If I were going to recommend reading material for military officers currently serving in the Armed Forces of Great Britain, the United Kingdom or any of her Commonwealth and NATO partners, then it would have to be a collection like this (see below, Max Hastings - "Catastrophe Europe Goes to War 1914", just to remember how things can unexpectedly start!):
Followed by a haunting tale of lost peace and complacency at all levels of government and the military (see below, Dan Dannatt's "Victory into Defeat"):
Which turned an "Unhappy Ending" of one world war into a new nightmare of another, with opening rounds going to the vanquished. This is a "first love" book of mine (see below, Alistair Horne - "To Lose a Battle France 1940", I discovered it in teh early 1990's and it has been on my self ever since):
Finally, while wild emotions are running around their heads, let them stop and read about Norway (mostly ignored apart from the First and Second Naval Battles of Narvik) - but look at the other Narvik, and the strange possibilities of this forgotten success in an otherwise bleak campaign .. which hailed the first successful allied amphibious operation of the war in 1940 (see below, Henrik Lunde's Hitler's Pre-Emptive War"):
Thought provoking and a tale of swinging fortunes. Best remember from history the lessons of "things lost and things gained," as the best made plans of mice and men play out upon the stage not under their control.
We had won, with a magical formula of 1918 combined arms warfare, hard earned through bitter experience of four years of fighting and then we lost or rather forgot it! Such criminal complacency meant that another generation of youth experienced a second World War. The people who "had practical experience of fighting it" drifted away and did other things. The world wanted to be pacifist. The politicians became politicians again and took their eye off the ball, they took the easy option, cutting to the bone military spending. The "war to end all wars" was supposed to be exactly that, although there was a dissenting feeling in Germany that in 1918 they had not been defeated in the field (the very same myth used by National Socialism and the "stabbing in the back" from a caste of politicians). However, in 1918 the Allied armies pummelled the German Imperial Army to its knees in the 100 Day Offensive with "combined arms" and overwhelming industrial power (infused with the additional of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) - which was not specifically called out in the book). The armistice came, it signalled the end of the war (11/11/1918), then came the Treaty of Versailles with its own cauldron of snakes that poisoned international politics for decades to come. The League of Nations was born and withered on the vine through application of realpolitik between the Great Powers. In Britain there was a spirit of the war is all over now, let's get back to normal (proper) peacetime soldering as we have an empire to run. Contemplation of another war of this magnitude was an anathea. Politicians who thought different were not elected .No peer war was expected within the next ten years, so colonial policing was the order of the day for the British Army. The British Army was shrunk to a rump (prioritising Empire over continental commitments) and certain important or maverick personalities played with their own hobby horses and pet projects within the confines of the Treasury's frugal remit. Britain literally became an island nation behind a sea and air barrier, the Royal Navy in her senior service role and the over promising of the RAF (capable of punishing enemies with the bomber and protecting the homeland with the fighter) gained favour. There was no appetite for a tangible army capacity capable of force projection on the continental mainland to deter the rising power of Nazi Germany. Without such an army, even if scaled back, there was no way of keeping the hard-earned organisational knowledge of "how to do things" at scale. Then the chickens come home to roost through a series of international crisis and the early war defeats of 1939-40 (see below, a tale of the once and future king - the practice of combined arms warfare, found - lost - then painfully recovered from 1942 onwards; although the British 1940 successes of The Western Desert Force against the Italians - Wavell's 10,000 (Beda Fomm), the East African Campaign and reconquest of Ethiopia and Somaliland, again against the Italians, was not called out):
David Isby gave an informative and interesting review of the book too:
In December 1913, Shackleton published details of his new expedition, grandly titled the "Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition". There is a legend that Shackleton posted an advertisement emphasising the hardship and danger of the planned voyage, so that he could better narrow down the selection of candidates for his expedition, but no record of any such advertisement has survived and its existence is considered doubtful.
https://discover.dtic.mil/
Col (Ret) David M Glantz is an impressive author on military matters, in particular the WWII Eastern Front.
https://boardgamegeek.com/thread/3325686/combined-arms-on-a-big-table
This game is a development, or next thoughts from his Fire and Movement game in his Simulating War Book. The rules are FREE and available through the link above. Shame on me I have yet to play this.
Following on from 3 Para's deployment in the 16th Air Assault Brigade in Afghanistan, 3 Brigade Royal Marine Commandos took their tour of duty in Afghanistan (2006-2007). They had the benefit of digesting hard "lessons learned" from the previous six months tour by the Paras and a lull ("phoney peace") of a Taliban cease-fire as they came "in country". To the commanding officers and staff can be credited as adopting a new strategy, as they had seen the punishment that static defences brought on garrison troops (Forward Operating Bases and District Centres) and planned for a more "manoeuvre orientated" approach, "going too the Taliban", in their backyard and "kicking the hornet's nest". The political pressures from teh Afghanistan government seem to be more controlled and knee-jerk reaction (that plagued the Para deployment), for teh most part seemed to be avoided. The advantage of the offensive mind-set being you do not sandwich yourself between the civilian population and the Taliban, Identification of teh enemy is easier because you are attacking identified strongholds - giving them no rest and unhinging their confidence. The initiative rests with teh attacker. MOGs (Mobile Operation Groups) were the order of the day to support bastion garrison points and the concept of "advance to ambush". This approach did pay dividends. as it was backed with overwhelming air power in an uncontested air space, tremendous firepower could be deployed "away" from danger close (although when "needs must" it can come in, without civilians to think about) to friendly and civilian population centres (see below, the Royal Marines were continually mixing it but importantly" on their terms"):
Read:
It all started for the UK with this deployment, other UK troops had been "in theatre" but now it was ISAF, War on Terror and "nation" rebuilding (with the intention of creating a Western mindset nation, in Afghanistan - that swallowed Alexander the Great, the Colonial British Empire [how many Afghan Wars?] and the post war Soviets .. their Vietnam). Good luck. The British intension was to follow the Malayan "ink blot" counterinsurgency plan, so Afghanistan could "nation build" (using their own troops) but "one political favour" right at the start of the deployment scuppered all this. "Hold this place first with your troops then we will take over with ANA (Army) and ANP (Police)". From that moment on 3 Para were forced into a static "blockhouse holding" strategy which at best was a long drawn out "draw". To quote Frazer from Dad's Army "We're doomed!" The ANA and ANP were woefully under resourced, infiltrated by the Taliban and suffered from corrupt levels of officials - taking the official money for themselves. Then to make matters worse, take a world class elite force (full of offensive spirit) and make them sit tight with bullseye targets on their chests! Everybody knew it was wrong but nobody could see a sensible alternative path forward .. Greek tragedy lived out in the twenty first century (see below, it is a very good read and outlines the actions in subtle matter of fact light and tells a fascinating story of professional soldiering):
This certainly was a read from the "sharp end" of Afghanistan combat with a spoiler alert, after surviving and thinking that is it for Captain Beattie he goes back for more (see below, the cover seems to sum up teh combat very well):
This makes a welcome change from my usual Audible listening to a book behaviour, actually opening and leafing through the pages of a physical book. I found it most enjoyable (see below, I also found it a different form of history from the norm, as you stepped inside the mind of a British Army infantry officer as his career built up to the expectation of combat and then experienced the elephant, albeit the new asymmetrical warfare of Afghanistan):