Sumter’s Brigade Reforms

Sumter’s brigade was broken by the battle of Fishing Creek (August 18, 1780). According to one participant, "the troops dispersed in every direction each taking care of himself." Sumter, on horseback, headed north. On August 19, he reached William Bratton’s house, near Williamson’s Plantation. From there, a handful of men saw him safely across the North Carolina border. He rode alone into Charlotte on August 20 [1].

Fishing Creek and Camden returned British control over northern South Carolina to the same state that it had been in June, before Sumter took the field. So unsafe was it in this area that "orders were then given out that there should be no assembling of companies even of a few men." However, Sumter's defeat also did not end the broader resistance to the British occupation of South Carolina. During Sumter’s campaign, South Carolina partisans organized in the western part of the state under James Williams and in the eastern part of the state under Francis Marion [2].

In North Carolina, now exposed to British invasion, a debate began over whether the conflict should be continued. Joseph Graham recalled that "several aged and respectable citizens insinuated that further resistance would… only produce more certain destruction to themselves and [their] families… But this was indignantly repelled by a great majority, and especially those who had been in action at Hanging Rock. Several of them stated that they then had seen the British soldiers run like sheep, and many of them bite the dust; that they were by no means invincible; that under suitable commanders and proper arrangements, they would at any time risk a conflict with them, man to man" [3].

Although Sumter bore ultimate responsibility for the debacle at Fishing Creek, he does not seem to have lost the esteem of those that had fought under him. It seems to have been generally understood that the defeat stemmed largely from some rather exceptional circumstances. According to Colonel Richard Winn (at the time recuperating from the wound he received at Hanging Rock), the most important factor was "the inattention of his patrols and rear guard Commanded by Major Crofford." Tarleton agreed: Although Sumter "had sent patrols to examine the road... fortunately for the British, they had not proceeded far enough to discover their approach." Indeed, the two Loyalist women that told Tarleton how to gain Sumter’s flank met the British commander just ½ mile in front of the American rear guard [4].

As Summer turned to Fall, Sumter's brigade reformed and returned to the field. Among the returnees was John Murphey, who had lived in the neighborhood of Fishing Creek, and was captured at the battle there. In early September he was released from the Camden jail upon making the following pledge:

"I John Murphy of Fishing Creek acknowledge myself a prisoner on parole to a detachment of his Majesty's troops under the command of the right Honorable Lieutenant General Earl of Cornwallis and I do promise that I will not act directly or indirectly against his Majesty's Government nor stir up others so to do, that I will not speak or say anything that shall be prejudicial to his Majesty's interest and will confine myself to my own plantation not exceeding one mile from thence until further enlarged."

However, Sumter "persuaded him that no good man and patriot would be bound by such a promise," upon which Murphey "tore up his parole and joined General Sumter" [5].

Notes:

1. The pension application of Samuel Watson, transcribed by Susan K. Zimmerman and R. Neil Vance. The pension application of George McLain, transcribed by Will Graves. The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract].

2. The pension application of Zachary Kitchens, transcribed by C. Leon Harris. John Buchanan. (1997). The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas.

3. William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

4. General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves. "Major Crofford" is very probably Major Robert Crawford of South Carolina. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot.

5. The pension application of John Murphey, transcribed by Will Graves.

Battle of Fishing Creek 4

Part 4: Sumter's Defeat

Previous: To Fishing Creek

Next: A Scene of Horror

Across Fishing Creek

The Americans slaughtered cattle and feasted on beef, roasted ears of corn, and freshly picked peaches. Some men napped, while others shaved or washed their clothes. Men and women living in the neighborhood came out to greet and encourage the soldiers. The American guards detected no danger. The situation in the American camp was idyllic. Yet at that moment, Tarleton’s 160 men were quickly bearing down on the Americans along the byway [1].

The first Americans to see Tarleton’s men were two vedettes. These men stepped out of the bushes and fired, killing one of the five dragoons in the British vanguard. The remaining dragoons killed the vedettes with their sabers and headed towards the creek. Responsibility for guarding the ford by which the byway crossed Fishing Creek had been left to one Captain Thompson. Thompson, however, had left his post and the ford was now unguarded [2].

Among the Americans to see the British vanguard and live to tell of it were John Williams and John Dobbins of the North Carolina militia. These two men and others were collecting peaches in an orchard near Fishing Creek. Fortunately for them, the four remaining dragoons either did not see them, or took no notice of them. The incredulous Americans offered no resistance and swam to safety across the Catawba River [3].

Finally, the dragoons ascended a height from which the main American body was in view. The dragoons crouched upon their horses and waving for their comrades to come on. Tarleton sped ahead and when he reached the height he was amazed to see "the front of the American camp, perfectly quiet, and not the least alarmed by the fire of the vedettes" [4].

The Americans’ had been using rifles to slaughter cattle; although the vedette’s two shots had been heard in camp, they elicited no special notice [5].

Stealthily, Tarleton’s "cavalry and infantry were formed into one line," just out of the Americans’ view. Then, "giving a general shout," the British charged [6].

The Fishing Creek Battlefield. Fishing Creek is the winding stream at left; the Catawba River is at right. The large blue circle shows the approximate position of the main American body on the river road. The smaller blue circle shows the rear guard. The red arrow depicts Tarleton's charge [7]. The main road (brown line) is based on the modern-day Catawba River Road. The byway is not depicted.

Fishing Creek Area. Part of the Fishing Creek battlefield has been flooded by damming on the Catawba River. This excerpt from Mills' 1825 atlas of South Carolina was used to roughly locate the original banks of the Catawba River in the above battlefield map. Islands shown in the 1825 atlas were not included in the battlefield map. Note that Mills' map designates the "Battle of F. C."

"A Perfect Rout"

The dragoons rushed the American encampment, with sabers gleaming brightly in the sunlight. The British infantry came streaming after, charging through the dragoons’ dusty wake.

Tarleton Forms His Line. Infantry and dragoons form a single-rank line of battle. According to Tarleton, most of his infantry came from the corps of light infantry that fought at Camden. Shown are light infantrymen from the 71st Foot and 16th Foot, as well as a soldier of the British Legion infantry. As per usual, the figure to participant ratio is 1:20.

Tarleton described the battle that followed in prosaic terms: "The arms and artillery of the Continentals were secured before the men could be assembled: Universal consternation immediately ensued throughout the camp; some opposition was, however, made from behind the wagons, in front of the militia. The numbers, and extensive encampment of the enemy, occasioned several conflicts before the action was decided" [8].

