October 31, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 31st: The British assaults on White Plains and Fort Washington were postponed by rain; Washington was alarmed by the state of his army; Washington ordered the troops to a stronger post.

Previous entry: October 30th; next: November 1st.

A downpour struck White Plains in the early morning hours. The rain increased Lieutenant-General William Howe’s unease, but he did not alter his plans to attack the American army at dawn.

George Washington was expecting an attack, and he had the Americans lie on their arms in the fortifications at White Plains. Brigadier-General George Clinton (Heath’s division) wrote:

“Our lines were manned all night… and a most horrid night it was to lie in cold trenches. Uncovered as we are, drawn on fatigue, making redoubts, fleches, abatis and lines… I fear [these things] will ultimately destroy our army without fighting. This I am sure of, that I am likely to lose more in my brigade by sickness occasioned by extra fatigue and want of covering, than in the course of an active campaign is ordinarily lost in the most severe actions”.

At 5 AM, the British army was in motion. A powerful blow was to be made on the left, where Mirbach’s and Lossberg’s Hessian brigades, the 4th British brigade, the Brigade of Guards, the 2nd and 3rd light infantry battalions, and the 5th and 49th regiments of foot assembled for battle. These forces were entrusted to Lieutenant-General Leopold Philip von Heister who apparently had replaced Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton as Howe’s favored subordinate.

Clinton commanded the center, and Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis the right. The forces in this sector included the 1st Light Infantry Battalion, the 1st British brigade, the Hessian grenadiers, the British Reserve, and the 28th, 35th, 44th, 64th, and 71st regiments of foot.

As the troops formed up and moved into place, they looked upon the forbidding American lines. The British redcoats and Hessian bluecoats were cold, wet, and no doubt fearful of what was to follow.

Then, around 7 AM, the men were told that the attack was cancelled, and they marched back to camp.

Hessian Major Carl Leopold Baurmeister later wrote: “a heavy rain, fortunately perhaps for the army, frustrated all our plans. The enemy, well advised of everything[,] were prepared and ready to repulse us, sleeping on their arms that night.” Lieutenant-General Henry Clinton noted that the rain “much swelled the river,” and Charles Stedman claimed that the rain “made the ground so slippery that it was thought it could not be possible to mount the face of the hill”.

The cancellation was only temporary. Headquarters ordered that “the army [is] to be in readiness to move upon the shortest notice.” Commissary Charles Stedman claimed that “the weather proved fine about noon, but the commander in chief did not think proper to put his former intentions in execution.” Instead, Howe seemingly preferred to wait until early the next morning when poor visibility would partially mask the attack.

Baurmeister wondered why Howe did not take other steps to hide his intentions:

“Much might have been done on our left wing to mislead them [i.e., the Americans]. For example, we might have built some bridges [over the Bronx] and constructed roads to them—but nothing was done.”

Although the British did not make a major feint, Washington was anxious for their flanks. Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Harrison (Washington’s secretary) wrote:

“The enemy are throwing up some lines and redoubts in our front, with a view of cannonading as soon as they are ready, and at the same time [they] are extending their wings further by our right and left. It is supposed that one of their objects is to advance a part of their troops, and seize… the bridge over Croton River, that the communication may be cut off with the upper country” [i.e., upstate New York].

Washington dispatched Brigadier-General Rezin Beall to secure this crossing with several regiments of Maryland militia.

Washington was unable to detach many men because his army was rapidly losing strength. Harrison noted:

“Our army is decreasing fast: several gentlemen who have come to camp within a few days have observed large numbers of militia returning home on the different roads”.

General orders from American headquarters on this date admonished the troops for being away from the fortifications:

“The General, in a ride he took yesterday, to reconnoitre the grounds about this [place], was surprised and shocked to find both officers and soldiers straggling all over the country, under one idle pretence or other, when they cannot tell the hour or minute the camp may be attacked, and their services indispensably necessary. He once more positively orders that neither officer [n]or soldier shall stir out of camp without leave… The provost marshal is to take up all stragglers; and it is enjoined upon all officers to seize every man who fires his gun without leave, and to have him tied up immediately and receive twenty lashes.”

Once again, there were small clashes between the armies.

Lieutenant Colonel William Henshaw (Moses Little’s 12th Continental Regiment, Nixon’s brigade) was stationed on the American right where the armies lay especially close together. He wrote:

“The enemy are now encamped within gunshot of us, so that there is a continual firing of small arms…. We daily expect an engagement with the enemy.”

Brigadier-General George Clinton noted that on this date one Captain Van Wyck was killed while commanding a company of rangers.

“He went out in the morning, with about thirty men, fell in with about one hundred of the enemy, and at once, not far distant from their lines, charged them with spirit, gave them a brisk fire, but unfortunately when loading his piece the second time, was shot in the head and fell dead. His lieutenant shot down the man who killed his captain. The enemy fled. Our party brought off their captain [i.e., Van Wyck]… He was a good man and valiant officer.”

During the day, a British deserter provided Washington with a detailed description of the planned British attack. Washington decided that the new position his men had begun to occupy on the night of October 28-29 was a better place to meet this attack. He ordered the troops to withdraw to the new position during the night.

This image uses a White Plains map of 1891 to illustrate the positions held by Washington and Howe at White Plains. The road network is substantially more developed at this time than it was in 1776; nevertheless, the area was still predominately rural (unlike today). The American positions were chiefly within the blue lines, and the British positions were chiefly within the red lines.

Washington’s initial position was on high ground north just north of the village of White Plains, with his flanks bounded by the Bronx River and St. Mary’s Lake. Part of the British army crossed the Bronx River on October 28, and remained on the high ground west of the river in the days that followed. These forces were opposite the American right, but to attack this flank they had to re-cross the Bronx River.

