pursuit of their Cavalry [i.e., the 17th Light Dragoons] you overtook their Artillery, whom you immediately made prisoners." Howard convincingly claimed that the guns were taken by his own infantry [see Note 1], but it’s possible that the cavalry encountered at least the horse-drawn limbers. Simon went on to relate that "the Drivers of the Horses who were Galloping off with 2-3 pounders, you could not make Surrender until after Repeated Commands from you, you were obliged to order to be Shot; after securing these fieldpieces."

Letting the 17th go, the American then turned on the British infantry. According to Simons "your third Charge was made on the right wing of their Army… who, under the Operation of a Universal panic, (having been successfully charged on the left of their Army by our friend Col. Howard) instantly surrendered" [see Note 2]. Major Joseph McJunkin remembered also the key role played by the American cavalry, "Washington darts before them with his cavalry and they too ground their arms [see Note 3].

The British infantry was certainly not going to outrun the American cavalry; frequently they could not outrun the American infantry.

Mackenzie wrote that "the infantry were easily overtaken, as the cause which had retarded the pursuit [i.e., exhaustion], had now an equal effect in impeding the retreat: dispirited on many accounts, they surrendered at discretion." De Chastellux agreed, "Fatigued by a very long march, they were soon overtaken."

Even the militia that had survived Nettles’ attack was able to contribute to this final assault on the British right. According to Private James Collins, "We… advanced briskly, and gained the right flank of the enemy, and they being hard pressed in front, by Howard, and falling very fast, could not stand it long.

Surrender (click to enlarge). Closely pressed by American Continentals and militia, and their retreat cut off by the American cavalry, most of the British infantry throw down their arms (not shown). Meanwhile, Tarleton stands "almost alone, between his flying troops and the enemy."

American Cavalryman Thomas Young, seeing the British line collapse so utterly noted that at this time, "Major Jolly and seven or eight of us, resolved upon an excursion to capture some of the baggage" [see Note 4]. Tarleton may have seen these men, but he evidently did not interfere with them. He retained his toehold on the battlefield.

Around the same time, that the Americans were mopping up the right side of the British line, the British left was also in complete collapse. Lieutenant-Colonel Howard recalled that "In the pursuit, I was led towards the [American] right, in among the 71st, who were broken into squads. They no longer offered serious resistance. William Moultrie claimed that "So great was the consternation in which the British infantry were, at seeing their cavalry gallop off, that, either from pique or panic, numbers of them never fired a gun."

Howard recalled that "I called to them [the 71st Foot] to surrender, they laid down their arms, and the officers delivered up their swords." Major McJunkin was also immediately present and remembered that "some begin to call for quarters," when "the voice of Howard is heard amid the rush of men and clangor of steel: ‘Throw down your arms and you shall have good quarters.’ When they were finally "convinced that quarters would be given, they as it were rent the very air with thanks that their lives would be spared. These were called the Scots regiment" [see Note 5].

All-in-all, according to William Moultrie, "upwards of five hundred laid down their arms, and surrendered themselves prisoners. The first battalion of the seventy-first, and two companies of light infantry, laid down their arms." The 71st surrendered on the British left; the two companies of light infantry (perhaps Moultrie meant the light infantry of the 16th and 71st regiments) were perhaps the last organized resistance on the British right.

Several anecdotes concerning the surrender of the 71st Foot have been preserved in participant accounts. McJunkin stated that "In the conclusion of this foray you might have seen Major [James] Jackson of Georgia rush among the broken ranks of the 71st Regiment and attempting to seize their standard, while they are vainly trying to form by it; you might have seen Col. Howard interposing for the relief of his friend when entangled among his foes" [see Note 6].

Howard related that one "Captain Duncanson, of the 71st grenadiers [see Note 7], gave me his sword, and stood by me. Upon getting on my horse, I found him pulling at my saddle, and he nearly unhorsed me. I expressed my displeasure, and asked him what he was about. The explanation was, that they had orders to give no'quarter, and they did not expect any; and as my men were coming up, he was afraid they would use him ill. I admitted his excuse, and put him into the care of a sergeant. I had messages from him for some years afterwards, expressing his obligation for my having saved his life."

Major Arthur McArthur, who commanded the first battalion of the 71st attempted to escape on horseback, but he was overridden by one or more mounted Americans. Who captured him is unclear. Colonel Andrew Pickens claimed that, "Major McCarthur surrendered to me, some distance from the battlefield & delivered his sword to me," while Major Jackson wrote that McArthur was "a prisoner on that occasion taken by myself" [emphasis in original].