Young James Collins, who had only recently joined Sumter, recalled that "Before Sumter could wake up his men and form, the enemy were among them cutting down everything in their way" [9].

According to one account, Sumter was sitting next to a wagon and was halfway through a shave when the British attacked. "When the colonel saw the state of things around, he cut a rope with which a horse was tied to a wagon, dropped his razor, mounted the horse and made his escape without saddle or bridle" [10].

At least one knot of resistance developed where the wagons were interposed between the dragoons and the militia. Here, some South Carolinians briefly rallied around Colonel William Bratton before being driven off. Then, according to Collins, the main part of Sumter’s force "retreated across the creek at the main road, leaving the remainder to the mercy of the enemy." Collins was with “the greater part of our number [who] dashed through the creek, at the fording place." These men were desperate "to secure our own safety… and pushing on with all possible speed, reached the highland." He called this "a perfect rout." The fate of those left behind was "an indiscriminate slaughter" [11].

Sumter's Defeat (click to enlarge). British dragoons and infantry overrun unarmed American Continentals at upper right, while a tenuous resistance is made by Carolina militia at lower left.

Tarleton also described the fighting as a "slaughter." According to one militiaman, the British were incensed at the deaths of a sergeant of the Legion dragoons and a captain of the light infantry. "The British officers had great spite at the militia, but ordered that the regulars [Continentals] should have quarters" [12].

The sight of so many enemy soldiers may also have been terrifying to the British, even though they had the upper hand. Relief came when the British found and released the Americans’ prisoners. These men picked up guns (which littered the ground) and joined their comrades. When this reinforcement arrived, the killing stopped [13].

Reinforcement. British prisoners, once released, picked up arms and joined their comrades. Shown here are soldiers of the 33rd and 71st regiments, who were captured on August 15.

By this time, the battleground was covered with scores of dead and grievously wounded Americans, both Continentals and militia. Tarleton claimed that 150 had been struck down, and the total American loss (including unwounded prisoners) was around 300. As for himself, he lost a mere 6 infantrymen, 9 dragoons, and 20 horses [14].

Notes:

In some places the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation of the quoted source material has been altered to bring it into line with modern standards.

1. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. The pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of Edward Doyle, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of John Williams, transcribed and annotated by Will Graves. The pension application of Samuel Eakin , transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of Zachary Kitchens, transcribed by C. Leon Harris. The pension application of David McCance, transcribed by Will Graves. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot.

2. Tarleton, ibid. The pension application of John Henderson, transcribed by Will Graves.

3. The pension application of John Williams, transcribed and annotated by Will Graves.

4. Tarleton, ibid.

5. Tarleton, ibid. The pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

6. Tarleton, ibid.

7. Saye, ibid. has the British attacking along a relatively unguarded byway. Tarleton, ibid., claimed that the first thing he saw was "the front of the American camp" -- not the rear guard. James Collins in his (1859) Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier, claimed that the Americans "retreated across the creek at the main road," which is at the bottom of the map. This statement implies that the British were attacking from a different direction. Collins also recorded that "the rear guard consisting of militia were posted at the Creek." David McCance, ibid. claimed that "the rear guard was ordered to remain one mile behind" the main body, which is consistent with Collins' statement and Mills' placement of the battlefield. However, McCance also claimed that the rear guard "was taken," which seemingly is contradicted by Tarleton, Saye, and Collins (at least when the three are read together). Militiaman George Cunningham claimed that he was one of those "standing guard," but he was not captured. (see the pension application of George Cunningham, transcribed by Will Graves).

8. Tarleton, ibid.

9. Collins, ibid. A transcription appears in Michael Scoggins (2005). The Battle of Fishing Creek. Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Vol. 2, No. 8.

10. Saye, ibid.

11. Saye, ibid. Collins, ibid.

12. Tarleton, ibid. The pension application of Thomas Bartley, transcribed and annotated by C. Leon Harris.

13. Tarleton, ibid.

14. Tarleton, ibid. British Legion killed and wounded at Catawba Fords. British Legion prisoners taken at Catawba Fords. The pension application of George Neely, transcribed by Will Graves. The pension application of John Patton, transcribed by Will Graves.

Battle of Hanging Rock 5

Part 5: American Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Previous: British Strength and Losses at Hanging Rock

Next: Sumter's Night March to Hanging Rock

Thomas Sumter claimed that he had “Six hundred brave men,” [1] and other participant statements point to a similar total [2]. Not everyone in his command was armed or fought during the battle (among these was Andrew Jackson, future 7th president of the United States) [3]. The number of men who were engaged may have been closer to 540 [4]. Those who were armed were badly supplied with ammunition. It was thought that Sumter's men had no more than 5 [5] or 10 [6] bullets apiece.

Sumter divided his force into three parts, and each contained around 200 men. These divisions are henceforth referred to as the left, center, and right divisions, after their relative positions at the beginning of the battle. Possibly the left division was commanded by William Hill, the center by Robert Irwin, and the right by Richard Winn [7].

Left Division: Several small South Carolina militia regiments, including William Bratton’s regiment, Andrew Neal’s regiment (commanded by either Samuel Watson or William Hill [8]), Edward Lacey’s regiment (possibly commanded by John McClure [9]), and Joseph Brandon’s regiment (commanded by James Steen) [10]. Most of the men in these regiments had seen action before, including at Williamson’s Plantation and Rocky Mount. Of the men that fought in this division, Joseph McJunkin of Brandon’s regiment left a detailed description of the battle.

Center Division: A battalion of 200 North Carolina militiamen under the command of Robert Irwin [11]. These men hailed from Mecklenburg County. Of the men that fought in this division, Joseph Graham left a detailed description of the battle.

Right Division: Major William Davie’s troop of dragoons (70-80 men) [12], supported by a mixture of North and South Carolina militia units [13]. Of the men that fought in this division, William Davie and Richard Winn left detailed descriptions of the battle.

American Losses:

Thomas Sumter claimed that he lost 20 killed, 40 wounded, and 10 missing [14]. Other American participants gave lower figures, but their claims are less reliable. The 10 missing men were likely killed or wounded, but as the fighting took place over a wide area, they were not found by their comrades before the end of the battle. Among these was Matthew McClurkin, who "was severely wounded on the head... taken prisoner by the British troops... confined in jail and... sent to Charleston to be put aboard a prison ship." Fortunately, before arriving in Charleston, "he and the other prisoners overpowered the guard and made their escape" [15]

The British estimated American losses at about 100 [16].

Notes:

1. Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

2. James Hodge Saye. Memoirs of Major Joseph McJunkin, Revolutionary Patriot; Alexander S. Salley. (1921). Col. William Hill's Memoirs of the Revolution.

3. Augustus C. Buell. (1907). History of Andrew Jackson: Pioneer, Patriot, Soldier, Politician, President.

4. According to Joseph McJunkin. Richard Winn claimed that Sumter had 500 men with arms and another 200 without. The men without arms were left to take care of the horses, but later these men took up the arms of the killed and wounded and joined their comrades in the action.

Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11. General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780, transcribed by Will Graves.

5. Hill, ibid.

6. William Gordon. (1801). The History of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment of the United States of America, Vol 3.

7. This description is based primarily on the account of William Davie. See The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [extract]. Davie's account also appears in, John H. Wheeler. (1851). Historical Sketches of North Carolina from 1584 to 1851, Vol. 1. Davie identified Hill and Irwin with the left and center, respectively. Davie claimed he had command of the right division, but Richard Winn also claimed that role. Winn's claim seems more credible as he outranked Davie and had served with Sumter longer.

8. Andrew Neal was killed 7 days earlier at Rocky Mount. One Samuel Gordon of this regiment claimed that Samuel Watson took over after Neal was killed, whereas Thomas Lofton remembered Hill becoming his commander. See the pension application of Samuel Gordon, and the pension application of Thomas Lofton, both transcribed by Will Graves.

9. Joseph Gaston claimed that before Sumter's men crossed the Catawba River to attack Hanging Rock, "General Sumter ordered an election for general officers in the Chester Regiment." He claimed that John McClure was elected colonel, "Colonel E. Lacy having, at that time, become unpopular among the Chester Whigs." However, several accounts placed Lacey at the battle, suggesting either that Gaston was in error or that he was serving in some other capacity. See Joseph Gaston. (1836/1873). Joseph Gaston's Narrative. The Historical Magazine and Notes and Querries Concerning the Antiquities, History and Biography of America, Vol. 1.

10. Will Graves. (2005). What Did Joseph McJunkin Really Saye? Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution, Volume 2, Issue 11. Brandon's absence on this occasion is not explained in the available sources. Steen was his second in command.

11. William Davie, ibid. Letter from Allen J. Davie to Archibald D. Murphey, August 9, 1826.

12. Graham said 70; Hill, ibid., said 80. William Davie, ibid., placed his troop on the American right. For Graham, see William A. Graham (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

13. William Davie, ibid. Winn, ibid., identified his regiment as one of the specific units.

14. Sumter, ibid.

15. The pension application of Matthew McClurkin, transcribed by Will Graves.

16. Banastre Tarleton. (1787). A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

The Battle of Rocky Mount 3

Part 3: The Assault on Rocky Mount

Previous: Sumter's First Target

Next: "Come and Take It"

[Revised 12/31/09]

Sumter's Plan of Attack:

Brigadier-General Thomas Sumter resolved to attack the British post at Rocky Mount, ahead of the American invasion of South Carolina. This British post was garrisoned by a force significantly smaller than his own, and any British force attempting to come to its relief would have to cross the wide Catawba River [Note 1]. Nevertheless, Rocky Mount would not be an easy post to take, especially as Sumter's militia had no artillery.

Sumter did not leave a written description of his specific plan of attack, but a reconstruction can be made on the basis of British and American statements. Sumter, it seems, planned to send small parties forward to clear the abatis surrounding the post and then set fire to the buildings while protected by covering fire from the rest of his force, which would be on the edge of the surrounding woods. Given that the Americans had a 2 to 1 advantage in numbers, they hoped to bring enough suppressing fire on the buildings to make the operation a success. To improve the odds of success, the American force was to get close to the fort the day before the battle and then make a surprise attack early in the morning. Further, when the Americans attacked they would do so from three directions at once [see Note 2].

The Attack Begins:

Sumter's plan of attack was sound, and he successfully brought his men close to Rocky Mount without detection. Before the Americans made their final advance, Sumter divided his men into three columns. According to Private William Clark, "The attack was made, by dividing the Army into three divisions, each of which was to approach in different directions. The commanders of these three divisions were Colonels [Andrew] Neal, Brannon [i.e., Thomas Brandon] & William Bratton. In line with this view, Private James Clinton remembered that "Sumter divided his men into two or three divisions and ordered the assault to be made from different directions." Likewise, Private Arthur Travis stated that "Our forces were divided into three divisions."

At the time that the Americans were making their final approach march to Rocky Mount, the British garrison was in a normal state of alert, but unsuspecting that Sumter's men were so near. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon (who was not present, but who had received a letter from the post's commander immediately after the battle), "The New York Volunteers... were as usual at the hour standing to their arms." The horses of the British Legion dragoons had "been saddled all night, [and man and horse] were soon after Day-break ordered out to grass."

Rawdon wrote that the dragoons "had scarcely passed an abbatis which surrounded the Post, when they fell in with three large Columns of the Rebels by whom they were fired upon and dispersed" [see Note 3]. According to Sumter, the Americans took "several prisoners, a Great Number of excellent horses, Saddles, Guns, &c."

The firing alerted the post, and the New York Volunteers "were immediately thrown into some Log Houses constructed for the purpose of defence." Although the element of surprise had been lost, the Americans pressed gamely forward. North Carolina militiaman Joseph Graham described what the Americans saw once they reached the British defenses:

"The slope from the top of the hill was gradual, and nearly equal on all sides, and the land cleared. There was no swell in the ground to shelter them from the enemy's fire, only on the west side of a ledge of a blackish kind of rocks at the distance of one hundred and forty yards from the houses. The men were drawn up in a line below these rocks, and advanced up to them, and a party sent around on each flank."

In other words, the three American columns approached the post from the west, but then one column was sent to attack from the north, while another was sent to attack from the south. A comparison of the accounts by Colonel Richard Winn and Private William Clark suggests that Colonel Thomas Brandon led the northern column, Colonel Andrew Neal led the center column, and Colonel William Bratton led the southern column.

The advance of these columns unnerved the Loyalists stationed outside the abatis. According to Rawdon, "some Militia abandoning a Redoubt which they were appointed to garrison... ran into the Houses." South Carolina Militiaman Samuel Gordon claimed that the Americans "drove old Colonel Floyd, a Tory commander into the Fort."

"Blackish kind of Rocks." These boulders, on the western slope of Rocky Mount, are of the same type that the American militia sheltered behind. This image is a screen shot showing a Google Maps "street view" of the area. Appropriate to the American attack, this picture of Rocky Mount was taken in the morning, while the western slope of the hill was cast in shadow.

A Flanking Column Approaches Rocky Mount (click to enlarge). The representations of the battle in miniature on this page are intended to be evocative of the action, but they do not follow a set scale.

Neal's Assault:

With the Americans closing with the post from three directions, Sumter ordered an assault. According to British Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, Sumter "selected some of his bravest followers [see Note 4], to remove the [abatis], and to endeavour to set fire to the [buildings], whilst his people, under cover of the trees and rocks, on the declivity of the mountain, maintained a heavy fire upon the garrison."

William Clark, who was with the center column, noted that attack had to be made "through an old field about 200 yards to the house in which the enemy were posted and around which they had fixed huge timbers pointing outwards. On our approach, the enemy poured a destructive fire on us, and in this assault Colonel Neal, and several others were killed."

James Clinton, who was also present, recalled that "Colonel Neal was killed, not 5 feet from where I stood. I saw him fall & heard, and do now remember, his last words: 'I have received a mortal wound – God have mercy on my soul' and instantly died."

Richard Winn then took over. He wrote that, "being in a Clear Old field and finding his Men much Exposed Ordered a Retrt for a Small Distance." The other columns were also repulsed, although, apparently with fewer losses. Lieutenant-Colonel William Hill (with the southern column, according to Winn) wrote that, "we were forced to retreat behind a ledge of Rocks about a hundred y[ar]ds. from the house."

Attacking the Abatis. A party of militia (one of whom is carrying a torch), rush the abatis under covering fire from riflemen in the woods. According to William Clark, the abatis consisted of "fixed huge timbers pointing outwards."

Notes:

1. Sumter took the precaution of detaching a large party of North Carolina militia, including Major William Davie's dragoons, to occupy the British post at Hanging Rock (the post most likely to send reinforcements to Rocky Mount). Davie's memoir records a successful raid on Hanging Rock the same day that Sumter attacked Rocky Mount.

2. This description of the Sumter's plan of attack is rather different than that which I've encountered elsewhere. Historian John Buchanan claimed the attack mostly entailed sniping and a single, disastrous, frontal assault. However, the present description is well grounded in accounts of the battle. Evidence of the use of covering fire is in the accounts by Major William Davie and Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton (neither of whom was present, but their histories of the Southern Campaign are generally deemed reliable). Evidence of the division of Sumter’s force into three parts is in descriptions of the battle by Colonel Richard Winn, Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Rawdon, Adjutant Joseph Graham, and Privates William Clark, James Clinton and Arthur Travis. My reading of the various sources has led me to believe that Sumter was a competent tactician, but that does not mean that he is above criticism.

Henry Lee (who was not present, but nevertheless is a good source of information) claimed in his postwar history that Sumter "approached Rocky Mount with his characteristic impetuosity." Lee had a point: My impression is that Sumter was eager to attack the enemy and chose not to wait until a piece of cannon became available, or for some fortunate circumstance to develop (e.g., foggy weather certainly would have helped). Much of the American plan of attack at Rocky Mount seems also improvised.

3. American Colonel Richard Winn was one that participated in this exchange. However, his memoir describes a very different incident. He wrote that we:

"Should have completely Surprised the place had it not have been for a Tory Colonel by the Name of Black with about 100 Tory Militia from Broad River to reinforce the Mount they getting to the place late encampt Out with intention of going on Early in the Morning these people we had no Knowledge until we were among them Winn being in the Advance gave them a fire & they Ran and left many of their Horses & Cloathing, this gave the alarm to the Mount, however in a few Minutes the place was attacked."

This discrepancy can be attributed to faulty memory on Winn's part. However, another, intriguing possibility is that the dragoons were not wearing their uniform jackets and the several dragoons captured by the Americans lied about their unit identification.

4. The privates claiming to have participated in this attack were from Neal's regiment, suggesting that his regiment, in whole or in part, constituted the assaulting force. Given the small size of the South Carolina militia regiments (see Note 1 in Part 2 of this series), it's possible the British would have mistaken his command for a picked force.

Sources:

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's postwar memoir.

John Buchanan. (1997). The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas.

William R. Davie, The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie [excerpt]

William Alexander Graham. (1904). General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Clark. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of James Clinton. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Gordon (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Arthur Travis. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Henry Lee. (1812). Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

William T. Sherman. (2009). Calendar and Record of the Revolutionary War in the South: 1780-1781. 6th Ed. (.pdf file). [Contains a transcription of Rawdon's letter].

The website, The Colonial and State Records of North Carolina, hosted by the University of North Carolina, includes a transcription of the Letter from Thomas Sumter to Thomas Pinckney, August 9, 1780.

The Battle of Williamson's Plantation 4

Part 4: Huck's Defeat

Previous: The Americans Gather

Next: Aftermath

The American force spent the night of July 11-12, 1780 searching for Captain Christian Huck's British force. It wasn't until the early hours of the morning that they learned that Huck was encamped near Colonel William Bratton's plantation. By this time the Americans were doubtlessly exhausted, but they remained committed to the attack.

Although virtually every high ranking officer with the Americans would be credited by at least one source with holding the overall command, it seems more likely that decisions were made by committee. Colonel Richard Winn (who claimed to have been the American commander in his memoir), described the Americans' approach in some detail. The Americans, on horseback, were travelling along a road on or near the path of today's Brattonsville Road. He wrote that "it was then about one hour to day brake here Colo Winn Ordered the party to file off to the Left of the Road & Dismount and immediately had the whole paraded then Capt. Read a bold daring Officer was Ordered to pick Out twenty five Men and file off to the left of Col. Brattons plantation and as soon as the Action begun in front he was to attack the rear of the Enemy & take all Straggling parties..." The Americans were as of yet unfamiliar with how Huck and his men were deployed, but sent Read's group off into the woods to attempt to surround the Bratton house.

According to Winn, "at the same time Capt Read received his Orders the Remaining part of the Men Commenced their march to bring on the Action." The main part of the American force expected to encounter the British at any moment. However, "on coming to the fork of the Road was informed by two Tories in Search of their Horses that Colo. Ferguson with his party lay in the Edge of a field which was in advance of the British Horse about three Hundred yards." In other words, when the Americans reached the point where Williamson's Lane began, they learned that the British were not at Bratton's plantation, but at Williamson's neighboring plantation. There, "Capt. Hook who Commanded posted himself in a Strong log House around him prepared to Mount in a moment if Required."

The Americans paused and worked out a new plan of attack. Again, the tactical plan was to send a detachment in rear of the British position. Winn wrote, "you must Understand when I took the two Tories I halted for a short time and sent Capt. McClure with his Company Round Williams plantation to attack the Enemy as soon as he heard the first firing." Not mentioned by Winn is whether an effort was made to recall Read or redirect his movements [see Note 1].

The Americans approached the plantation from the west. Evidently, visibility was poor. Although the Loyalists and provincials were awake and their equipage packed, they did not see the Americans before they had closed to within rifle range. Winn wrote, "the Sun was about to rise and notwithstanding I marched in 10 or 15 Steps for at least 200 yards of Colo Fergusons party [i.e., Loyalist militia] I was not discovered until they were fired on Colo Ferguson and some of his Men was killed the first onset the rest ran and Chiefly left their Horses tho saddled and ready to Mount." John Craig likewise remembered Ferguson as being among the first to fall. He "stood at the end of the lane and was shot down, and his clothing was blackened with the gun powder." This description suggests that the Americans very quickly closed with the Loyalists. This rapid headlong rush sent first the Loyalist militia and then the New York Volunteers into headlong flight.

The Americans Attack (click to enlarge). Here and below, 1 miniature represents 5 participants in the battle.

John Craig remembered that "We heard the words, 'boys take over the fence,'" "and our men rushed after the Tories and British as they fled before us." Lieutenant-Colonel William Hill wrote that "there were many of their carcasses found in the woods some days after." Hill's statement implies that the fleeing soldiers did not rush down the lane en masse (which would have made them easy targets), but many instead fled through the fields and into the woods with a number of the Americans in pursuit.

"Take Over the Fence" (click to enlarge). Loyalists and Provincials flee before the American surprise attack.

At the same time that British resistance collapsed on the west end of the plantation, a second American force emerged from the woods behind the Williamson house. Militiaman James Collins, a 16-year-old armed with an obsolete shotgun, was with this force.

Collins wrote, "Not long after sunrise, we came in sight of their headquarters, which were in a log building. In the rear of the building was a large peach orchard; at some distance behind the peach orchard we all dismounted and tied our horses [see Note 2]; we then proceeded on foot through the orchard, thinking the peach trees would be a good safeguard, against the charge of the horsemen. We had not proceeded far until the sentinels discovered us--fired on us and fled. The troops were soon mounted and paraded. This, I confess, was a very imposing sight, at least to me, for I had never seen a troop of British horse before, and thought they differed vastly in appearance from us--poor hunting-shirt fellows. The leader drew his sword, mounted his horse, and began to storm and rave, and advanced on us; but we kept close to the peach orchard. When they had got pretty near the peach trees, their leader called out, “disperse you d--d rebels, or I will put every man of you to the sword.”

"We Did Not Stop One Minute" (two views; click to enlarge). The main American force advances from the west while a detachment approaches the Williamson house through the orchard.

Under ordinary conditions, this American detachment would have been overwhelmed by the British Legion dragoons. However, the dragoons didn't have the opportunity to mount a charge. At the same time that Huck responded to the danger in his rear, the main American force pressed towards the Williamson house. Winn wrote that "here we did not stop one Minute [after driving off the Loyalists and Provincials] but went on to commence our Attack on the British horse in a clear open old field we was paraded in About one Hundred yards from them." Collins, in the peach orchard, watched as "Our rifle balls began to whistle among them." John Craig, who was with the main American force claimed that "John Carroll led the way, I was next to him, and Charles Miles next." Huck was doomed. "We halted to fire and both Miles and Carroll fired at the same time, and brought down the Captain of the British Dragoons."

Collins saw that "Hook was shot off his horse and fell at full length; his sword flew out of his hand as he fell and lay at some distance, and both lay till some of his men gathered about him and around him two or three times. At length one halted and pointed his sword downward, seemed to pause a moment, then raising his sword, wheeled off and all started at full gallop. We then moved on to the house without opposition, but all had disappeared. There Collins saw two more dragoons that had been struck. "In the yard sat two good looking fellows bleeding pretty freely, their horses standing at no great distance: one of whom was shot through the thigh."

Huck's End. Huck lies in the yard of the Williamson house, his command scattered.

With that, the battle of Williamson's Plantation was over [see Note 3].

Winn reflected that "we was in full possession of the field in five Minutes without the loss of a Single Man Either Kild or Wounded, as I am well convinced the Enemy during the Action Never fired a Single gun or pistol." Another participant, Hugh Gaston, likewise believed that "The action continued but a few minutes."

Notes:

1. Given the small size of the companies and regiments it seems surprising that Captains Read and McClure would be charged with commanding these important detachments and not one of the higher-ranking officers that were present. It may be that each of the senior officers regarded himself as the rightful commander of the main force and so chose to remain with it (Sumter was not present and he seemingly had not designated a second in command). Perhaps the several colonels eschewed command of a secondary force because it would serve as tacit acknowledgment of one's subordinate position. Alternatively, rank was sometimes determined by political considerations rather than by military ability (such was the case with Lieutenant-Colonel William Hill); perhaps Read and McClure were given these commands because they were recognized as especially active and able.

2. On this detail, accounts differ. According to Winn, the Americans had all dismounted some time earlier.

3. Or perhaps not. Winn described the the British fleeing eastward and wrote that "as they ran by Capt. McClure he gave them a fire but was not near enough to do them much damage he had the misfortune to lose one Man being a little advanced before the rest was I was inform kild by One of his Own party." Winn believed there were two groups of Americans on the battlefield: the main body, with which he served, and McClure's party. Winn wrote ruefully, "I do believe had I have not lost the Service of Capt. Read but few of the British or Tories would have been able to have Escaped." If Winn's account is accurate, then the group of Americans in the peach orchard must have been commanded by Captain McClure. The representation in miniature shows how Winn's account can be connected to Collins': the fleeing Loyalist militia and New York Volunteers cross the path of the Americans in rear of the house, allowing the Americans to have given them a fire before approaching Huck and the British Legion dragoons. Collins wrote that "For my own part, I fired my old shot gun only twice in the action. I suppose I did no more harm than burning so much powder." He did not mention seeing a group of retreating British infantry -- only some sentries and the British Legion dragoons. Rather than conclude that Collins omitted an important detail, Michael Scoggins concluded that Winn was mistaken about Read's absence. Scoggins placed Read's group (including Collins) behind the Williamson house, and McClure's group further to the east. The representation in miniature is consistent with this interpretation as well -- it just doesn't show such a third group, because it would have encountered the fleeing British outside the area I modeled.

William Hill's account of the battle touches somewhat on this issue. He wrote: "The plan was to attack both ends of the Lane at the same time, but unfortunately the party sent to make the attack on the east end of the lane met with some embarrassments, by fences, brush, briars &c. that they could not get to the end of the lane until the firing commenced at the west end." His account places two forces of Americans in the battle, which is consistent with the view that Collins was with McClure. However, he places the second group near the road, rather than behind the house, which is consistent with the view that Collins was with Read.

Sources:

James Collins. (1859). Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Hugh Gaston. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780. (Includes transcriptions of statements by many participants).

The Battle of Williamson's Plantation 3

Part 3: The Americans Gather

Previous: The British Encampment

Next: Huck's Defeat

"...it was determined to attack Lord Hook"

Captain Christian Huck, on a mission to seize local American militia commanders, failed to find either Colonel William Bratton or Captain John McClure. As his force advanced far from its base at Rocky Mount, it unwittingly entered into a dangerous game of cat and mouse with the Americans. Huck was looking for the Americans, but soon the Americans were also looking for him. The Americans were not at their individual homes, but had kept together in small bands for safety; further, they reacted to Huck's advance by drawing together into a fairly large ad hoc force.

The Americans sought to put a stop to Huck's raid, although they inconsistently described the underlying motives.

James Collins cited the destruction of Hill's Ironworks ("it was determined to attack Lord Hook, and take vengeance for the burning of the ironworks"). However, William Hill, who had owned the ironworks, described Huck's "blasphemy" and his seizure of "all the horses fit for his purpose, so that many of the aged men had to walk many miles home afoot." He concluded that "This ill behaviour of the enemy made an impression on the minds of the most serious men in this little band and raised their courage under the belief that they would be made instruments in the hand of Heaven to punish this enemy for his wickedness and blasphemy — and no doubt the recent injuries that many of their families received from the said Hook and his party had an effect to stimulate this little band to a proper courage." John Craig claimed that Huck had made refugees of the Americans' families, and when they reached the Catawba River on their way home, they saw that "the far bank was lined with women and children, who had been ordered from their homes by the British and Tories on account of their relations generally having joined themselves to the Whig party [i.e., Sumter's militia]... The situation of these women and children driven from their firesides, excited in every bosom a sympathy for the distressed, and an indignation against the hard-hearted foe who could perpetrate such an inhuman deed."

Craig's account seems suspect because he alone recalled a heart-rending scene that others seemingly would have remembered. Other accounts have William Bratton's family remaining at home after a visit from Huck and his men, even though Bratton was the most notorious "rebel" in the vicinity.

In any event, participant accounts make clear that on July 11, 1780, several bands of Americans united and decided what to do about Huck. Craig claimed that "we received orders to turn out our horses to graze, and meanwhile the officers called a council and soon determined to risk all consequences and attack the inhuman ruffians." According to Colonel Richard Winn, the decision to attack Huck was not made easily. Winn noted that "both Officers & Men seemed loath to Engage the Horse [i.e., Huck's British Legion dragoons] as they had cut Buford Men to pieces so shortly before." A month and a half before a sizeable force of Continentals had been slaughtered by British Legion dragoons at the Waxhaws. How could they take on such men? Nevertheless, "about 130 agreed to follow Winn and try the Business."

Estimating American Total Strength:

It is difficult to determine the exact size of American militia forces at American Revolutionary War battles because of a paucity of reliable records. I commented on this issue at length during my Cowpens project. I noted that if statements by American officials are taken at face value than one concludes that the American militia numbered around 500 or so (How Many Fought at Cowpens?). However, if one estimates American numbers based on the number of pension applications filed by survivors (Problems with Pensions, Veteran Survival), or the number of officers that were present (Little River Regiment), then the number would be about three times as large (Cowpens in Miniature 3). Concern for this issue represents more than an interest in fine details. Whether the Americans' victory at Cowpens should be regarded as a triumph of underdogs hinges on which interpretation one makes [see Note 1]. I suggested one could test the plausibility of different approaches by making comparisons with other battles. Williamson's Plantation, which has been especially well studied among battles in the Southern campaign, happens to make an ideal test case.

One of the striking features about Williamson's Plantation is that there is relatively good agreement on the question of how many Americans were present:

In correspondence written by nonparticipants shortly after the battle, Thomas Sumter wrote that “I had about one hundred and thirty in the action." Major Thomas Blount said that the Americans fielded "a party of 80 or 90 Militia."

In pension statements or memoirs written many years later, participants claimed that there was "about 130" (Winn), "The number of the Americans was 133, and many of them without arms" (Hill), "We numbered one hundred and thirty-three" (Craig), there were "a few militia Boys" (Hillhouse), the Americans consisted of "Col. Bratton and Capt. Jenkins with about one hundred men" (Jenkins), the Americans consisted of "Coll. Neel... with 110 men" (Lofton).

Early secondary sources provided similar information: Ramsay wrote there were 133 men. Lossing said there were initially 133 men, but 23 left the American force before the battle, leaving only 110. Lossing explicitly claimed to have obtained his information from a veteran. Ramsay probably did as well.

The specificity in these numbers strongly suggest that a headcount was taken before the battle and the participants well remembered the result (133). However, there is still room for varying interpretations -- does this total represent the initial strength or the total after some dropped out? Does it include men without arms and/or men left to guard the horses? Does it include, as will be described in the next post, other detachments that were made shortly before the battle? Given this uncertainty, one can argue for a total considerably above or below 133 men. Michael Scoggins' recent history of the battle, for example, has 159 Americans participating in the fighting [see Note 2]. However, one can build a case around the statements by Winn, Lossing, Blount, Jenkins and Lofton, that the true total was closer to 100. Nevertheless, the variation among these estimates is fairly low: the total seems to have been about 133, plus or minus 30 men.

Michael Scoggins' history allows the validity of different methods of estimating troop totals to be tested because it includes a table that lists every alleged participant, the sources that identify that individual as a participant, and the individual's rank and likely unit affiliation. Therefore, if the method of estimating the number of participants by examining pension applications or counting the number of captains present is valid, then the estimates generated by these methods should be within 133 plus-or-minus 30 men.

Taking the approach of estimating totals based on pension applications, one finds that 58 persons claimed to have been at the battle. Using Lawrence Babits' estimate of around 3.5 actual participants for every pension application filed, one arrives at a total American force of 203 men. This method of estimation produces a total that is a little more than 50% above the actual approximate size of the American force, suggesting moderately poor validity.

Taking the approach of estimating one 25-man company for every captain identified at the battle, one finds in Scoggins' table that there were 23 participants with the rank of captain. By extension, 575 participants (25 * 23) would have been present. The estimated total is far above the likely historical total, suggesting that the method has very poor validity.

At the time that I wrote about Cowpens I observed that the logic behind these methods of estimation seems sound, yet the results they produce are questionable. An examination of these methods with the numbers for Williamson's Plantation confirms for me that opinion. I gave some reasons previously why I thought the results could be flawed even though the logic seems sound. I also have some new thoughts on the subject, which I'll share in an upcoming post.

American Order of Battle:

The American order of battle, described below, is based on Michael Scoggins' history of the battle. The totals for each regiment are approximate because a handful of men could not be clearly linked to a specific unit. In these cases I randomly assigned the participant to one of the units to which he plausibly could have belonged. The accuracy of information in original sources is assumed. The rank and file indicated below includes mostly privates, a few men are identified as sergeants, none as corporals. Richard Winn claimed to have been commander of this force (as did others); he evidently was present, but not his regiment.

Neal's Regiment:

Colonel Andrew Neal, Lieutenant-Colonel William Hill, Major James Hawthorne, about 7 captains, 4 lieutenants, 19 rank and file.

Bratton's Regiment:

Colonel William Bratton, Major John Wallace, about 11 captains, 6 lieutenants, 42 rank and file.

Lacey's Regiment:

Colonel Eward Lacey, Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick McGriff, Major Michael Dickson, about 5 captains, 7 lieutenants, 30 rank and file.

One pension application (Samuel Wallace) identifies two units of North Carolina militia at the battle; the absence of confirmation by other applications or sources suggests that North Carolina militia regiments were not present.

A stand-out feature of this order of battle is the exceptionally high ratio of officers to rank and file: 1:1.36 for Neal's regiment, 1:2.21 for Bratton's regiment, and 1:2.00 for Lacey's regiment. A similarly high ratio may have been present among the South Carolina militia regiments at Cowpens. This does not mean, of course, that such a high ratio was always present among South Carolina militia regiments, to say nothing of regiments from other states.

Notes:

1. The high-end estimates of American totals at cowpens have the Americans outnumbering the British by more than 2:1. The low-end estimates have the British outnumbering the Americans by about 1.3:1.

2. This estimate is based on a combination of participant statements and a compilation of state and federal records (such as pension applications) that identify participants by name.

Sources:

Thomas Blount. Letter to Abner Nash, July 23, 1780. Colonial and State Records of North Carolina.

James Collins. (1859). Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier.

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Hillhouse (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of William Jenkins (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Thomas Lofton (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Samuel Wallace (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Benson John Lossing. (1860). Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution (Vol. 2).

David Ramsay (1811). The History of the American Revolution (Vol. 2).

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780. (Includes transcriptions of statements by many participants).

Thomas Sumter. Letter to Johann De Kalb, July 17, 1780. Colonial and State Records of North Carolina.

The Battle of Williamson's Plantation 2

Part 2: The British Encampment

Previous: Huck Rides Again

Next: The Americans Gather

The location of Williamson's Plantation is generally known, although the original structures vanished long ago. Several sketches were made of the battlefield in the mid-to-late 19th Century based on local family traditions. Unfortunately, these sketches differ in terms of some of the most basic details. However, these, in combination with participant accounts, suggests that the Williamson house was about 500 yards from Colonel William Bratton's plantation. The Bratton house is now part of Historic Brattonsville.

The William Bratton house today, as seen using Google Maps (click to enlarge). Google Maps is now set up much like Google Earth (see this post) and includes the same "street view" function and links to Panoramio pictures.

Various sources also provide some details about what this plantation would have looked like in 1780. The Williamson house was probably a sturdy, two-story house, built of logs, on the north side of a road running east by southeast from the vicinity of the Bratton house. The land along the road was cleared to the west all the way to the Bratton house. The road itself was a lane lined by "a strong fence" in William Hill's words. To the north and south was forested country. The Williamson house was in old field, with various outbuildings nearby. An orchard was in the rear of the house. There was at least one large oat field west of the house. A corn crib was mentioned in some descriptions of the battle; wheat is another likely crop. The land was clear west of the plantation, all the way to the Bratton house.

Williamson's Plantation (click to enlarge). A satellite view (left) of Historic Brattonsville and the site of Williamson's Plantation The Williamson house was located within or near to the red circle. The street view on the right is from Percival Road looking in the direction of the site of the Williamson house. The area is covered by second-growth forest.

Below is the miniature version of the Williamson Plantation that I assembled. Some compromise is necessary between a realistic looking farm and one that is correctly scaled. The representation will be at a 1:5 scale, rather than the 1:20 I plan to follow generally, but even so, a single building has a "footprint" equivalent to 25 buildings (because it is both 5 times too long and 5 times too wide). Therefore, the farmhouse and the various outbuildings is represented by a single resin building that I had handy. The small clump of trees behind the house represents the orchard. Several farm fields are also represented. Distances are not to a set scale. The result is a far cry from a realistic portrayal of an 18th-Century Backcountry plantation, but it's more attractive and practical than many alternatives.

Williamson's Plantation in miniature.

When the British encamped, Huck stayed in the Williamson house, perhaps with Hunt and some other dragoons. The rest of the dragoons were nearby. The New York Volunteers appear to have encamped in the lane. The Loyalist militia were at the western end of the plantation, either in the lane or in a field. When the Americans attacked, the men were up and preparing for the day. Their gear had been stowed on their horses, and, were it not for the attack, they would have departed before long.

Sources:

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780. (Includes transcriptions of British correspondence, and statements by many participants).

The Battle of Williamson's Plantation 1

The Battle of Williamson's Plantation
Part 1: Huck Rides Again
Next: The British Encampment

[The account appearing in this and subsequent posts is heavily indebted to Michael C. Scoggins' recent history of the battle. The present account is generally consistent with his, although I arrived at a different conclusion about British numbers, as described below. Readers should note that Scoggins' history includes many more details concerning the battle of Williamson's Plantation than are related here].

In early July, 1780, much of Thomas Sumter's brigade of militia temporarily disbanded. The farmers-turned-soldiers returned to their homes to reap their crops, see their families, and otherwise prepare for the coming attempt to retake South Carolina. This dispersal of Sumter's men made them vulnerable, and an attempt was soon made by the British to capture some of the leading figures in the militia. Lieutenant-Colonel George Turnbull, who commanded the British post at Rocky Mount, wrote on July 12 to his superior officer, Colonel Francis Rawdon, informing him of the attempt.

"…hearing that a noted Partisan McClure [i.e., Captain John McClure] was come home and Reaping his Grain about Twenty Two miles above and that Col. Bratton [i.e., Colonel William Bratton] who Lived Twelve miles farther was publishing Proclamations and Pardons to who should return to their duty, I proposed to Capt. Huck [i.e., Captain Christian Huck, who led the British raid on Hill's Ironworks] that I woud mount twenty of our men and give him some militia to the amount of fifty to Beat up those two Quarters. The party marched from this Monday Evening and found only one of the McClures and no person at Brattons. My orders to him was not to go farther than Prudence should Direct him."

Although not obvious from Turnbull's letter to Rawdon, Huck's force consisted of three groups: British Legion dragoons, New York Volunteers, and Loyalist militia. All were mounted.

There are two key sources of information on the strength of these commands: Lieutenant-Colonel Turnbull, who wrote several letters to Rawdon about Huck's mission and defeat, and Lieutenant Hunt of the British Legion. Hunt was in the battle, and the account he related to Lieutenant Anthony Allaire and Dr. Uzal Johnson appeared in their journals the day after Huck's defeat.

According to Allaire's journal:

"Lieut. Hunt of the Legion Cavalry came to our quarters... He was one of the party defeated the twelfth inst. He gave an imperfect account of the affair. Capt. Huck commanded the party consisting of one subaltern and seventeen dragoons of the Legion, three subalterns and eighteen New York Volunteers, twenty-five militia men."

Lieutenant Hunt was speaking candidly to another officer the day after the battle, and his account is not suspect. However, the numbers he stated (as recorded by Allaire) differed somewhat from that stated by others. Below I comment on why I am generally accepting of Hunt's statement.

British Legion: Captain Huck, Lieutenant Hunt, and 17 rank and file.

Turnbull did not report the number of dragoons to his superiors (at least in extant correspondence). Cornwallis reported to Clinton that the number of dragoons was between 30 and 40. Cornwallis may have given this number because he knew this to be the approximate strength of Huck's troop and he assumed (not having been told otherwise) that all of Huck's dragoons were present [see Note 1]. But were they? Huck had been dispatched on a search-and-seize mission, not a combat mission. Turnbull may have felt it wiser to give more experience to his Loyalist militia and a group of New York Volunteers that were recently mounted than to dispatch all of his dragoons. Turnbull did not expressly indicate this in his correspondence, but his comments to Rawdon on casualties (to be covered in an upcoming post) make considerably more sense if only a portion of the dragoons were present.

New York Volunteers: Lieutenant McGrigor, Ensign Cameron, and 18 rank and file.

Turnbull's letters to Rawdon name the officers with this group. Turnbull identifies Lieutenant Adamson as a third officer, but Uzal Johnston recorded in his journal that there were only two subalterns, and Michael Scoggins' research suggests that Adamson was not with the Volunteers, but rather the militia.

Loyalist Militia: 25 or so militiamen under Colonel Matthew Floyd and "Colonel" James Ferguson [see Note 2].

Hunt claimed that there were 25 militia; Cornwallis wrote Clinton that there were 60. Hunt's total for the militia is less reliable than his other figures because he is less likely to have been informed of their total or to have performed a head count. However, Hunt's statement should not be dismissed. American militia would leave the ranks at times for various reasons, and it could well be that the Loyalist militia were no different. It should be recalled that the British were not anticipating combat, and some men (perhaps many) might have been allowed to visit home while they were out on this expedition. Indeed, there may even have been some military value in such departures as it would help raise morale and allow the men to gather supplies. These militiamen might even have been able to learn of the Americans' latest movements from family members. There is at least some evidence of Loyalist militiamen leaving the ranks. Colonel Richard Winn wrote of capturing Major John Owens on the night preceding the battle and two privates the morning of the battle.

If the number of militiamen fluctuated, then it is all the more unlikely that Hunt's number is definite. His statement of 25 men sounds like an estimation, and in the confusion of the early morning fight, he hardly could have been sure.

Using Hunt as a source, Huck's force totaled 65 men or so [see Note 3]. Notably, American sources provided much higher estimates. The difference in their statements is so large that it seems safest to dismiss the latter estimates out of hand. These estimates include that there were “two or three hundred Tories” (Samuel Killough), “About 300 Tories under Colonel Floyd and fifty dragoons under Capt. Hook, and Capt. Adamson with fifty Light Infantry” (John Craig), and "100 horse &... of the Tory militia... about 300 men” (William Hill). It should be noted that the battle was short in duration, that the battle was fought under conditions of reduced visibility, and that these statements by American participants were made many years after the fact.

Notes:

1. One might wonder why Cornwallis would have given a number for the British Legion dragoons if he did not know it for certain. My supposition is that Cornwallis was concerned about what Clinton would see in American newspapers. Both sides habitually magnified their opponent's strength and losses, and Cornwallis wanted Clinton to know that Huck's force was small in size and that the defeat was not of great military consequence (the political consequences, however, were another matter). Stating a number -- even if imprecise -- established this point.

2. It is questionable whether the British ever gave Ferguson a colonel's commission. He is not listed in Lambert's seminal history of South Carolina Loyalists.

3. Michael Scoggins sided with Cornwallis over Hunt on the question of the number of British Legion dragoons and Loyalist militia. Consequently, he had almost twice as many British participants in the battle as I state here.

Sources:

Lyman Copeland Draper. (1881). King's Mountain and Its heroes: History of the Battle of King's Mountain. (Includes a transcription of Allaire's journal).

Will Graves transcribed General Richard Winn's Notes -- 1780. (.pdf file).

Will Graves transcribed William Hill's memoir. (.pdf file).

Will Grabes transcribed the pension application of John Craig (.pdf file).

Robert S. Lambert. (1987). South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution.

Michael C. Scoggins. (2005). The Day It Rained Militia: Huck's Defeat and the Revolution in the South Carolina Backcountry, May-July 1780. (Includes transcriptions of British corresepondence, and statements by many participants).