Washington’s initial position was a good one, but his army was more secure in the position they occupied on the night of October 31-November 1 (the area at the top of the map).

October 28, 1776 (Part 2)

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

This is the second of four posts chronicling the events of October 28.

Synopsis for midday on October 28th: American infantry assembled on Chatterton’s Hill; Charles Stedman spotted an opportunity to destroy Washington’s army; the armies exchanged cannon fire; William Howe moved to seize Chatterton’s Hill.

Previous entry: Morning of October 28; next: Afternoon of October 28.

Washington decided to support the American troops on Chatterton’s Hill. It seems he first approached the elite Delaware Regiment (Alexander’s brigade, Spencer’s division) and ordered their commanding officer, Colonel John Haslet, to lead his regiment to the hill and take command of the militia there.

He then ordered Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall’s brigade (Lee’s division) to advance to the hill as well.

Among the men setting out with McDougall’s brigade was Second Lieutenant Elisha Bostwick of Charles Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment. Bostwick recently had a “sickness called bilious fever” which, he said, “took all the hair off my head”. He rejoined his regiment yesterday, but he was “still unable to do duty or guard”. As the troops marched off to battle, “some thought [I was] unable to go with them,” but, he said, “I chose to be with the company”.

Meanwhile, the head of the British army reached high ground south of the village of White Plains. For the first time, the British could clearly see how the American army was deployed. Commissary Charles Stedman wrote:

“They were encamped on a long ridge of hill, the brow of which was covered with lines hastily thrown up… The weakest part was the centre. The slope of the hill was very gradual in the direction of the road by the Court House. The lines were by no means formidable, not being fraized; and the rockiness of the soil prevented the ditch from being made of any troublesome depth.”

Stedman was convinced that “an assault… on the centre of the enemy’s works… would have been destruction to the Americans.” He noted that “When our army came in sight their tents were standing.” He could see the Americans were beginning to move their tents and baggage and this “together with the movement of troops backward and forward, in evident uncertainty of purpose, gave an extraordinary picture of alarm.” Thus, “victory was to be reasonably expected, not only from the valor of our troops, but from the confusion of the enemy.”

Unknown to Stedman, the British also had another advantage: the center of the American position was chiefly manned by inexperienced state troops and militia. With very few exceptions (e.g., Hand’s 1st Continental Regiment, Sargent’s 16th Continental Regiment), the Continentals were deployed on the left and right flanks of the army.

No immediate assault, however, could be made, as a number of units were still coming up.

As the British moved up and deployed, some of their artillery began to cannonade the mishmash of American troops on Chatterton’s Hill. Haslet recalled:

“We had not been many minutes on the ground, when the cannonade began, and the second shot wounded a militia-man in the thigh, upon which the whole regiment [of militia] broke and fled immediately, and were not rallied without much difficulty.”

In the center of the line, the Americans had a small stroke of success. Private Solomon Nash (Knox’s Artillery Regiment) noted, “about 12 o’clock the [British] light horse came near us[;] we fired and killed three men and 3 horses and took one of the enemy after a smart engagement.”

Major-General William Heath gave a different account of this incident:

“about twenty light-horse [of the 16th Light Dragoons], in full gallop, and brandishing their swords, appeared on the road leading to the courthouse, and now directly in front of General Heath's division. The light-horse leaped the fence of a wheat-field at the foot of the hill, on which Colonel Malcolm's [New York militia] regiment was posted, of which the light-horse were not aware, until a shot from Lieutenant Fenno's field-piece gave them notice, by striking in the midst of them, and [sending] a horseman pitching from his horse. They then wheeled short about, galloped out of the field as fast as they came in, rode behind a little hill in the road, and faced about, the tops of their caps only being visible to General Heath where he stood.”

Back on Chatterton’s Hill, Brigadier-General Alexander McDougall’s brigade came up and deployed for battle. Lieutenant Bostwick described “the place of action” as “a large field of fenced lots”. The British had a clear of these men, and Bostwick complained that they “were wholly exposed to the fire of their artillery”.

McDougall’s men were situated behind the Delaware Regiment, and Haslet noted that “Some of our officers expressed much apprehension from the fire of our friends so posted.” In other words, they didn’t want to be accidentally shot in the back if the British attacked. “On my application to the General [McDougall], he ordered us to the right, formed his own brigade on the left, and ordered [Colonel Eleazer] Brooks' Massachusetts Militia still farther to the right, behind a stone fence.”

This “stone fence” was part of a primitive fortification defended by Colonel John Moseley’s Massachusetts Militia Regiment. Orderly Sergeant Thomas Craige remembered that “Brook’s regiment, with some other troops, went into it. Brook’s regiment was next to us.”

All of this activity caught the eye of the British general staff.

Lieutenant-General William Howe later reported that “Colonel [Johann Gottlieb] Rall, who commanded a brigade of Hessians on the left, observing this position of the enemy and seeing a height on the other side of the Bronx unoccupied by them from whence their flank might be galled… took possession of it with great alacrity to the approbation of Lieutenant-General [Leopold Philip von] Heister who was acquainted with this movement by Sir William Erskine.”

Stedman thought that because the Americans were pushing men onto the hill, Howe was led “to imagine this hill to be of more importance than it… appeared to be”. Probably too, the British concluded that if the hill was worth taking, now was the time to take it. Major Stephen Kemble observed that the hill “might have cost us dear had we attempted it the next day”, that is, after the Americans had properly fortified it.

