October 15, 1776

From October 8th to November 1st, I am blogging about the White Plains “campaign” of 1776. Click here for an overview of this project, a listing of the sources used, and other general information.

Synopsis for October 15th: The standoff at Throg’s Neck continued; the armies prepared for another movement; Hugh Mercer led a raid onto Staten Island.

Previous entry: October 14th; next: October 16th.

The uneasy standoff at Throg’s Neck (commonly called Frog’s Point) continued into a fourth day. American Major General William Heath noted, “The scattering fire across the marsh continued, and now and then a man was killed.” Sergeant John Smith (Lippitt’s Rhode Island State Regiment) was witness to one of these incidents:

“in the morning… I walked out to see the country and found plenty of… apples and peaches and [I] went as far as our lower lines and saw the enemy on Frog’s Point where they was at an house over a creek[,] a little beyond musket shot of our guard[.] One who appeared like an officer ventured down to the creek and was shot down by one of our men and was carried up by them to the house”.

Archibald Robertson of the Royal Engineers noted that he spent the day “raising two mock batteries… opposite the bridge… and a line opposite theirs on our right” by the head of the creek. These batteries made it look as if the British would attempt an overland push across Westchester Creek. In actuality, the British were preparing to bypass the American defenses by landing on another part of the coast.

Newly-arrived American Major General Charles Lee did not know what move the British would make next, but he felt that the Americans should not wait for it in their present position. According to Chaplain Benjamin Trumbull (5th Connecticut State Battalion)*:

“General Lee… thought that the situation of the army of the States of America was much too confined and cramped, and that it could not be good policy to lie still in such a situation, or to hazard the great cause in which we were embarked in one general action, in which if we should not succeed, the army might be lost, as a retreat would be extremely difficult if not impossible.”

George Washington was also troubled by the situation of the army. He doubted that he had enough men to prevent the British from taking control of the Hudson, maintain the army’s fortifications in upper Manhattan, and counter the British advance into Westchester County. He wrote that:

“…we are obliged to divide our force, and guard every probable place of attack as well as we can; as most of our stores are here [in upper Manhattan] and about King's Bridge, and the preservation of the communication with the States on the other side of Hudson’s River [is] a matter of great importance… I have sent two regiments of the Massachusetts militia up the river to watch the motions of the [British] ships [cf.October 9th & 10th], and to oppose any landing of men that they may attempt. I am also extending every part of my force that I possibly can… to oppose the enemy [inWestchester County], and prevent their effecting their plan… but our numbers being far inferior to the demands for men, I cannot answer for what may happen: the most in my power shall be done.”

The American stance at this time was not wholly defensive.

In Connecticut, Governor Jonathan Trumbull and Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Livingston (2ndNew York Regiment) had begun to wage war on British Loyalists occupying Long Island. They were in the process of rounding up men and boats so as to make a major raid.

In New Jersey, Major-General Nathanael Greene and Brigadier-General Hugh Mercer led on this date a raid onto Staten Island. Staten Island was the first base of operations for the British army in the New York City area. However, by this date the island was largely stripped of troops.

Colonel Samuel Patterson was present with a battalion of Delaware militia. He later wrote:

“in the evening, General Mercer ordered part of four battalions to… go on board boats at eight o’clock that evening. We did, in the whole about six hundred men, with two pieces of brass artillery. We crossed all about ten o’clock at night, in order to attack a small fort at the east end of that island, at the watering-place, and to be there by break of day,--seventeen miles, our battalion in front”.

While the Americans were marching across the island, a messenger caught up with the generals and informed them that Washington had called for a council of war that would convene in the morning. Greene left, but Mercer continued ahead.

According to Patterson, “At the same time” we were “informed… that the fort was reinforced the day before by the arrival of fresh troops… to about twelve hundred men.”

Mercer gave up the idea of taking the fort and sent back the artillery. However, he also learned of a target of opportunity. He afterwards reported, “I was then advanced within a few miles of Richmond town [on Staten Island], and received information… that a company of British troops, one of Hessians and one of [Cortland] Skinner’s [Loyalist] militia [the New Jersey Volunteers], lay there.” He issued orders to surround and capture these men.

According to Patterson, Mercer ordered Patterson and one Colonel Samuel Griffin to take the Delaware militia and two rifle companies to a point “about a mile below the town… and to lay about there till near break of day”. There they would cut off the retreat of the British troops. “General Mercer’s plan was—he to attack, with his party, in three places, and we to be ready at the same time in the other quarters.”