Notes:

1. Morgan also implicitly credited Howard with capturing the guns in his official report of the battle. Howard, Morgan reported, "gave orders for the line to charge bayonets, which was done with such address that they [the British] fled with the utmost precipitation leaving their fieldpieces in our possession."

2. The excised text includes that "the right wing of their Army Composed of their Legeonary Infantry, intermixed with the Battallion of the Brave 71st (under the Command of Major McArthur,)" The 71st Foot was neither a part of the right wing of their army nor next to the British Legion infantry. Perhaps he was thinking of the light infantry companies of the 71st Foot, who were on hand.

3. The full text reads "One battalion throws down their arms and the men fall to the earth. Another commences flight, but Washington darts before them with his cavalry and they too ground their arms." McJunkin recognized that the British line had broken into two parts. The battalion that "throws down their arms" is the 71st, the other "battalion" is the British right. McJunkin was personally involved at this time in the fight against the 71st; he did not seem to realize or remember that the British right included several commands.

4. Howard mentions Morgan’s aide, Baron de Glaubeck leading "five or six militia men well mounted," on this excursion. McJunkin related that "After the surrender of the British infantry a company of fourteen dashed off to take possession of the British baggage wagons ten miles distant. Major Benjamin Jolly and a Frenchman called De Barron headed this party. It happened to pass Col. Tarleton while he was collecting his men after the retreat. Unconscious of this fact, they pressed on in comparative security."

Other individuals may have also made a mounted pursuit. Militiaman Hugh McNary claimed that he joined in the pursuit "when the Enemy first gave way." Whether the rest of his company was mounted or on foot, he "got far enough ahead of his company to stop a British officer, the officer surrendered, deponent [i.e., McNary] dismounted and took from the officer his Holsters and pistols, and after getting them, he discovered, that his company had stopped pursuit and were retreating back, he mounted his horse and returned leaving the British officer, but took the Holsters and pistols which he afterwards sold."

5. Several American sources seemed impressed by the restraint they showed on this occasion (implicitly in contrast with what happened on other battlefields). Morgan reported that "It, perhaps, would be well to remark, for the honor of the American arms, that although the progress of this [Tarleton’s] corps was marked with burning and devastation, and although they waged the most cruel warfare, not a man was killed, wounded, or even insulted, after he surrendered."

6. Major James Jackson confirmed this episode: "[I ran] the utmost risk of my life, in an attempt to seize the colors of the 71st regiment in the midst of it, on their attempt to form after they were broken, being saved by an exertion of Col. Howard’s." The 71st Foot did not carry its colors into the battle. The 7th Foot did have its colors, one of which was captured by an American militiaman (see 7th Regiment of Foot). This account may describe that capture.

7. The two battalions of the 71st Foot had, between them, two companies of light infantry, and two companies of grenadiers. The former were at the battle of Cowpens, the latter were not. The 71st's grenadiers were captured at the battle of Stony Point in 1779. That Captain Duncanson would have been at Cowpens indicates that he was 1) absent during the battle of Stony Point, 2) at that battle, but subsequently exchanged, or 3) captured at Stony Point, but released on parole. If Duncanson had violated his parole, he was liable to be hanged.

Sources:

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report, and a copy of Jackson's letters.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can be found on this Battle of Camden website.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

Thomas Balch's 1857 Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution has Simons' letter to William Washington. His book can be downloaded from this site.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Hanger's, and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Young, McJunkin, Collins, Howard, and Pickens, among others.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes a review by Will Graves of McJunkin's statements. McJunkin's description of the raid on the baggage train can be found here.

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Hugh McNary (.pdf file).

Related: 71st Foot, The American Cavalry - Part 1, The American Cavalry - Part 2

Cowpens in Miniature 19

Part 19: “A Close and Murderous Fire”

Previous: The Third Crisis

Next: Washington and Howard Charge

As the Continentals about-faced and moved off in retreat, the British infantry surged towards them, cheering and wielding their bayonets. According to Henry Lee, "Considering this retrograde movement the precursor of flight, the British line rushed on with impetuosity and disorder." It was fortunate for the Americans that their commanders kept a cool head at this interval and marked out a spot where their men would halt and renew the fight. It was fortunate too that the American rank and file did not realize that the retreat was in error. Morgan and Howard acted "as if the retrograde movement had been really preconcerted" [see Note 1].

The British infantry were near the Continentals, and perhaps closing the distance with the Continentals, but the British could not overtake them. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie complained that "The infantry were not in condition to overtake the fugitives" [see Note 2]. The British, more so than the Americans "had been in motion day and night" in the days leading up to the battle. "A number [of the British]… had already fallen… fatigue, however, enfeebled the pursuit, much more than loss of blood… the infantry, though well disposed, were unable to come up with his [Howard’s] corps [see Note 3].

