We had won, with a magical formula of 1918 combined arms warfare, hard earned through bitter experience of four years of fighting and then we lost or rather forgot it! Such criminal complacency meant that another generation of youth experienced a second World War. The people who "had practical experience of fighting it" drifted away and did other things. The world wanted to be pacifist. The politicians became politicians again and took their eye off the ball, they took the easy option, cutting to the bone military spending. The "war to end all wars" was supposed to be exactly that, although there was a dissenting feeling in Germany that in 1918 they had not been defeated in the field (the very same myth used by National Socialism and the "stabbing in the back" from a caste of politicians). However, in 1918 the Allied armies pummelled the German Imperial Army to its knees in the 100 Day Offensive with "combined arms" and overwhelming industrial power (infused with the additional of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) - which was not specifically called out in the book). The armistice came, it signalled the end of the war (11/11/1918), then came the Treaty of Versailles with its own cauldron of snakes that poisoned international politics for decades to come. The League of Nations was born and withered on the vine through application of realpolitik between the Great Powers. In Britain there was a spirit of the war is all over now, let's get back to normal (proper) peacetime soldering as we have an empire to run. Contemplation of another war of this magnitude was an anathea. Politicians who thought different were not elected .No peer war was expected within the next ten years, so colonial policing was the order of the day for the British Army. The British Army was shrunk to a rump (prioritising Empire over continental commitments) and certain important or maverick personalities played with their own hobby horses and pet projects within the confines of the Treasury's frugal remit. Britain literally became an island nation behind a sea and air barrier, the Royal Navy in her senior service role and the over promising of the RAF (capable of punishing enemies with the bomber and protecting the homeland with the fighter) gained favour. There was no appetite for a tangible army capacity capable of force projection on the continental mainland to deter the rising power of Nazi Germany. Without such an army, even if scaled back, there was no way of keeping the hard-earned organisational knowledge of "how to do things" at scale. Then the chickens come home to roost through a series of international crisis and the early war defeats of 1939-40 (see below, a tale of the once and future king - the practice of combined arms warfare, found - lost - then painfully recovered from 1942 onwards; although the British 1940 successes of The Western Desert Force against the Italians - Wavell's 10,000 (Beda Fomm), the East African Campaign and reconquest of Ethiopia and Somaliland, again against the Italians, was not called out):
The allegory or case study to modern times (2022+) is called out, how different is the current political situation with Russia and continental Europe? The message is clear. Let us not make the same mistake again. The world of 2025 seems horribly similar to the 1930's and the lead up to the Second World War. This time we also live in a nuclear age where the stakes could not be higher. The general (Dannatt) also seems to indirectly pushing the value of wargaming in military circle - when you do not have the physical items it does not stop you from imaginative thought experiments (with reference back to the Germans formulating the doctrine of mobile warfare in the 1930's without any tanks - they wargamed and conducted imaginative field exercises). If you want peace, then be sure you are prepared for war. A protagonist thinks twice before attacking a prepared potential victim - or rather the "victim" is not viewed as a victim but rather a "respected or feared foe". Deterrence has to be credibly backed up or the paper tiger will be called out. Knowing what form of armed forces (Army, Navy, Air, Cyber, Space, Civil) you need is the key to knowing what capabilities you have to nurture or retain for future use (and their scalability for wartime needs). That comes from an unending intellectual engagement across the whole spectrum of government. I for one cannot fault the main theme of the message!
David Isby gave an informative and interesting review of the book too:
https://www.strategypage.com/bookreviews/2537#gsc.tab=0