Patterson added: “[Mercer] is… as cool in his plans as a philosopher. I love him.”

*The letter was anonymous; Ezra Stiles believed Trumbull was the author.

Battle of Longueuil (3)

This is the third of three posts on the October 30, 1775, battle of Longueuil. For the first two parts, see here and here.

On the morning of October 30, 1775, British forces in Montreal boarded boats in the harbor and set out to do battle with American forces on the other side of the St. Lawrence River. A larger vessel (probably the schooner Gaspé and probably with Governor Guy Carleton himself on board) led the way. There were around 34 boats in total, most of them small craft. Claude-Nicolas-Guillaume de Lorimier, commanded the Canadian militia from one small boat, which contained “two rudders, eight rowers and others ready to fire.”

The Battle of Longueuil (click to enlarge). The numbers on the map correspond with the numbers below describing key events during the battle. The arrows indicate the approximate location of troop movements during the battle.

1. A little before noon, the small boats passed Île Ronde and became visible to the Americans. A crowd of civilians followed the boats and watched events from the northern shore.

2. The American forces were garrisoned at Longueuil on the southern shore. When the boats came into view, the troops marched down to the riverfront. They brought with them a recently arrived 4-pounder cannon. This functioned as a kind of secret weapon, which the soldiers hid by standing close around it.

3. The British boats did not make a direct descent on Longueuil. Instead, the schooner turned back upstream. The Americans dispatched a company-sized detachment to follow it. When the schooner neared the southern shore, the Americans began firing at it. The schooner then appeared to veer away, and the rest of the boats followed and “promenaded” past Longueuil.

When the British boats reached Île Ste Hélène, some of the Canadians and Native Americans disembarked. This group, under the command of de Lorimier’s brother (Jean-Claude-Chamilly) went down to the shallow water separating Île Ste Hélène from the southern shore. Meanwhile de Lorimier arranged the boats in a line of battle.

American Continentals of the 2nd New York Regiment follow the British boats.

4. More and more American infantry were sent upstream until only the 4-pounder gun and its crew were left in the village.

5. Carleton, however, did not immediately give the signal to attack (he was to fire two cannons). While de Lorimier waited, Chaptes La Corne Saint-Luc came alongside him in a canoe paddled by Algonquians. They were singing a war song. La Corne Saint-Luc was an experienced officer and part of Carleton’s inner circle. When de Lorimier asked him what was to be done, La Corne Saint-Luc pointed ahead and said “Voilà l'endroit où il faut se distinguer.” De Lorimier took this to be the general order, and at that moment, he recalled:

“I made the cry of attack - My brother, on the cry, rushed with all his Indians on the shoals to get to the mainland, from sandbar to sandbar and rock to rock…”

The boats then advanced “in line, all in the same order, all my boats on my left and to the right those Indians who might listen to my orders. We proceeded in that order.”

The Americans were now taking position on the southern shore opposite Île Ste Hélène. Many lay down behind the river bank, which formed in places a natural breastwork. Others crouched behind pine trees. Two Indians got to the shore as the Americans were deploying. One David Mallary of the Green Mountain Boys ran down and captured one. The other got away and hid in a barn (he was captured that night).

The Green Mountain Boys take position before British forces can get to shore.

Then the Americans opened fire as a number of Indians and Canadians neared shore. These men were horribly exposed, and they either ducked down behind rocks or took shelter on the small islands. They returned fire against an enemy they could barely see.

The Green Mountain Boys, prone behind the river bank, fire on British forces in the river.

Carleton was not pleased, and he soon gave the signal for the troops to withdraw. Some immediately fell back, but others found themselves pinned down close to shore. The boats did not uniformly respond either. De Lorimier was so focused on what lay ahead of him, that he initially missed the signal to retreat. When his boat did withdraw, he observed a boat containing some men of the 26th regiment that had gotten caught on the rocks. The men on board could not extricate themselves, and they lay down waiting for night to fall.

From out in the river, the British fired shot and shell on the Americans. None struck the well-protected Americans, although there were close calls. Lieutenant John Fassett of the Green Mountain Boys recalled, “There was one shell broke within a few feet of my head right over me. The pieces flew all around me and there were men lying very thick around me, but none received any harm.”