Lieutenant-Colonel John Eager Howard, in command of this battalion commented that "This retreat was accidental but was very fortunate as we thereby were extricated from the enemy."

They had fallen back approximately 100 yards [see Note 4], wheeling to their right during the retreat [see Note 5].

The Continentals Halt (click to enlarge).

At this point, according to Howard, "The enemy were now very near us." The distance may have been less than 30 yards [see Note 6].

Howard gave the command "to halt and face about." And with that "the line was perfectly formed in a moment."

For the pursuing British, here was a great shock. One moment they were on the verge of vanquishing their enemy, the next they were eye-to-eye with a wall of infantry.

There was a moment’s pause, and then the next command was given.

According to Anderson, we "then give them a full Volley."

This volley can be regarded as the climatic moment of the battle, an instant that both sides recognized as a turning point. The American after action report stated that we "gave them a fortunate volley, which threw them into disorder." The British after action report echoed this remark "General Morgan's Corps faced about & gave them [the British troops] a heavy fire. This unexpected event, occasioned the utmost confusion" [see Note 7].

A Fatal Volley (click to enlarge).

Henry Lee observed that the British were "Stunned by this unexpected shock," and "the most advanced of the enemy recoiled in confusion." The Americans, for their part, did not relent. The Continentals, in Howard’s words, gave the British "a few rounds" of "a very destructive fire."

Meanwhile, the British were also inflicting heavy losses, but on the American militia.

Major Joseph McJunkin stated that during the battle, "Tarleton… made a charge on the right & left wings, treading & cutting till he got in the rear of Howard's command." The first attack, by Ogilvie, had already been repulsed. The second one, by Lieutenant Henry Nettles and the 17th Light Dragoons, had cut through Triplett’s Virginians. Beyond Triplett’s men, and in the rear of the American position, was a host of targets for the 17th Light Dragoons. The dragoons attacked them all.

Nettles' Attack. 1 & 2 = American Cavalry, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line (broken), 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line (Triplett's former company has been broken, but the rest of the line is intact), 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line (reforming), 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company (reforming), 11 = Other British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = Main British Legion Dragoon Reserve.

Captain Connelly, who was fleeing with his company from the right wing of the main line towards the militia horses recalled that the British cavalry attacked "our company when just about to catch up [to] our horses which was tied about four hundred paces in the rear of the line of Battle." They "fell upon us with great fury."

Some men from the right wing of the militia line were also in this area [see Note 8]. These men had already reached their horses when the dragoons attacked. One of these men Private James Collins of South Carolina recalled, "Tarleton's cavalry pursued us; ("now," thought I, "my hide is in the loft;") just as we got to our horses, they overtook us and began to make a few hacks at some, however, without doing much injury. They, in their haste, had pretty much scattered, perhaps, thinking they would have another Fishing creek frolic."

The heaviest blow fell upon the men of Colonel Andrew Pickens’ regiment of South Carolina militia. After serving on the militia line, they had reformed behind Triplett’s Virginians….

Jeremiah Files claimed he "was wounded by Tarleton's Dragoons on the head--on the left Arm and on the right Hand each wound was made with a sword… the wounds Greatly Disabled [him] & stuned him for some time." Private James Pettigrew saw that his, James Caldwell, "was cut almost to death by Tarlton's horsemen so much so that he had to be borne from the field." Michael Cain was wounded "on the head by a sword." His Captain, Andrew Miller, was killed [see Note 9]. Charles Holland "was wounded by a sword thrust through the body."

Private Robert Long, who was on the other side of the battlefield, heard that "At that time Tarleton brought 200 or 300 cavalry round in the rear of our left wing of militia." Nettles in fact had nowhere near this many men. This statement conveys something of the shocking power of this attack, coming upon the militia when and where it was least expected.

Notes:

1. From Francois-Jean de Chastellux’s 1781 interview with Daniel Morgan. During the retreat, Morgan saw that "the English, with more confidence than order, advanced to the attack." His own troops, meanwhile, were able to "keep their ranks." Therefore, Morgan "suffered them [the Continentals] to retreat a hundred paces, and then commanded them to halt and face the enemy, as if the retrograde movement had been really preconcerted."

2. Mackenzie’s thoughts here and elsewhere are expressed in such a way as to defame Tarleton. The retreating Continentals were not "fugitives," but rather maintained order. Mackenzie is insinuating that Tarleton could not even defeat an already-beaten foe.