Howe wrote:

“Upon viewing the situation orders were given for a battalion of Hessians to pass the Bronx and attack this detached corps [of Americans on Chatterton’s Hill], supported by the 2nd brigade of British under the command of Brigadier-General [Alexander] Leslie, and the Hessian grenadiers sent from the right commanded by Colonel [Carl von] Donop, giving directions at the same time for Colonel Rall to charge the enemy’s flank”.

The Americans watched these developments with awe.

Captain William Hull (Charles Webb’s 19th Continental Regiment, McDougall’s brigade) remembered:

“we discovered at a distance the approach of the British army. Its appearance was truly magnificent. A bright autumnal sun shed its full luster on their polished arms; and the rich array of dress and military equipage, gave an imposing grandeur to the scene, as they advanced, in all the pomp and circumstance of war, to give us battle.”

This map (click to enlarge) illustrates the position of British (red numbers) and American units (blue circles) prior to the assault on Chatterton’s Hill.

There is some uncertainty as to exactly which American units were on the hill. The units represented are ones for which the source material clearly places on Chatterton’s Hill (as opposed to some other area of combat, such as the Mamaroneck Road). The location of these units on the map is somewhat approximate; particularly important to this reconstruction were the accounts by Joseph Plumb Martin, Benjamin Trumbull, Thomas Craige, John Haslet, John Brooks, and William Hull.

The British units represent the whole of von Heister’s column, minus several small commands (two battalions of the 71st Foot and some Provincials). This reconstruction of their deployment is based chiefly on the Charles Blaskowitz map of the battle, and, to a lesser extent, the accounts by Carl Leopold Baurmeister and Johann von Ewald. There are several discrepancies among these sources, which makes this representation more approximate than that for the Americans. For example, Blaskowitz did not show the 1st British brigade on his map; the location I’ve assigned to it follows from Ewald’s account, but it cannot be considered definite.

The village of White Plains and the Americans’ main defensive works are off-map to the upper right. Heister’s column advanced from the bottom of the map along the York (or East Chester) Road. Donop’s Hessian grenadiers marched into this area from the right edge of the map, probably near the units marked #6 and #7.

I commented on the development of this map in a couple of previous posts (here and here).

October 22, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 22nd: The Americans concentrated at White Plains; the British received a large reinforcement.

Previous entry: October 21st (Part 2); next: October 23rd.

Two American divisions (those of William Heath and Joseph Spencer) marched to White Plains on the night of October 21-22 [see footnote]. They reached White Plains early in the morning in an exhausted condition. Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion, Spencer’s division) wrote:

“The men slept on the ground in the streets [and] had nothing to cook with or to cover them, and many of them were exceeding[ly] hungry as well as sleepy and weary.”

It took some time for the new arrivals to become established. Major-General William Heath noted that his division “took post on the high strong ground… on the left of the line”. Looking around at the situation of the rest army, he saw that:

“The ground, from General Heath's left to the right, descended gradually a very considerable distance, and then gradually ascended up to the plain, and still on to the right to more commanding ground. On this was the American army formed, the line running nearly from northeast to southwest. There were some strong works thrown up on the plain, across the road, and still to the right of it… Headquarters were on the plain, near the crossroads.”

It wasn’t until the evening that a decision was made as to where to place Trumbull’s battalion. At last they were ordered from the center of the village over to the right side of the line, which meant, according to Trumbull, recrossing “with weary steps the ground we had… with so much labour travelled over [earlier].” Trumbull groused, “The men are worried in a manner to death and are treated with great hardship and severity, and in my opinion are put to much unnecessary hardship and fatigue.”

More men were on the way. On this date John Sullivan’s division marched for White Plains; probably so too did the division of Israel Putnam, which had been manning the defenses in upper Manhattan [see footnote].

Major-General Charles Lee’s men continued to occupy the Mile Square area. They had been defending the left flank of the army. However, the movement of Washington’s army to White Plains meant that their role was becoming one of defending the right flank of the army. In this position they safeguarded the slow-moving procession of provisions and other stores from upper Manhattan to White Plains.

As the British remained near the coast, Lee’s men had the opportunity to forage and look for plunder in the surrounding countryside. According to Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Regiment, Lee’s division):

“Amaziah Blackmore[,] a sergeant in Captain Blackmore’s company[,] went to Eastchester amongst the deserted houses to see what he could plunder[. He] was surrounded in the house with a lieutenant and a fifer and was made prisoner by about 30 Hessians and plundered of his shoe and knee buckles and 18 dollars in paper money and carried away… he watched [for] an opportunity and sprang from between [his guards]… and kicked away his shoes that were loose on his feet and got clear of them and came into camp again… Last night Captain Bailey and Lieutenant Richmond went down and plundered some houses at East Chester of household furniture to the value of 400 dollars and one colt[,] which the general made a present of to Captain Bailey”.

The British were aware of the desperate condition of the American army. As Commissary Charles Stedman later put it:

“The American army was now in a disagreeable situation. The soldiers were very poorly clothed, and a scarcity of provisions among them had been followed by much illness. Nor, amidst these disadvantages, was their position either secure or eligible in other respects. Their sole resource was to avoid action”.

Meanwhile, the British awaited fresh provisions and welcomed the arrival of more reinforcements. A second division of Hessians had recently crossed the Atlantic and was at New York City. This force consisted of six Hessian regiments (plus jaegers and artillerists) under the command of Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, and an additional regiment from the German state of Waldeck. On this date, the division left New York City and landed near New Rochelle.

Ambrose Serle witnessed the passage of these troops northward:

“This morning the Hessians… passed in flat-boats up the Eastern River towards the grand army. They were all in high spirits, and rowed along with drums beating, trumpets and fifes sounding, and colors flying in a very gallant order. They made a fine appearance altogether.”

The New York Gazette noted:

“It being a very fine day, the scene was rendered extremely beautiful by the crowds upon the water, [and the Hessians] cheering their military brethren and other spectators on shore, and making the hills resound with trumpets, French horns, drums and fifes, accompanied by the harmony of their voices.”

Among the new arrivals was Captain Johann von Ewald, who commanded the detachment of jaegers. Ewald wrote:

“…early on the morning of the 22nd[,] the flatboats appeared and took in the troops. As soon as the boats, each containing fifty men, had assembled on the western side of the city, the journey toward land was started up the East River. It was very pleasant. On the right we observed the well-cultivated shore of Long Island, and on the left the shore of York Island [i.e., Manhattan]. Everything was new to us and we liked it all.”

“Night overtook us and we continued our journey for several more hours in utter darkness. Since no one knew when or where we would land, we were plagued with boredom and curiosity. But at last we set foot on the coast of the province of New York in the vicinity of New Rochelle…. In the darkness all we could see was that the area was wooded. Dogs were barking nearby, hence we could assume that people must reside in the area.”

“The commanding general ordered the regiments to encamp and light fires… which was carried out promptly… sooner had several fires blazed than we heard cries of chickens, geese, and pigs which our resourceful soldiers had discovered. Within the hour, several roasts hung from long sticks before each fire. The whole camp was as busy as an anthill. From this one can see how easily a good soldier knows his way about.”

Footnote: The exact position of Washington’s divisions from one day to the next is difficult to piece together from the source material. That Alexander’s brigade (Spencer’s division) arrived in White Plains on the 21st is indicated by Rufus Putnam’s memoir, the journal of James McMichael, and the presence of men from this brigade in the action at Mamaroneck. That Heath’s division, followed by the remainder of Spencer’s division, reached White Plains on the morning of the 22nd is indicated by William Heath’s memoir, and Benjamin Trumbull’s journal. That Sullivan’s division reached White Plains on the night of the 22nd is indicated by Heath’s memoir and the journal of David How. At about the same time that Sullivan’s men moved, three companies of Knox’s Artillery marched from a point near Kingsbridge to White Plains. An artillerist in this detachment (Solomon Nash) recorded in his journal, “today about 10 o’clock we struck our tents and set out for White Plains and arrived there about 12 o’clock at night and encamped.”

I don’t have a copy of a journal by an infantryman in Israel Putnam’s division, but the overall pattern of activity in the army strongly suggests that Putnam’s men at least started the move from Manhattan to White Plains on the 22nd and that they completed the move no later than the 23rd.

October 13, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776.Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 13th: The Americans brought reinforcements into Westchester County; the British prepared for their next move.

Previous entry: October 12th; next: October 14th.

Major-General William Heath commanded the American troops in lower Westchester County. He observed that at Throg’s Neck “a large number of vessels, ships, brigs, schooners, sloops… etc.” were at anchor offshore. During the night of October 12-13, “[their] lanthorns were lighted and hung out at their yard arms which made a very extraordinary appearance.”

The Americans suspected the landing on Throg’s Neck was only a feint, and they thought the British might make a new landing elsewhere. Sure enough, the British showed no signs of attempting to force their way overland from Throg’s Neck. Instead, there was only scattered firing between the armies. According to Heath, “Captain Bryant [of Knox’s Artillery Regiment], now and then… saluted the British with a field-piece.”

To prepare against the various possible British moves, the Americans poured reinforcements into Westchester County. Alexander McDougall’s marched into Westchester County from Manhattan, and the brigades of John Glover and John Nixon were sent across the Hudson from New Jersey to Kingsbridge.

Screenshot of a Google Maps satellite view of Throg’s Neck (click to enlarge). The marked sites of the British landing and of Westchester Creek bridge are based on the Charles Blaskowitz map, shown partially below.

Excerpt of a Charles Blaskowitz showing the position of British and American forces on either side of Westchester Creek (click to enlarge). The American positions at the bridge (lower left) and at the head of the creek (upper left) were defended by troops from Colonel Edward Hand’s Pennsylvania brigade, Colonel William Prescott’s 7th Continental Regiment, Colonel Morris Graham’s New York militia regiment, and a couple of pieces of artillery. These troops (among others) were commanded by Major-General William Heath. Only part of the British army is visible. Blaskowitz depicted close to the bridge some companies of British light infantry (the red triangles), the 1st Jäger Company (two green triangles), and a detachment of light dragoons (the red and white square). Near the head of the creek is the 2nd British brigade (5th, 28th, 35th, 49th regiments of foot). The rest of the British army was encamped to the east or southeast.

The Throg’s Neck area is today heavily urbanized. The image below (screenshot using Google Maps) shows that the humble Westchester Creek Bridge has given way to several major traffic arteries.

British Commissary Charles Stedman later criticized Lieutenant-General William Howe for not immediately making another move. He called the landing on Throg’s Neck a “mistake” and said that it “should have been remedied instantly, by pushing along some other route”. The British landing craft were on hand, and the troops were already carrying provisions for this day and the next, but no move was made. Howe explained later that another move “would have been an imprudent measure, as it could not have been executed without much unnecessary risk.” Instead, Howe decided to wait until he was more fully prepared. During this time, he later wrote, “we were employed in getting up stores and provisions” and “the carriages and horses for transporting provisions, artillery, ammunition, and baggage.” More men were on the way as well.

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (15)

This is the final entry in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10, Part 11, Part 12, Part 13, Part 14.

In the “separate battle” at Guilford Courthouse, British forces attacking Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee’s flank corps found their flank and rear imperiled by the “Rockbridge Rifles” of Edward Stevens’ brigade of Virginia militia [Part 14].

The British drew men away from their primary attack to counter the Virginians, but they found the riflemen difficult to dislodge. Rifleman Andrew Wiley later remembered, “the British forces… were swept off [a ridge] by the Virginia Riflemen, but formed again and again”. [1]

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The model battlefield as the battle winds down (click to enlarge). The Americans first line was behind the fields near the bottom of the image, the second line was in the woods in the center, and the third line was at the top (where miniature redcoats can be seen driving back the American Continentals). The green-coated British Legion cavalry are massed behind the infantry. The “separate battle” is occurring along the right edge of the image.

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Meanwhile, Lee attempted to break off the action and join the Continentals on the third line. In his words:

Lee dispensed with his cavalry, heretofore held in the rear to cover retreat in case of disaster, ordering it to close with the left of the continental line, and there to act until it should receive further orders. Upon [Regiment von] Bose... [his troops] now turned with increased animation and with confidence of success. [2]

Lee’s men drove the Guardsmen and Hessians back a little ways. At that point:

Every obstacle now removed, Lee pressed forward... and joined his horse close by Guilford court-house.

However, by the time Lee’s troops reached the courthouse area, the battle for the third line was over. Lee then followed the rest of the army on its retreat.

After Lee retreated, the Rockbridge Rifles were the only sizable group of Americans left on the battlefield (Lee, perhaps, had been unaware of their presence). The Rifles soon were imperiled. At about the same time that Lee left the fight, British Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton was dispatched to aid the Hessians and Guardsmen with part of his British Legion cavalry. Tarleton recalled that en route:

[they] found officers and men of both corps wounded, and in possession of the enemy: The prisoners were quickly rescued from the hands of their captors, and the dragoons… [continued on] without delay. As soon as the cavalry arrived, the guards and the Hessians were directed to fire a volley upon the largest party of the militia, and, under the cover of the smoke, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton doubled round the right flank of the guards, and charged the Americans with considerable effect. The enemy gave way on all sides, and were routed with confusion and loss. [2]

Samuel Houston of the Rockbridge Rifles recalled running for his life from the charging horsemen: “we were obliged to run, and many were sore chased, and some cut down.” [3]

Houston and a number of other riflemen eventually found each other and made their way towards the American encampment.

Darkness and rainfall halted the movement of both armies. Houston’s party, which had several wounded men in it, spent a miserable night in the woods:

all being almost wearied out, we… encamped, where, through darkness and rain, and want of provisions we were in distress. Some parched a little corn. We stretched blankets to shelter some of us from the rain.

The British army encamped on the battlefield. Commissary General Charles Stedman recalled that:

The night… was remarkable for its darkness, accompanied with rain, which fell in torrents…. The cries of the wounded and dying who remained on the field of action during the night exceed all description. Such a complicated scene of horror and distress, it is hoped, for the sake of humanity, rarely occurs, even in a military life. [4]

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British Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis had been victorious at the battle of Guilford Courthouse as a victory, but only in a very narrow sense. He had driven the Americans from field, but more than 1 in 4 of his men were killed or wounded in the process. He also failed to achieve his primary objective – restoration of a favorable strategic situation in the southern theater through the destruction of the American army.

American Major-General Nathanael Greene’s army, however, had been greatly damaged. Many of his Continentals had been killed or wounded, and much of his militia was scattered. Some of the North Carolina militia simply went home after the battle; some left out of disgust with what they felt was poor leadership by their commanders.

Greene’s situation was in a sense the opposite of that of Cornwallis. He had been unsuccessful on the tactical level (his defense-in-depth had not stopped the British attack), but he was closer than before to achieving his strategic objectives. Cornwallis gave up his pursuit of Greene’s army and moved eastward where he could be supplied. That move gave Greene an open road into South Carolina, and he soon undertook the reconquest of that state.

When Greene moved south, he expected Cornwallis would abandon North Carolina and try to defend British holdings in South Carolina. Instead, Cornwallis, after being resupplied, moved north into Virginia.

Cornwallis later explained that a retreat into South Carolina would have been difficult to undertake and would further weaken his army. Moreover, he suspected that the fight for control of the South Carolina backcountry would be over before his troops arrived. Cornwallis knew that Virginia was Greene’s main source of men and supplies. He reasoned that no action could better preserve British holdings in the south than taking Virginia out of the war. Furthermore, Virginia was vulnerable: its fine ports and rich plantations were defended by little more than militia.

Neither commander got exactly what he wanted from these moves. Greene had considerable trouble driving the British from the South Carolina backcountry; the campaign in this quarter dragged on for months. Cornwallis had an easy and successful campaign when he first arrived in Virginia, but he was unable to stop Greene’s activity in South Carolina. Furthermore, American resistance in Virginia grew stronger with time. By late summer, 1781, Cornwallis’ operations were largely confined to the coast, and in October his army was besieged and forced to surrender at Yorktown.

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Notes:

1. Pension application of Andrew Wiley.

2. Lee's and Tarleton's accounts of the battle (among others) can be found in this compendium.

3. Houston's account appears in William Henry Foote (1855). Sketches of Virginia....

4. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (14)

This is Part 13 in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10, Part 11, Part 12, Part 13.

While British and American regulars battled on the 3rd line at Guilford Courthouse (parts 9-13 in this series), a separate battle took place in the woods to the south. There, Regiment von Bose and the 1st Battalion of Guards advanced against the American light troops in Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee’s flank corps.

The British troops were at a disadvantage in the heavily wooded terrain. Commissary General Charles Stedman later wrote:

[The Guards] suffered greatly in ascending a woody height to attack the second line of the Americans, strongly posted upon the top of it, who, availing themselves of the advantages of their situation, retired, as soon as they had discharged their pieces, behind the brow of the hill, which protected them from the shot of the guards, and returned, as soon as they had loaded, and were again in readiness to fire. [1]

The Guards at last seized this hill and pressed on to attack another line of Americans. However:

the battalion was not in regular order when it received the fire of the third American line. The enemy’s fire… poured in not only on the front but flank of the battalion… [until] it was at last entirely broken. Fortunately, at this time, the Hessian regiment of Bose… was advancing in firm and compact order on the left of the guards, to attack the enemy.

The Hessians then wheeled to their right, engaged the Americans, and allowed the Guards to rally. Stedman added:

No sooner had the guards and Hessians defeated the enemy in front, than they found it necessary to return and attack another body of them [the Americans] that appeared in the rear; and in this manner were they obliged to traverse the same ground in various directions, before the enemy were completely put to the rout.

The troops to the rear were probably the Rockbridge Rifles of Brigadier-General Edward Stevens’ brigade of Virginia militia. These troops held a part of the woods in between the British troops in the separate battle and the rest of the British army; thus, they remained on the American second line long after the rest of the Virginia militia had retreated.

The Virginians at last got into action with the 1st Guards. According to Samuel Houston:

we fired on their flank, and that brought down many of them… We pursued them about forty poles [220 yards] to the top of a hill, where they stood, and we retreated from them back to where we formed. Here we repulsed them again; and they a second time made us retreat back to our first ground, where we were deceived by a reinforcement of Hessians, whom we took for our own [both Hessians and Continentals wore blue coats], and cried to them to see if they were our friends, and shouted Liberty! Liberty! and advanced up till they let off some guns; then we fired sharply on them, and made them retreat a little. [2]

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Regiment von Bose drives Virginia riflemen and North Carolina militiamen through the woods at the beginning of the separate battle (here and below, click to enlarge).

In the foreground, the 1st Battalion of Guards struggles against the Rockbridge Rifles. In the background, Regiment von Bose attacks the flank of Lee’s flank corps.

Another view of the above.

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Notes:

1. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

2. Houston's account appears in William Henry Foote (1855). Sketches of Virginia....

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (8)

This is the eighth in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7.

Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee had been placed at the head of a flank corps (or “corps of observation”) that consisted of his own legion of infantry and cavalry, some Virginian Continental light infantry, and a corps of riflemen from western North Carolina and Virginia. As briefly noted in Part 1, this corps skirmished with the British on the British march to Guilford Courthouse. Lee’s men then took position on the extreme left end of the first American line.

It so happened that the right end of the British line (Regiment von Bose) passed through this field, giving Lee what he thought was a magnificent opportunity to stymie the British attack. He later wrote:

[the men] raked by their fire the right of the British wing, entirely uncovered… The appearance in this quarter was so favorable that sanguine hopes were entertained by many of the officers, from the manifest advantage possessed, of breaking down the enemy’s right before he approached the fence; and the troops exhibited the appearance of great zeal and alacrity. [1]

However, he claimed that he could not capitalize on the opportunity, because of the rapid collapse of the North Carolina militia on the first line (see Part 4). The sudden retreat of the North Carolinians “threw the corps of Lee out of combination with the army, and also exposed it to destruction.”

Regiment von Bose, aided by the 1st battalion of Guards (brought up from reserve), began to pursue Lee’s men. However, according to Charles Stedman:

the first battalion of the guards, and the regiment of Bose, [were] greatly impeded in advancing by the excessive thickness of the woods, which rendered their bayonets of little use. The broken corps of the enemy were thereby encouraged to make frequent stands, and to throw in an irregular fire… [2]

The pursuit of Lee caused the 1st Guards and Hessians to become separated from the rest of the British army. Soon, they would find themselves in a desperate fight for survival in the deep woods.

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At the beginning of the battle, Regiment von Bose was placed on the right end of the British line, alongside the 71st Regiment of Foot (Fraser’s Highlanders).

However, after the American first line was defeated, the two regiments headed in slightly different directions, and a gap opened between them.

The further the two regiments advanced, the larger the gap became. In this image, the 71st is approaching Brigadier-General Edward Stevens’ brigade, while Regiment von Bose skirmishes with riflemen in Lee’s corps.

However, Regiment von Bose was not without support; the 1st Battalion of British Guards was soon ordered up to their assistance.

Lee’s Legion (foreground) and Campbell’s Virginia riflemen (background) skirmish with the British and Hessians in the woods.

Parties of riflemen contest the Hessians’ advance.

Virginia light infantry cause trouble for the 1st Guards.

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Notes:

In this post I describe the beginning of what is known as the "separate battle" at Guilford Courthouse. I've commented previously on different ways the source material for this part of the battle can be interpreted (see here).

1. Henry Lee. (1812). Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States.

2. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

Guilford Courthouse in Miniature (5)

This is the fourth in a series of posts depicting the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature. Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4.

The initial British attack was directed against the North Carolina militia, who formed a defensive line behind a rail fence. The attack was successful, but soon the British left wing found itself threatened on its flank.

The British left wing was led by Lieutenant-Colonel James Webster and consisted of the 23rd and 33rd regiments, supported by British Guards and Hessian jaegers.

According to Charles Stedman (British officer and later historian), Webster found “the left of the thirty-third regiment exposed to a heavy fire from the right wing of the enemy, which greatly out-flanked him …” [1]

Webster’s assailants came from a corps of cavalry, light infantry, and riflemen commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel William Washington. Early in the fighting a picked body of the riflemen were dispatched to skirmish with the British. This group (about 50 men) were led by Major John Callaway of Virginia. According to one rifleman, the men gave “the Enemys left Flank four or five destructive fires [before] the Major ordered a Retreat”. [2]

Stedman noted that Webster “changed his front to the left…. [and] moving to the left with the thirty-third regiment, supported by the light-infantry of the guards, and the yagers, routed and put to flight the right wing of the enemy…” [1]

However, the American retreat came only after a stubborn defense.

James Collins, who was with a part of the North Carolina militia, recalled that “He, with most of his company stood till they got four fires” [3]

Sergeant-Major William Seymour of the Delaware light infantry wrote that:

“our riflemen and musquetry behaved with great bravery, killing and wounding great numbers of the enemy. Colonel Washington’s Light Infantry on the right flank was attacked by three British regiments, in which they behaved with almost incredible bravery …” [4]

The first American line retreats before the British infantry. In the background are Virginian militia from the brigades of Brigadier-General Robert Lawson and Brigadier-General Edward Stevens. The 33rd Regiment of Foot (red and white flag) attacks Lynch’s riflemen while British Guards and Jaegers (bottom and right) come up to reinforce the British line.

The 33rd Foot attacks Lynch’s riflemen with the bayonet.

The 33rd Foot, wheeling to the left, confronts Continental light infantry.

Notes:

1. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2.

2. Pension application of Joel Leftwich.

3. Pension application of James Collins.

4. William Seymour (1896). A journal of the southern expedition: 1780-1783. Papers of the Historical Society of Delaware, 15, 3-42.

The three British "regiments" possibly refer to be the 33rd Foot, the Hessian jaegers, and the Guards' light infantry company.

The “Separate Battle” at Guilford Courthouse

The British army at Guilford Courthouse deployed for battle in a well-ordered formation. However, this order did not last very long. As the British routed the first American line, and drove into a forest to attack the second, the British regiments became scattered and disorganized. Two British units drifted so far to the right of the others that they fought what has been called a “separate battle” at Guilford Courthouse.

The two British units in the separate battle were Regiment von Bose and the 1st battalion of Guards. These two unit fought two American formations: Henry Lee’s flank corps and the “Rockbridge Rifles” [1].

The source material does not allow one to trace the exact movements of the units in this fight, but some generalities can be stated with confidence.

One of the most helpful accounts for understanding the course of the separate battle was composed by Charles Stedman, a British staff officer who wrote one of the first military histories of the Revolutionary War [2].

According to Stedman, the advancing 1st Guards found themselves facing, alone, a withering fire from a hilltop. The Guards eventually seized this position, but only to find that “another line of the Americans presented itself to view, extending far beyond the right of the guards, and inclining towards their flank, so as almost to encompass them.” The fire from in front and from the right “completed its confusion and disorder” until the battalion “was at last entirely broken.”

Stedman went on to relate that the Guards were saved by “the fortunate arrival of the regiment of Bose” which “was advancing in firm and compact order on the left of the guards...” The Hessians then wheeled to their right and attacked the Americans while the Guards rallied. The two units then made a unified drive against the Americans.

The "separate battle" at Guilford Courthouse according to Stedman (click to enlarge). The image has been cropped and red arrows drawn onto the map to clearly show the path taken by the 1st Guards and Regiment von Bose (these are indicated by faint dashed lines on the original map).

The Stedman map shows the separate battle to have been centered on a prominent hill south and west of the American third line. This hill will also be included in the Guilford Courthouse diorama I am preparing. The figure below depicts the area I am modeling (at left: the roads, fields, and topographic features that will be modeled; at right: a modern topographic map of the same area).

Below I show how the movements depicted on the Stedman map correspond with my project map. The four panels in this map represent, from left to right, four successive stages in the separate battle (note that the final phases of the separate battle are not shown). The following units are represented by numbers: 1) 1st Guards, 2) Regiment von Bose, 3) Lee’s flank corps. In the first panel, Regiment von Bose attacks the American first line, and the 1st Guards is brought up from reserve to extend the British line. In the second panel, the 1st Guards approaches a hill defended by Lee’s men. In the third panel, the 1st Guards takes the hilltop, but is driven back in disorder. In the fourth panel, Regiment von Bose wheels to the right and attacks the Americans while the 1st Guards rally.

(click to enlarge)

Although the 1st Guards and Regiment von Bose had taken a key position, the separate battle was far from over. According to Stedman:

No sooner had the guards and Hessians defeated the enemy in front, than they found it necessary to return and attack another body of them [Americans] that appeared in the rear; and in this manner were they obliged to traverse the same ground in various directions, before the enemy were completely put to the rout.

The separate battle finally ended when Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton arrived with part of the British cavalry. These troops scattered “a few hardy rifle-men” who had remained behind to harry the British.

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Another valuable source on the separate battle is the journal of Samuel Houston of the Rockbridge Rifles. The Rockbridge Rifles was positioned on the extreme left of the American second line (in Brigadier-General Edward Stevens' brigade). Houston wrote that:

...the enemy appeared to us; we fired on their flank, and that brought down many of them; at which time Capt. Tedford was killed. We pursued them about forty poles [i.e., 660 feet], to the top of a hill, where they stood, and we retreated from them back to where we formed. Here we repulsed them again; and they a second time made us retreat back to our first ground, where we were deceived by a reinforcement of Hessians, whom we took for our own, and cried to them to see if they were our friends, and shouted Liberty! Liberty! and advanced up till they let off some guns; then we fired sharply on them, and made them retreat a little. [3]

Presumably, the “the enemy [who] appeared to us” were men of the 1st Guards, and the “Hessians” were men of Regiment von Bose.

There are two basic ways of reconciling Houston’s account with Stedman’s. One way is to assume that the events described by Houston correspond with the first set of events described by Stedman (the attack of the 1st Guards up a hill, their retreat, and subsequent relief by Regiment von Bose). The other way is to assume that the events described by Houston correspond with the second set of events described by Stedman (the appearance of an American force in the rear of the British and the subsequent round of back-and-forth combat in the woods).

As described below, neither method of reconciling the accounts is wholly satisfactory, leaving as an open question what exactly took place during the separate battle.

First, consider the possibility that the combat described by Houston took place earlier rather than later. In this case, the initial sequence of events in the separate battle might look something like this (click to enlarge):

The four panels in this map represent, from left to right, four successive stages in the separate battle (note that the final phases of the separate battle are not shown). The following units are represented by numbers: 1) 1st Guards, 2) Regiment von Bose, 3) Lee’s flank corps, 4) Rockbridge Rifles. In the first panel, Regiment von Bose attacks the American first line, and the 1st Guards is brought up from reserve to extend the British line. In the second panel, the 1st Guards attacks a hill defended by Lee’s men. The Rockbridge Rifles spy the flank of the Guards and attack it. In the third panel, fighting rages back and forth between the 1st Guards and the Rockbridge Rifles. At last, the 1st Guards is saved by the advance of Regiment von Bose. In the fourth panel, Regiment von Bose wheels to the right and attacks the Americans and the 1st Guards rally and renew the attack.

A difficulty in combining the accounts in this way is that some statements by Stedman and Houston appear to contradict.

• Stedman’s account indicates that the Guards were attacked on their right flank; Houston’s account suggests that the Guards were attacked on their left flank.
• Stedman’s account suggests that the Guards advanced on a relatively straight line, interrupted by one brief retreat. Houston’s account indicates that the fighting raged back and forth over a wide area.
• Stedman’s account suggests that the Guards were forced to retreat from a hill; Houston’s account indicates that the Guards were forced to retreat to a hill.

I tried to finesse these differences in the above figure, but the interpretation is not without problems. For example, the above figure makes it appear that Regiment von Bose was very slow in reaching the separate battle. This seems implausible in light of comments made by the British army commander, Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis, in his after action report:

the Hessian regiment of Bose deserves my widest praises for its discipline, alacrity, and courage, and does honor to Major Du Buy, who commands it, and who is an officer of superior merit. [4]

Why would Cornwallis have praised the regiment’s “alacrity” if it was slow to advance?

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An alternative way of combining the accounts by Stedman and Houston is to assume that the combat described by Houston occurred relatively late in the battle (when the British discovered an American force to their rear). In this case, the initial sequence of events in the separate battle might look something like the figure below (click to enlarge).

The eight panels in this map represent, from upper left to lower right, eight successive stages in the separate battle (note that the final phases of the separate battle are not shown). The following units are represented by numbers: 1) 1st Guards, 2) Regiment von Bose, 3) Lee’s flank corps, 4) Rockbridge Rifles. In the first panel, Regiment von Bose attacks the American first line, and the 1st Guards is brought up from reserve to extend the British line. In the second panel, the 1st Guards approaches a hill defended by Lee’s men. In the third panel, the 1st Guards reach the top of the hill, only to be forced to retreat when the Americans attack their right flank. The Guards are given time to rally by the arrival of Regiment von Bose. In the fourth panel, Regiment von Bose wheels to the right and attacks the Americans. In the fifth panel, the 1st Guards renews the attack. In the sixth panel, the 1st Guards and Regiment von Bose are forced to fight off party of Americans in their rear. In the seventh panel, the 1st Guards run into a deadly fire from the Rockbridge Rifles while pursuing one group of Americans. Meanwhile, Regiment von Bose continues to fight off small parties of Americans. In the eighth panel, back and forth fighting has begun between the 1st Guards and the Rockbridge Rifles. Panels 7 and 8 correspond with the beginning of the quoted passage in Houston’s journal.

A ninth panel, were it included, would show part of Regiment von Bose advancing on the Rockbridge Rifles, as per Houston’s account. Note that in the first interpretation, the Hessians advanced on the Rifles from the west, while in this case the Hessians advanced on the Rifles from the east. I think the change in direction is a strong point of the second interpretation. It’s more plausible that the Rockbridge Rifles would have been deceived by a body of men advancing from the east – the direction from which reinforcements might be expected – than from the west – the direction from which the British originally attacked.

One cause for skepticism about this interpretation is that it is terribly complicated. Also problematic is that there is not a lot of evidence to support the fine points depicted in the figure above.

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I'm not sure how I will handle the details of the separate battle when I begin representing the battle of Guilford Courthouse in miniature later this month. Feel free to leave a comment as to how you would interpret the source material.

Notes:

1. Lee’s flank corps consisted of Lee’s Legion, some militia dragoons, and a corps riflemen. After the battle started, they were joined by some diehards among the North Carolina militia. The Rockbridge Rifles was a regiment of Virginia militia on the extreme left of the American second line. (See The Americans at Guilford Courthouse).

2. Charles Stedman. (1794). The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War, Vol. 2. Note that Stedman is believed to have been at the battle of Guilford Courthouse, but it has not been established that he was an eyewitness to the separate battle. In any event, his account was probably composed years after the battle.

3. William Henry Foote (1855). Sketches of Virginia...

4. A copy of Cornwallis' report can be found in this useful compendium of primary sources.