6. Carleton then ordered some of the boats to descend on the village, but when these boats neared shore, they were repulsed by the Americans’ cannon.

Sporadic musket fire continued along the shore. There, Fassett had another close call: “I had got my gun charged and was lying flat on my belly as all the rest were and was going to get up to see if I could see anybody to shoot at when one spoke and said: “There is a man running, shoot him!” I put my head a little higher when all at once our men fired very brisk and one that was behind me fired his gun over my head so that it seemed to shake my head, and Capt’n Stanton that was close behind me said that he expected I was killed. He said it did not go more than one inch from my head the whole charge, but it did not hurt me.”

The American infantry received some small reinforcements. Captain John Nicholson's company of the 3rd New York arrived from La Prairie. More importantly, the gun crew in Longueuil brought their cannon up river, and fired on some more boats and raked the small islands in the river.

By this time, Carleton had had enough, and he and his flotilla returned to Montreal. His last order was for “fires on the island [to be lit] to warm the Indians who might withdraw.”

According to Fassett:

“By this time it had begun to be dark. Then we hailed the Enemy (for there were some within 30 rods) and told them that if they would come ashore to us they could have good quarter, there were 3 behind one rock that said they would. We waited for them sometime. Then we called again. They said they had a wounded man they could not bring. Col. Warner [i.e., Lieutenant-Colonel Seth Warner] told them to leave him and come ashore and if they offered to run back, or if they fired a gun, Death was their portion. Then we see one stepping off the other way Col. Warner ordered us to fire. The gun cracked merrily at him. He fell down and crawled off, but whether we hit him I don’t know.”

The Vermonters then brought off the wounded man, a Mohawk that de Lorimier called, “my great chief Hotgouentagehte.” He was bleeding profusely from a leg wound, and he died soon after being brought on shore. The other man was Jean-Baptiste Lemoine dit Despins, who, according to Fassett, “was a gentleman… [whose] father is one of the richest men in Montreal.” Other men venturing out into the water took prisoner a militiaman named Lacoste.

The battle of Longueuil was a one-sided victory for the Americans. Captain Wait Hopkins of the Green Mountain Boys was slightly wounded. There were no other American casualties.

British casualties are uncertain. The Americans found two dead Native Americans after the battle (in addition to the Mohawk chief), and they captured two Native Americans and two Canadians. De Lorimier knew about the losses reported by the Americans, but he did not mention any other Canadian or Native American casualties. He did, however, state that there were two killed and three wounded in the stranded boat containing troops of the 26th regiment.

The Americans believed they inflicted heavy losses. According to Fassett, the Americans learned from a Canadian prisoner that “we killed 12 men in the first Boat that tried to land. They said they believed we killed 9 others and wounded about 50 men.” But where were the bodies? Either their deaths were imagined or the dead were carried away by the river. Their fire had certainly seemed devastating. During the battle, Fassett noted, “We saw numbers fall down and some never got up again.”

Fassett slept little that night, and the next day he witnessed the burial of the Native Americans:

“The 3 Indians were buried when we got there. Canadians were digging a grave for them. They dug it about 2 ft. and a half deep, then put them in stark naked with their faces downward, two at the bottom with their heads both one way, the other on top with his head at the others feet. Then they flung on dirt and then stones. ‘Twas such a funeral as I never saw before. Nothing extra, it is very cold.”

Note:

This account of the battle of Longueuil is constructed chiefly from the journal of John Fassett, and the memoirs of Guillaume de Lorimier and Simon Sanguinet (both published in Verreau's 1873 Invasion du Canada). Attention was also paid to brief descriptions of the battle appearing in a number of other places, such as this letter from Richard Montgomery to Philip Schuyler, and this letter from one of the men besieging Fort Saint-Jean.

Also helpful were the entries in the Dictionary of Canadian Biography on Claude-Nicolas-Guillaume de Lorimier, and Chaptes La Corne Saint-Luc.

Battle of Longueuil (2)

At the end of October, 1775, Guy Carleton, governor of Quebec, prepared to cross the St. Lawrence River and do battle with the American Continentals gathered on the far shore. To carry out this mission, he had a small army consisting of about 130 British regulars, 80 Native Americans, and around 500 Canadian militia [1]. He had also around 34 boats of various sizes to carry his troops across the river, plus the armed schooner Gaspé.