3. Mackenzie claimed that "not less than two-thirds of the British infantry officers," "and nearly the same proportion of privates," had been shot. The British had amassed serious casualties by this point, but this is an exaggeration. The casualties Mackenzie alleges to have occurred by this time are greater than those suffered by the British during the entirety of the battle. This is another example in which Mackenzie’s wording implies Tarleton’s mishandling of the battle.

4. According to Howard; others stated different distances. Morgan claimed that "We retired in good order about fifty paces." Francois-Jean de Chastellux claimed that Morgan told him that he let the Continentals "retreat a hundred paces." Private John Thomas of Virginia claimed that the Continentals "retreated from aboutt 80 yards."

5. The postwar histories by Francois-Jean de Chastellux and David Stewart both describe the whole Continental line wheeling. Howard stated that the retreat began on his right flank; the wheeling movement may have resulted from the Continental line breaking off the engagement from right to left (Lawrence Babits, in a Devil of a Whipping, describes in considerable detail how this could have occurred). Whether ordered or accidental, this wheeling motion was particularly fortunate to the Americans because it prevented the 71st Foot from gaining their right flank. The wheeling movement also helps explain why different sources differently estimated the distance of the Continentals’ retreat; in such a maneuver, some parts of the line would have fallen back further than others. A distance of 100 yards for at least part of the line seems likely as this was the distance between the Continentals and Triplett’s Virginians (see The Main Line: Organization). If the Continentals had retreated further, Triplett would have been exposed to a British bayonet charge.

6. How close the two lines were has been variously stated (and perhaps was various at different points on the line). Stewart thought that the 71st Foot had come "within forty yards of the hostile force." Howard claimed the British were "within 30 yards of us with two field pieces." Virginia militiaman John Thomas thought that the British were "within aboutt 30 steps of them."

Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Continentals thought that "We let them Come Within ten Or fifteen yards of us." Anderson’s phrase that "we let them come" close, is striking. It is unclear whether Howard intended to have the pursuing British get close to the Continentals. Judging from Anderson’s journal, he was one that evidently believed that "the retrograde movement had been really preconcerted," and perhaps this is his supposition for why his superiors would order such a movement. Chastellux believed something similar before he interviewed Morgan.

7. A number of participants made similar remarks. Howard wrote in one place: "The enemy were now very near us. Our men commenced a very destructive fire, which they little expected, and a few rounds occasioned great disorder in their ranks." In another he said, "The enemy pressed upon us in rather disorder, expecting the fate of the day was decided. They were by this time within 30 yards of us with two field pieces; my men with uncommon coolness gave them an unexpected and deadly fire." Banastre Tarleton claimed in his memoir that "An unexpected fire at this instant from the Americans, who came about as they were retreating, stopped the British, and threw them into confusion." Private John Thomas of Virgina recalled that the Continentals "were ordered to wheele and fire. They did so, the British being within aboutt 30 steps of them." Private John Baldwin of North Carolina recalled that "Morgan defeated the British with his regulars, after they concluded the Americans were all running."

Similar comments also appeared in postwar histories of the battle. For example, Henry Lee wrote that "the British line rushed on with impetuosity and disorder; but, as it drew near, Howard faced about, and gave it a close and murderous fire. Stunned by this unexpected shock, the most advanced of the enemy recoiled in confusion." David Stewart wrote that "Colonel Howard, commanding the reserve, threw in a fire upon the 71st when within forty yards of the hostile force. The fire was destructive: nearly one-half of their number fell." This is an exaggeration (see Note 4, above). The British line was so much longer than that of the Continentals that it seems likely a part of the 71st was not struck at all by this volley. More accurately, Stewart also claimed that "The fate of the action was decided by the destructive fire of the Americans' second line."

8. Henry Lee thought they had been detached by Colonel Andrew Pickens to help secure the miltia’s horses. See Flight of the Militia - Part 3.

9. These claims were made by Cain’s widow. She also identified him with Captain Robert Anderson of this regiment.

Sources:

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Mackenzie's and Tarleton's accounts of the battle.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Howard, Anderson, Collins, and Thomas, among others.

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's after action report.

A transcription of the British after action report, written by Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, can be found here.

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes an article by Will Graves that provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Henry Connelly (.pdf).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Jeremiah Files (.pdf file).

Nan Overton West transcribed the pension application of James Pettigew (.pdf file).

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of Michael Cain (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Charles Holland (.pdf file).

See The Statements of Private Robert Long for a transcription of his statements.

François-Jean de Chastellux's 1787 Travels in North-America, in the Years 1780, 1781, and 1782.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of John Baldwin (.pdf file).

Related: The Fatal Moment, British Cavalry Charges at Cowpens - Part 2, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization