Cowpens in Miniature 24

Part 24: The Last Gambit

Previous: Surrender

Next: The Battle Ends

Tarleton remained on the battlefield with a small group of stalwarts, even after the British had surrendered. He surely knew that the British right had fled or surrendered. Less clear is if he knew what had befallen the 71st Foot. In any case, the Americans soon assembled a force consisting of the bulk of their cavalry [see Note 1] and at least a portion of the Continentals to drive off of this last vestige of resistance and pursue those forces that had fled.

Upon the surrender of the 71st Foot, Colonel Andrew Pickens remembered that he "sent back to Genl Morgan, by Major Jackson, Major McCarthur, with the sword" [see Note 2]. He then "met Coln Washington with his cavalry in pursuit of Tarleton" [see Note 3]. He therefore "ordered Jackson who was brave & active, to return as quickly as possible with as many mounted militia as he could get."

Meanwhile, Tarleton watched as the Americans approached. With him were "Fourteen officers and forty horse-men… not unmindful of their own reputation, or the situation of their commanding officer." The American cavalry had somewhat fewer than 100 men. The prudent decision, perhaps, would have been to turn around and retreat down the Green River Road, but he felt compelled to put up a fight [see Note 4].

Final Confrontation. 1 = American Cavalry, 4 = American Infantry, 11, 14 = British Legion Dragoons, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons. The blue-ringed circles show where the British front line (9) and 71st Foot (13) surrendered.

Final Confrontation (click to enlarge). As American cavalry and infantry set off in pursuit of the fleeing British, they must first confront Tarleton.

Lieutenant Mackenzie, although by now a prisoner, was perhaps witness to this event. He recalled, with a mixture of awe and disdain, that "Even at this late stage of the defeat, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, with no more than fifty horse, hesitated not to charge the whole of Washington's cavalry, though supported by the continentals; it was a small body of officers, and a detachment of the seventeenth regiment of dragoons, who presented themselves on this desperate occasion" [see Note 5].

The official British report of the battle claimed that these cavalry, "having had time to recollect themselves, & being animated by the Bravery of the Officer who had so often led them to victory, charged & repulsed Colonel Washington's Horse." Tarleton’s memoir went further, claiming that "Colonel Washington's cavalry were… driven back into the continental infantry by this handful of brave men" [see Note 6].

Tarleton's Charge. 1 = American Cavalry, 4 = American Infantry, 11 = British Cavalry.

Tarleton's Charge (click to enlarge).

This description seems basically accurate. Cornet Simons recalled that "It was at this period after the Action that we sustained the greatest loss of Men." Delaware Continental Henry Wells stated that "In this fight I was struck across the left shoulder by one of Tarleton's Troopers, With his Sword with Such Violence, that the colar of my coat, my vest and my Shirt, were each cut through, and the flesh & skin Sleightly scratched and bruised so much so that there was a considerable not or welt on my Sholder for a number of days" [see Note 7].

Success, however, was fleeting. The American cavalry quickly recovered and they sent the British fleeing. Alexander Chesney wrote that we "the remainder [of the British Legion] charged but were repulsed… I was with Tarleton in the charge" [see Note 8]. Mackenzie stated that "the loss sustained was in proportion to the danger of the enterprise, and the whole body was repulsed."

Simons noted that "their Cavalry, who finding they could no longer Keep Everhart a Prisoner, Shot him with a Pistol, in the head, over one of his eyes, (I cannot remember particularly which) being then intermixed with the enemy, Everhart pointed out to me the man who shot him, and on whom a just Retaliation was exercised, and who by my order, was instantly Shot, and his horse as well as I can recollect, was given to Everhart, whom I ordered in the rear to the Surgeons" [see again Note 5].

Once again, Tarleton escaped capture [see Note 9]. Henry Wells recalled that "Col. Tarleton was hard run by a small detachment of American horse and barely escaped being taken prisoner. It was generally agreed in the Camp that Tarleton could easily have been shot by those in pursuit of him, but their object was to take him alive."

The immediate American pursuit was determined, but disorganized. This led to one more confrontation between the British and American cavalry.

Howard learned that "In the pursuit he [William Washington] had got a head of his men, perhaps 30 yards. Three of the british officers observing this wheeled about and made a charge at him. The officer on his right was raising his arm to cut at him when a sargent came up and made a stroke at this officer which disabled his arm.--The officer on the left at the same moment was preparing to make a stroke at him when a boy, a waiter, who had not the strength to wield a sword, drew his pistol and shot and wounded this officer, which disabled him. The third person, who Washington thinks was Tarleton, made a thrust at him which he parryed. This person then retreated 10 or 12 steps and wheeled about and fired a pistol which wounded Washington's horse [see Note 10].

Pursuit. 1 = American Cavalry, 4 = American Infantry, 11 = British Cavalry.

Pursuit (click to enlarge).

Notes:

1. But not all. As noted previously (Cowpens in Miniature 23), a part of the mounted militia was attempting to capture the British baggage train. Cornet Simons believed that some of the Continental dragoons were still mopping up the scattered British infantry. He wrote to Washington that "Lt Bell" had "taken off with him in pursuit of the Enemy, on our left nearly a fourth part of your Regt."

At least part (and maybe most) of the mounted militia was with Washington at this time. Manual McConnell stated in his pension application that he was a member of "Capt. McCall's company… attached to the command of Col. Washington." He claimed that "he was with or not far behind Col. Washington when he chased Col. Tarlton so close after the battle."

2. Although Pickens and Jackson differed as to who captured McArthur, they agreed on this point. Jackson wrote to Morgan that I had "the honor of introducing Maj. McArthur [to you]."

3. Pickens’ statement is important in establishing the timing of this last encounter of the British and American cavalry. That Washington was still on the battlefield strongly suggests that this fight occurred after the 71st had surrendered. Indications that the Delaware Continentals were also a part of Washington’s pursuit force, places the surrender of the 71st (in which the Delawareans participated), before this fight with Tarleton. In Simons account, Washington began "pursuit of their Cavalry," "immediately after Securing the Prisoners."

4. Benson Lossing, a mid-19th Century visitor of the battlefield, wrote that the British infantry "retreated along the Mill gap road [i.e., the Green River Road] to the place near Scruggs's... then covered with an open wood like the ground where the conflict commenced. There the battle ended and the pursuit was relinquished. It was near the northern border of that present open field that Washington and Tarleton had a personal conflict." He also wrote that "The battle ended within a quarter of a mile of Scruggs's." Scrugg's farm was not present at the time of the battle. It's future location was near the road, close to the right edge of the battlefield map. I show Tarleton's charge occurring close to 1/2 mile from Scrugg's farm. Although not shown (because of the small numbers involve), I envision the final brush between Washington and (allegedly) Tarleton to have occurred at a location about midway between the site of Tarleton's charge and the eastern edge of the battlefield.

5. Tarleton said there were 14 officers. Mackenzie indicated that the 17th Light Dragoons had two officers; my system for estimating British strength at the battle (see Cowpens in Miniature 2) yielded 12 officers for the British Legion dragoons. Therefore, it’s possible that all of the British Legion dragoon and 17th Light Dragoon officers were present. Although seemingly excluded, it’s possible that some mounted infantry officers were also present.

Tarleton generally gave round numbers for his strength, so it’s unlikely that exactly 40 troopers were with him, as he claimed. Mackenzie said that the number was something less than 50 and identified them as the 17th Light Dragoons. In view of their heavy losses earlier in the battle (see Cowpens in Miniature 20), they could not have mustered close to 40 or 50 men. Some rank and file of the British Legion must have been present. Their identity is unknown, although Simons’ account implicates that the men holding Sergeant Everhart a prisoner were present (see Cowpens in Miniature 7 regarding his capture). This suggests either the British vanguard or a provost guard had been left in the rear when the British Legion reserve was ordered up. This group is repeatedly depicted on the battlefield maps I’ve prepared.

6. Howard’s account was written in order to correct mischaracterizations of the battle present in William Johnson’s account (see Flight of the Militia - Part 1). Howard seems to have regarded Tarleton’s description as basically accurate (as do I), although Howard wrote that on this point, Tarleton was in error. "Tarleton says that 14 officers & 40 men charged Washington's horse and drove them back to the [Continentals] ... This is not correct. This affair checked Washington's pursuit, but he did not fall back." If Howard meant only that Washington did not fall back to where Howard, the militia, and the remainder of the Continentals were guarding the prisoners, then this statement is not problematic. Tarleton’s version seems to be confirmed by Delaware Continental Henry Wells.

7. He’s referring to the battle in general and not specifically this exchange, but this is the most likely timing. Other Delaware Continentals indicated they joined with Washington in the pursuit. Lieutenant Thomas Anderson wrote "We followed them ten miles but not being able to Come up With them Returned back to the field of Battle that night and lay amongst the Dead & Wounded Very Well pleased With Our days Work." Sergeant-Major William Seymour wrote "our men pursuing them for the distance of twelve miles." Neither of these statements, however, mentions the cavalry action at the beginning of the pursuit.

8. This is the most logical event that Chesney is referring to. However, when the passage is read in context, Chesney seems to be referring to some charge that occurred at the beginning of the American counterattack (See Alexander Chesney's Rivulet for the full text of his statement). While Chesney should be regarded as an excellent source, I did not make the most direct interpretation of his account because such a claim would be in contrast with a number of other participant accounts.

It should be noted Tarleton, and the band with him, might not have witnessed the surrender of the 71st Foot because of the intervening ridge. Chesney may have learned about their surrender later and wrongly concluded that the 71st surrendered after the unsuccessful final cavalry fight. The official British report of the battle claimed that "The Loss of our Cavalry is inconsiderable, but I fear, about 400 of the Infantry are either killed or wounded, or taken." This claim was disingenuous. The "400 of the Infantry" just about covers the killed, wounded, and captured that Tarleton could likely see from his final position of the battlefield. The loss sustained by the 71st (which was total) could at least have been surmised.

9. This is in reference to his escaping being captured with Major McArthur and the 71st Foot (see Cowpens in Miniature 22).

10. David Stewart related a muddled version of this same episode. In his telling, Cornet Patterson of the 17th Light Dragoons was the officer wounded by Washington’s "waiter." Continental dragoon James Kelly described a second-hand version of this episode in his pension application.

Sources:

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statements by Pickens, Howard, and Anderson, among others.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's, and Mackenzie's accounts of the battle.

A transcription of the British after action report, written by Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, can be found here.

Thomas Balch's 1857 Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland Line During the Revolution has Simons' letter to William Washington. His book can be downloaded from this site.

Will Graves trancribed the pension application of Henry Wells (.pdf file).

The Journal of Alexander Chesney.

Will Graves transcribed the pension application of Manual McConnell (.pdf file).

James Graham's 1856 The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Jackson's letters.

Benson John Lossing's 1860 Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution (Vol. 2).

William Johnson's 1822 Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can be found on this Battle of Camden website.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland.

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of James Kelly (.pdf file).

Related: The British Legion, The American Cavalry - Part 1, 17th Light Dragoons

Cowpens in Miniature 13

Part 13: Fighting on the Skirmish Line

Previous: "Bring on the Battle"

Next: The Militia Line

Private John Savage’s shot rang across the battlefield. The other skirmishers Morgan had sent forward were also in range of the British line and, according to Major Joseph McJunkin, “In a few moments the fire is general.” The American commander, Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, stated that the skirmishers “gave them [the British] a heavy and galling fire.”

The British commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, responded to the American gunfire by hurrying up the remainder of this deployment and ordering his forces to advance. Tarleton, however, didn’t mention that his men were under fire. He gave as the reason why “he hurried the formation of his troops” was that he was “gratified with the certainty of battle” and “prone to presume on victory.”

Under rifle fire, the 7th Foot and remaining British light infantry formed into line. Major George Hanger learned that “While Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton was reconnoitering the enemy on his right, a scattering fire commenced by some recruits of the 7th, who had but newly joined their regiment, and seen no service.” These men couldn’t help but fire back at their tormentors, even though the Americans were still out of range. Hanger asserted that “This unsteady behaviour he [Tarleton] silenced to the utmost of his power, and then led the line to action” [see Note 1].

Fighting on the Skirmish Line (two views; click to enlarge). Shots are fired by the American skirmishers as the British complete their deployment. Some men of the 7th Foot fire in response.

Because the British left and right deployed at different times and with different degrees of difficulty, a range of opinions formed about the propriety of Tarleton’s decision to advance at this moment. Lieutenant Roderick Mackenzie of the 71st Foot light infantry complained that, “Without the delay of a single moment, and in despite of extreme fatigue, the light-legion infantry and fusiliers were ordered to form in line.” However, Major Hanger, who knew many of those in the battle, learned that “Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton did halt the troops for near half an hour, and made them throw of their knapsacks and blankets to render them lighter for action.”

American sources likewise offer varying descriptions of when the British advance began. As has already been noted, Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Continentals remembered a prolonged wait before the British advance began. However, Private James Collins of South Carolina recalled that the British “halted for a short time, and then advanced rapidly, as if certain victory.” Cavalryman James Kelly echoed Mackenzie when he stated that the British “hardly got formed before Tarlton made his charge.”

The beginning of the British attack was an auspicious moment remembered by a number of participants. Lieutenant Anderson wrote in his journal that the British “about Sunrise… began the attack by the Discharge of two pieces of cannon and three Huzzas advancing briskly On our rifle men that Was posted in front.”

Morgan, who had remained with the militia after sending the skirmishers forward observed that “their whole line moved on with the greatest impetuosity, shouting as they advanced.” Thomas Young, who was nearby with the mounted militia, also watched the advance. “About sun-rise, the British line advanced at a sort of trot, with a loud halloo. It was the most beautiful line I ever saw. When they shouted, I heard Morgan say, "They gave us the British halloo, boys, give them the Indian halloo, by G_"; and he galloped along the lines, cheering the men, and telling them [the men on the militia line] not to fire until we could see the whites of their eyes.”

The two British cannon were lined up with the gap between the wings of front-line American militia. Their fire was directed not at the thin line of militia, but rather at the large block of Continentals further down field. Their fire does not seem to have been particularly accurate, for there is little evidence that the Continentals suffered from cannon fire. Instead, the British round shot flew over or past the Continentals, affecting the Continental light dragoons posted in reserve.

Thomas Young noted “the British line advanced under cover of their artillery… it opened so fiercely upon the centre, that Col. Washington moved his cavalry from the centre towards the right wing” [see Note 2]. This move placed the American cavalry on lower ground and placed the crest of the foremost ridge between the dragoons and the British guns.

The British advanced “in as good a line as troops could move at open files,” according to Tarleton. As they did so, the American skirmishers fell back, preventing the British from getting into range. Thomas Young recalled that “After the first fire [i.e., the first fire after the British began their attack], the militia retreated, and the cavalry covered their retreat.” The mounted militiamen were on hand to protect the skirmishers from a sudden dash by the British cavalry, but as this did not occur, they merely escorted the skirmishers back towards the militia line.

The skirmishers meanwhile kept “up a warm fire… [while] gradually retreating,” according to Major James Jackson. Sergeant-Major William Seymour thought that the militia “stood very well for some time.” His superior, Lieutenant Thomas Anderson, was also impressed. “[The riflemen] Fought Well Disputing the ground that Was between them and us, Flying from One tree to another” [see Note 3]. Private John Thomas of Virginia thought that these militiamen fired, in total, “five rounds.”

The British Attack the Skirmishers. 1 = Continental Light Dragoons, 2 = Mounted Militia, 3 = Right Wing of the Main Line, 4 = Continental Infantry, 5 = Left Wing of the Main Line, 6 = Right Wing of the Militia Line, 7 = Left Wing of the Militia Line, 8 = American Skirmishers, 9 = British Front Line, 10 = Captain David Ogilvie's Company, 11 = British Mounted Vanguard, 12 = 17th Light Dragoons, 13 = 71st Foot, 14 = British Legion Dragoon Reserve.


The Skirmish Line Retreats (two views; click to enlarge). The American skirmishers fire their finals shots as the British advance on the militia line.

Henry Lee wrote that the skirmishers, after “preserving a desultory well-aimed fire… fell back to the front line, to range with it and renew the conflict.” There, they “arrayed with Pickens” [see Note 4]. Watching from the main line, Private William Neel of Virginia saw that the militia, “broke in the centre.” Neel did not realize that the Americans were merely following orders. According to Morgan, the skirmishers under “McDowall and Cunningham… retreated to the regiments intended for their support.” This meant that the men under McDowell and Cunningham took up positions on the right and left wing of the militia line, respectively, leaving a gap between them [see Note 5].

As for the mounted militia, Thomas Young noted that when the militia “were again formed… we retired to the rear,” meaning to a new station behind the militia line. Once again, the mounted militia were expected to cover their comrades when they retreated.

Notes:

1. Hanger provided most detail about this incident. There are subtle differences between Tarleton's and Hanger's versions. Tarleton's account implies that the 7th stopped to fire at the skirmishers after the British attack began. Tarleton also did not claim to have personally stopped the recruits from firing.

2. This statement serves as another indication that there was relatively thin tree cover on the battlefield.

3. With a gap between the two wings of the militia line directly in front of the Continentals, these skirmishers were in fact the only militia troops between them and the British.

4. Most participant accounts of the battle do not distinguish between the front-line militia and the skirmishers, but rather indicate that there was only one militia line. This is a very strong indication that the skirmishers served double duty. All of the British accounts (Tarleton, Hanger, Mackenzie, Cornwallis, Stewart, Chesney) are of this view. Descriptions of skirmishers that were in some sense distinct from the militia line appear principally in Morgan, and the detailed participant accounts by McJunkin and Young, and in reliable postwar histories by nonparticipants, like Lee and Moultrie.

The strongest contraindicative statement is by Major Joseph McJunkin, who wrote that “The sharpshooters fall behind Pickens.” This could mean that the skirmishers (or at least the group with McJunkin) did not participate in the militia line fighting. Alternatively, he may have meant only that the skirmishers stopped retreating only when they cleared the militia line; there they could reload their rifles in peace.

5. There is no reason why the gap built into the militia line would also have been present on the skirmish line. Indeed, a position in front of the gap between the two wings of the militia line was an ideal place for the skirmishers to fight. From there they could retreat to their comrades without obstructing their comrades’ view of the enemy.

Sources:

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine includes an article by Will Graves that provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

James Graham's (1856) The Life of General Daniel Morgan has a copy of Morgan's report, and a copy of Jackson's letters.

A transcription of William Seymour's journal can also be found on this Battle of Camden website.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's, Mackenzie's, and Hanger's accounts of the battle.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statement by Anderson, Collins, Young, Thomas, and Neel, among other sources.

C. Leon Harris transcribed the pension application of James Kelly (.pdf file).

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

A transcription of Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis' statement about the battle can be found here.

David Stewart's 1825 Sketches... of the Highlanders of Scotland

The Journal of Alexander Chesney

William Moultrie's 1802 Memoirs of the American Revolution

Related: The American Skirmishers, The Militia Line: Composition and Organization, Who Did John Savage Shoot?

Cowpens in Miniature 10

Part 10: The British Reach Cowpens

Previous: Morgan's Plan

Next: The British Deploy

While the Americans were deploying for battle, the British were on the last leg of their march to Cowpens. In front, the British vanguard swept down the Green River Road, seeking out the Americans. After engaging Sergeant Lawrence Everhart’s patrol, they next encountered Morgan’s vedettes. Major Joseph McJunkin recalled that, “The guns of the vedettes, led by Capt. [Joshua] Inman, announce the approach of the foe.” Major James Jackson of George confirmed that Inman was in command. In a letter to Morgan he wrote, “[Inman] was particularly serviceable to you in advertising you of the enemy’s approach and skirmishing with their advance.”

Little is known about these vedettes, but they appear to have included both Georgians and South Carolinians and to have been sufficiently numerous to pose some armed resistance to the advancing British. A “vedette” is, by definition, a mounted sentry, although it's not clear that all were in fact on horseback [see Note 1]. The British vanguard charged at the vedettes with slashing sabres. Some were cut down, others nearly so. South Carolina militiaman Thomas Young recalled “Our pickets were stationed three miles in advance…. Samuel Clowney was one of the picket guards, and I often heard him afterwards laugh at his narrow escape. It was about day that the pickets were driven in.”

As the vedettes were driven back, the British vanguard was soon able to come within sight of the American army. The horsemen halted and sent word to Tarleton, who was with the main body.

Tarleton soon learned from “the commanding officer in front… that the American troops were halted and forming.” Tarleton knew nothing about this location, only that he had caught up with the Americans before they could retreat across the Broad River (or so he supposed; see Note 2).

Tarleton wrote, “The guides were immediately consulted relative to the ground which General Morgan the occupied, and the country in his rear. These people described both with great perspicuity: They said that the woods were open and free from swamps; that the part of Broad river, just above the place where King's creek joined the stream, was about six miles distant from the enemy's left flank, and that the river, by making a curve to the westward, ran parallel to the rear.”

Now, the British column marched the last couple of miles to the Cowpens. Perhaps at this interval word began to filter through the ranks that the Americans had stopped and would fight.

The Americans, who had completed their deployment, stood in ranks quietly awaiting their enemy.

Thomas Young, who was serving with the mounted militia, recalled, “The morning of the 17th of January, 1781, was bitterly cold. We were formed in order of battle, and the men were slapping their hands together to keep warm-an exertion not long necessary.”

Captain Benjamin Brooks of Maryland, Brigade Major to the Continental infantry was on horseback in front of the main line. He peered down the Green River Road, past the British dragoons and into the shadows beyond. At last, the British infantry column strode into view. According to Private John Thomas of Virginia, Brooks then “rode up to Gel. Morgan and informed him that the British were in Sight.”

Colonel Henry Lee stated that, “On the verge of battle, Morgan availed himself of the short and awful interim to exhort his troops.” He spoke to the militia and “extolled the zeal and bravery so often displayed by them, when unsupported with the bayonet or sword; and declared his confidence that they could not fail in maintaining their reputation, when supported by chosen bodies of horse and foot, and conducted by himself. Nor did he forget to glance at his unvarying fortune, and superior experience; or to mention how often, with his corps of riflemen, he had brought British troops, equal to those before him, to submission. He described the deep regret he had already experienced in being obliged, from prudential considerations, to retire before an enemy always in his power; exhorted the line to be firm and steady; to fire with good 'aim; and, if they would pour in but two volleys at killing distance, he would take upon himself to secure victory.”

Major Joseph McJunkin, who was with the South Carolinians on the right of the militia line, remembered Morgan appealing to Providence. With “the Enemy in sight between day light and sun-up, Gen. Morgan addressed the Sovereign of the Universe in the following words, saying—‘O thou Great Disposer of all Events, the battle is not to the strong, nor the race to the swift: Our domineering Enemy now being in sight, Oh, leave us not nor forsake us!’”

Morgan then rode over to the Continentals, and with them, according to Lee, “he was very brief. He reminded them of the confidence he had always reposed in their skill and courage; assured them that victory was certain, if they acted well their part; and desired them not to be discouraged by the sudden retreat of the militia, that being part of his plan and orders.”

Notes:

1. Lawrence Babits, in A Devil of a Whipping, quotes the account of South Carolinia militiaman James Caldwell (p 59) that clearly served as one of these vedettes. Caldwell was cut down by the British vanguard; the quoted passage implies he was on foot at the time.

2. The British after action report credits Tarleton with having, “conducted his march so well & got so near to General Morgan, who was retreating before him, as to make it dangerous for him to pass the Broad River, and came up with him at 8:00 AM on the l7th instant.” The British did not realize that the Americans had chosen to fight at this location despite the disadvantageous circumstances.

Sources:

This issue (.pdf file) of The Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution magazine provides a complete treatment of McJunkin's statements.

Theodorus Bailey Myers' 1881 Cowpens Papers has a copy of Jackson's letters.

John Moncure's online history of the battle, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour, has a transcription of the statement by Young and Thomas, among other sources.

Marg Baskin's Banastre Tarleton website has a transcription of Tarleton's memoir.

Henry Lee's 1812 Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States

Lawrence Babits' A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens is available through amazon.com.

A transcription of the British after action report (letter from Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis' to Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton) can be found here.

Related: The Cowpens Battlefield, Cornwallis' Report, Tarleton's Narrative

The Hammond Map

An account by Captain Samuel Hammond of South Carolina is one of the most important statements about how the American army was deployed at the battle of Cowpens. Unfortunately, it is also contradictory and confusing.

Hammond wrote of the evening before the battle:

"Orders had been issued to the militia, to have twenty-four rounds of balls prepared and ready for use, before they retired to rest. A general order, forming the disposition of the troops, in case of coming to action, had also been prepared, and was read to Colonels Pickens and McCall, Major Jackson and the author of these notes, in the course of the evening. No copy was ever afforded to either of these authors, before the battle, and the author of these notes has never since seen them, but in the, course of the same evening he made the following notes upon them, then fresh in his memory, and which was shown to Major Jackson and Colonel McCall, and approved by them as correct as far as they went. To show those concerned what would be their stations, the author drew out a rough sketch of the position set forth in the general order, and after the action, the rough sketch of the enemy's position was added. No perfect or accurate sketch of the enemy's position was ever drawn: this was only taken by the eye, not with mathematical instruments; and yet no opportunity has been afforded of correcting it. Nevertheless, this gives you a still better idea of the affair, than could be obtained without it.

"The order commenced in substance thus:

"As the enemy seems resolved to force us into action, the numbers and spirit of this little band of patriot soldiers seems to justify the general in the belief that they may be met with confidence, defeated and driven back. To prepare for which, the following order will be observed.

"The front line will be composed of that part of Colonel McCall's regiment of South-Carolina State troops, who have not yet been equipped as dragoons, under the command of Major Hammond; the Georgia volunteers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham, and the North Carolina volunteers, under the command of Major McDowal, Colonel Cunningham will take post on the right, Major McDowal on the left of the line, southwest of the road, upon the rising ground beyond the valley in front, three hundred to three hundred and fifty yards in rear of this cantonment or camp, with the left resting upon the road. Major Hammond will take post on the left of the road, in line with Colonel Cunningham; supported on the left by Captain Donoly, of the Georgia refugees.

"The second line will be composed of the continental regiment of Maryland troops, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Howard; on the left of the second line, falling back one hundred yards in its rear, a continuation of the second line, or third line, will be formed, advancing its left wing towards the enemy, so as to bring it nearly parallel with the left of the continental troops, upon the second line. The Virginia militia, commanded by Major Triplet, with the South-Carolina militia, commanded by Captain Beaty, will form to the right of the second line; the left nearly opposite to the right of the second line, one hundred yards in its rear; the right extending towards the enemy, so as to be opposite to or parallel with the second line, The main guard will hold its present position, and be commanded as at present by Colonel Washington's cavalry, with such of Colonel McCall's regiment of new raised South-Carolina State troops, as have been equipped for dragoons, will be a reserve, and form in the rear of Colonel Pickens, beyond the ridge, one or two hundred yards, and nearly opposite the main guard, north of the road.

"This is not meant as a correct report of the general order, but as nearly so as the memory, influenced by such events, could be expected to retain. The sketch annexed will give you a further illustration of the important event.”

One problem with this statement concerns certain omissions. He named Triplett and Beaty as serving with a wing of troops to the right of Howard's Continentals, but he did not identifiy the troops serving to the left of the Continentals. He said that McCall's dragoons were to be held in reserve behind Pickens, but he didn't identify where Pickens was stationed.

There is also a contradiction in his statement about the placement of troops on the front line. First he said first that, "Colonel Cunningham will take post on the right, Major McDowal [sic] on the left of the line, southwest of the road." This would seem to indicate that both commands were to be southwest of the road, with Cunningham on the right and McDowell on the left. However, he then said that "Major Hammond will take post on the left [i.e., northeast] of the road, in line with Colonel Cunningham." If Hammond were in line with Cunningham, then Cunningham would have been on the left of McDowell, not on the right.

Confusion also arises from a comparison of Hammond's written accounts with the maps he allegedly drew. Here is the "sketch," in two parts, which was originally printed in Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South.


The first map seems to have the directional arrow pointing in the wrong direction (South rather than North). McCall's dragoons have disappeared. There is a "valley or ravine" running across the road in front of the American position that does not correspond with the actual terrain (see this post). There are also two second lines, each consisting of the same troops, but in different positions. Perhaps the intention was to show the position of these troops at two different points in time. However, in neither case do the wings on either side of Howard's continentals begin 100 yards behind the regulars as the text has them.

The second map has Hammond on the far right of the American line when the text has him on the far left.

Of the two, the textual description seems more reliable. It is more detailed than the maps, and seems to better reflect Hammond's recollection. (I wonder if the printer, in preparing the sketch for publication, did not err in attaching labels to the sketch). The textual description also meshes well with other descriptions of the American deployment, including that in Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan's after action report. The maps are considerably less consistent with other participant accounts.

Sources:

Joseph Johnson's 1851 Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South is the original source of Hammond's account.