A significant problem facing Carleton was that the river did not lend itself to amphibious operations. Major Henry Livingston, who commanded the American forces at La Prairie, noted that the river “is very unsafe to navigate. The rocks often projecting just out of the water above a mile from either shore & some but a few Inches under the surface & very dangerous for Battoes or Canoes to strike on.” [2]

Perhaps for this reason, Carleton decided to make his attack near Longueuil, in a place where the water was so shallow that men could wade to shore from an island [Île Ste Hélène] well out in the river. This permitted the attack to be made in two parts: “a number were to wade and the rest to come with their boats.”

The nearest American defenders were 2 miles away in the village of Longueuil. This force, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Seth Warner, included all or nearly all of the Green Mountain Boys, and 5 or 6 companies of the 2nd New York regiment. There, the officers took lodging in some houses while the men encamped in or about an ancient stone fort. [4]

Carleton organized the Canadian militia into “brigades,” and asked the prominent citizens of Montreal to select one from their ranks to lead the Canadians and Indians. They chose Claude-Nicolas-Guillaume de Lorimier, a 31-year-old volunteer who had previously distinguished himself in operations around Fort Saint-Jean. [5]

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A view of Montreal, from the St. Lawrence River.

A view of Montreal from Mont Royal. The city and its suburbs are visible in the middle ground. At center left is Île Ste Hélène. The battle of Longueuil was fought between this island and the far shore of the river.

The fort at Longueuil. This drawing shows the fort's appearance in the early 19th-Century, before it was demolished.

Maps of the area between Île Ste Hélène and the southern shore of the St. Lawrence, dating from 1866 (top), 1915 (middle), and 1952 (bottom). The river is quite shallow at this point, and in various places the sandbars create small islands. A comparison of the three maps suggests that these small islands would change over time.

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Notes:

1. Simon Sanguinet, a resident of Montreal, claimed in his memoir that there were 130 regulars, 80 Native Americans, and 800 Canadian militia. Other sources suggest that Carleton's army was smaller, especially in terms of Canadian militia. For example, the day after the battle Lieutenant John Fassett (a copy of his journal is available here) learned from a Canadian prisoner that Carleton had commanded “660 men, that 100 were Regulars, and the rest Canadians and a few Indians.”

2. A copy of Livingston's journal is available here.

3. Sanguinet and de Lorimier stated that the attack was made from Île Ste Hélène. The quoted passage is from Fassett's journal and it refers to a prisoner's description of Carleton's plan of attack.

4. cf. journals by Fassett and Livingston.

5. This description is based on de Lorimier's memoir. In September he co-led the party that halted the first American advance on Fort Saint-Jean. When Moses Hazen was captured by the British on September 18, de Lorimier was given the assignment of taking him back to Montreal. At this time, almost everyone making the journey between Montreal and Fort Saint-Jean was captured by the Americans; de Lorimier was successful despite having a prisoner in tow. Afterwards, de Lorimier claimed that John Brown offered him the position of major with the Americans if he would switch sides. He did not.

Battle of Longueuil (1)

The American Invasion of Canada has been a recurring theme of this blog. Last month I wrote about two events that took place during this campaign. On September 25, 1775, the Americans began to bombard Fort Saint-Jean. Most of the British regulars defending Canada were trapped in this fort. On the same day, the British defeated Ethan Allen’s men in the battle of Longue-Pointe. Afterwards, hundreds of Canadian militia rallied to the support of the British governor Guy Carleton.

By the beginning of October, Carleton had amassed a small army at Montreal which he hoped to use to raise the siege of Fort Saint-Jean. This army consisted of 900 or so militia, 100 Native Americans (Algonquians and Mohawk), and more than 100 British regulars [1].

However, Carleton took no immediate action.

• He lacked reliable information on American numbers and deployment.
• He doubted that his militia would overpower Montgomery’s Continentals.
• He was hopeful of obtaining additional militia from the rural parishes.
• He wanted Lieutenant-Colonel Allan Maclean to come to his assistance with British troops garrisoning the city of Quebec.

During mid-to-late October, the Americans built up a small force to defend the southern shore of the St. Lawrence river. This force consisted of the Green Mountain Boys, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Seth Warner, the 2nd New York regiment, and two companies of the 3rd New York regiment (those of Captains John Nicholson and Lewis Dubois).

British and American Positions in Mid-October (click to enlarge). Warner occupied Longueuil on October 15. Brown and Livingston attacked Fort Chambly on October 17. Around this time, Maclean arrived at Sorel.

While the Americans grew stronger, Carleton’s army grew weaker. Carleton’s efforts to force additional militia to join his army were unsuccessful. In addition, as the weeks went by without action, Carleton’s militia began to grow restless and started returning to their homes [2].

In mid-October, the British began sending armed boats along the southern shore of the St. Lawrence in what seem to have been efforts to probe the American defenses. Exchanges of fire took place on October 15, between Boucherville and Longueuil, and October 18 and October 26 at Longueuil.

Carleton finally launched a major attack at Longueuil on October 30. Details concerning this battle will be described in two upcoming posts.

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Example of a probing attack (that of October 18), as described by Lieutenant John Fassett of the Green Mountain Boys:

“Seven Boats came down the river and made as if they were going to land on a point of an island or come across the river to us. A number of our officers went out towards the boats, and the Regulars from the boats fired their field pieces at us. The Balls and Grape Shot flew over our heads, but did us no harm. They shot two or three cannon balls thro' the roofs of some of the houses. Our men fired several small arms at them. Their Balls scooted along by their boats, some of them” [3].

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Notes:

1. Estimates of Carleton’s force varied widely. Carleton claimed 900; Simon Sanguinet, resident of Montreal, stated there twice as many men. Others, less credibly, claimed that Carleton had almost no assistance from the Canadian militia.

2. Carleton complained in a letter dated October 25 that the militia “disappear thirty or forty of a night.” However, it seems that he still had at least 500 Canadians available for the October 30 attack on Longueuil (see journals of John Fassett and Henry Livingston, and these letters by Henry Livingston and Timothy Bedel).

3. Fassett’s journal provides essential reading on the American invasion of Canada. A .pdf copy can be found here.

New York Regiments of 1775

In 1775, the colony of New York raised four regiments of infantry and one company of artillery. These troops were assigned to the army commanded by Major-General Philip Schuyler and Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery, and they participated in the siege of Fort Saint-Jean and the assault on Quebec.

New York had considerable difficulty getting its men into the field, with the result that when the American invasion of Canada was launched, only 5 companies of the 1st New York Regiment were on hand. Many of the troops were awaiting either arms and equipment, or transportation north.

The problems then facing the colony are well-illustrated in a letter by the lieutenant-colonel of the 4th New York, written just 1 week before the invasion got under way.

"I arrived [in Albany] the 26th [of August], finding Captain Henry B. Livingston, with his Company, in a small house in Town. He wants many things, such as shoes, stockings, shirts, underclothes, haversacks, and cash, having advanced all himself that has been paid his men as yet. The day I arrived, came up the following Captains, with their Companies: Captain Herrick, Captain Palmer, Captain Horton, and Captain Mills, all without blankets, excepting Captain David Palmer; many of the men wanting shirts, shoes, stockings, underclothes, and, in short, without any thing fit for a soldier, except a uniform coat; and not more than thirty guns [i.e., muskets], with four Companies, fit for service. They are now on board of the small boats that brought them up, having no place for them to go into, as there is not one tent that I can find for our Battalion, and three Companies without blankets, and none to be had at this place. I do not know how to act or what to do with them; they begin to ask for cash and better lodgings, being much crowded in the small boats in which I am obliged to keep them."

Uniform coats seems to be one of the few items the colony was able to reliably supply to its troops. On June 28, 1775, the New York Provincial Congress ordered the purchase of 712 of each of the following types of short coats: blue broadcloth with crimson facings, light brown coarse broadcloth with blue facings, grey broadcloth with green facings, and dark brown coarse broadcloth with scarlet facings. [see here].

A number of writers have indicated that the above description refers to, in order, the uniforms worn by the four New York regiments. However, in a relatively recent uniform book, Marko Zlatich (1994) wrote that in practice the regiments were clothed as follows: blue faced scarlet (1st New York), blue faced crimson (2nd New York), a variety of coat colors faced green (3rd New York), a variety of coat colors faced blue (4th New York).

Lamb's New York artillery company wore blue coats with buff facings. [see here].

Uniforms of Lamb's Artillery Company (Left) and the 3rd New York (Right) According to Charles Lefferts.

3rd New York Regiment in Miniature. Following Zlatich, I've painted the regiment in a variety of coat colors (blue, brown, and grey) faced green. The miniatures are by Stone Mountain.

Reenactor Units:

• 2nd New York Regiment
• 3rd New York Regiment
• Lamb's Artillery Company

Second Skirmish at Petite-Rivière-du-Nord

An American army, under Major-General Philip Schuyler, advanced into Canada on September 4, 1775. Two days later it made what amounted to a reconnaissance-in-force against British-held Fort Saint-Jean. By September 10, reinforcements increased the size of his army from fewer than 1,000 men to 1,394 effectives. The new arrivals included parts of the 2nd New York and 4th Connecticut regiments, and a small number of cannon. [1]

Schuyler believed himself strong enough to begin siege operations against Fort Saint-Jean. His plan to divide the American force into three parts. One part would consist of infantrymen turned sailors and marines. A second part would consist of infantrymen and the army’s artillery. Together these first two parts would establish a base south of the fort and protect the American supply line. The third part would consist of a detachment of infantry that would circle around the fort and cut the British supply line. Schuyler anticipated that additional men and guns would arrive in the days and weeks ahead, at which point he would be able to begin attacking the fort itself.

Ritzema's Planned Advance (approximate path shown in light blue) and Actual Advance (in dark blue). Click to Enlarge.

Schuyler’s army advanced from L'Île-aux-Noix on the 10th, and landed late in the day at the abandoned “upper breastwork.” Schuyler, who was unwell, gave command of the expedition to Brigadier-General Richard Montgomery. Lieutenant-Colonel Rudolphus Ritzema commanded the detachment that was to cut the fort’s supply line.

While the infantry proceeded on land, two American row galleys, the Schuyler and Hancock, proceeded downstream. Each was armed with a 12-pounder cannon and 12 swivel guns. The galleys came under fire as they neared the “lower breastwork” from British forces on land and in the river.

The British commander at Fort Saint-Jean, Major Charles Preston, had anticipated a second American advance. To watch for such a movement, he had dispatched thirty some Canadian gentlemen volunteers and Indian allies under the command of Joseph-Dominique-Emmanuel Le Moyne de Longueuil. This force travelled upstream in two bateaux armed with swivel guns, and halted when it reached the abandoned lower breastwork. There, de Longueuil landed one part of his force, while the others remained in the boats.

Le Moyne de Longueuil

When de Longueuil's men saw the American row galleys, the land forces began a long-range musket fire, and the bateaux fired grape shot from the swivel guns.

According to the one of the Americans, “Our armed boats perceiving the fire on the lake, fired three twelve-pounders, one of which took the enemy' s principal batteau directly in the bow, and tore her from stem to stern; she immediately sunk, with all the men in her, amounting to thirty-five.” [2]

Clearly overmatched, de Longueuil ordered a retreat, and all but six of his land force embarked in the remaining bateau and headed for the fort. The retreating bateau was fired at by the galleys, but the men aboard escaped without injury. The six who remained behind were sieurs Boucherville, de La Bruere, Campion, La Madeleine, and Perthuis, and an Abenaki indian. These men occupied a small house near the lower breastwork and kept watch on American movements.

Meanwhile, Ritzema's detachment set off to make a night march around the fort. Ritzema was in front with a small vanguard. Behind him were 60 men of the 4th Connecticut, followed by 300 men of the 5th Connecticut, and finally 140 men of the 1st New York.

Ritzema had just reached the lower breastwork when the advance fell apart. The 5th Connecticut had been ambushed in the advance on September 6, and the evening gloom promised another attack. These troops panicked when they unexpectedly encountered another group of men in the woods. Soon they, along with most of Ritzema's other men, were in flight for the upper breastwork. The Americans thought that “they had been waylaid by a party of Regulars and Indians” [emphasis in original], but “not a gun had been fired, except one by a man of the detachment.” The men in the woods had been their own comrades. [3]

After some time, Montgomery, Ritzema, and other officers were able to reorganize the men and put them back on the march. However, they had advanced only about 1/4 mile when the Connecticutians panicked a second time after some random shells from Fort Saint-Jean burst in the woods.

After this second retreat, Ritzema was left with less than half of his original force. Ritzema resolutely pressed on, and his men struggled to keep up in the dark, swampy woods. Near midnight, Ritzema, now with only about 50 men, at last reached the lower breastwork. There, the Americans observed a fire had been lit in a small house, and they moved to surround it. Sieurs Boucherville and La Madeleine, who were outside the house, gave the alarm and fled. When the men inside the house ran out the door, they were met with a hail of gunfire. Sieur Perthuis and the Abenaki were killed, Sieur de La Bruere was shot in both arms (but escaped), and Sieur Campion got away unharmed.

Realizing how few men were still with him, Ritzema halted and waited for stragglers to appear. Meanwhile, his men stripped and scalped Sieur Perthuis and beheaded the dead Abenaki. [4] Sometime before 3am, Montgomery cancelled the operation and ordered Ritzema's men back to the upper breastwork.

The next morning [September 11] the senior officers announced, in a council of war, that they favored continuing operations against Saint-Jean. However, word then came that the enemy was on the move. According to one officer: “we saw their armed schooner [the Royal Savage], of one hundred and eighty tons, carrying twelve nine-pounders, coming towards us.” It was a critical moment: the American flotilla was no match for such a vessel. [5]

According to Ritzema, the New York troops “remained in their Ranks & shewed a ready Spirit to proceed,” but the Connecticutians panicked and fled to the bateaux. Ritzema, in a rage, wounded several fleeing men with his sword, and had to be restrained by a doctor from using his pistol, too. He concluded, “This infamous conduct so much dispirited the General that he ordered the whole to embark and to proceed to Isle au Noix.” [6]

Once again, an American movement against Fort Saint-Jean had ended in disappointment.

Montgomery complained bitterly in a letter to his wife:

“…such a set of pusillanimous wretches never were collected. Could I, with decency, leave the army in its present situation, I would not serve an hour longer. I am much afraid the general character of the people has been too justly represented. However, there are some whose spirit I have confidence in; they are taking pains with the men, and they flatter me with hopes of prevailing on them to retrieve their characters.”

He also feared that any chance that the Canadians would rise up en masse to support the Americans was now lost:

“ We were so unfortunate as to have some Canadians witnesses of our disgrace! What they will think of the brave Bostonians [7], I know not! My own feelings tell me they are not likely to put confidence in such friends.”

Notes:

1. I've had some difficulty discerning the exact composition of Schuyler's army on September 10. The following represents my understanding of the organization as of this writing (keep in mind that I'm working with a limited set of sources):

• 1st Connecticut: 2 companies, commanded by captains William Douglass and David Welch. Douglass commanded a row galley; it's possible that all of these men were used to man vessels in the American flotilla.
• 4th Connecticut: A part of the regiment, commanded by Major Samuel Elmore.
• 5th Connecticut: Most or all of the regiment, commanded by Colonel David Waterbury.
• 6th Connecticut: 1 company, commanded by Captain Edward Mott. These men were likely serving the American cannon and/or helping to man the vessels.
• 1st New York: A part of the regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Rudolphus Ritzema.
• 2nd New York: A part of the regiment. The officers that I have been able to place with the army at this time are Captain Christopher Yates, Captain Joseph McCracken, and Lieutenant Cornelius Van Slyck.

2. I haven’t been able to find any confirmation of this disaster among Canadian sources. Although the Americans suspected that most or all of the men aboard this vessel were killed or drowned, this is may have been a case of wishful thinking. The men in the boat were thought to have been either Canadian volunteers or British regulars. At the very least, it appears from Canadian sources that no seigneurs died in his incident.

Another mystery (to me) is when exactly this incident took place. One source implies that it occurred immediately before the skirmish on land, while others imply that it took place considerably earlier.

3. Montgomery believed that the men who inadvertently triggered the panic were stragglers. Another source claimed that they were a party guarding the flank of the American column.

4. The mutilation of the dead bodies was done in retaliation for similar acts attributed to the Indians. One American claimed that after the skirmish on the 6th, “they dug up our dead and mangled them in the most shocking manner.” Perthuis may have been wearing a red coat, for he was mistaken for a British regular. An observer wrote, “We stripped the Regular and found a very fine gun and sword--the gun with two Barrels the neatest I ever saw, a fine watch some money, and very neatly dressed.”

5. The Royal Savage had only recently been launched. It was unavailable to contest the American advance on September 6. Unbeknownst to the Americans, the Royal Savage actually carried only 3, 4, and 6-pounders.

6. Ritzema was convinced that the Connecticut troops were the chief problem. Montgomery, who was also a citizen of New York, found cause for complaint with the troops as a whole.

7. This is in reference to the Canadian slang word Bostonnais, which literally means person from Boston, but was used in reference to all Americans. It carried roughly the same meaning as Yankee does today to some non-Americans.